This appeal by the defendants is directed against the judgment and decree dated 20.9.2000 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Karimganj in Title Appeal No. 37/1998, whereby and whereunder the appeal preferred by the defendants/appellants has been dismissed by upholding the judgment and decree dated 14.9.1998 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1, Karimganj in Title Suit No. 409/1993. 2. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in the present appeal filed Title Suit No. 409/1993 praying for a decree declaring the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2’s right as land holders in respect of the 3rd Schedule land; for declaration of plaintiff No. 1’s right as land holder to the extent of 50% of the share of the land in the 4th Schedule; for declaration of tenancy right of the plaintiff No. 3 in respect of the remaining part of the 4th Schedule land; for passing a decree for recovery of khas possession of the land in 3rd and 4th Schedule by evicting the defendant Nos. 1 to 4/appellants in the present appeal and also for permanent injunction, contending inter alia that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 came to occupy the land described in Schedule I initially as tenant under late Sajid Ali and thereafter he purchased the Schedule 3 land, which is part of Schedule 1 land, by registered deed of sale dated 18.12.1950 together with the houses and other structures standing there on from the heirs of late Sajid Ali and on the strength of such purchase the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 became the owner of Schedule 3 land and after the death of their predecessor-in-interest they inherited the property and became the owner. 1 and 2 became the owner of Schedule 3 land and after the death of their predecessor-in-interest they inherited the property and became the owner. It has also been contended in the plaint that the 2nd Schedule land which includes the 4th Schedule land and the houses standing thereon originally belonged to Khan Saheb Abdul Karim Choudhury and Khan Bahadur Abdul Majid Choudhury in equal shares and the plaintiff No. 3, which is a registered firm was tenant in respect of the land and the shop and houses standing over the Schedule 4 land as monthly tenant under the aforesaid owners and subsequently the plaintiff No. 1 purchased 50% of the land and the houses of 2nd Schedule from the heirs of late Khan Saheb Abdul Karim Choudhury by registered deed of sale dated 14.6.1978 and became the owner in respect of the 50% of the 2nd Schedule land and in respect of the remaining 50% the proforma defendant Nos. 5 and 6, who are the heirs of Khan Bahadur Abdul Majid Choudhury continued to be the owners, in respect of which also the plaintiff No. 3 is the monthly tenant. According to the plaintiffs the defendant Nos. 1 to 4 on 30.6.1986 along with others trespassed into the land and blocked the passage in the eastern direction up to the Madan Mohan road which was used by the sweepers for cleaning the night soil from the latrine and blocked the said passage which necessitated filing of the suit by the plaintiffs with the relief claimed, as noticed above. 3. The defendant Nos. 1 to 4 contested the said suit by filing the written statement denying the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs over the land as claimed and also contending inter alia that their predecessor-in-interest late Kailash Chandra Banik was the original owner and after his death his son Raimohan Banik acquired title by right of inheritance and thereafter by the defendants. According to the defendants the land described in Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 are their ancestral property and they acquired the title by right of inheritance. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed the following issues: - “1. Is there any cause of action for the suit? 2. Is the suit maintainable in its present form and manner? 3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 4. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed the following issues: - “1. Is there any cause of action for the suit? 2. Is the suit maintainable in its present form and manner? 3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 4. Whether the defendants are trespassers on the suit land? 5. Whether the plaintiffs have right title interest over the suit land? 6. To what relief or reliefs plaintiffs are entitled?” 5. The trial court upon appreciation of the evidences on records, as adduced by the parties, both oral and documentary, has decreed the suit of the plaintiffs by holding that the plaintiffs have acquired right, title and interest in respect of the Schedule 1 land and consequently over the Schedule 3 land by right of purchase vide Ext. 6 sale deed dated 18.12.1950 and the 50% of the Schedule 2 land by right of purchase vide Ext. 8 sale deed dated 14.6.1978. For the remaining part of the Schedule 2 land the tenancy right by the plaintiff No. 3 was also declared. The trial court has rejected the claim of the defendants that land over which they claim title by right of inheritance and described in Schedule A to Schedule D of the written statement is not the suit land and the suit land described in Schedule 2 are different lands. Proforma defendant Nos. 5 and 6 who are the heirs of Khan Bahadur Abdul Majid Choudhury did not contest the suit. 6. Being aggrieved, the defendant Nos. 1 to 4 filed Title appeal No. 37/1998 which has also been dismissed by the first appellate court vide the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 20.9.2000 by concurring with the findings recorded by the trial court. Hence the present appeal. 