JUDGMENT : Thomas P. Joseph, J. 1. These Second Appeals arise from the separate judgments and decrees passed by the learned Principal Sub Judge, Kochi in A.S. Nos. 79 of 2005 and 64 of 2007 and of learned Additional Munsiff, Kochi in OS Nos. 473 of 2004 and 28 of 2006. RSA No. 835 of 2007 is filed by the plaintiffs 1 to 5 in OS No. 473 of 2004. That is a suit for recovery of possession of the suit property on the strength of the title plaintiffs claim over the suit property as per Ext. A1, assignment deed dated 10/10/2001. Learned Munsiff dismissed the suit which the First Appellate Court has confirmed. Hence RSA No. 835 of 2007. 2. The defendant in OS No. 473 of 2004 along with his mother filed OS No. 28 of 2006 for a decree for specific performance of Ext. B2, agreement for sale dated 27/11/1995 said to be executed by the late Velappan, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs in OS No.473 of 2004. The Trial Court dismissed the suit against which plaintiffs in OS No. 28 of 2006 preferred AS No 64 of 2007. The First Appellate Court allowed that appeal and granted a decree for specific performance of Ext. B2, agreement for sale. The defendants in OS No. 28 of 2006 have filed RSA No. 123 of 2009. 3. In RSA No. 825 of 2007, the following substantial question of law is framed: When the Scheme by which plaint schedule property was assigned specifically prohibits transfer of the property for a period of twenty years, whether, Ext. B2, agreement for sale of the said property is valid as any transfer in violation of public policy is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act and if so, whether on the, strength of Ext. B2, Courts below were justified in non-suiting the plaintiff granting benefit under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act? 4. In RSA No. 123 of 2009, following are the substantial Questions of law framed: (i) Whether the lower Appellate Court is justified in interfering with the well reasoned judgment of the Trial Court without a definite finding as to whether or not the Trial Court went wrong in any legal or factual aspects? 4. In RSA No. 123 of 2009, following are the substantial Questions of law framed: (i) Whether the lower Appellate Court is justified in interfering with the well reasoned judgment of the Trial Court without a definite finding as to whether or not the Trial Court went wrong in any legal or factual aspects? (ii) Whether or not in a suit for specific performance which is a discretionary remedy, the Appellate Court has power or jurisdiction to upset the findings of the Trial Court in the absence of a finding by the Appellate Court that the finding of the Trial Court was in any manner perverse or without any evidence at all? (iii) Is the restriction in respect of alienation of a property for a specific period transferred under a specific scheme of a public authority invalid for any reason and form what point of time the said restriction will start operate under the law? (iv) Whether or not an agreement for specific performance in respect of a properly in which the executant's had no saleable right as on the date of agreement can give rise to a cause of action for specific performance under Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act? (v) Whether in view of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, limitation for suit for specific performance based on an agreement for sale which will operate only on fulfilment of specified event or condition will start from the date of occurrence or fulfilment of the said event or condition as the case may be? 5. After hearing learned counsel on both sides, I have today framed the following substantial question of law as well in RSA No. 123 of 2009: "(vi) Whether Velappan, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants had any heritable or assignable right in the suit property so that the agreement allegedly executed by him could be enforced against his legal representatives who claim to have acquired title of the property by Ext. A1, dated 10/10/2001 ?" 6. Facts necessary for a decision of the above substantial questions of law are: Appellants are the legal representatives of the late Velappan, S/o. Thevan Kunjappan. Thevan Kunjappan was a scavenger of the Cochin Corporation (for short, "the Corporation). The Corporation purchased 1.65 acres of land to be distributed among the landless scavengers of the Corporation belonging to the Scheduled Caste Community. Thevan Kunjappan was a scavenger of the Cochin Corporation (for short, "the Corporation). The Corporation purchased 1.65 acres of land to be distributed among the landless scavengers of the Corporation belonging to the Scheduled Caste Community. According to the respondents, the Corporation allotted three cents to the late Thevan Kunjappan and after him, his son, the late Velappan took possession of the said three cents. He agreed to assign the said three cents to one Alphonse. Alphonse (allegedly) executed Ext. B1, agreement for sale dated 15/05/1988 in favour of the 2nd respondent in RSA No. 123 of 2009 and gave possession of the suit property. Later, it is said, the late Velappan, S/o. Thevan Kunjappan (after the death of Thevan Kunjappan) executed Ext. B2, agreement for sale dated 27/11/1995 in favour of the 1st respondent in RSA No. 123 of 2009 agreeing to sell the said three cents for consideration mentioned therein and (allegedly) received by the said Velappan. The agreement stipulated for payment of compensation to the 1st respondent in RSA No. 23 of 2009 in case the late Velappan did not fulfil his promise. Respondents constructed a house in the said property. 