JUDGMENT Heard Sr. Advocate Shri S.S. Kulshestra assisted by counsels Shri Rohit Roy, Mr. R. Sahay and Mr. A.K. Sinha on behalf of the petitioner and Shri Niranjan Kumar Singh and Mr. Bhawesh Kumar on behalf of the Zila Parishad and also Standing Counsel representing the State of Jharkhand. 2. Relief claimed in the instant writ petition is for issuance of appropriate writ or direction for quashing the letter No. 833 dated 31.08.2005 issued by Deputy Development CommissionercumCEO, Zila Parishad, Dhanbad, whereby the land falling under Khata No. 165, plot No. 266, Mouza No. 51, MouzaDhanbad, is directed to be vacated, also to quash the general order as contained in Memo No. TP 812 dated 30.08.2005 issued by the Executive Engineer, Town Planning Division, MADA, Dhanbad whereby unilateral declaration by the SDO, Dhanbad that the land in question is a public land, issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 05.04.2011 passed by Commissioner, North Chhotanagpur Division, Dhanbad, in encroachment Appeal No. 99 of 2005, quashing part of the notice in Memo No. 155/Zi.Pari dated 26.03.2011 published in 'Hindustan', Dhanbad edition dated 27.03.2011, so far it relates to Textile Market, Bank More, Dhanbad (Sl. No. 34) and also for quashing the notice dated 05.04.2011 contained in Memo No. 182/ZP whereby the petitioner has been directed to vacate the land in question within 24 hours and to restrain the respondent from taking any coercive action against the petitioner in respect of Textile Market, Bank More, Dhanbad. 3. The petitioner is a Society registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 constituted to promote wholesale cloth business and make available shops to the members of the Society and other sections of the Society. It is contended that approximately 200 members of the petitioner Society were in occupation of the shops in the space allotted to them. 4. The relief in the instant writ petition is regarding a building consisting of a number of shops situated at DB plot No. 1, C.S. plot No. 266, C.S. Khata No. 165, Mouza No. 51, MouzaDhanbad, P.S.Bank More, Dhanbad, having an area of 1 Bigha, 10 Kathas, 10 Chhataks and 32 sq. ft. commonly known as Textile Market. 5. 4. The relief in the instant writ petition is regarding a building consisting of a number of shops situated at DB plot No. 1, C.S. plot No. 266, C.S. Khata No. 165, Mouza No. 51, MouzaDhanbad, P.S.Bank More, Dhanbad, having an area of 1 Bigha, 10 Kathas, 10 Chhataks and 32 sq. ft. commonly known as Textile Market. 5. It is further submitted that C.S. plot No. 266 pertaining to C.S. Khata No. 165 of MouzaDhanbad, originally belonged to Manbhum District Board, a public body constituted under the Bihar & Orissa (Local Self Government) Act, 1985. This land was divided into a number of plots and settled with various persons in the early 1930 by the District Board, Manbhum. Certain pucca structures were constructed. Thereafter, the land on which the commercial structure is standing was put to auction by Manbhum District Board after issue of a public notice dated 29.05.1933. The purchaser was one Shri Prabhulal Pranjivan Pathak of Dhanbad, who made the highest bid. His bid of Rs. 5,000/being the highest was accepted and the bid money was deposited on 29.05.1933 and 31.08.1933. A registered deed of permanent settlement No. 1755 dated 16.04.1934 was executed by Rai Bahadur Sri Satish Chandra Sinha as Chairman of Manbhum District Board and other two members in favour of Prabhulal Pranjivan Pathak. Copy of the said registered deed of permanent settlement is brought on record by means of Annexure1. The other registered Deed of Kabuliat in favour of Manbhum District Board was also executed on the same day i.e. 16.04.1934. Prabhulal Pranjivan Pathak, Hari Shankar Worah, Kripa Chand Worah and Narbharam G. Chanchani provided funds for the purchase of said plot (Registered Deed of Kabuliat is annexed as Annexure2). The said settlee paid rent to Manbhum District Board in terms of the deed of settlement. The property was subsequently partitioned between the purchasers. 6. Learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner submits that the land was transferred to P.W.D. (Road) by virtue of Bihar Government Gazette Notification No. D/IIR93/5011407/LSG dated 24.11.1950. Learned counsel has further submitted that after the respective shares were allocated, sons of Kripa Shankar Worah, namely, Harsukh Worah and Chandrakant Worah transferred the land in question in favour of the petitioner Society by a registered Deed of Conveyance No. 4751 dated 18.09.1997 (photocopy of the said Deed of Conveyance is annexed as Annexure3). Learned counsel has further submitted that after the respective shares were allocated, sons of Kripa Shankar Worah, namely, Harsukh Worah and Chandrakant Worah transferred the land in question in favour of the petitioner Society by a registered Deed of Conveyance No. 4751 dated 18.09.1997 (photocopy of the said Deed of Conveyance is annexed as Annexure3). Thereafter, the Society got its name mutated in the P.W.D. and continued to pay rent to the Department, till the year 2005. Subsequently, the P.W.D. refused to accept rent from the petitioner on account of pendency of Dhanbad Encroachment Appeal No. 99 of 2005 (Annexure4 to the writ petition is photocopy of the letter No. 1608 dated 07.12.1999, rent receipt and letter No. 1419 dated 15.09.2001). 