7. The appeal was admitted for hearing vide order dated 9.2.2001 on the following substantial questions of law: - 1. Whether the learned courts below were justified in relying on Exhibit 3 executed on 24.7.1931 in violation of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act? 2. Whether the learned courts below were justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs in total disregard to the documents namely, Exhibit ‘G’ (Khatian No. 3752 Dag Nos. 5072, 5073 and 5074) and ‘H’ (Khatian No. 3351 Dag No. 5069) issued as far back as on 16.12.1968? 8. I have heard Mr. 2. Whether the learned courts below were justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs in total disregard to the documents namely, Exhibit ‘G’ (Khatian No. 3752 Dag Nos. 5072, 5073 and 5074) and ‘H’ (Khatian No. 3351 Dag No. 5069) issued as far back as on 16.12.1968? 8. I have heard Mr. BR Dey, learned senior counsel for the appellants as well as Mr. GN Sahewalla, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. None appears for the proforma respondent Nos. 4 and 5 who are the proforma defendant Nos. 5 and 6 in the suit. 9. Referring to the substantial question of law No. 1 as framed vide order dated 9.2.2001 and also referring to the Ext. 3, the purported sale deed executed by Sri Pratapchand Golcha in favour of Sri Bharat Chandra Deb, on the basis of which the plaintiffs ultimately claims title, it has been submitted by Mr. Dey, learned senior counsel for the appellants that since the said document i.e. Ext. 3 has not been registered as required under Section 107 of the transfer of the Property Act read with Section 17 (1) (d) of the Registration Act, 1908, the lessee namely; Bharat Chandra Deb did not acquire any right to transfer the land as mentioned in Ext. 3 document dated 24.7.1931 and hence the subsequent transfer by Ext. 4 sale deed dated 10.10.1931 by Bharat Ch. Deb in favour of Sajid Ali, Forman Ali and Majid Ali can not confer any right, title and interest on the transferee and hence by virtue of the sale deed dated 18.12.1950 (Ext. 6) by which the heirs of Sajid Ali, after partition of the land amongst the three brother namely, Forman Ali Mia, Sajid Ali Mia and Wajid Ali Mia, vide Ext. 5, no title can be passed on to the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in respect of the Schedule 3 land which is part of the Schedule 1 land transferred by the heirs of Sajid Ali vide Ext. 6 sale deed dated 18.12.1950. According to Mr. Dey as Bharat Chandra Deb had no right over the property subsequent transfer by him would also not confer any right on the transferee. Mr. Dey, therefore, submits that the decree declaring the land holders right in favour of the plaintiff Nos. 6 sale deed dated 18.12.1950. According to Mr. Dey as Bharat Chandra Deb had no right over the property subsequent transfer by him would also not confer any right on the transferee. Mr. Dey, therefore, submits that the decree declaring the land holders right in favour of the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in respect of the 3rd Schedule land, which is part of the Schedule 1 land and recovery of khas possession in respect of the 3rd Schedule land, therefore, needs to be set aside. 10. Referring to the substantial question of law No. 2 as formulated, Mr. Dey submits that Ext. G and H Khatians reflect possession of the appellants/defendant Nos. 1 to 4 over both the Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 lands and hence the learned courts below keeping in view the long possession of the defendants over the said land ought not to have declared the right of the plaintiffs in respect of Schedule 3 and Schedule 4 land, which are part of the Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 land respectively. 11. Mr. Sahewalla, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3/plaintiffs on the other hand supporting the judgments and decrees passed by the courts below has submitted that the defendants having not raised the plea that Ext. 3 lease deed is invalid on the ground that the same has not been registered though required under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 17 (1) (d) of the Registration Act, cannot not be allowed to raise the said plea in the second appellate stage. It has also been submitted that the lessee namely Pratapchand Golcha has neither questioned the validity of Ext. 3 lease deed executed in favour of Bharat Chandra Deb who subsequently vide Ext. 4 sale deed transferred the said land to Forman Ali, Sajid Ali and Wajid Ali and the heirs of Sajid Ali thereafter transferred his share of land to