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2012 DIGILAW 597 (AP)

Vasudeva Realtors Pvt. Ltd. rep by its Managing Director Mrs. Suneeta Devabhakthuni v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Principal Secretary

2012-07-10

L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2012
Judgment :- The petitioner is a private limited company, undertaking the activity of construction and development. It entered into a development agreement with M/s. Sangam Dattaiah Goud and 16 others including respondents 4 to 8 herein on 27.06.2005 for construction of a building complex in Ac.5.07 guntas of land in Survey Nos.136, 137 and 156 of Khajaguda Village, Serilingampally Mandal; with a facility to have a common approach road of 33’ x 230’. It was also appointed as G.P.A. by the executants. The agreement was registered with the office of the District Registrar, Ranga Reddy at Moosapet. In terms of the agreement, the petitioner is said to have paid a sum of Rs.25,00,000/-. Being refundable security deposit, to respondents 4 to 8, towards their undivided one-fifth share Respondents 4 to 8 are also said to have agreed to sell 50% of their undivided share to the petitioner. After obtaining the construction permission/approval from the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation and the Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority, the petitioner is said to have developed the property. Some of the portions of the property so developed are also said to have been sold in terms of the agreement-cum-G.P.A. Respondents 4 to 8 executed a deed of partial cancellation of the development agreement-cum-G.P.A. on 30.10.2009 and the same was registered with the District Registrar of Marriages and Assurances, Moosapet, 3rd respondent herein as document No.6457/2009. The petitioner challenges the action of the 3rd respondent in registering the deed of cancellation executed by respondents 4 to 8. The petitioner pleads that though the document executed in its favour by Sangam Dattaiah Goud and 16 others on 27.06.2005 is named as development agreement, it has all the ingredients of the transaction of sale, to the extent of 50% of the share in favour of the petitioner. According to it, the consideration for the property so transferred is the investment of financial resources by the petitioner for development of the property. It is also stated that possession of the property was delivered and the document was registered by paying the stamp duty and registration charges as though it is a sale deed. The petitioner contends that the cancellation of such document, if at all, could have been done only with the participation of all the parties to it. It is also stated that possession of the property was delivered and the document was registered by paying the stamp duty and registration charges as though it is a sale deed. The petitioner contends that the cancellation of such document, if at all, could have been done only with the participation of all the parties to it. It further contends that the share of respondents 4 to 8 is not identified and when all the persons, representing one party to an agreement, or transaction, cannot unilaterally cancel a document, few persons, out of many, constituting one party have no right to cancel it. It is urged that the 3rd respondent ought not to have entertained the deed of cancellation at all. It is further pleaded that the original document answers the description of ‘conveyance’ as defined under Section 2(10) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (for short ‘the Act’). It is also pleaded that the prohibition contained under Rule 26(i)(k) of the A.P. Rules framed under the Registration Act (for short ‘the Rules’) gets attracted; atleast by analogy. The writ petition is mainly contested by respondents 4 to 8. They filed a counter affidavit justifying the execution o the deed of cancellation. They state that Rule 26(i)(k) of the Rules has no application to the facts of the case, sine it applies only to cases of conveyance through sale. They further plead that in case, the petitioners feel aggrieved by the deed of cancellation, they have to work out their remedies by filing a suit for declaration. Sri S. Ashok Anand Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the agreement-cum-G.P.A. in respect of a valuable property was brought into existence with the participation of the petitioner on the one hand and 17 persons on the other hand, including respondents 4 to 8, and that the same was registered as though it is a sale deed itself. He contends that the document, insofar as it confers rights vis-à-vis the 50% share in the developed property in the petitioner is absolute, without warranting the necessity of execution of separate document; and in that view of the matter, it is almost a sale deed, to the extent of the share of the petitioner. He further submits that the document answers the description of ‘conveyance’ and falls within the scope and ambit of Rule 26(i)(k) of the Rules. He further submits that the document answers the description of ‘conveyance’ and falls within the scope and ambit of Rule 26(i)(k) of the Rules. Learned counsel submits that when it is not permissible for one of the parties to a document to cancel it unilaterally, a deed of