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2012 DIGILAW 60 (MAD)

K. Ragupathy v. The Director of School Education, D. P. I. Compound

2012-01-04

K.N.BASHA

body2012
Judgment :- 1. The challenge in this writ petition is to the order passed by the second respondent dated 24.06.2009 bearing reference No.Na.Ka.147374/C3/E3/97 awarding the punishment of dismissal from service to the petitioner and the consequential order of the first respondent dated 22.04.2010 bearing reference No.Moo.Mu.No.70357/C4/E1/2009, rejecting the appeal preferred by the petitioner, with a prayer to quash the same as being illegal, arbitrary, vindictive, without jurisdiction and in violation of the principles of natural justice and consequently, direct the respondents 1 and 2 to pay all benefits including monetary for the period the petitioner was placed under suspension i.e., 11.01.1998 to 21.12.2001, grant promotion to the post of Headmaster w.e.f 19.02.2003 when the petitioners juniors were promoted, grant monetary benefits as Headmaster from that date including the salary arrears, calculate the terminal benefits payable to the petitioner based on the salary he would have drawn had he been promoted as Headmaster on 19.02.2003 within a time frame. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed as School Assistant through the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission in the year 1975-76. Thereafter, the petitioner was promoted as Additional Assistant Educational Officer, Ulundurpet. The petitioner has been served with a suspension order dated 11.01.1998 placing him under suspension and subsequently, he has been served with a charge memo dated 18.09.1998 alleging that he had committed certain irregularities during the period between 14.01.1994 and 30.06.1995. As he has placed under prolonged suspension, the petitioner preferred an application in O.A.No.1666/1999 before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Chennai and the Tribunal, by its order dated 23.08.2011, directed the first respondent to complete the disciplinary proceedings within four months. The second respondent through its proceedings dated 21.12.2001 revoked the suspension order passed against the petitioner and posted him as Special Graduate Teacher (Maths) Government High School in Pudupattu. Thereafter, the first respondent, through its proceedings dated 24.05.2002, directed the petitioner to submit his explanation to the charge memo dated 18.09.1998. 3. The petitioner submitted a detailed explanation dated 03.07.2002, denying the charges levelled against him and he has specifically stated that as a superior officer, he has signed the respective records only after the concerned Clerk and the Superintendent confirming their verification and as such, he cannot be held liable or responsible for the allegations levelled against him. 3. The petitioner submitted a detailed explanation dated 03.07.2002, denying the charges levelled against him and he has specifically stated that as a superior officer, he has signed the respective records only after the concerned Clerk and the Superintendent confirming their verification and as such, he cannot be held liable or responsible for the allegations levelled against him. The Clerk and the Superintendent concerned, who had actually prepared the basic records pursuant to which payments were made were not questioned and punished. Therefore, the entire action on the respondents are arbitrary and discriminatory. The Department has also passed necessary recovery orders and admittedly amounts were recovered. The second respondent, without appreciating the explanation offered by the petitioner, appointed the third respondent as the Enquiry Officer as per the proceedings dated 24.09.2002. 4. The third respondent sent a notice dated 21.11.2002 stating that Enquiry would be held on 29.11.2002. On the said date, the second respondent had merely asked the petitioner about the comments on the charges levelled against him. The Department has not examined any witness or marked any document in support of the charges. The Enquiry Officer had not conducted the enquiry in the manner known to law. 5. The petitioners promotion was also withheld and his juniors have been promoted as Headmasters, as per the proceedings of the second respondent dated 19.02.2003, overlooking the petitioner. The third respondent submitted his report dated 24.05.2003 stating that final report can be given only on seeing the outcome of the criminal proceedings. The petitioner sent a representation dated 11.06.2003 to the respondents seeking for the relief of dropping the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him and to treat the period of suspension as on duty. The petitioner again sent a detailed representation dated 23.06.2003 objecting the second respondents action in not considering his name and promoting him to the post of Headmaster. Since the respondent was silent on his representations, the petitioner preferred a writ petition in W.P.No.21697/2005 and this Court passed an order dated 28.10.2008, directing the respondent to finalize the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him within a period of six months. 6. To his shock and surprise, the petitioner was served with a show cause notice dated 03.12.2008 enclosing the Enquiry Report dated 02.03.2005 alleging that the charges levelled against the petitioner have been proved and sought for explanation. 6. To his shock and surprise, the petitioner was served with a show cause notice dated 03.12.2008 enclosing the Enquiry Report dated 02.03.2005 alleging that the charges levelled against the petitioner have been proved and sought for explanation. The petitioner sent a detailed representation dated 08.12.2008 and requested to drop all further proceedings. The petitioner also filed a writ petition in W.P.No.1342/2009 to quash the charge sheet dated 18.09.1998 and the consequential show cause notice issued by the second respondent dated 03.12.2008 and this Court, by the order dated 27.01.2009, directed the respondents to pass final orders within 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order with liberty to challenge the same by the petitioner. 7. The petitioner attained the age of superannuation on 31.01.2009 and the respondents refused to permit the petitioner to retire pending disciplinary proceedings and thereafter passed an order dated 24.06.2009 dismissing the petitioner from service. Challenging the said order of the second respondent, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the first respondent on 20.07.2009 and the same was also rejected by the order dated 22.04.2010. Being aggrieved against the said orders, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition with the above said prayer. 