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Karnataka High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 60 (KAR)

S. Chandrashekar v. State by CBI

2012-01-17

V.JAGANNATHAN

body2012
Judgment : 1. This appeal is by the accused who has been convicted by the Special Court in Special C.C.No.120 of 1998 for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 472 and 473 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 13(1) (d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and consequent sentence imposed upon the appellant. 2. The case of the prosecution in short is that, the appellant while working as Assistant Manager and Branch Manager of Peenya Branch of National Insurance Company Limited during the year 1990, cheated the National Insurance Company to the extent of Rs.6,000/-by falsely obtaining the personal accident insurance policy No.60220/9100191 in the name of H. Gangadhar for the period from 21-8-1989 to 20-8-1990 and the details of the proposal form were filled up and signature of the insured was also forged by the appellant and subsequently the appellant submitted a bogus claim intimation letter dated 25-6-1990 by falsely intimating that the insured viz., Gangadhar had suffered an accident while driving the vehicle on 25-6-1990 on Airport Road, Domlur. This letter was prepared by the accused in his handwriting and the signature of the insured was also forged by him and thereafter the appellant-accused submitted to filled up claim with false information and forged the signature of the insured even in the medical certificate and created a fictitious name as Dr. Vivek of Sathya clinic and finally got the amount of Rs.6,000/-debited from the account of the National Insurance Company and finally the said amount was credited to S.B.A/C.No.34419 on realisation. The said amount was transferred to the account of the accused bearing No.2851 at State Bank of India and he utilised the amount for his own purpose. Fake letterhead, rubber stamp of Dr. Vivek, ink pad and other fabricated documents were all seized from the house of the accused. 3. The C.B.I. after investigation, filed a charge-sheet against the appellant for the aforementioned offences and following the accused pleading not guilty to the charge, the prosecution examined in all 30 witnesses and produced 52 documents. After recording of the accused statement, D.W.1 was examined on behalf of the accused. 4. 3. The C.B.I. after investigation, filed a charge-sheet against the appellant for the aforementioned offences and following the accused pleading not guilty to the charge, the prosecution examined in all 30 witnesses and produced 52 documents. After recording of the accused statement, D.W.1 was examined on behalf of the accused. 4. The Trial Court, after evidence appreciation, held that the prosecution had brought home the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and accordingly he was convicted in respect of each one of the offences with which he was charged. 5. Learned Special Judge sentenced the appellant to 4 years R.I. with default sentence for non-payment of fine in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, 471, 472 and 473 of the IPC as well as under Section 13(1) (d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Only in respect of the offence under Section 467 of the IPC he was convicted for 5 years with default sentence for non-payment of fine. It is this judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court is called in question in this appeal. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel Sri Chandrashekara for the appellant and the learned Counsel Sri C.H. Jadhav for the respondent and perused the records of this case. 7. Submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that, though the charge is that, the accused had made false claim in the name of one Gangadhar, the said Gangadhar was not examined before the Trial Court. Therefore, the accused could not have been convicted. 8. However, submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent Sri C.H. Jadhav is that, the evidence of the Doctor and the documents produced coupled with the evidence of several witnesses clearly go to establish that the appellant had committed the aforesaid offences and all the incriminating materials were seized from the house of the accused. 9. Having thus heard both sides and after going through the evidence on record, I do not find any good ground made out by the appellant for this Court to interfere with the judgment of conviction for the following reasons. 10. P.W.1 is the search witness and he has deposed in his evidence that Ex.P.1 is the search mahazar and under it he seized Exts.P.2 to P.6, P.44 and M.O.1 from the house of the accused. 10. P.W.1 is the search witness and he has deposed in his evidence that Ex.P.1 is the search mahazar and under it he seized Exts.P.2 to P.6, P.44 and M.O.1 from the house of the accused. No explanation was forthcoming from the accused as to how these documents belonged to National Insurance Company could be traced from the house of the accused. Secondly, the learned Judge has also referred to the evidence of P.W.21-M. Ravi, who has stated that, Ex.P.23 which is the personal accident claim form bears the signature of the accused at Ex.P.23 (g-1) and this is not disputed by the accused. The application Ex.P.44 was seized from the house of the accused and even the address furnished in Ex.P.23 (e) and Ex.P.52 was found to be a wrong address and P.W.29 has spoken to in this connection. 11. Insofar as the address of Gangadhar given as No.36, Nehru Circle, Seshadripuram, Bangalore, is concerned, the prosecution has examined number of witness’s viz., P.Ws.9, 10, 11 and 12 and the effect of the evidence of these witnesses is that no person by name Gangadhar was found residing at No.36, Nehru Circle, Seshadripuram, Bangalore. In fact P.W.12-Ravindranath has deposed in his evidence that House Nos.36, 36/1, 37 and 38 are the different portions of one house and he is the owner of the said house and says that it was the accused who was the tenant in the said house bearing No.36 and nobody by name Gangadhar had been given any portion of his house. 