7. While so, appellants filed OS No. 473 of 2004 for recovery of possession of the property alleging that respondents are trespassers in the said property. Respondents resists the suit on the strength of Exts. B1 and B2, agreements referred above. 8. After the Trial Court dismissed OS No. 473 of 2004, respondents filed OS No. 28 of 2006 for specific performance of Ext. B2, agreement for sale dated 27/11/1995 allegedly executed by the late Velappan in favour of the 1st respondent. Appellants denied execution of Exts. B1 and B2, agreements and contended that respondents are trespassers into the property. They also contended that Alphonse or Velappan had no right or interest over the property so that they could agree to convey it to the respondents. They claimed title over the property for themselves as per Ext. A1, assignment deed dated 10/10/2001. 9. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below were not correct in dismissing OS No. 473 of 2004 and the First Appellate Court, in allowing OS No. 28 of 2006. They claimed title over the property for themselves as per Ext. A1, assignment deed dated 10/10/2001. 9. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Courts below were not correct in dismissing OS No. 473 of 2004 and the First Appellate Court, in allowing OS No. 28 of 2006. It is contended that the Courts below have proceeded on the assumption that the suit property had devolved on the appellants as legal representatives of the late Velappan and hence appellants are bound by Ext. B2, agreement Velappan had allegedly executed in favour of the 1st respondent in RSA No. 123 of 2009. It is contented that Velappan had no right title, interest or possession of the property at the time Ext. B2, agreement was allegedly executed, nor did he acquire any interest thereafter so that after his death appellants as his legal representatives inherited it and were bound to honour Ext. B2, agreement. Appellants directly acquired title over the property as per Ext. A1, assignment deed dated 10/10/2001. There is no privity of contract between the appellants and the respondents. Hence the appellants could not be directed to execute assignment deed in favour of the respondents. It is argued by the learned counsel that Ext. B2, sale agreement even if executed by the late Velappan will not confer any interest or right over the property to the respondents. Reliance is placed on Rakhama Sitaram Ghadge v. Laxman Sitaram Ghadge and Another, AIR 1960 Bombay 105 ; A. N. Hangenatta Naidu v. Senthamarai and Others, AIR 1979 Mad. 26 and Kunhikrishnan v. Secretary, Nadapuram Service Co-op. Bank Ltd., 1986 KHC 444 : 1986 KLT SN 70 : 1986 KLJ 568 : 1986 KLN SN 64 : 1987 (1) KLT 201 . A further contention is that the due execution of Exts. B1 and B2, agreements is not proved. It is argued that there is no evidence to show how the property allegedly came into, the possession of Alphonse who is said to have executed Ext. B1, agreement. Ext. B1, agreement does not confer any right to the 1st respondent in RSA No. 123 of 2009. It is also argued by the learned counsel that at any rate, Ext. A1 contains a restriction that the property is not alienable for a period of 20 years and hence Ext. B1, agreement. Ext. B1, agreement does not confer any right to the 1st respondent in RSA No. 123 of 2009. It is also argued by the learned counsel that at any rate, Ext. A1 contains a restriction that the property is not alienable for a period of 20 years and hence Ext. B2, agreement even if executed by the late Velappan is not valid and could not be enforced. Learned counsel argued that restraint against alienation under Ext. A1 not being total is valid and not hit by Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act (for short, "the Act"). It was within the power of the Corporation to direct by a resolution that the allottees shall not transfer the property for a period of 20 years as referred to stated in Ext.A1. The decision of the Corporation has the force of law. Reliance is placed on Antony v. Chellanam Grama Panchayat, 2009 (3) KHC 331 : 2009 (3) KLT 334 : 2009 (2) KLJ 655-paragraph 25. Learned counsel argued that since the late Velappan had not acquired any heritable or alienable interest in the suit property. Section 53 of the Act has also no application. As respondents were aware, at the time of the alleged execution of Ext. B2 that Velappan had no right over the property. Section 43 of the Act has no application. That provision can apply only to a concluded transfer and not an agreement to transfer. 