Judgment :- Ashim Kumar Banerjee, J. 1. Premises no. 46, Park Street, Calcutta is comprised of one bigha of land having two storeyed building having a built up area of four thousand five hundred square feet as claimed by Mr. Roy Chowdhury appearing for Sheila Guha. Armenian Church was the owner of the said premises in question, now under the control and management of Official Trustee, West Bengal. In 1962, the Official Trustee executed a Deed of Lease in favour of one Dr. Mohini Mohan Ghosh for a period of twenty-one years. Dr. Ghosh was granted permission to sublet part of the premises for residential purpose with a rider that he would be obliged to occupy and reside in the said premises retaining major portion of it. The said lease executed on October 4, 1962 was renewed for a further term on the same terms and conditions. The renewed lease expired on February 6, 1985. Mr. Ghosh however, continued in possession. Official Trustee permitted him to retain possession as a monthly tenant on the same terms and conditions as contained in the Deed of Lease. The Official Trustee created the tenancy vide letter dated February 14, 1994, that gave an unfettered right so to say to the Ghoses to stay in the said premises by exploiting a substantial portion of it for commercial gain by subletting. Mr. Roychowdhury however, claimed that he was to bear all statutory outgoing and cost of maintenance of the said property and he used to spend a lac of rupees per month. On that score, we do not find any definite proof. On November 3, 1995, Dr. Mohini Mohan Ghosh died intestate leaving him surviving two daughters and two sons and widow Ava Rani Ghosh, the eldest one was Sheila Guha. The present controversy would relate to a sub-tenant Mohanhal, who came to reside in flat no.4 of the said premises as a subtenant under Mohini Mohan in 1968. On December 17, 1984 Mohanlal died leaving him surviving his widow and sons including Rahul and Rajeev Maheshwari, the appellants in Dispute arose when Rahul bypassed Sheila and others and contacted the Official Trustee directly as also the Church. On August 19, 1999 Rahul and Others (hereinafter referred to as Maheshwari Group) entered into an agreement for development of the said property subject to the approval of Official Trustee. On August 19, 1999 Rahul and Others (hereinafter referred to as Maheshwari Group) entered into an agreement for development of the said property subject to the approval of Official Trustee. Under the agreement, Maheswaries were to take all steps for clearing of hindrances that might come up in the way of development of the property including making suitable arrangement with the occupants, if possible, by getting vacant possession from them. Wardens of the Armenian Church filed an application being G.A. No.3565 of 2000, inter alia, for obtaining permission of this Court with regard to development of the said property in terms of the agreement referred to above and a corresponding direction upon the Official Trustee to execute the said agreement on behalf of the Church. The petitioners did not press the said application. On November 27, 2003 one of us (Ashim Kumar Banerjee,J.) sitting singly, dismissed the same for default. On November 18, 2004 Maheshwari Group applied for intervention in the said application being G.A. No.356 of 2000 presumably without knowing that the same had already been dismissed for default. The learned Single Judge allowed the said application without knowing that the G.A. No.356 of 2000 had already been dismissed. Vide letter dated August 12, 2005, the advocates for the Church Wardens extended their support to Maheshwaris by indicating that they would have no objection if the Maheswaries would take steps for obtaining vacant and peaceful possession of the property in view of the delay in receiving permission from the Court. 2. Maheshwaris claimed that after being permitted to intervene in the application for permission and after being permitted by the Wardens to take steps for getting the property vacated they entered into an agreement with Sheila Guha where Sheila agreed to vacate the premises on a consideration written therein. She also received a part consideration. The agreement was reduced to writing through a letter dated July 15, 2006 that Sheila signed as a mark of acceptance. Sheila however, denied her signature. Her other relations also disowned the agreement and contended that Sheila had no business to enter into such agreement on their behalf. Sheila’s agreement sought to be recorded in the letter dated July 15, 2006 contained an arbitration clause. We are told, the arbitrator already entered upon reference. Sheila however, denied her signature. Her other relations also disowned the agreement and contended that Sheila had no business to enter into such agreement on their behalf. Sheila’s agreement sought to be recorded in the letter dated July 15, 2006 contained an arbitration clause. We are told, the arbitrator already entered upon reference. Sheila’s counsel however, disputed such aspect and contended that they would be taking appropriate steps for revocation of the authority of the arbitrator on the ground that there was no agreement at all. Sheila's relations also disowned the arbitrator as they were admittedly not parties to the agreement. 