7. The petitioner's case proceeds further on a specific assertion that all the old structure standing on the land was demolished and the present Textile Market was constructed after obtaining sanction/no objection on 09.11.2001 from MADA, Dhanbad. 8. The controversy arose for the first time when Zila Parishad issued a notice dated 31.08.2005 (Annexure6) for removal of the encroachment over the land of Khata No. 165, plot No. 266, Area0.27½decimals, close to the Over bridge. 9. Learned counsel states that individual notice was not served to the petitioner Society, but a general order was issued that SDO, Dhabad has initiated proceedings for removal of the encroachment and unauthorized occupants from the public land bearing Khata No. 165, plot No. 266. The Dhanbad Encroachment Appeal No. 99 of 2005 was subsequently dismissed as not maintainable consequent to a direction by this Court to decide the appeal in the year 2011. The said appeal was dismissed on 05.04.2011 on the ground that there was no order passed under Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, 1985 and, therefore, appeal was not maintainable. Thus, the petitioner has laid emphasis that till date, no proceedings under the aforesaid Act of 1985 has ever been initiated for removal of the socalled encroachment or affording any opportunity of hearing. 10. The notice impugned in the instant writ petition, vide Memo No. 155/ Zi.Pari dated 26.03.2011 was published in 'Hindustan' Dhanbad edition dated 27.03.2011 and also to quash the letter No. 833 dated 31.08.2005 issued by Deputy Development CommissionercumCEO, Zila Parishad, Dhanbad, declaring the land of Khata No. 165, plot No. 266 public land of Zila Parishad. 10. The notice impugned in the instant writ petition, vide Memo No. 155/ Zi.Pari dated 26.03.2011 was published in 'Hindustan' Dhanbad edition dated 27.03.2011 and also to quash the letter No. 833 dated 31.08.2005 issued by Deputy Development CommissionercumCEO, Zila Parishad, Dhanbad, declaring the land of Khata No. 165, plot No. 266 public land of Zila Parishad. The petitioners were therefore directed to vacate the shops in their occupation forthwith. This was during the pendency of Encroachment Appeal No. 99 of 2005 and Zila Parishad had put in appearance, but no objection or show cause was filed. 11. Counsel on behalf of the petitioner has brought to my notice that Government of Bihar, Local Self Government Department, in exercise of powers under Section 3(1) of Bihar Provincialisation of Roads and Hospitals Act, 1947 (Bihar Act No. 6 of 1948), vide Notification No. D/IIR93/5011407/LSG dated 24.11.1950 transferred the DhanbadKatras Road and GovindpurDhanbad Road, along with four other roads covering total length of 31 miles 07 furlongs and 96 yards, to P.W.D. The width of the road was not specified since the statute takes care about the width by defining the term 'Road' by virtue of Section 3 of the Bihar Act No. 6 of 1948, the District Board, Manbhum was stripped of the power to control and administer road and, thus, powers were vested in the State of Bihar. The said Act provides that the State of Bihar was represented by P.W.D. and a notification was also endorsed to that effect. Extract of the aforesaid Act is quoted below: “2. Definitions. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, (a) ......... (b) ......... (c) ......... (d) 'Road includes. (i) on both sides, the drains or gutters and the land up to the defined boundary of any abutting property, notwithstanding the projection over such land of any platform, verandah or other superstructure; and (ii) the soil, pavements, stones and other materials of the road and all drains, bridges, culverts, causeways, trees, channels erections, materials, implements and other things provided for or appertaining to the road. 3. Vesting of roads and hospitals in the Government. 3. Vesting of roads and hospitals in the Government. The (State) Government may, by notification, direct that, with effect from such date as may be specified therein and subject to the provisions of Section 6 and such conditions and exceptions as may be prescribed, any hospital or road which is vested in, or is under the control or administration of, the Commissioners of any Municipality, any District Board or other Local Authority or any Committee or Joint Committee or other body thereof constituted under the Bihar & Orissa Local Self Government Act of 1885, the Bihar & Orissa Municipal Act, 1922, or any other law whereby the local authority was constituted (or any person or trustee) shall notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, be vested in (the State Government); Provided that before issuing such notification, the (State) Government shall give such notice as it considers reasonable