cancellation executed by a small fraction of one of the parties, does not have any legal effect and the 3rd respondent ought not to have registered the same. Learned Government Pleader for Revenue appearing for respondents 1 to 3, and Sri M.R.S. Srinivas learned counsel for respondents 4 to 8, on the other hand, submit that Rule 26(i)(k) of the Rules does not get attracted in respect of an agreement of sale or any document, other than sale deed. They submit that the 3rd respondent has no option but to register a document presented before him, once the requirements as to payment of stamp duty and registration charges are complied with. They further plead that in case, the petitioner feels aggrieved by the deed of cancellation, it has to work out its remedies in a Civil Court. The development agreement-cum-G.P.A. dated 27.06.2005 was executed between the petitioner on the one side and Sangam Dattaiah Goud and 16 others including respondents 4 to 8 on the other side. According to the conditions stipulated therein, the petitioner would be entitled to 55% of the developed property and the owners of the land, are entitled to 45%. Respondents 4 to 5 have one-fifth share in the total land, they have agreed to part with 50% of the share that accrues to them under the agreement, in favour of the petitioner. There is no denial of the fact that permissions were obtained from the concerned authorities, construction was made with the funds mobilized by the petitioner and a portion of the developed property that fell to the share of the petitioner was also sold. At that stage, respondents 4 to 8 executed a deed of partial cancellation. Two questions assume importance in this regard. The first is “whether the agreement, dated 27.06.2005 answers the description of conveyance” and the second is “whether the 3rd respondent was justified in registering the deed of cancellation executed by respondents 4 to 8”. At that stage, respondents 4 to 8 executed a deed of partial cancellation. Two questions assume importance in this regard. The first is “whether the agreement, dated 27.06.2005 answers the description of conveyance” and the second is “whether the 3rd respondent was justified in registering the deed of cancellation executed by respondents 4 to 8”. The word ‘conveyance’ is defined under section 2(10) of the Act as under: ‘Conveyance’,-‘conveyance’ includes a conveyance on sale and every instrument by which property, whether movable or immovable, is transferred inter vivos and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by Schedule 1 [or by Schedule I-A] as the case may be. The definition is inclusive, and takes in its fold, not only the transactions of sales simpliciter, but also the arrangements between the parties that have the effect of conferring rights vis-à-vis the property. This may be, from the point of view of levy o stamp duty. However, its meaning assumes significance in view of the fact that Rule 26 (i)(k) of the Rules employs the terms “conveyance”. The interrelation between the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act and the Registration Act is too well known. An individual has the freedom not only to enter into agreement, but also to cancel or vary the same. it is trite that valuable rights accrue to the parties, once a contract is entered into particularly through a written document, incorporating various conditions. Whoever exercises the freedom to resile from the contract would naturally be exposed to the consequences that flow from the relevant provisions of law, as and when the aggrieved party puts the machinery of law in motion. Registration of a document by itself, does not redefine the conditions. If the document is covered by Section 17 of the Act, it becomes enforceable, only when it is registered. In cases, where the documents are required to be registered, either under Section 17 of the Registration Act or any other provision of law, the transaction becomes complete through, and on registration. Law, equity, common sense and public policy warrant that any variation of a completed transaction, much less annulment thereof, can take place only with the mutual consent of the parties. In the recent past, instances of cancellation of document by one of the parties to a validly executed sale deed have been on the rise. Law, equity, common sense and public policy warrant that any variation of a completed transaction, much less annulment thereof, can take place only with the mutual consent of the parties. In the recent past, instances of cancellation of document by one of the parties to a validly executed sale deed have been on the rise. When such documents of unilateral cancellation are registered, the effort made by ‘the aggrieved parties by approaching the High court to challenge any act of registration was not successful. In Yanala Malleswari vs. Ananthula Sayamma ( 2006 (6) ALT 523 ), a Full Bench of this Court took the view that even where a sale deed is unilaterally cancelled, through another instrument executed by one of the parties, the remedy for the aggrieved party is only to file a suit. Obviously to overcome the situation, the State stepped in and introduced Rule 26(i)(k) of the Rules, which reads as under: “26(i)(k)(i) The registering officer shall ensure at the time of presentation