10. It is argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that the Courts below have found in favour of due execution of Exts. B1 and B2 and that does not involve any substantial question of law. It is further contended by the learned counsel that the Corporation executed Ext.A1, assignment deed in favour of the appellants only in their capacity as legal heirs of the late Velappan and hence appellants are bound by Ext. B2, agreement. Section 13(1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 would also save the situation so far as respondents are concerned and obliged the appellants to comply with the terms and conditions of Ext. B2. At any rate, Section 43 of the Act would apply and the appellants are bound to convey the right they have acquired as per Ext. A1, to the respondents. Section 53A of the Act is also relied upon to protect the possession of the respondents. 11. B2. At any rate, Section 43 of the Act would apply and the appellants are bound to convey the right they have acquired as per Ext. A1, to the respondents. Section 53A of the Act is also relied upon to protect the possession of the respondents. 11. It is the further contention of the learned counsel that whatever the Corporation has decided in the matter of restraint on alienation of the property is not part of the public policy; public policy must be enunciated by legislation and not by a decision of a local authority. Apart from the public policy the law making body has enunciated by enactment, it is not within the power of the Courts to decide what are public policy. Reliance is placed on Gherulai Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya and Others, 1959 KHC 546 : AIR 1959 SC 781 : 1959 Supp (2) SCR 406, Gulabchand Gambhirmal v. Kudilal Govindram and Another, AIR 1959 MP 151 and Sudha Alias Gulabi v. Sankappa Rai, AIR 1963 Mysore 245. 12. The learned counsel further argued that the restraint against alienation though for a limited period of 20 years is in effect a total restraint and hence hit by Section 10 of the Act. Reliance is placed on the decisions in Bhavani Amma v. Dakshina Kerala Maha Idavaka, 2007 (4) KHC 818 : 2008 (2) KLT 340 : AIR 2008 Kerala 38 : ILR 2007 (4) Ker. 556 : 2008 (1) KLJ 28 and Rajan v. Kumari Kamalam, 2010 (2) KLT SN 30. According to the learned counsel, the bar against restraint on alienation under Section 10 of the Act could be overcome only by an enactment made by the law making body and not by a resolution of the local authority. 13. So far as the execution of Exts. B1 and B2 challenged by the appellants is Concerned, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that though the 1st appellant ten examined as PW 1 in OS No. 473 of 2004 has stated in the proof affidavit that Ext. B2, agreement is not executed by the late Velappan but there is no challenge to that statement. It is also argued that there is no acceptable evidence that Ext. B2, agreement was executed by the late Velappan. Hence, the Courts below ought to have found against due execution of Ext. B2. So far as Ext. B2, agreement is not executed by the late Velappan but there is no challenge to that statement. It is also argued that there is no acceptable evidence that Ext. B2, agreement was executed by the late Velappan. Hence, the Courts below ought to have found against due execution of Ext. B2. So far as Ext. B1 is concerned it is argued that no witness is examined to prove its execution. 14. So far as Ext. B1 is concerned, the Courts below concurrently found in favour of its due execution based on the evidence given by PW 1 in OS No. 28 of 2006. So far as Ext. B2 is concerned, I was taken through the evidence of PW 1 in OS No. 473 of 2004. True that in the proof affidavit she denied that the said agreement was executed by her husband the late Velappan. It is also true that no specific question was put to PW 1 in cross-examination in that regard. But it is seen that in cross-examination it was suggested to PW 1 that by Ext. B2, agreement her husband had agreed to sell the suit property in favour of the 1st respondent in RSA No. 123 of 2009. Hence, it cannot be said that the version of PW 1 in OS No. 473 of 2004 was not challenged in cross-examination. Courts below having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case found in favour of the due execution of Ext. B2, as well. The finding of the Courts below as to the due execution of Exts. B1 and B2 is based on the evidence. So far as that finding is not shown to be perverse, it involved no substantial question of law. Hence the appellants cannot successfully contend in these Second Appeals that the due execution of Exts. B1 and B2 is not proved. 15. The crucial question for decision is whether by virtue of Ext. B2, respondents could the appellants to execute the assignment deed in their favour. In Ext. B2, Velappan who was a Government servant has stated that pursuant to the allotment of the suit property-three cents to his father, the late Thevan Kunjappan as per the Indira Scheme (for rehabilitation of scavengers), the said property belonged to the late Thevan Kunjappan and on his death, the late Velappan got absolute right over the said property. In Ext. B2, Velappan who was a Government servant has stated that pursuant to the allotment of the suit property-three cents to his father, the late Thevan Kunjappan as per the Indira Scheme (for rehabilitation of scavengers), the said property belonged to the late Thevan Kunjappan and on his death, the late Velappan got absolute right over the said property. The said property was agreed to be sold to the 1st respondent in RSA No.123 of 2009. 