of its intention to issue such notification and shall consider any objections or suggestions that may be put forward by the local authority concerned or other interested persons; (Provided further that nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to apply to any hospital, which is vested in, or is under the control or administration of any religious or philanthropic mission). (2) Subject as aforesaid, all rights and liabilities of the Commissioners of the Municipality, the District Board or other local authority or of any committee (Joint Committee, body, persons or trustee) referred to in subsection (i) in, appertaining to, or arising out of, the property covered by the notification issued under that subsection shall, with effect from the date mentioned in the notification pass and be transferred to (the Government) and the (State) Government shall from such date be in charge of the administration, control, maintenance and management of the said property. 6. Compensation. 6. Compensation. Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to authorise the acquisition of any private right or interest in any hospital, road or in any portion thereof, without the payment of compensation in the manner and in accordance with the principles hereinafter set out, that is to say, (a) where the amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement; (b) where no such agreement can be reached, it shall be determined in the prescribed manner by an arbitrator of prescribed qualifications appointed by the (State) Government; (c) the arbitrator in making his award shall have regard to the provisions of subsection (1) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, so far as the same can be made applicable; (d) an appeal shall lie to the prescribed authority against the award of an arbitrator except in cases where the amount thereof does not exceed an amount prescribed in this behalf and the decision of the prescribed, authority on any such appeal shall be final; (e) save as provided in this section and anything that may be prescribed, nothing in any law for the time being in force shall apply to arbitrations under this section. Explanation-In this section, the expression “Private right or interest” shall not be deemed to include any right or interest of any local authority or body referred to in subsection (1) of Section (3). 12. Emphatic submission on behalf of the petitioner is that Section 6 of Bihar Act No. 6 of 1948 makes it clear that the land abutting to the road belonging to a private person could be acquired in lieu of compensation. The State Government acquired a portion of plot No. 266/12 measuring 3 decimals and compensation was paid to the owner of the plot, who purchased the land from the District Board. Judgment in Reference Case No. 41/35 of 196769 is also brought on record in the instant writ petition, which is annexed along with the supplementary affidavit as Annexure15. The State Government acquired a portion of plot No. 266/12 measuring 3 decimals and compensation was paid to the owner of the plot, who purchased the land from the District Board. Judgment in Reference Case No. 41/35 of 196769 is also brought on record in the instant writ petition, which is annexed along with the supplementary affidavit as Annexure15. The petitioner wrote a letter to the Circle Officer, Dhanbad dated 28.05.2001 informing that the name of the petitioner society stands mutated in the records of P.W.D., Dhanbad, vide its letter No. 1608 dated 07.12.1999 (Annexure16 to the writ petition) seeking information from the Circle Officer, Dhanbad that whether any subsequent mutation in the revenue records under the control of Circle Officer, Dhanbad would be required and whether any rent is payable or not ? This was replied by the Circle Officer, vide letter No. 1573 dated 12.06.2001 that the land in question stands transferred in the name of P.W.D. and the necessary formalities were to be completed by the P.W.D. Thus, this communication was relied upon by the petitioner regarding transfer of the land and the Control of P.W.D. 13. Learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner argued that notification No. D/IIR93/5011407/LSG dated 24.11.1950 is sufficient proof that Zila Parishad was already divested from any right of managing the property in question. 14. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Zila Parishad disputing the petitioner's claim on the basis of various documents, rent receipts and the letters issued by the P.W.D., on the ground that judicial review of the disputed questions of right, title and interest cannot be permitted under writ jurisdiction. Article 226 is an extraordinary jurisdiction and since the petitioner has encroached and made constructions over the land belonging to the Zila Parishad, notice was issued for removal of unauthorized structure under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act. An Appeal filed at the behest of the petitioner was dismissed as not maintainable. The documents relied upon by the petitioner are subject matter of investigation by the Vigilance department, which will ascertain and examine the documents. It is further stated that the documents are forged, fabricated, illegal and only after a clearance by the Vigilance department, the petitioner could place any reliance and stake its claim on its basis. The documents relied upon by the petitioner are subject matter of investigation by the Vigilance department, which will ascertain and examine the documents. It is further stated that the documents are forged, fabricated, illegal and only after a clearance by the Vigilance department, the petitioner could place any reliance and stake its claim on its basis. The respondent has also asserted that pursuant to the Bihar Provincialisation of Roads and Hospitals Act, 1947, a notification dated 24.11.1950 was issued by the Local Self Government Department, Government of Bihar, that it is only the roads that vests in P.W.D. and not the road side land, which is the property of the Zila Parishad. P.W.D. is not empowered to mutate any name nor can prepare any record of right under tenancy and, therefore, the documents annexed with the writ petition are void and confer no right, title or interest on the petitioner and, thus, the land mutated by P.W.D. is without any legal authority. The rent receipts issued also do not confer any right and that the petitioner is in unauthorized occupation. 15. The emphasis by Respondent No. 4 is on the orders of the P.I.L. wherein I.A. No. 971 of 2011 was treated as contempt application and direction was issued by a Division Bench of this Court to remove all illegal encroachments. The Zila Parishad has also emphasized on the decision of this Court dated 11.07.2011 in three connected writ petitions W.P.(C) No. 2687 of 2011, W.P.(C) No. 2688 of 2011 and W.P.(C) No. 1932 of 2011 dismissing the writ petitions. The said decision was upheld in L.P.A. No. 269 of 2011 and L.P.A. No. 270 of 2011, vide order dated 22.09.2011. The respondents submits that the judgment is upheld in L.P.A., since the controversy involved is same, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 16. I have gone through the writ petition, counter affidavit, written submissions on behalf of the petitioner and the judgment passed in the three connected writ petitions as well as the order passed in L.P.A. I have also considered the arguments advanced on behalf of the respective counsel. Before I proceed to decide the actual controversy, the submission on behalf of the respondent that since various writ petitions decided by this Court in favour of Zila Parishad and upheld in the L.P.A., the present controversy is also covered by the previous decision. Before I proceed to decide the actual controversy, the submission on behalf of the respondent that since various writ petitions decided by this Court in favour of Zila Parishad and upheld in the L.P.A., the present controversy is also covered by the previous decision. In my opinion, this assertion alone cannot be a basis to outrightly reject the writ petition without ascertaining and analyzing various issues involved. The facts of the present case and assertions and submissions on behalf of the petitioner as well as the basis of the claim is identical or not? In fact, the ground for rejection of the writ petitions was besides insufficiency of any document to substantiate their right or claim in the previous writ petition, the petitioner had approached this Court earlier by filing two writ petitions, W.P.(C) No. 5244 of 2005 (Deba Prasad Chakraborty Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.) and W.P.(C) No. 5918 of 2005 (Smt. Bimla Devi & Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.), this Court had declined to grant any relief and recorded a finding with a direction to the petitioner to get their right and title adjudicated by a competent authority or civil court of competent jurisdiction. The documents annexed and the special features of the present case projects altogether a different picture. The documents and various orders were not brought on record in the previous writ petitions such as control over the road side land and transfer to P.W.D. under the Bihar Provincialisation of Roads and Hospitals Act, 1947. Various documents such as the registered deed of permanent settlement (Annexure1), registered Deed of Kabuliat (Annexure2), Deed of Conveyance (Annexure3), photocopy of the letter No. 1608 dated 07.12.1999, rent receipts and letter No. 1419 dated 15.09.2001 (Annexure4) issued by the P.W.D. etc. were not placed before the court. Besides, the petitioner brought on record all these documents in Encroachment Appeal No. 99 of 2005 and also the present petitioner never approached previously for adjudication of its right in this Court. The provisions of Bihar Act No. 6 of 1948, the notification dated 24.11.1950, whereby DhanabdKatras Road and GovindpurDhanbad Road with four other roads, power and control and administration was transferred to the State of Bihar which was represented by P.W.D. These questions were not decided nor the documents detailed above were brought on record to substantiate