Judgment :- 1. Petitioners owned land measuring Acs.2.21 guntas situated in Sy.Nos.686 to 689 of Damarcherla village and Mandal, Nalgonda District. A curve shape road was laid through their lands after acquiring the land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Again in order to make the road straight Ac.0.18 guntas land in Sy.No.713 belonging to the 5th Respondent herein was acquired pursuant to a draft notification published in A.P. Gazette dated 10-07-2000 under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 made on 15-07-2000. The 5th respondent, who lost the land, submitted a representation to allot alternative land in the old road in lieu of compensation. The proposal was approved by the R&B Department, which is the requisitioning department. Accordingly, permission was accorded by the District collector vide Letter No.G1/2738/2002, dated 16-09-2002. Thereupon, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Miryalguda, the 1st Respondent herein issued orders in Proceedings No.E1/3006/97, dated -12-2002 allotting 18 guntas of land existing in R&B road in favour of the 5th Respondent herein. The said order is challenged in this Writ Petition. 2. Heard Sri M. Rajamalla Reddy, learned counsel for Petitioners, learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition appearing for Respondents 1 to 4 and Sri A. Pulla Reddy, learned counsel for the 5th Respondent. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners would urge that the impugned order is arbitrary and contrary to the provisions of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act 1317 Fasli (for brevity, ‘Revenue Act’) and the Assignment Rules. According to him, whenever agricultural or pasteurized land, which is acquired for public benefit, is not required, patta thereof should be granted in favour of the person from whom the said land was acquired, provided he has consented to refund the compensation originally paid to him. The counsel would place reliance on the provisions of Section 54-A of the Revenue Act. He would contend that the petitioners are entitled for restoration of land by granting patta in their favour, since the land acquired from them was no more required for public purpose. 4. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition and the counsel for the 5th Respondent while refuting the aforesaid contentions would submit that the petitioners are not entitled for restoration of the land. They would urge that lands of the petitioners were acquired long time back and are vested in the Government. 4. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition and the counsel for the 5th Respondent while refuting the aforesaid contentions would submit that the petitioners are not entitled for restoration of the land. They would urge that lands of the petitioners were acquired long time back and are vested in the Government. According to them, when once the land is vested in the Government, it is open for the Government to deal with the said property in an appropriate manner even if the notified purpose has ceased. The land was legally allotted in favour of the 5th Respondent who had accepted the same in lieu of payment of compensation. 5. It is not in dispute that land of the 5th Respondent measuring 18 guntas was acquired in pursuance of draft notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, dated 10-07-2000 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act, dated 15-07-2000 for the purpose of widening and straightening the road from Narketpally to Addanki via Damacherla which was curve shaped earlier. It is also not in dispute that the 5th Respondent wanted alternative land existing on the old road by way of exchange in lieu of compensation. The said proposal was accepted by the Requisitioning Authority and was accordingly allotted the land by virtue of the impugned order. 6. Similarly, it is not in dispute that earlier the petitioners’ land was validly acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the possession of the same had been taken after payment of compensation to them. Hence, by virtue of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquired land stood vested absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. It is well settled in a catena of judgments of the Apex Court that upon acquisition of land, the land absolutely vests with the Government and that the original owners from whom the land was acquired are not entitled for re-conveyance on the ground that the land was not utilized for the purpose for which it is acquired. 7. In the case Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and ors. ( (1996) 6 SCC 405 ), the Apex Court while rejecting the claim of the petitioner for restitution of the possession of the land acquired pursuant to the resolution of the State Government observed thus:- “2. 7. In the case Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and ors. ( (1996) 6 SCC 405 ), the Apex Court while rejecting the claim of the petitioner for restitution of the possession of the land acquired pursuant to the resolution of the State Government observed thus:- “2. …… We do not think that this Court would be justified in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilized for any other public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose. It is not intended that any land which remained unutilized, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions.” 8. In Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and Ors. (AIR 2005 SC 234) the Apex Court after referring the case of Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil (supra) and other cases held that “if the land was not used for the purpose for which it was acquired, it was open to the State Government to take action but that did confer any right on the respondents to ask for restitution of the land”. Paras 10 and 11 of the said judgment read thus:- “10. In Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra ( (1996) 6 SCC 405 ), it is stated that the acquired land remaining unutilized was not intended to be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of notification. 11. Yet again in C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N. ( (1997) 2 SCC 627 ), it is held that acquired land having vested in the State and the compensation having been paid to the claimant, he was not entitled to restitution of possession on the ground that either original public purposes had ceased to be in operation or the land could not be used for other purpose.” 9. From the aforementioned decisions, it follows that (1) under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land acquired vests in the Government absolutely free from all encumbrances; (2) the land acquired for a public purpose could be utilized for any other public purpose; and (3) the acquired land which is vested in the Government free from all encumbrances cannot be re-assigned or re-conveyed to the original owner merely on the basis of an executive order. 10. In the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court, it must be held that the petitioners are not entitled for re-conveyance of the land. 11. The petitioners rely on the provisions of Section 54-A of the Revenue Act to claim re-conveyance. According to them as the land acquired from them is no longer required, they are entitled for patta in terms of Section 54 of the Revenue Act. In order to appreciate the contention, it is useful to extract the said provision. “54-A. Procedure in respect of land acquired for purpose of public benefit and no more required:-- When agricultural or pasturage land acquired for public benefit is no longer required the patta thereof shall be made in the name of the person or his successor from whom, such land was acquired provided he consents to refund the compensation originally paid to him. If such person or his successor does not take the land, it may be given on patta under Section 54.” 12. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that it is applicable only in respect of agricultural or pasture lands, provided the same has retained the same nature. In other words, if the land has not been utilised and it has been retained in its original form as agricultural or pasteurized land, patta may be granted in the name of the erstwhile owner or his successor. If the nature of the land has been changed and the land has not remained as agricultural or pasteurize land, Section 54-A has no application. This position is clear from the fact that if the former owner or the successor does not take the land it may be given on patta under Section 54, which permits auction of unoccupied land with the permission of the Tahsildar. This view of mine is supported by the judgment in Koppula Narasiah and ors. This position is clear from the fact that if the former owner or the successor does not take the land it may be given on patta under Section 54, which permits auction of unoccupied land with the permission of the Tahsildar. This view of mine is supported by the judgment in Koppula Narasiah and ors. v. Government of A.P., irrigation and CAD Department and ors. ( 2000 (6) ALT 337 ). 13. In the instant case, indisputably the land acquired from the petitioners did not remain in the same from because road was constructed by the R&B Department after acquisition. Thus, there can be no re-conveyance of this land to the petitioners. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, would submit that in any case the land could not have been given to the 5th respondent in exchange. According to him no private alienations are permissible in law and that any alienation should be through public auction. The said contention is without substance. Ordinarily compensation under the Land Acquisition Act is payable in cash. However, under Section 31(4) clearly the Collector is competent to grant land in lieu of cash compensation. 15. For the aforesaid reasons clearly the petitioners are not entitled for the re conveyance land and the impugned order allotting land in favour of the 5th respondent in lieu of compensation payable to him, does not suffer from any illegality. 16. The writ petition is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.