for registration of cancellation deeds of previously registered deed of conveyances on sale before him that such cancellation deeds are executed by all the executant and claimant parties to the previously registered conveyance on sale and that such cancellation deed is accompanied by a declaration showing annulling the transaction contained in the previously registered deed of conveyance on sale; Provided that the registering officer shall dispense with the execution of cancellation deeds by executant and claimant parties to the previously registered deeds o conveyances on sale before him if the cancellation deed is executed by a Civil Judge or a Government Orders declaring the properties contained in the previously registered conveyance on sale to the Government or Assigned or Endowment lands or properties not registrable by any provision of law. (ii) Save in the manner provided for above no cancellation deed of a previously registered deed of conveyance on sale before him shall be accepted for presentation for registration. (iii) If there are any informalities in presentation of a nature which can be remedied, for instances, non-compliance of the requirements mentioned at Clauses (a) to (f), (h), (i) and (j) of sub-rule (i) or this rule, the Registering Officer shall give the party such information as may be necessary and return the fees and the document with a view to the document being presented again in due form. the action of the Registering Officer shall be confined to advice and he shall not himself alter the document in any way.” Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered this very aspect and has also examined the purport of Rule 26(i)(k) of the Rules in Thotta Ganga Laxmi and another vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (2012 (1) ALD 90(SC)). It was held that unilateral cancellation of deeds of sale cannot be sustained, and the judgment of this Court in Yanala Malleswari’s case (1 supra) stood overruled. The Supreme Court observed. “In our opinion, there was no need for the appellants to approach the civil Court as the said cancellation deed dated 4.8.2005 as well as registration of the same was wholly void and non est and can be ignored altogether. For illustration, if ‘A’ transfers a piece of land to ‘B’ by a registered sale deed, then, if it is not disputed that ‘A’ had the title to the land, that title passes to ‘B’ on the registration of the sale deed (retrospectively from the date of the execution of the same) and ‘B’ then becomes the owner of the land. If ‘A’ wants to subsequently get the sale deed cancelled, he has to file a civil suit for cancellation or else he can request ‘B’ to sell the land back to ‘A’ but by no stretch of imagination, can a cancellation deed be executed or registered. This is unheard of in law.” It may be true that a cursory reading of Rule 26(i)(k) of the Rules gives an impression that the provision covers mostly the deeds of cancellation of sale deeds. However, the use of expression “conveyance” and the circumstances that warranted making of the said Rule, would lead to a conclusion that it applies not only to cancellation of sale deeds, pure and simple, but also to the transactions, that have the ingredients and characteristics of a sale. The best way to understand its purport would be to see whether the transaction, which is sought to be cancelled conferred any final rights, may be in respect of a part of the property, on the other party. The answer is ‘yes’, the registration of such document gets prohibited by analogy, if not the application of the principle, underlying the Rules. The answer is ‘yes’, the registration of such document gets prohibited by analogy, if not the application of the principle, underlying the Rules. In the instant case, the agreement-cum-G.P.A., dated 27.06.2005 is not the one, through which one party offered to sell, and other party agreed to purchase, the property. It is to the effect that one of the parties i.e., petitioner herein shall invest funds for making construction upon it after obtaining the plans, and on completion of the construction, the owners of the land would be entitled to 45% of the constructed area, where as the petitioner would be entitled to 55% of the area. The apportionment is not only of the constructed area, but also of the land on which, the construction is made. While the owners of the land get the benefit of construction without incurring any expenditure, the builder i.e. the petitioner gets proportionate rights of ownership over the land vis-à-vis its share of the constructed area. Obviously for this reason, the Legislature incorporated a provision in the Act, which requires that the stamp duty and registration charges be paid on the document, on par with a sale deed. The document is also registered. The result is that almost absolute rights are conferred upon the petitioner vis-à-vis a portion of the property, possession thereof is delivered, entire consideration is paid and the document is registered. Another way of looking at the matter is as to whether the petitioner could have exercised the rights of ownership vis-à-vis the proportionate area of flats, that has fallen to its share, without the necessity of execution of any other document in its favour. The answer to this is ‘yes’. The