the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 vide Ext. 6 sale deed, after partition of the land sold by Bharat Chandra Deb in favour of Forman Ali, Sajid Ali and Wajid Ali. The learned senior counsel further submits that in any case there is no relation between Ext. 3 lease deed and Ext. 1 and 2 vide Ext. 6 sale deed, after partition of the land sold by Bharat Chandra Deb in favour of Forman Ali, Sajid Ali and Wajid Ali. The learned senior counsel further submits that in any case there is no relation between Ext. 3 lease deed and Ext. 6 sale deed by which the plaintiff No. 1 purchased 50 % of the Schedule 3 land by registered sale deed dated 1.6.1978 from the heirs of Khan Saheb Abdul Karim Choudhury and for the remaining 50% of the land the plaintiff No. 3 was declared to be tenant under the proforma respondent Nos. 5 and 6 they being the heirs of Khan Bahadur Abdul Majid Choudhury. The learned senior counsel further submits that though the defendants/appellants by proving Ext. G and H wanted to prove the long possession over the suit property they never claimed their right by way of adverse possession and hence the plaintiffs cannot be denied their right to get the decree in respect of Schedule 3 and Schedule 4 property which are part of the Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 property respectively, as mere possession however long it may be cannot confer any title on the possessor of the property. 12. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the judgment and decrees passed by the courts below apart from the Exhibits more particularly the Exhibits 3 to 8. Ext. 3 is the lease deed executed by Pratapchand Golcha in favour of Bharat Chandra Deb on 24.7.1930 by creating yearly tenancy in respect of the land for a period of three years reserving the annual rent. The said Bharat Chandra Deb subsequently vide Ext. 4 registered sale deed dated 10.10.1931 transferred the said land in favour of Forman Ali, Sajid Ali and Wajid Ali all sons of Jitu Mia. By Ext. 5 registered deed dated 8.7.1953 there was partition of the land amongst the three brothers namely; Forman Ali, Sajid Ali and Wajid Ali, which was sold to them by Bharat Chandra Deb vide Ext. 4 sale deed. The land falling in the share of Sajid Ali was subsequently transferred by his heirs in favour of the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 vide sale deed dated 18.12.1950 (Ext. 6). The sale deed dated 18.12.1950 (Ext. 6) therefore relates to the land covered by Ext. 3 lease deed. Ext. 4 sale deed. The land falling in the share of Sajid Ali was subsequently transferred by his heirs in favour of the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 vide sale deed dated 18.12.1950 (Ext. 6). The sale deed dated 18.12.1950 (Ext. 6) therefore relates to the land covered by Ext. 3 lease deed. Ext. 3 to Ext. 6 were proved by the plaintiffs to show how the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 acquired title in respect of the Schedule 1 land vis-à-vis Schedule 3 land. Ext. 7 is the general power of attorney executed by the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of Mahabirprasad Bhura, Ratanlan Singhi, and Vinod Kumar Bothra, on the strength of which PW 1, 2 and 3 deposed in the suit. Ext. 8 is the sale deed dated 14.6.1978 by which the plaintiff No. 1 had purchased 50 % of the Schedule 2 land from the heirs of Khan Saheb Abdul Karim Choudhury. The Schedule 2 land originally belonged to the two brothers namely; Khan Saheb Abdul Karim Choudhury and Khan Bahadur Abdul Majid Choudhury in equal shares and out of the share of Abdul Karim Choudhury his heirs sold half of Schedule 2 land vide Ext. 8 sale deed dated 14.6.1978 in favour of the plaintiff No. 1. It also appears from the evidence adduced and the judgments passed by both the courts below that in respect of the remaining half of the land in Schedule 2 i.e. Schedule 4 land the plaintiff No. 3 continued to be the tenant under the proforma defendant Nos. 5 and 6. The learned senior counsel for the appellants could not bring to the notice of this Court anything even to suggest that the land described in Schedule 2 is part of the land covered by Ext. 3 lease deed. 13. Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that a lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by a registered instrument. 14. Clause (d) of Sub Section (1) of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 requires that the documents of lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent must be registered. 14. Clause (d) of Sub Section (1) of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 requires that the documents of lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent must be registered. The effect of non registration of a document compulsorily required to be registered has been stipulated in Section 49 of the said Act. It provides that any document required by Section 17 or by any provisions of the Transfer of the Property Act, 1882 to be registered, shall effect any immovable property comprised therein or confer any power to adopt, or be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or confer such power unless it has been registered. Proviso to Section 49 stipulates that such unregistered document affecting immovable property, however, may be received for evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. 