8. Mr.N.G.R.Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently contended that the entire proceedings is vitiated as the enquiry itself was not conducted in the manner known to law. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that not even a single witness was examined by the department and no document was marked on the side of the department to substantiate the allegations levelled against the petitioner herein. It is contended that the petitioner has submitted a detailed explanation denying the allegations levelled against him and stated that he is no way responsible for the lapses or irregularities and he has signed the files after verification by the subordinate staffs, namely, the Clerk and the Superintendent. It is further contended that this is a case of no evidence and the enquiry was not conducted in the manner as per the principles and guidelines stipulated by the Honble Apex Court in number of decisions and as such, the entire proceedings is vitiated and the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. It is further contended that this is a case of no evidence and the enquiry was not conducted in the manner as per the principles and guidelines stipulated by the Honble Apex Court in number of decisions and as such, the entire proceedings is vitiated and the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contentions, would place reliance on the following decisions: (1) State of Uttaranchal and Others v. Kharak Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 236 (2) Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and Others reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 9. Per contra, learned Special Government Pleader submitted that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders. It is contended that the impugned orders were passed on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer and on the basis of the materials available on record. It is further contended that the explanation offered by the petitioner is unacceptable for the simple reason that it is his responsibility to verify and not merely to sign the files prepared by the subordinate staffs. It is also contended that prior notice was sent to the petitioner well in advance before conducting the enquiry and the enquiry was conducted as per the rules. The learned Special Government Pleader contended that the irregularities committed by the petitioner were found only during the course of audit inspection and based on the audit report, a charge memo was issued against him and pursuant to the charge memo, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner. It is submitted that this is a matter relating to loss of money to the Government to the tune of Rs.15 lakhs. The learned Special Government Pleader submitted that criminal proceeding was initiated by CBCID police and the same is pending as on date and as such, the question of promoting the petitioner or dropping any further action, could be taken only after the outcome of the criminal proceedings. It is submitted that the second show cause notice was also served before awarding the punishment by affording opportunity to the petitioner and as such, the petitioner may not have any grievance. Lastly, it is submitted that the petitioner has willingly participated in the enquiry and he has not raised any objection or sought for production of any witness or document. Lastly, it is submitted that the petitioner has willingly participated in the enquiry and he has not raised any objection or sought for production of any witness or document. The learned Special Government Pleader submitted that a detailed counter was also filed in this matter. 10. I have given my careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions put forward by either side and perused the entire materials available on record including the affidavit filed by the petitioner and the counter affidavit filed by the respondents and the impugned orders passed by the respondents 1 and 2. 11. The crux of the question involved in this matter is to the effect that whether the department has discharged its burden of establishing the charges levelled against the petitioner by conducting a proper, fair and bonafide enquiry and by examining witnesses and marking documents in the departmental proceedings in the manner known to law. 12. At the outset, it is to be stated that initially the petitioner has been served with the suspension order dated 11.01.1998 and thereafter, the charge memo dated 18.09.1998 was served on him in respect of the alleged transactions said to have taken place during the year 1994-95. It is pertinent to note that there is a delay of 3 to 4 years even for issuing the charge memo and it is seen that though the second respondent has passed the order of suspension as early as on 11.01.1998, it took 8 months time for the Department in serving the charge memo as the charge memo itself is dated 18.09.1998. The only explanation for such delay as per the learned Special Government is to the effect that the irregularities were found only during audit inspection and after the irregularities pointed out in the audit report, the respondents have taken action against the petitioner by passing the order of suspension and thereafter issuing the charge memo. I am unable to countenance that contention for the simple reason that audit inspection has to be conducted periodically every year and not in once in 3 years or 4 years and if there is any lapse or irregularities committed by the delinquent officer during the course of earlier audit inspection, it could have been very well ascertained. I am unable to countenance that contention for the simple reason that audit inspection has to be conducted periodically every year and not in once in 3 years or 4 years and if there is any lapse or irregularities committed by the delinquent officer during the course of earlier audit inspection, it could have been very well ascertained. But, as far as the case on hand is concerned, there is absolutely no explanation whatsoever forthcoming from the department for the delay in issuing the charge memo in this case. This infirmity cannot be brushed aside by this Court in view of other serious infirmities and illegalities pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner in respect of the method and manner of conducting disciplinary proceedings in this matter. 13. This Court has no hesitation to hold that this is a classic case of no evidence, as, admittedly, the Department has not chosen to examine any witness much less the author of the audit report, a vital document strongly relied by the respondents for initiating disciplinary proceedings against the delinquent officer, namely, the petitioner herein. There is absolutely no explanation whatsoever forthcoming from the Department for the non-examination of the author of the audit report by the respondents during the course of enquiry or the disciplinary proceedings. Without examining the author of the audit report, the respondents cannot place any reliance on the audit report and such procedure is unknown to the disciplinary proceedings. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner rightly placed reliance on the decision of the Honble Apex Court in State of Uttaranchal and Others v. Kharak Singh reported in (2008) 8 SCC 236 . The Honble Apex Court after referring to its earlier decisions has held as hereunder: "(15.) From the above decisions, the following principles would emerge: (i) The enquiries must be conducted bona fide and care must be taken to see that the enquiries do not become empty formalities. (emphasis supplied by this Court) (ii) If an officer is a witness to any of the incidents which is the subject-matter of the enquiry or if the enquiry was initiated on a report of an officer, then in all fairness he should not be the enquiry officer. (emphasis supplied by this Court) (ii) If an officer is a witness to any of the incidents which is the subject-matter of the enquiry or if the enquiry was initiated on a report of an officer, then in all fairness he should not be the enquiry officer. If the said position becomes known after the appointment of the enquiry officer, during the enquiry, steps should be taken to see that the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer. (iii) In an enquiry, the employer/department should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman/delinquent charged and give an opportunity to him to cross-examine the witnesses of the employer. Only thereafter, the workman/delinquent be asked whether he wants to lead any evidence and asked to give any explanation about the evidence led against him. (iv) On receipt of the enquiry report, before proceeding further, it is incumbent on the part of the disciplinary/punishing authority to supply a copy of the enquiry report and all connected materials relied on by the enquiry officer to enable him to offer his views, if any. The Honble Apex Court in the said decision further held as hereunder: "(17)... No witnesses were examined. Apparently there was not even a presenting officer. A perusal of the report shows that the enquiry officer himself inspected the areas in the forest and after taking note of certain alleged deficiencies secured some answers from the delinquent by putting some questions. It is clear that the enquiry officer himself has acted as the investigator, prosecutor and judge. Such a procedure is opposed to principles of natural justice and has been frowned upon by this Court." 15. In yet another decision in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and Others reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 , the Honble Apex Court has held as hereunder: "(14.) Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof..." (emphasis supplied by this Court) The Honble Apex Court further held in the said decision as hereunder: "A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a Departmental proceeding but the Principles of Natural Justice are. As the report of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof." (emphasis supplied by this Court) 16. In an unreported order dated 26.09.2006 in W.P.Nos.13887/2006 etc., a learned single Judge of this Court has held as hereunder: "(13.) As per the judgement in Rajkishore Pandey v. Rewa Sidhi Gramin Bank and Another (1989) 4 SLR at paragraph 11 and so also the judgment Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen AIR 1959 SC 1111 , when the author of the report has not been examined, any order passed, basing on the report, is unsustainable and apart from this as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, all the applicants were appointed in the year 1981 and as far as certificate verification is concerned, it should have been done immediately after their appointment and in this case, their services also regularized by the order issued in the year 1982. But long after that, the certificate verification has been carried on and the impugned order has been passed as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, if action is taken in a shrewd manner, even assuming the certificate produced are false certificate, the petitioners would have got an alternative job. As on date, they have completed more than 20 years of service. As on date, they have completed more than 20 years of service. That apart, this issue has been already covered by judgment referred by Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal in O.A.Nos.684 to 691 of 1992, 671/1994 and 4031 of 1991 batch." (emphasis supplied by this Court) The principles laid down by the Honble Apex Court and this Court in the decisions cited supra are squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case, as in this case also, the disciplinary authority strongly placed reliance on the vital document, namely, audit report, but the author of the audit report was not examined by the department and as such, without examining its author, by no stretch of imagination it could be construed to be a legal evidence to prove the charges levelled against the delinquent officer, namely, the petitioner herein. This important illegality is not at all taken note even by the appellate authority, namely, the first respondent herein while rejecting the appeal preferred by the petitioner. 17. In view of the aforesaid illegalities and infirmities, the entire disciplinary proceedings are vitiated and the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned orders viz., (i) the order of the second respondent dated 24.06.2009 bearing reference No.Na.Ka.147374/C3/E3/97 and (ii) the consequential order of the second Respondent Appellate Authority dated 22.04.2010 bearing reference No.Moo.Mu.No.70357/C4/E1/2009 are hereby set aside. 18. It is stated by the petitioner in the affidavit that he had already attained the age of superannuation on 31.01.2009 and the petitioner was not allowed to retire pending disciplinary proceedings. Under the above said circumstance, it is made clear that in view of the quashing of the impugned orders, the petitioner is deemed to have been in continuous service from the date of suspension i.e., from 11.01.1998 and he is entitled to be promoted if he is otherwise qualified and eligible for promotion to higher cadre and accordingly, notional promotion should be given to the petitioner apart from other retiral and attendant monetary benefits. It is further made clear that the above said exercise shall be completed within a period of twelve (12) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.