16. Ext. A1 is the assignment deed dated 10/10/2001 executed by the Corporation in favour of the appellants. There, it is stated that for rehabilitating the landless scavengers, the Corporation had evolved a scheme and accordingly purchased 1.65 Acres in RS No. 178 as per assignment deed No. 1198 of 1969. As per resolution No. 20 taken in the meeting of the Council on 07/01/1997 (Ext. B2, agreement executed by the late Velappan on 27/11/1995) it was decided to allot three cents each to the beneficiaries of the said scheme. Accordingly, the property referred to in Ext. A1 was assigned to the appellants with absolute right to effect mutation, possess the land and pay the revenue. Ext. A1 stipulates that in accordance with the decision as per file No. FCP 1 -151/68 the property was not to be alienated for a period of 20 years. It is stated in Ext. A1 that though the sale consideration is fixed as Rs. 1,000/-, it is given up in favour of the appellants (by the vendor, the Corporation). Ext. A1 contains a statement that since Velappan has expired, the document is being executed in favour of his legal representatives (appellants). 17. The learned counsel for the respondents would contend, with reference to the averments in the plaint in OS No. 473 of 2004 that the late Thevan Kunjappan and after him his son, the late Velappan were in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. It is the argument of the learned counsel that thus Thevan Kunjappan and after him, his son, Velappan had possessory right over the suit property which was capable of being assigned or agreed to the assigned. It is argued that the allotment by the Corporation was to the late Velappan and as he expired, Ext. A1 assignment deed was executed in favour of the appellants, his legal heirs. Hence Section 13(1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 applied, it is argued. It is argued that the allotment by the Corporation was to the late Velappan and as he expired, Ext. A1 assignment deed was executed in favour of the appellants, his legal heirs. Hence Section 13(1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 applied, it is argued. 18. The decisions in Rakhama Sitaram Ghadge v. Laxman Sitaram Ghadge and Another, A.N. Ranganatha Naidu v. Senthamarai and Others and Kunhiknshnan v. Secretary, Nadapi Service Co-op. Bank Ltd. are authority to hold that an agreement for sale by itself does not create any right or interest in immovable property. Going by Ext. A1, it appears to me that though, in the capacity as legal representatives of the late Velappan, the assignment under Ext. A1 was directly in favour of the appellants. That they are the legal representatives of the late Velappan may be the reason why the Corporation assigned the land to the appellants. The sale consideration otherwise payable by the appellants was given up by the Corporation in favour of the appellants. This is not a case of assignment being in favour of the late Velappan and by inheritance, appellants acquiring it. I must also notice that going by Ext. A1, the decision to allot the plots to the beneficiaries was taken by the Corporation only in its meeting on 07/01/1997 while Ext. B2, agreement was executed by the late Velappan on 27/11/1995. (I am told that Velappan died on 19/04/1997). 19. True that Ext. A1 shows that even during the life time of the late Velappan and though, subsequent to Ext. B2 the Corporation of Cochin had in its meeting on 07.01.1997 taken a decision to allot land to the beneficiaries of the Scheme. But, that decision of the Corporation did not confer any alienable or heritable right on the late Velappan. At the best, he was only a beneficiary of the Scheme in his capacity as the legal heir of the late Thevan Kunjappan who was a scavenger of the Corporation. That, there was a decision taken by the Corporation on 07/01/1997 did not clothe the late Velappan with any heritable assignable right over the property. Until Ext. A1, assignment deed dated 10/10/2001, the Corporation continued to be the absolute owner in possession of the suit property and by Ext. A1, that was conveyed to the appellants. 20. I must also notice that though Ext. Until Ext. A1, assignment deed dated 10/10/2001, the Corporation continued to be the absolute owner in possession of the suit property and by Ext. A1, that was conveyed to the appellants. 20. I must also notice that though Ext. A1 is styled as an assignment deed, no consideration did pass from the appellants in favour of the Corporation, the vendor. Ext. A1 states that the sale consideration fixed as Rs. 1,000/- was given up in favour of the appellants obviously in view of the Scheme the Corporation had evolved to the benefit of the landless scavengers under it. Ext. A1 could betaken as a gratuitous transfer in favour of the appellants for the service done by their predecessor in interest, the late Thevan Kunjappan. 