the claim. The provisions of Bihar Act No. 6 of 1948, the notification dated 24.11.1950, whereby DhanabdKatras Road and GovindpurDhanbad Road with four other roads, power and control and administration was transferred to the State of Bihar which was represented by P.W.D. These questions were not decided nor the documents detailed above were brought on record to substantiate the claim. Besides, the earlier judgment is a judgment in personam and cannot be treated to be a judgment in rem and, therefore, cannot be made binding to the instant writ petition. Learned counsel tried to substantiate his arguments on the basis of certain decisions of the Apex Court, Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Gurnam Kaur, AIR (1989) SC 38, Government of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. V. Gowramma & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 863 and State of Haryana & Anr. Vs. Dharam Singh & Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 340. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had dealt with the principle of 'Precedence'. How a previous decision can be binding on a subsequent case, having same questions involved ? The Apex Court ruled that even if the same questions are involved in a subsequent petition that cannot be necessarily binding on the subsequent case unless it is substantiated that the question decided and the ratio laid in the previous decisions are absolutely identical and covers all the disputed question in the subsequent petition. In the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), the Apex Court had ruled that a decision or direction in a previous case could not be treated to be a precedence. In the case of Jamna Das Vs. Delhi Administration, the Hon'ble Supreme Court issued direction to the Municipal Corporation to construct stalls and put the petitioner and pavement squatters in possession thereof. This was a consent order between the parties. In the subsequent decision of Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), the Apex Court declined to accept the decision in Jamna Das Case as a precedence since it was decided without any reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from the public place. In the subsequent decision of Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), the Apex Court declined to accept the decision in Jamna Das Case as a precedence since it was decided without any reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from the public place. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that where a previous petition in which the controversy was decided on the basis of an agreement, a subsequent petition preferred by a pavement squatter for issuance of appropriate writ or direction restraining the Municipal Corporation from evicting without adopting due process of law, the Supreme Court held that the high court could not rely on the previous decision of the Apex Court which was passed on the basis of consent and agreement between the parties. Similarly, in the case of Government of Karnataka (supra), it was held that a decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. A principle on which a question before a court decided previously and if the same facts, circumstances and the question of law is involved, then it can be made binding. However, each case presents its own features and every thing said in the previous decision cannot be made binding on a subsequent case without adventing to the submissions made and the special features brought forth in a subsequent dispute. According to the well settled theory of precedence, every decision consist of three basic postulates (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is therefore an authority for what it actually decides. Similar views have been expressed in the case of State of Haryana (supra). 18. On perusal of judgment of the three connected writ petitions, the basis is that there was no document or lease deed or any rent receipts etc. brought on record in support of a prima facie legal possession. Similar views have been expressed in the case of State of Haryana (supra). 18. On perusal of judgment of the three connected writ petitions, the basis is that there was no document or lease deed or any rent receipts etc. brought on record in support of a prima facie legal possession. Besides, the legal questions regarding notification dated 24.11.1950, provisions of Bihar Provincialisation of Roads and Hospitals Act, 1947, the registered deeds annexed with the writ petition were not brought on record to substantiate their claim. In the first round of litigation, two petitioners were directed to get the disputed questions decided by an authority or a court of competent jurisdiction as far back in the year 2005, which admittedly was not done and, therefore, the present case cannot be dismissed merely because the previous writ petition was dismissed. Specific questions have been raised in this writ petition which is supported by documents, even assuming that those documents cannot be given a legal binding effect, but it can only