ORAL ORDER Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the State. 2. The petitioner, a Havildar in the Police Service is aggrieved by his order of dismissal dated 28.02.2003, affirmed in Appeal by the D.I.G. on 08.02.2012 and the Memorial also dismissed on 08.02.2012 by the Director General of Police. The petitioner came earlier in C.W.J.C. No. 6713 of 2008 when his Memorial had remained pending. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the departmental proceedings were held in a manner contrary to law. No evidence of any witness was led in support of the charge. The order of dismissal and that of the Appellate authority were not speaking in nature disclosing application of mind. The punishment was serious in nature. Reliance was placed on A.I.R. 2009 SC (supp) 79 (S. Thankamani v. Greater Cochin Development Authority) that an unreasoned order was reflective of arbitrariness and non application of mind. The order was liable to be set aside on that ground alone. 4. It was next urged that a punishment of dismissal for 71 days of unauthorized absence was too harsh and grossly disproportionate. Reliance was placed on (2012) 2 SCC 254 (Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India). The petitioner had now been acquitted in Appeal from his conviction on a criminal charge. 5. Counsel for the State opposed the writ application submitting that the impugned orders required no interference. Acquittal in the criminal case did not vest a right to reinstatement. The dismissal was in 2003, acquittal in 2006, and the petitioner moved the Court in 2008 for the first time, emphasing the aspect of delay. 6. A memo of charge was framed on 20.03.2002. It alleged that he reported sick on 13.06.1995. On basis of Medical certificates he was granted earned leave for 30 days and half earned leave for 60 days. He was required to report for duty on 11.09.1995. During the period of leave he figured as a named accused in Chenari P.S. Case No. 49 of 1995 registered on 27.07.1995 under Sections 25(1-b)(a)/26/27/35 of the Arms Act. He reported for duty71 days late on 21.11.1995. After considering the defence an inquiry report of guilt was submitted on 20.03.2002. The inquiry report also notices that departmental witnesses were asked to appear but they did not appear. Some witnesses did depose noticed in the inquiry report. The Superintendent of Police ordered dismissal. 7. He reported for duty71 days late on 21.11.1995. After considering the defence an inquiry report of guilt was submitted on 20.03.2002. The inquiry report also notices that departmental witnesses were asked to appear but they did not appear. Some witnesses did depose noticed in the inquiry report. The Superintendent of Police ordered dismissal. 7. In the criminal case the petitioner was convicted on 23.08.2005. But in Criminal Appeal No. 44 of 2005 he was acquitted on 09.08.2006 on the ground that the order of sanction under the Arms Act was defective. 8. In a departmental proceeding strict rules of evidence shall not apply. The findings are based on preponderance of probability. But this shall not include a case of no evidence. If there is any iota of evidence to sustain the findings, the writ court will not interfere. The power of judicial review is confined to infirmity in the decision making process or perversity in findings. In a given case whether there is any evidence on preponderance of probability or not shall depend on the facts of the case. There can be no generalized proposition broadly speaking. 9. The petitioner proceeded on sick leave and sought extension of the same on medical grounds. During the same period when he claimed a defence of illness based on medical prescriptions, he was made a named accused in a criminal case leading to custody and conviction. The acquittal in Appeal is not on merits but on the technicality of an invalid sanction. No further evidence or discussion is required of the falsity for plea of illness. He could not simultaneously be ill and still be involved in a criminal prosecution, taken into custody and convicted. Surely, he must have taken a plea of alibi of illness in the criminal trial which must have been disbelieved leading to his conviction. The petitioner has not brought on record the judgment of the trial convicting him. 10. The acquittal in the criminal case cannot vest a right in him to demand reinstatement. Even if the acquittal was on merits it would not have created a vested right to seek reinstatement. Normal service jurisprudence holds that the accusation and its implication in the departmental proceedings and in a criminal case are entirely different matters. It is not that the allegations were common. Even if the acquittal was on merits it would not have created a vested right to seek reinstatement. Normal service jurisprudence holds that the accusation and its implication in the departmental proceedings and in a criminal case are entirely different matters. It is not that the allegations were common. His conduct for involvement in a criminal case leading to conviction is the foundation for the departmental allegations rendering him unfit for service. The respondents fully retained the jurisdiction and authority to decline reinstatement in service even after the conviction was set aside for any reason. 11. In (1997) 4 SCC 385 (Union of India v. Bihari Lal Sidhana) it was held at paragraph 5 as follows, and the judicial view remains consists that :- 5. It is true that the respondent was acquitted by the criminal court but acquittal does not automatically give him the right to be reinstated into the service. It would still be open to the competent authority to take decision whether the delinquent government servant can be taken into service or disciplinary action should be taken under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules or under the Temporary Service Rules. Admittedly, the respondent had been working as a temporary government servant before he was kept under suspension. The termination order indicated the factum that he, by then, was under suspension. It is only a way of describing him as being under suspension when the order came to be passed but that does not constitute any stigma. Mere acquittal of government employee does not automatically entitle the government servant to reinstatement. As stated earlier, it would be open to the appropriate competent authority to take a decision whether the enquiry into the conduct is required to be done before directing reinstatement or appropriate action should be taken as per law, if otherwise, available…..” 12. The submission of the petitioner that his involvement in the criminal case was unrelated to discharge of duties has only to be stated to be rejected. The petitioner belonged to the uniformed disciplined service. The standards of scrutiny for a conduct that may apply to a person in civil service shall not be the same as applicable to one in the uniformed service. The uniformed service imposes an onerous responsibility and obligation on him to abide by the law at all times on duty and off duty. The standards of scrutiny for a conduct that may apply to a person in civil service shall not be the same as applicable to one in the uniformed service. The uniformed service imposes an onerous responsibility and obligation on him to abide by the law at all times on duty and off duty. If he falls foul of the law by conduct, it hardly matters if he was on duty or off duty, the dignity of the uniform gets soiled. The nature of his conduct outside service also has relevancy. The deleterious effect of the submission if accepted may permit those in uniform to sully the uniform and authority by possessing unlicensed weapons for various purposes. The effect of the same on the sincere in service shall be demoralizing. The society will not be in awe of the uniform, but in fear. 13. In (1996) 7 SCC 748 (Karam Singh v. State of Punjab) the petitioner, a constable was dismissed for conviction by a Criminal Court. It was held at paragraph 2 as follows:- “2. …. The conviction in this case is on the ground of his participation in causing the death of and causing injury to one person. Though he was acquitted of the offence of murder, he being a constable at the relevant time and being a disciplined member of the force, he was not expected to participate in the commission of crime; instead, he was expected to prevent the commission…” 14. Once it is held that conviction in the criminal case was for an event during the alleged period of absence stands proved, the defence that no witnesses were examined loses its relevance. He has not been prejudiced in any manner. There was nothing to prove. During the period in question he was in custody pursuant to the criminal case from 27.07.1995 to 12.02.1996. The case of Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra) relating to a civilian service has no application to the facts of the present case. The issue did not relate to an offence of absence by reason of custody and conviction in a criminal case. 15. The impugned orders suffer from no errors calling for interference. 16. The application is dismissed.