21. In J.E. Solomon v. Official assignee and Another, 1939 (180) Indian Cases 399, referring to Section 6 of the Act and the expression "like nature" occurring therein, it is held that transfer of a chance of receiving a gratuitous payment at the discretion of an employer for services rendered is purely a fortuitous possibility; its realization is not to be determined by the effort or design of the transferor. It is as of a like nature to the mere expectation of purely fortuitous possibility of succeeding to the whole or part of an estate. It is held that such a claim or privilege is not transferable. 22. The Scheme the Corporation had evolved was for the advantage of the landless scavengers belonging to the Scheduled Caste Community. The Corporation decided to allot three cents each to the beneficiaries under that Scheme. It was by a resolution dated 07/01/1997 (subsequent to Ext. B2) that the beneficiaries were selected by the Corporation one of whom happened to be the late Velappan for the service done by his father, the late Thevan Kunjappan. In other words, the late Velappan was taken as a beneficiary in recognition of the service his father had rendered to the Corporation. Velappan had no legal right to claim to be a beneficiary. He only had the chance of being one of the beneficiaries and may be due to his death in the meantime, fact remains that no. assignment was made in his favour. He acquired no heritable or assignable right over the property. The allotment and selection of the beneficiaries were entirely at the discretion of the Corporation. He only had the chance of being one of the beneficiaries and may be due to his death in the meantime, fact remains that no. assignment was made in his favour. He acquired no heritable or assignable right over the property. The allotment and selection of the beneficiaries were entirely at the discretion of the Corporation. I am not inclined to think, either that Velappan had any interest over the property to agree to be conveyed as per Ext.B2 or that appellants inherited any right or interest from the said Velappan so that they are bound by Ext. B2. 23. Turning to Section 13(1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on Clause (a) which, says that if the vendor or lessor has subsequently to the contract acquired any interest in the property, the purchaser or lessee may compel him to make good the contract out of such interest. I give emphasis to the expression 'interest' occurring in Clause (a) of Section 13(1). I stated that during his life time, the late Velappan had not acquired any interest and much less any heritable or assignable interest in the suit property and that by virtue of Ext. A1, appellants directly acquired right over the property from the Corporation. Hence Section 13(1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act has no application. Moreover, Section 13(1)(a) can apply only to a concluded contract of sale and not to an agreement for sale as held in Silla Chandra Sekharam v. Lalita Shahuani and Another, AIR 1359 Orissa 169. Respondents cannot by virtue of Section 13(1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 enforce Ext. B2 on the appellants. 24. Another contention raised on behalf of respondents is that they are entitled to the protection of Section 43 of the Act. I am not inclined to accept that contention since the said provision applies only to cases of fraudulent or erroneous transfer of property by a person who did not have right over it. In this case no question of 'fraudulent' or 'erroneous' transfer is involved as there is only an agreement for sale (and not a proposed transfer) and nobody has a case that Velappan had erroneously or fraudulently professed to convey right or interest in the suit property. Respondents were aware that Velappan had no right or interest oven the property, as Ext. Respondents were aware that Velappan had no right or interest oven the property, as Ext. B2 only refers to a chance of Velappan being a beneficiary of the scheme evolved by the Corporation. 25. Though, was contended by the learned counsel for respondents that the averments in the plaint in OS No. 473 of 2004 show that the late Thevan Kunjappan and after him, the late Velappan had possessory right over the property, I am not inclined to accept that argument as well. In the plaint in OS No. 473 of 2004 what is averred is that the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants was permitted to put up a house in the suit property and possess it, I can only understand that as a permission granted by the Corporation, the rightful owner of the property to put up a house (Sic: to put a house), which is in the form of a licence, and even if it is assumed that for the purpose of enjoyment of that licence, the late Velappan had some sort of possession over the property, that does not amount to 'possession' in law. 