be discarded in the event either it is found to be forged, fictitious or unenforceable by a competent court. The documents brought on record are not denied by the respondents as well. 19. In view of these circumstances, I am compelled to decide the instant writ petition on its own merit. In the instant case, the petitioner has brought on record copy of a registered deed of permanent settlement in favour of Prabhulal Pranjivan Pathak as Annexure1 and simultaneously, Deed of Kabuliat in favour of Manbhum District Board executed on 16.04.1934 by Prabhulal Pranjivan Pathak, Hari Shankar Worah, Kripa Chand Worah and Narbharam G. Chanchani, who, according to the petitioner, provided funds for purchase of the said plot. Annexure2 is the Deed of Kabuliat. The petitioner Society has also brought on record a registered Deed of Conveyance No. 4751 dated 18.09.1997 as Annexure3. Annexure4 to the writ petition is a letter No. 1608 dated 07.12.1991 by the Public Works Department, Dhanbad to Koylanchal Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd., Jalan Market, Kirkend, Dhanbad which was a demand letter by the department of P.W.D. for an amount of Rs. 5,200/for mutating the name of the Society. Annexure4 to the writ petition is a letter No. 1608 dated 07.12.1991 by the Public Works Department, Dhanbad to Koylanchal Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd., Jalan Market, Kirkend, Dhanbad which was a demand letter by the department of P.W.D. for an amount of Rs. 5,200/for mutating the name of the Society. No doubt, the letter also mentions that this mutation is a temporary one and is a provisional mutation and any order passed by the Government and any excess amount demanded will be payable by the Society, otherwise, the mutation will be treated as cancelled. Another letter dated 15.09.2001, vide letter No. 1419 once again intimating that an area of 1 Bigha, 10 Kathas, 10 Chhataks and 32 sq. ft. mutated in the name of Society is absolutely provisional. The annual rent is fixed @ Rs. 1540/and, thus, the demand for the year 2001 pursuant to the said letter, was deposited and the receipt of payment by the P.W.D. is also part of Annexure4. Annexure5 is a letter No. TP5 dated 09.11.2001 intimating a no objection from the MADA, Dhanbad along with the sanctioned plan before the constructions were made on the land in question. 20. The petitioner has brought on record and challenged letter No. 833 dated 31.08.2005 whereby the contesting respondent has directed the petitioner to vacate the premises intimating that the land in question is a public land and occupation of the petitioner Society amounts to an encroachment. It was at this stage an appeal was preferred on 08.09.2005 before the Commissioner, North Chhotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh, which was registered as Encroachment Appeal No.99 of 2005. The Appeal was admitted, vide order dated 20.09.2005, which is Annexure8 to the writ petition. 21. On perusal of the order dated 20.09.2005, it transpires that the Deputy Development CommissionercumChief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Dhanbad was noticed making it clear that the respondents would be at liberty to raise the issue of maintainability, if any, on the next date fixed. 16.11.2005 was the next date fixed. The appellate court passed an order of statusquo at the time of admission of appeal which continued till the date of its dismissal. Appearance was filed on behalf of the respondent on 16.11.2005. On perusal of the order sheet, it is evident that subsequent to filing of Vakalatnama, nothing was done at the behest of respondent. The appellate court passed an order of statusquo at the time of admission of appeal which continued till the date of its dismissal. Appearance was filed on behalf of the respondent on 16.11.2005. On perusal of the order sheet, it is evident that subsequent to filing of Vakalatnama, nothing was done at the behest of respondent. After direction by this Court for expeditious disposal, the Appeal was dismissed as not maintainable. A notice was published in the newspaper dated 27.03.2011 consequent to an order passed in I.A. No. 971 of 2011 in W.P.(PIL) No. 1872 of 2010 dated 25.03.2011. A representation was made by the petitioner on 27.03.2011 bringing to the knowledge of Zila Parishad all the facts and circumstances of the petitioner's case. The petitioner appeared before the Commissioner, North Chhotanagpur Division. The Commissioner, North Chhotanagpur Division dismissed the appeal on the ground of maintainability after recording a finding that complicated question of right, title and interest is involved and, therefore, this court is not competent to decide such questions. This can only be decided by a competent court. This order is also under challenge in the instant writ petition. 