3. In this backdrop, Maheshwaris approached the learned Single Judge by filing an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and obtained an ex parte order of injunction as well as appointment of receiver in respect of flat no.3 that became vacant in the mean time. The learned Single Judge passed the said ad interim order on September 14, 2006 making it returnable on a subsequent date. The receiver visited the said premises and submitted a report. The learned Judge passed further ex parte order directing the receiver to remain in symbolic position. The learned Judge ultimately heard the matter and dismissed the same vide judgment and order dated November 29, 2011. 4. G.A. No. 3821 of 2007 was filed by Sheila for discharge of receiver that was dismissed for default and, subsequently, restored. G.A. No.758 of 2010 was filed by Ela, sister of Sheila seeking leave to intervene and C.C. No.3 of 2008 was an application for contempt complaining violation of ex parte orders dated September 14 and 25, 2006. All the pending applications were heard analogously and disposed of by the learned Judge vide judgment and order impugned herein. 5. The analysis of the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge would reveal as follows : i) Parties to the agreement dated August 19, 1999 could do nothing about the matters covered thereby. ii) If Maheshwaris did not have present right in respect of the property notwithstanding their assertion of the purported agreement that Sheila Guha alleged to have executed, the rights of the heirs of the original tenant at the premises can scarcely be affected. ii) If Maheshwaris did not have present right in respect of the property notwithstanding their assertion of the purported agreement that Sheila Guha alleged to have executed, the rights of the heirs of the original tenant at the premises can scarcely be affected. iii) Church or his wardens were not interested to act upon the agreement of 1999 even if the agreement between Maheshwari and Sheila given credence it would not help Maheshwari to act in furtherance of the agreement of 1999. iv) The Court disbelieved the Maheshwari’s argument on joint tenancy represented by Sheila to bind the other tenants. v) Trust properties cannot be dealt with by trustees with even the remotest motive of personal gain. The best terms may generally come upon bids being invited. vi) The Wardens here showed extraordinary enthusiasm in entering into a private deal with private persons and expecting the official trustee to rubber stamp it. vii) There was no merit in the application made under Section 9. His Lordship disposed of all the pending applications. While doing so, His Lordship directed as follows :- 6. “One or more flats at premises No.46 Park Street to which the joint tenants are entitled remain vacant. It is not inconceivable that the vacant flat or flats may be subject by the joint tenants against a substantial initial payment. Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that possession is made over by tenants in prime commercial locations to subtenants against hefty initial payments, more often than not in cash. Since the property belongs to a trust which earns a measly amount of less than Rs.3000/-per month for an asset that should fetch it lakhs of rupees a month, it would be injudicious to allow the joint tenants to enjoy such bonanza with the church or its relevant trust being left in the lurch. Sheila Guha, who is one of the joint tenants and actually in occupation of the vacant flat or flats, has volunteered to take prior permission of the Official Trustee before creating any subtenancy in respect of any portion of the premises in occupation of the joint tenants. Sheila Guha, who is one of the joint tenants and actually in occupation of the vacant flat or flats, has volunteered to take prior permission of the Official Trustee before creating any subtenancy in respect of any portion of the premises in occupation of the joint tenants. Accordingly, in keeping with the ethos of Section 25 of the 1913 Act, the joint tenants are permitted to create any sub-tenancy in favour of any other in respect of any portion of premises No.46 Park Street under their occupation, but only after obtaining the previous sanction of the Official Trustee. The Official Trustee should not unreasonably withhold the permission if the initial premium for creation of any subtenancy appears to be reasonable to the Official Trustee and the joint tenants offer three-fourths of such amount to the trust. Such order may not be seen to have detracted from any rights of the trust qua the joint tenants in any manner whatsoever.” 7. According to Mr. Utpal Bose, learned Judge made observations that would foreclose the rights and privileges the appellants had under the agreement of 1999. The learned Judge’s observations also prejudiced his rights and contentions under the agreement with Sheila pending consideration before the arbitrator. Mr. Bose further contended that the scope of the application made under Section 9 was for interim protection during pendency of the arbitration. The learned Judge could not have issued direction with regard to creation of further tenancy in respect of vacant flat. Mr. Bose also contended that the comments made on the agreement of 1999 was beyond jurisdiction. 