'Possession' was with the Corporation. A licensee also can have some sort of possession (though under the licensor) for the proper enjoyment of the license. Ext. A1 specifically authorizes the appellant to possess and enjoy the property. So, it is a case of appellants getting possession oil property from the Corporation and not inheriting possession of the late Velappan. Hence the question of enforcing Ext. B2 against the appellants to the extent of possessory right also does not arise. For the said reason, the late Velappan could not also put the respondents in possession". At the best, it was only an occupation under a licensee, the late Velappan which was not binding on the licensor, the Corporation who, by virtue of Ext. A1 gave legal possession of the property to the appellants. Hence, Section 53A of the Act also has no application. From the date of Ext. A1, possession of the respondents become adverse to the appellants and they, by virtue of Ext. A1 acquired the right to take possession of the suit property. 26. The other question I am called upon to answer is whether Ext. B2, agreement is invalid as it violates Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act being a contract against public policy. A1, possession of the respondents become adverse to the appellants and they, by virtue of Ext. A1 acquired the right to take possession of the suit property. 26. The other question I am called upon to answer is whether Ext. B2, agreement is invalid as it violates Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act being a contract against public policy. I am also called upon to decide whether the restraint against alienation in Ext.A1 though for a period of 20 years is hit by Section 10 of the Act. 27. So far as the latter question is concerned, reference is made by the learned counsel for respondents to the decisions in Bhavani Amma v. Dakshina Kerala Maha Idavaka and Rajan v. Kumari Kamalam (supra). In the former decision the question considered was whether a provision in a sale deed that on failure to construct a private college in the property sold, the property shall be reconveyed by the vendee to the vendor is barred under Section 10 of the Act? It was held that if an absolute estate is created and after the creation of such an estate a condition which brings a diminution of that absolute estate is imposed on the person in whose favour the absolute estate is created, such condition being repugnant to the nature of the estate created is void and unenforceable. In the latter of the above said two decisions, it is held that even a restraint for a short period is void under Section 10 of the Act. 28. Ext. A1 provides that the appellants shall not alienate the property for a period of 20 years. In Renaud v. Tourangeau, ILR 1867 (2) PC 4 the Privy Council has opined that a restriction against alienation for 20 years was contrary to the general principles of jurisprudence. Jarman says (see 'Jarman 8th Edn.' page 571) that "it seems now settled that a restraint on alienation is bad even if it is limited in point of time." May be limited to a period of 20 years, the restraint on alienation is absolute during that period. The Corporation, by a resolution of it cannot overcome the bar under Section 10 of the Act. The restraint against alienation is held void by Section 10 of the Act. That is a provision enacted by the Legislature. The Corporation, by a resolution of it cannot overcome the bar under Section 10 of the Act. The restraint against alienation is held void by Section 10 of the Act. That is a provision enacted by the Legislature. A public policy to overcome that bar must be the result of an enactment by the Legislature. The decision in Antony v. Chellanam Grama Panchayat (supra) only says that like a Legislature, the Panchayat committee should have the powers to annul the action of the executive by a legislative process, which in the case of a Panchayat is by passing a resolution by the committee. But the decision of the local authority cannot override a provisions of the Statute. Therefore, I am to hold that the condition restraining alienation in Ext. A1 imposed by the Corporation by its decision being a total restraint of alienation is void by virtue of Section 10 of the Act. 29. Then the next question is whether Ext. B2, agreement is violate of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act? I referred to Ext. A1 and the resolution taken by the Corporation on 07/01/1997 to allot property to the beneficiaries of the Scheme. I also referred to Ext. A1 to say that it was by file No. FCP 1 -151/68 that the Corporation decided that there must be a restraint against alienation of property allotted to the beneficiaries for a period of 20 years. 