22. Taking into consideration an overall circumstances, I am of the opinion that the decision of the previous writ petitions confirmed in L.P.A. cannot be treated as a precedence to dismiss the present writ petition. In fact, it is settled principle of law that an unauthorized occupant cannot be ousted without adopting due process of law. In the present writ petition, the petitioner has demonstrated that his initial occupation cannot be said to be illegal. It was on the basis of certain registered deed which has already been discussed above and, therefore, the petitioner could not be ousted treating the constructions as an encroachment. A State Government Department such as P.W.D. accepted rent and also mutated the name of the petitioner, though provisionally, but at no point of time, the petitioner was ever noticed regarding the fact that P.W.D. had no authority to accept rent. The petitioner had already brought all these aspects to the notice of Zila Parishad pursuant to a notice issued in the year 2005 when the Encroachment Appeal No. 99 of 2005 was preferred before the Deputy Commissioner. The Zila Parishad had also filed their appearance as far back as on 16.11.2005. Nothing was done at the behest of the Zila Parishad itself. The Zila Parishad had also filed their appearance as far back as on 16.11.2005. Nothing was done at the behest of the Zila Parishad itself. On the other hand, it was only on the direction of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 1713 of 2011 when the Commissioner, North Chhotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh was directed to decide the appeal which was dismissed summarily on the ground of maintainability. 23. Contention on behalf of the Zila Parishad regarding Section 9699 of Bihar & Oriss (Local Self Government) Act, 1895, regarding previous sanction of the local Government by the District Board before executing the deed of transfer is a valid objection, but if the authority concerned as in the instant writ petition, the District Board, omitted to mention certain facts in the Deed of Conveyance, it would not be invalidated merely on account of the neglect of the authority concerned over whom the purchaser had no control whatsoever. 24. I am inclined to agree with the submission of the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner that the provisions of the statute relate to performance of a public duty, but it would work highly prejudicial on the person who has no control over those authorities, who are entrusted with the duty and the concerned authority fails to discharge its duty after adopting the appropriate procedure, this would not promote the main object of the legislature. This principle was enunciated in the case of J.P. Bansal Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 1405 . The Apex Court held such provisions to be directory and not mandatory. 25. In paragraph31 of the writ petition, the petitioner has highlighted that an adjoining portion of C.S. plot No. 266 was also settled and transferred by the Manbhum District Board and there are several occupants who have not been disturbed and respondents have sanctioned their occupation by adopting pick and choose method. 26. The answering respondent while replying these assertions of paragraph31 of the writ petition, in para 19 of the counter affidavit, has very casually taken a stand that one wrong cannot undo another wrong and, thus, the Society cannot be allowed to continue their encroachment over the land of Zila Parishad, Dhanbad. The Zila Parishad has also stated in its counter affidavit that the Vigilance Department is enquiring the matter, but result of the enquiry has not been disclosed. 27. The Zila Parishad has also stated in its counter affidavit that the Vigilance Department is enquiring the matter, but result of the enquiry has not been disclosed. 27. Evidently, they have not taken any action against the adjoining land. The explanation on behalf of the respondent is not only half hearted, but without any reason. I am in agreement with the grievance of the petitioner that the members of Society have been subjected to a clear discrimination. The instant discrimination is also accentuated by certain assertions in para9 and 10 of the supplementary affidavit, which is not denied in para12 of the supplementary counter affidavit. The Zila Parishad has recognized the title of similarly placed persons and has transferred part of C.S. plot No. 266 to one Sachdeva family, who is an adjoining settlee by means of a letter No. 116 dated 07.03.1999 and concluded that there is no encroachment by the Sachdeva family. 