8. He further contended that the learned Judge failed to appreciate, further creation of third party right in respect of any of the portions by Sheila, would cause prejudice to the lis pending before the arbitrator. He lastly contended that the appellant moved His Lordship along with the application under Section 9. Sheila did not make any prayer at all for permission to sublet. Giving directions for subletting was thus beyond jurisdiction and in any event would interfere with the 1999 agreement. On merits, Mr. Bose contended that His Lordship failed to appreciate the scheme of 1989 as well as the letter of the Church dated August 12, 2005 extending support to the appellant through their lawyer. Giving directions for subletting was thus beyond jurisdiction and in any event would interfere with the 1999 agreement. On merits, Mr. Bose contended that His Lordship failed to appreciate the scheme of 1989 as well as the letter of the Church dated August 12, 2005 extending support to the appellant through their lawyer. He prayed for setting aside of the order of the learned single Judge and an order of status quo restraining Sheila from dealing with and/or disposing of any part of the property. 9. Mr. Surhid Roychowdhury, learned counsel appearing for Sheila being led by Mr. P.K. Das learned senior advocate pressed his cross-objection making a grievance for the part of the order that restricted her right to utilise the rental income which she might be getting by letting out the vacant flat. 10. Opposing the appeal, Mr. Roychowdhury also contended that the official trustee created the tenancy in 1962 in favour of her father. Initially, it was through a lease for ten years, after one more extension the official trustee created tenancy on the same terms and conditions that would include authority to sublet any part of the premises. Such unfettered right could not be interfered with that too, in a purported arbitration proceeding between her and the appellants. On factual score, Mr. Roychowdhury contended that she had no agreement with Maheshwari and the purported signature appearing at the bottom of the document said to be the arbitration agreement, was forged. Mr. Roychowdhury contended that Sheila did not want development of the property. They would be happy to see that their rights were preserved as per the agreement they had with the Official Trustee. 11. On a query made by this Court, Mr. Roychowdhury informed the Court that he was paying rupees seven thousand five hundred as rent to the Official Trustee for the entire house. This was in addition to his monthly expense of rupees one lac approximately for maintaining safety and security of the entire building as also the electricity charges and other statutory outcomings. 12. The younger sister of Sheila, Ela appeared before us through Shri Ajoy Krishna Chatterjee, learned senior counsel. Mr. Chatterjee supported the contentions raised by Mr. Roychowdhury. This was in addition to his monthly expense of rupees one lac approximately for maintaining safety and security of the entire building as also the electricity charges and other statutory outcomings. 12. The younger sister of Sheila, Ela appeared before us through Shri Ajoy Krishna Chatterjee, learned senior counsel. Mr. Chatterjee supported the contentions raised by Mr. Roychowdhury. In addition, he contended, as a worse case, even if the agreement between Sheila and Maheshwari were held to be valid that would not be enforceable in law in absence of the co-tenants being made party to the same. Mr. Chatterjee contended that Ela was enjoying tenancy jointly with Sheila and her brothers. Such right could not be disturbed either by the 1999 agreement Maheshwaries entered into with Church or 2006 agreement they sought to have entered into with Sheila. Mr. Chatterjee also prayed for dismissal of the appeal as also setting aside of the part of the order as indicated above being the subject matter of the cross-objection filed by Sheila. 13. We have considered the rival contentions. We have carefully perused the judgment and order of the learned single Judge. We are in full agreement with His Lordship when His Lordship expressed annoyance, the way trust property was thoroughly mishandled. His Lordship made drastic comment about the agreement referred to above. We do not wish to repeat. However, several questions would crop up that we could not brush aside. The Armenian Church owned the property in a prime locality of Calcutta. We were told that the total area of the said premises would be one bigha having two storeyed building constructed thereon. We are amazed to note that the original tenancy created in 1962 did not have the Court’s permission, at least not shown to us. It was a lease executed by an Official Trustee. How Monoranjan was selected as a tenant, is a question whose answer is not known to us. How the Official Trustee being