NAWAL KISHORE VARSHNEY v. Xth ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE
2012-03-10
DEVENDRA PRATAP SINGH
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Devendra Pratap Singh, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. This petition is directed against orders dated 22.2.1985 and 20.11.1997 in proceedings under Small Causes Courts Act. The petitioner landlord instituted Suit No. 571 of 1978 before the Judge Small Causes for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment of the respondent tenant. It was filed inter alia with the allegation that the disputed shop was Joint Hindu Family property which was being managed by the father of the petitioner as ‘Karta’ who let it out to the respondent tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 70/- per month. However, a partition of all the properties of the Joint Hindu Family took place through a partition decree on 1.1.1976 and the disputed shop fell into the exclusive share of the landlord who vide notice dated 10.11.1977 determined the tenancy and raised a demand of arrears of rent w.e.f 1.1.1976. The tenant failed to pay the arrears or to quit after the notice period forcing him to file the suit. 2. After exchange of pleadings the suit was partly decreed for arrears of rent with a finding of default but ejectment was denied on the ground that the notice was invalid on the ground that the arrears were not quantified and the period within which it was to be paid was also not disclosed. Aggrieved, the petitioner landlord filed SCC Revision No. 31 of 1985 claiming eviction while the respondent tenant preferred SCC Revision No. 25 of 1985 against decree of arrears of rent. The revisional Court allowed the revision of the tenant and dismissed the revision filed by the petitioner landlord vide order dated 20.11.1987 and thus, this petition by the landlord. 3. The revisional Court found that since the rent-deed was not a registered document therefore, it cannot be said that there was any landlord-tenant relationship. It further went on to hold that in the notice neither the arrears were disclosed nor period of payment was mentioned, therefore, the notice was also bad. It also found that the notice was never served on the tenant. 4.
It further went on to hold that in the notice neither the arrears were disclosed nor period of payment was mentioned, therefore, the notice was also bad. It also found that the notice was never served on the tenant. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Courts below have erred in law in taking a very hyper technical view in holding the notice as invalid and though the notice mentions Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, but in fact it fulfilled the twin requirements of Section 20(2) of the Act. 5. A notice to quit under the Act is slightly different than a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In a notice under the Act there should be a clear cut demand for payment of arrears of rent which should be for more than four months and on failure to pay the arrears he is rendered liable for eviction. Thus, in a notice under the Act suit for eviction can only be filed if the arrears have not paid within 30 days of receipt of the notice. However, in a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act the tenancy can also be terminated in the presentii. 6. A copy of the notice dated 10.11.1977 has been filed as Annexure-1 which discloses in paragraph 3 that the respondent is a tenant at the rent of Rs. 70/- per month. In paragraph 4 it is stated that the tenant is a very bad pay master and has not paid rent w.e.f. 1.1.1976. In paragraph 5 a demand for payment of entire arrears of rent has been raised while in paragraph 6 it is stated that the tenant may quit after expiry of the period of notice. The period of notice provided under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 20(2) of the Act is 30 days. The notice duly mentions about the statutory period provided under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and it also raises a demand for rent at the rate of Rs. 70/- per month from 1.1.1976 which is for a period of more than four months.
The notice duly mentions about the statutory period provided under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and it also raises a demand for rent at the rate of Rs. 70/- per month from 1.1.1976 which is for a period of more than four months. The Apex Court in the case of Bhagabandas Agarwalla v. Bhagwandas Kanu and others, 1977 (2) SCC 646 , after relying upon several decisions has held that a notice to quit must be construed not with a desire to find faults in it but it must be construed in a common sense way without taking a hyper critical view. A learned Single Judge of our Court in the case of Khadi and Village Industries Commission v. Satyeswar Prasad Nautiyal, 1985 (1) ARC 74, in some what similar circumstances, held that if the notice did not terminate the tenancy in presentii and the suit is filed much after expiry of the period mentioned without any payment of arrears, it could not be said that the notice was invalid. In the present case also the suit was filed much after expiry of 30 days of receipt of notice by the tenant and the tenancy was not terminated in the presentii. However, much stress has been laid by the counsel for the respondent to contend that neither the exact arrears were quantified nor the period in which it was to be paid was mentioned in the notice and therefore, the notice was invalid. He has relied upon a Single Judge decision of this Court rendered in the case of Harish Chandra v. IInd Additional District Judge, Moradabad, (1983)ARC 89. 7. No doubt the learned Single Judge in the case of Harish Chandra (Supra) has stated that the twin requirements of the rent to be paid and the period within which it is to be paid, has to be mentioned in the notice in compliance to Section 20(2) of the Act. But the learned Judge himself found that such requirement is necessary so that the notice is not so mixed up as to confuse the tenant about the arrears and the period within which it has to be paid. As observed hereinabove, the notice to quit clearly mentions that rent at the rate of Rs. 70/- per month is due w.e.f. 1.1.1976. It also mentions that the tenancy is determined on the expiry of the period of notice.