endeavour is not to examine the legal implications that flow from the acts and omissions of the parties herein. It is only to verify whether Rule 26(i) (k) of the Rules gets attracted. Once the purpose underlying the said provision is to prevent the unilateral cancellation of concluded transactions of sale, there is no reason why, it be not extended to the transaction, which has all the ingredients of sale. This apart, the Rule cannot be said to be the sole repository of the principle that a bilateral transaction, which validly confers rights upon parties thereto, cannot be cancelled unilaterally, by one of them. It deals with a part of it. This apart, the Rule cannot be said to be the sole repository of the principle that a bilateral transaction, which validly confers rights upon parties thereto, cannot be cancelled unilaterally, by one of them. It deals with a part of it. It is axiomatic and stands to reasons that if conferment of mutual rights and obligations necessitates the execution of registered document, with the participation of both the parties, a deed which purports to cancel the transaction equally needs the participation of both. Therefore, the agreement of sale is certainly a conveyance. The unilateral cancellation of it is prohibited under Rule 26(i)(k) of the Rules. In a way, the transaction on hand stands on a higher footing than the one of a sale deed. In a transaction of sale, the deed is executed by the vendor; though with the knowledge of purchaser. He only signs the documents. The development agreement is executed by both the parties. If the cancellation of sale is required to be done with the participation of the vendor and purchaser; the requirement becomes much more essential as regards cancellation of transaction, which is brought into existence through a document executed by both the parties. Now comes to the second question. In the context of registration of documents, the freedom of a registering authority to very the contents thereof is very restricted. Rule 58 of the Rules mandates that it shall be no part of the duty of the registering officer to enquire into the validity of the document presented before him. The Rule reads. 58. It forms no part of a registering officer’s duty to enquire into the validity of a document brought to him for registration or to attend to any written or verbal protest against the registration of a document based on the ground that the executing party had no right to execute the document; but he is bound to consider objections raised on any of the grounds stated below. (a) that the parties appearing or about to appear before him are not the persons they profess to be; (b) that the document is forged; (c) that the person appearing as a representative, assign or agent, has no right to appear in that capacity; (d) that the executing party is not really dead as alleged by theparty applying for registration; and (e) that the executing party is a minor or an idiot or a lunatic. Where however, the document, which is presented for registration, purports to cancel another that was registered with the same authority, a different situation would arise. It has already been mentioned that Rule 26(i)(k) of the Rules enables the registering authority to refuse registration of a deed of cancellation executed by only one of the parties and purports to cancel the conveyance through sale and that the agreement dated 27.06.2005 has all the ingredients of such conveyance. Assuming that the Rule has no application, it needs to be verified as to whether small fraction of one of the parties can cancel the above transaction. In any bilateral transaction, mutual rights and obligations are defined for each of them. Wherever many persons constitute a party viz., vendors or purchasers, their rights and obligations are joint and several, unless a different arrangement is indicated in the document itself. It may be possible for a party, in its entirety, viz., vendors or purchasers, as a whole, to resile from transaction. It is however impermissible for a small portion of the parties to put an end to the entire transaction. For instance, a transaction of lease is brought into existence with the participation of lessors comprising of 10 persons and lessees comprising of 20 persons. Though it may be possible for the lessors or lessees as a whole to cancel the transaction and get registered, one of the 10 lessors or handful of the 20 lessees cannot be conferred with the right and prerogative to put an end to the entire transaction. Here again, the discussion is only from the point of view of the obligation on the part of the registering authority. he cannot permit a small fraction of one of the parties to set at naught, the entire transaction. He must ensure that at least one party, in its entirety is represented in execution of the deed of cancellation, before registering it. Hence, the writ petition is allowed. he cannot permit a small fraction of one of the parties to set at naught, the entire transaction. He must ensure that at least one party, in its entirety is represented in execution of the deed of cancellation, before registering it. Hence, the writ petition is allowed. The miscellaneous petition filed in this writ petition also stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.