12. In the light of the aforesaid evidence of the prosecution witnesses and documents produced, the Trial Court therefore concluded that the address given in the pass book-Ex.P.2 and the account opening form are all bogus one and the accused had created a fictitious person by name Gangadhar through his fraudulent operations. Another reason which led the Trial Court to take the said view is that, the claim application was accompanied by a medical certificate said to have been issued by Dr. Vivek of Sathya Clinic and Exs.P.4 and P.5 were seized from the house of the accused and they were the letterheads of Dr. Vivek. The evidence of P.Ws.1 and 29 had established that the letterheads and rubber stamp were recovered from the house of the accused. Vivek of Sathya Clinic and Exs.P.4 and P.5 were seized from the house of the accused and they were the letterheads of Dr. Vivek. The evidence of P.Ws.1 and 29 had established that the letterheads and rubber stamp were recovered from the house of the accused. The evidence of P.W.19 also establishes that she had not leased her house to anyone by name Dr. Vivek to run a clinic by name Sathya Clinic and she had gone to depose that there is no clinic by name Sathya Clinic in their area. 13. P.W.25 has deposed about the nature of work of the accused viz., signing the policy documents, processing of claims, honouring of claims etc., and has identified the signature of the accused as per Ex.P.23. 14. P.W.21-M. Ravi has deposed in his evidence that the accused personally received the claim application said to be of one Gangadhar and the processing note was also put up by the accused himself and it was personally approved by him as per Ex.P.23(a). 15. The Trial Court also found that even the address given in respect of the account number said to be that the Gangadhar was also a bogus one and therefore the Trial court had no difficulty in concluding the name of Gangadhar is a fictitious name created by the accused and the accused himself was operating behind the said name. 16. Apart from the aforesaid evidence, the Trial Court also found the cheque book-Ex.P.3 was seized along with the passbook from the house of the accused and no explanation was forthcoming from the accused as to how he came in possession of the same. 17. Learned Trial Judge also observed at para 25 of the judgment that the accused had made use of the name Gangadhar for making deposit and this is clear from Exs.P.11 to P.14 and Ex.P51. As far as the handwriting is concerned, the learned Trial Judge has discussed the evidence at para 26 and has observed that P.W.28, the handwriting expert has given his opinion as per Ex.P.41 and the reasons at Ex.P.42. Although these questions were put to the accused under Section 313 statement, the accused gave evasive answers and stated that the questioned writings. Although these questions were put to the accused under Section 313 statement, the accused gave evasive answers and stated that the questioned writings. Q.47 in Ex.P.11 was found to tally with the standard writings of the accused and the questioned writings have been marked as Q.187, 191 and 192 and the signatures have been marked as Q.189 and 190. 18. I have already referred to various aspects of the evidence on record to point out that the view taken by the Trial Court that the person by name Gangadhar is none other than the accused is clearly established from the evidence placed by the prosecution. Therefore, the findings recorded by the Court below cannot be termed as perverse under any circumstances. The defence evidence of D.W.1 was also found to be not of much use to the accused as the said witness has spoken only about the procedure followed in the Insurance Company. 19. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court does not call for any interference. 20. Heard on sentence. Submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that, the incident pertains to the year 1990 and more than two decades have passed and the appellant has undergone sufficient mental agony all these years and he has also suffered dismissal from service and he is now aged about 63 years and therefore, these factors be considered in respect of the sentence modification. 21. Having thus heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and the learned Counsel for the respondent and taking note of the circumstances now put forward by the appellant’s Counsel, in my view, taking the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence can be reduced to one year simple imprisonment while maintaining the fine amount as it is. 22. In this result, I pass the following order: The conviction of the appellant by the Trial Court in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 472 and 473 of the IPC and Section 13(1) (d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is sustained. The sentence of imprisonment imposed in respect of each one of the offences is however modified into one year simple imprisonment in respect of each one of the offences for which he has been convicted and the fine amount imposed and the default sentence however are maintained. The sentence of imprisonment imposed in respect of each one of the offences is however modified into one year simple imprisonment in respect of each one of the offences for which he has been convicted and the fine amount imposed and the default sentence however are maintained. The appeal is therefore allowed only the extent of sentence being reduced as above. The fine amount to be deposited shall also include the amount already in deposit. The sentence of one year in respect of each one of the offences in place of sentence imposed by the Trial Court, shall run concurrently. The accused is entitled to set off in respect of the period already undergone by him in custody.