As observed hereinabove, the notice to quit clearly mentions that rent at the rate of Rs. 70/- per month is due w.e.f. 1.1.1976. It also mentions that the tenancy is determined on the expiry of the period of notice. Thus, there was absolutely no confusion so far as the tenant is concerned and that is also not his case anywhere in the Court below. Therefore, it is apparent that the Courts below fell into error in holding that the notice was invalid and thus, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is bound to be accepted. 8. It is then urged by the counsel for the petitioner that the revisional Court committed a manifest error of law in holding that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between the parties merely because the rent deed was not registered. There is sufficient material on record to show, that the disputed property fell into the exclusive share of the petitioner upon the partition decree w.e.f. 1.1.1976. It is also not denied that earlier Shankar Lal, the father of the petitioner was the landlord of the Joint Hindu Family property as a “Karta” and therefore, was receiving rent. After partition the petitioner steps into the shoes of the owner/landlord. Further, a perusal of the rent-deed shows that it is not a lease under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act because it is a unilateral document signed only by the tenant. A unilateral document signed by only one party could not be a lease and therefore, as held by the learned Single Judge of our Court in the case of Shyam Lal v. Vth Additional Distrcit Judge, 1989 (1) ARC 267, such a document was not required to be registered. Apart from the rent-deed, the petitioner had also filed copies of the assessment orders with regard to the disputed premises showing that the respondent was a tenant of Shankar Lal, father of the petitioner. In fact in the reply to the notice also, there was such admission. The revisional Court erroneously did not consider all these aspects and illegally over turned the findings of fact. Therefore even on this account the relationship of landlord-tenant was fully established under law. 9.
In fact in the reply to the notice also, there was such admission. The revisional Court erroneously did not consider all these aspects and illegally over turned the findings of fact. Therefore even on this account the relationship of landlord-tenant was fully established under law. 9. Lastly, it is urged that the revisional Court erred in law in ignoring the evidence of Shri O.P. Bhatnagar, Advocate who had sent the reply to the notice given by the petitioner only on the ground that he had not appeared in an earlier case of the tenant. 10. In the written statement the respondent tenant had denied that he had sent any reply to the notice through Shri O.P. Bhatnagar and therefore, the petitioner landlord produced Shri O.P. Bhatnagar and filed his affidavit stating that on the instructions of the tenant he had replied to the notice received by the tenant. He also stated in the affidavit that he knew the tenant as he appeared for him in a case under Section 125 Cr.P.C. earlier. The trial Court after considering the fact that Shri O.P. Bhatnagar was a senior lawyer of the District who had remained in practice for about 26 years coupled with the fact that he earlier appeared for the tenant, relied upon the affidavit. The revisional Court perversely held that the affidavit of O.P. Bhatnagar could not be believed because he never appeared in the case under Section 125 Cr.P.C. with regard to the tenant. It is very seldom that advocates of such a senior stature file affidavits in Courts. Further the tenant did not deny that he was a party in the case under Section 125 Cr.P.C. but no explanation was given as to how Shri O.P. Bhatnagar came to know about the case under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The finding of fact recorded by the trial Court was based on sufficient evidence on record and merely because one of the averments was allegedly found incorrect could not have been a ground to reject his affidavit. Therefore, the revisional Court even on this ground faltered and committed an error apparent on the face of the record. For the reasons above, this petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned revisional order dated 20.11.1997 is hereby quashed.
Therefore, the revisional Court even on this ground faltered and committed an error apparent on the face of the record. For the reasons above, this petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned revisional order dated 20.11.1997 is hereby quashed. Further, the findings of the Trial Judge in regard to validity of the notice is also set aside and it is held that the notice to quit was a valid notice and therefore, the suit stands decreed together with pendente lite damages/mean profits. No order as to costs. ——————