30. In Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya and Others (supra) the Supreme Court has referred to what is 'public policy' and how it is evolved. In paragraph 22, reference is made to the decision of Park B, in Egerton v. Brownlow, 1853 (4) HLC 121 where it is held that the term, 'public policy' is vague and unsatisfactory, and calculated to lead to uncertainty and error, when applied to the decision of legal rights; it may, and does, in its ordinary sense, mean 'political expedience' or that which is best for the common good of the community. It is further stated in that "it is the province of the statesman, and not the lawyer, to discuss, and of the Legislature to determine what is best for the public good, and to provide for it by proper enactments". It is further stated in that "it is the province of the statesman, and not the lawyer, to discuss, and of the Legislature to determine what is best for the public good, and to provide for it by proper enactments". The Supreme Court says that the observations quoted from Park B in Egerton v. Brownlow indicate that the doctrine of public policy is only a branch of common law and unless the principle of public policy is recognised, by that law, Court cannot apply it to invalidate a contract. In paragraph 23, the doctrine of public policy may be summarized as under: "Public policy or the policy of the law is an illusive concept, it has been described as "untrustworthy guide", "variable quality", "uncertain one" "unruly horse", etc.; the primary duty of a Court of Law is to enforce a promise which the parties have made and to uphold the sanctity of contracts which form the basis of society. " It is also held that it is advisable in the interest of stability of society not to make any attempt to discover new heads in these days. 31. What are public policy is considered by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulabchand Gambhirmal v. Kudilal Govindram and Another (supra). Certain illustrations are also given. May be the illustration is not exhaustive but, it gives guidelines as to what could or would be public policy. Here, no public policy is evolved by the Legislature. Hence it cannot be said that Ext. B2 is hit by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. 32. The substantial questions of law are answered as above. 33. In the light of my above findings, I must hold that respondents are not entitled to get specific performance of Ext. B2, agreement against the appellants and get a sale deed executed as decreed by the Courts below. Appellants, on the strength of their title over the suit property are entitled to recover the same from the respondents. 34. Going by Exts. B1 and B2, it would appear that it was not the appellants or their predecessors who had constructed the present building in the suit property. The principle 'quic quid plantatur solo cedit solo' which is applicable in England is not applicable in India. Hence the land and building could be owned by different persons. 34. Going by Exts. B1 and B2, it would appear that it was not the appellants or their predecessors who had constructed the present building in the suit property. The principle 'quic quid plantatur solo cedit solo' which is applicable in England is not applicable in India. Hence the land and building could be owned by different persons. Evidence shows that the building in the suit property was constructed by the respondents. Hence it is at the option of the appellants either to pay off the respondents for the building and other structures they have constructed in the suit property or, permit the respondents to remove the building and other structures. In case the appellants desire to pay off the respondents for the cost of constructions made in the suit property, the cost as of now, shall be determined by the executing Court by appointing an Advocate Commissioner at the expense of the appellants. Resultantly the Second Appeals are allowed as under: (A) RSA No. 825 of 2007 (i) The judgment and decree of learned Principal Sub Judge, Kochi in AS No. 79 of 2005 and of learned Additional Munsiff, Kochi in OS No. 473 of 2004 are set aside. (ii) OS No. 473 of 2004 is decreed as under; (a) Appellants/plaintiffs are allowed to recover possession of the suit property from respondents on the strength of their title. (b) Appellants/plaintiffs will have the option, either to pay the cost (as of now) of constructions made by the respondents in the suit property and assessed by the executing Court, to the respondents or, permit the respondents to remove the structures they have put up in the said property before the suit property is delivered to the appellants/plaintiffs. (c) If the appellants/plaintiffs do not exercise that option within the time granted by the executing Court, respondents shall remove the structures in the suit property within the time granted by the executing Court failing which it will be open to the appellants to get it removed through the executing Court and realise its expense from the respondents. (B) RSA No. 123 of 2009 (i) The judgment and decree of learned Sub Judge, Kochi in AS No. 64 of 2007 are set aside. (ii) The judgment and decree of learned Additional Munsiff, Kochi in OS No. 28 of 2006 are restored. (B) RSA No. 123 of 2009 (i) The judgment and decree of learned Sub Judge, Kochi in AS No. 64 of 2007 are set aside. (ii) The judgment and decree of learned Additional Munsiff, Kochi in OS No. 28 of 2006 are restored. (iii) OS No. 28 of 2006 of the Court of learned Additional Munsiff, Kochi will stand dismissed. (C) Parties shall suffer their costs in all the proceedings. All pending interlocutory applications will stand dismissed.