28. Every court has an inherent power to do real and substantiate justice and also to prevent the arbitrary action of the State, if the court feels that the State has acted in disregard to the principles laid down under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 29. In the instant case, the action of the Zila Parishad is a glaring wrong without any justifiable reason. The P.I.L. in this Court was filed for removal of the encroachment. The word 'encroachment' in my view is altogether different from an unauthorized occupation. Besides, the P.I.L. was in connection with the grievance of the general public that certain politicians and bureaucrats are in occupation of the public land without any authority and only on account of their muscle power, which is being misused. The lease which is being claimed to be in existence by such person is actually not in existence in the Registrar Office of the District Board, Dhanbad and, therefore, an order was passed to remove such encroachers. This is not the case at hand. The settled principle of law of the country is that in case a person is in possession of property, even on an assumption that he has no right to remain on property, he cannot be dispossessed except adopting the recourse of law. The Government cannot evict unauthorized occupants in a summary proceedings specially when a complicated question of title arose as the facts disclosed in the petition at hand. The Government cannot evict unauthorized occupants in a summary proceedings specially when a complicated question of title arose as the facts disclosed in the petition at hand. The duration of occupation is also a relevant factor. The petitioner has specifically stated that they are in occupation since 70 years and the Zila Parishad did not even try to get the documents examined or get the matter clarified by P.W.D. and also from the Land Acquisition Office. The rent receipts were also not verified before bringing the livelihood of the members of the petitioner Society at a complete halt. Right to live is a fundamental right which has been blatantly violated in the instant case. The duration of occupation is a relevant factor and the occupation by the petitioner Society since last 70 years is sufficient to prima facie come to a conclusion that it is a bonafide claim of the petitioner and at least requires an adjudication in accordance with established procedure of law. In the case of Meghmala & Ors. Vs. G. Narasimha Reddy & Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 383 , the Apex Court held that even a trespasser cannot be evicted forcibly. An illegal occupant can be ousted, even by a State authority in accordance with law. 30. In my view, the ouster of the petitioner Society is a high handed exercise of power. This Court had not granted a blanket power to the Zila Parishad to oust every such person, which, the Zila Parishad, in its own opinion, considers to be an unauthorized occupants. There ought to be a criteria adopted for ouster and that too, not in the manner as it has been done in the instant case. Evidently, a notice was given as far back in the year 2005. The appeal was pending and there was also an order of statusquo, but only because a direction was given by this Court to decide the appeal expeditiously, the Zila Parishad adopted the principle of 'might is right'. 31. Perusal of the order dismissing the appeal clearly shows that the authority concerned had recorded a finding that intricate question of right, title and interest is involved, which cannot be decided in the said appeal. Besides, there is no order passed under the Encroachment Removal Act and, therefore, the appeal was not maintainable. 31. Perusal of the order dismissing the appeal clearly shows that the authority concerned had recorded a finding that intricate question of right, title and interest is involved, which cannot be decided in the said appeal. Besides, there is no order passed under the Encroachment Removal Act and, therefore, the appeal was not maintainable. This alone could not have authorized the Zila Parishad to render the shop owners, who belong to a small or middle income group, jobless and forced them to face the prospects of a die hard situation. 32. For the reasons hereinabove, the action of the Zila Parishad by ousting the petitioner Society by means of a notice published in the 'Hindustan' newspaper is set at naught. The Zila Parishad is directed to put back the petitioner Society, namely, Koylanchal Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd. in possession within a period of four weeks from today. So far the prayer for quashing the order in the Encroachment Appeal No. 99 of 2005, there is no illegality in the said order dated 31.08.2005. The petitioner Society may get an appropriate adjudication by a competent court and till then, the Zila Parishad is restrained from interfering in their possession. However, it will be open for the Zila Parishad to examine the documents and make a complete enquiry. It shall also look into the options for regularizing the possession and fixing the rent to ensure that the livelihood of the members of the petitioner Society is secured and they are not rendered jobless and penniless. The Zila Parishad is directed to look into the documents and examine the case of the members of the Society at par with the occupants of the adjacent plot such as Sachdeva Family and pass a reasoned order in accordance with law after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The outcome of the Vigilance enquiry shall be intimated to the petitioner and they shall be given an opportunity to challenge the same and also an opportunity of hearing so that the principles of natural justice are not violated and equities are also balanced. 33. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. Petition allowed.