15. As discussed above, the plaintiffs in order to establish their right in respect of Schedule 3 property, which is a part of Schedule 1 property, has traced the right of the vendors to Ext. 3 lease deed by which the original owner of the said land Pratapchand Golcha leased out the same to Bharat Ch. Deb, who in turn vide Ext. 4 sold out the same to Sajid Ali and his brothers and thereafter the heirs of Sajid Ali to the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 vide Ext. 6 sale deed. 16. The Ext. 3 document by which the tenancy for three years was created by reserving the annual rent is the document which requires to be registered compulsorily under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act. No right shall be created in favour of Bharat Ch. Deb by virtue of Ext. 3 the said document having not been registered, which is evident from Ext. 3 document itself that the registration of the said document has been refused by the Sub Registrar on 7.8.1931. Consequently Bharat Ch. Deb would not have any right to transfer the property vide Ext. 4 sale deed in favour of the aforesaid three brothers including Sajid Ali and by the heir of Sajid Ali to the plaintiff Nos. 3 document itself that the registration of the said document has been refused by the Sub Registrar on 7.8.1931. Consequently Bharat Ch. Deb would not have any right to transfer the property vide Ext. 4 sale deed in favour of the aforesaid three brothers including Sajid Ali and by the heir of Sajid Ali to the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 vide Ext. 6 sale deed. 17. The contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondents that as the defendants have not raised the said plea in the written statement they cannot be allowed to raise such plea in the second appellate stage, cannot be accepted as the plaintiffs have traced the source of their right to Ext. 3 lease deed and the Court is also required to determine as to whether the plaintiffs’ vendor had acquired any right by such lease deed Ext. 3. 18. Section 90 of the Evidence Act allows the Court to draw presumption as to the signatures and every part of such document which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person and also relating to its due execution and attestation if such document is produced from the proper custody and proved to be 30 years old. There is no dispute to the Courts power to draw presumption which, however, is rebutable. Though the presumption can be drawn about the execution of the lease deed being Ext. 3, the lessee cannot claim any right over the property covered by Ext. 3 lease deed the same being not a registered documents. 19. The second contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that as they by proving the Ext. G and H could establish their long possession since 1968, the learned court below ought not to have declared the right of the plaintiff No. 3 in respect of the Schedule 4 land cannot be accepted in the absence of any claim of right by adverse possession by the defendants. Mere possession however long it may be cannot confer any right on the possessor unless of course the possessor could demonstrate by leading cogent and reliable evidence that his right has ripen by right of adverse possession which is not the case in hand. That apart the appellants/defendants also could not prove that the area of land mentioned in Ext. G and H is the suit land. That apart the appellants/defendants also could not prove that the area of land mentioned in Ext. G and H is the suit land. The contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant before the first appellate court that the suit is barred by limitation, in view of Article 64 of the Limitation Act, is also not tenable as the suit filed by the plaintiff is based on title and not on the basis of previous possession. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I am of the view that while the plaintiff No. 1 is entitled to the declaration of his landholder right by right of purchase vide Ext. 8 sale deed dated 14.6.1978 in respect of the 50% of Schedule 4 land and also the plaintiff No. 3 to the decree declaring his status as tenant in respect of the remaining Schedule 4 land, the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 are not entitled to the declaration of their right in respect of the Schedule 3 land as prayed for. Hence while affirming the judgment and decree passed declaring the plaintiff No. 1’s right in respect of 50% of the Schedule 4 land and of the plaintiff No. 3’s status as tenant in respect of the remaining 50% of the Schedule 4 land as well as eviction of defendants from 50% of the land in Schedule 4, the decree passed declaring the right of plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in respect of the Schedule 3 land is set aside. 21. Accordingly the appeal is partly allowed. No cost. 22. The Registry is directed to draw a decree and send down the records forthwith. _____________