a public official could part with possession of a prime property that too, for a song? The Deed of Lease appearing at page 302 – 311 would show that the premises was let out at a monthly rent of rupees eleven hundred to be enhanced on every five years basis at the rate of rupees hundred. Clause 5 of the said lease would provide as follows :- 14. The Deed of Lease appearing at page 302 – 311 would show that the premises was let out at a monthly rent of rupees eleven hundred to be enhanced on every five years basis at the rate of rupees hundred. Clause 5 of the said lease would provide as follows :- 14. “Notwithstanding the permission of the lessor first had and obtained in writing to assign and/or transfer the lease of the demised premises but the lessee will have the right to sublet part of the demised premises …………….”. Whether the property was let out at the best possible consideration, is not known to us. The mode of selection of tenant was also not clear. The lease got extended on February 6, 1985 as we find from page 312323, the terms being same, the lease was extended for a further period at enhanced rate of rupees two thousand five hundred. We fail to appreciate, how one bigha property that too vacant, could be let out to a tenant at the rate of rupees two thousand five hundred per month. After expiry of the said lease the official trustee created tenancy giving right to the tenant to have protection under the tenancy law that they otherwise might not have as a lessee. Although parties were fighting each other in Court Maheshwaris, Sheila and Ela were ad idem on the cross-objection of sheila. They did not want any fetter from the Court on the commercial exploitation of the said property. It is a fight as to who would have the major share of the cake. Church is always at the receiving end. Thanks to the wardens. Ms. Noelle Banerjee, learned counsel appearing for the Church on instruction contended that Church would be happy if the subject agreements were allowed to be performed with a little modification as to enhancement of the consideration that Maheshwaris were to pay to the official trustee and/or the Church, as the case may be. Official Trustee was not a party. In course of hearing we asked Mr. Bose to send a letter of request for them to come. We were told, notice was duly served. Official Trustee as usual did not think it fit to attend the Court’s call. 15. If we proceed having a strict interpretation of law we would have to allow the cross-objection. In course of hearing we asked Mr. Bose to send a letter of request for them to come. We were told, notice was duly served. Official Trustee as usual did not think it fit to attend the Court’s call. 15. If we proceed having a strict interpretation of law we would have to allow the cross-objection. Can we be a mere onlooker when the Church property was virtually under the control of the Court? Our conscience prick to notice the sorry state of affairs as depicted above. In 2012 the Courts, in our view, must strive to find out ways and means to do substantial justice instead of going into the niceties of law and extend support to those who wish to take shelter under the flaws of the law and remain scot free despite wrong being committed. Coming back to the issue, we feel, the learned Judge was right in denying the relief to Maheshwaris. The agreement itself was in doubt. Signatures appearing on the agreement were claimed to have been forged. Even if the agreement is given full credence, it has no independent limb to stand upon. Even the 1999 agreement was subject to the approval of the Court that is not forthcoming. We do not know how the arbitrator is proceeding. We do not wish to make any comment. From the facts as discussed above, the appellants were not entitled to any relief under Section 9 of the said Act of 1996. The learned Judge rightly denied the same that would deserve no interference. 16. We would have stopped there, had it not been a trust under the control and management of the Official Trustee that would amount to supervision of this Court. Considering the sorry state of affairs the parties are restrained to create any third party interest. It would be applicable to Sheila, Ela and their siblings. It would apply to Maheshwaris as well. It would also apply to Official Trustee. Whosoever wishes to disturb the status quo, must approach the appropriate Court upon notice to others and take appropriate steps and proceed accordingly. 17. We direct the Official Trustee to bring the entire facts to the notice of the learned Judge taking interlocutory matters and pray for necessary direction with regard to management and affairs of the property in question. 18. 17. We direct the Official Trustee to bring the entire facts to the notice of the learned Judge taking interlocutory matters and pray for necessary direction with regard to management and affairs of the property in question. 18. The Registrar, High Court, Original Side is directed to place a copy of this order before the learned interlocutory Judge for His Lordship’s information and perusal. 19. The appeals along with cross-objections are disposed of without any order as to costs.