JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. Heard learned advocate Mr. T.K. Patel, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Alkesh N. Shah learned AGP for the respondent. 2. Rule. Learned AGP Mr. Alkesh N. Shah waives service of notice of rule on behalf of respondent state authority. 3. At the request of learned advocate for the petitioner and with consent of learned AGP, the petition is taken up for hearing and final decision today. 4. In present petition, the petitioner has prayed for below mentioned relief: “6(B) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the order dated: 01/05/2012 passed by Chief controlling revenue authority in Stamp/Appeal/28/2012/2358;” 5. At the time of hearing, the petitioner requested for permission to amend the petition so as to amend paragraph No.6 and add request for further. The request was granted and the petitioner was permitted to amend the petition. Accordingly, paragraph No.6(F) has been added, which reads thus: “6(F) This Hon’ble Court be pleased to condone the delay caused by present petitioner in preferring stamp/Appeal/28/2012/2358 before Chief Controlling Revenue Authority;” 6. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 1.5.2012 passed by the competent authority under Section 53 of the Gujarat Stamp Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), whereby the competent authority has declined to entertain the petitioner’s application filed under Section 53 of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') against the order dated 23.12.2011 passed by the first adjudicating authority on the ground that it was filed after expiry of prescribed period of limitation. 7. It appears that the competent authority found that delay of about 42 days was caused in filing the application against the order of the first adjudicating authority. 8. The facts involved in and leading to present petition are that : 8.1 Somewhere in May 1999, the petitioner purchased land bearing Survey No. 255 of T.P. Scheme No.3, Final Plot No.88 of village Odhav, Taluka City and District Ahmedabad. The sale deed under which the petitioner purchased the said property was submitted for registration and the document was registered at Registration No.1414/1999. 8.2 The petitioner has claimed that value of the property was Rs.4,83,508/- and accordingly, stamp duty in the sum of Rs. The sale deed under which the petitioner purchased the said property was submitted for registration and the document was registered at Registration No.1414/1999. 8.2 The petitioner has claimed that value of the property was Rs.4,83,508/- and accordingly, stamp duty in the sum of Rs. 67,704/- was paid which, according to the petitioner, was adequate in view of the value of the property and applicable rate as per the Act. 8.3 It appears that after period of about 12 years, the authority took up the document for verification and scrutiny. On the basis of verification and scrutiny, the competent authority issued notice under Section 32-A of the Act dated 29.8.2011 conveying tentative view and preliminary decision that the market value of the land would be of about Rs. 83,64,000/- (and not Rs. 4,83,508/- as per the valuation made by the petitioner in the sale deed) and accordingly, the petitioner is obliged to pay deficient stamp duty to the tune of about Rs.5,59,846/-. The petitioner was asked to file reply-explanation. 8.4 Subsequently, in pursuance of the above mentioned notice dated 29.8.2011, the competent authority proceeded to determine the quantum of deficient stamp duty and passed order dated 23.12.2011 directing the petitioner to pay deficient stamp duty in the sum of Rs.5,59,596/- and Rs.250/- towards fine. 8.5 The petitioner felt aggrieved by the said order and therefore preferred application under Section 53 of the Act. 8.6 The petitioner has claimed that though the said order is said to have been passed on 23.12.2011, it was never served to the petitioner, but only on inquiry about the pending proceedings, the petitioner came to know, in April 2012, that the order was already passed and therefore, he immediately filed application under Section 53 of the Act. 8.7 The competent authority, under Section 53 of the Act, took into consideration the date of order, i.e. 23.12.2011 to determine as to whether the application was filed within prescribed time limit or not. On that premise, the application came to be treated as time barred. The competent authority conveyed its decision to the petitioner vide its letter/order dated 1.5.2012. The petitioner is aggrieved by the said decision whereby the authority has treated the said application as time barred on the ground that the petitioner filed the said application after expiry of prescribed period of 90 days. 9. Mr. T.K. Patel, learned advocate has appeared for the petitioner. The petitioner is aggrieved by the said decision whereby the authority has treated the said application as time barred on the ground that the petitioner filed the said application after expiry of prescribed period of 90 days. 9. Mr. T.K. Patel, learned advocate has appeared for the petitioner. He submitted that the order dated 23.12.2011 was never served to the petitioner and the petitioner was neither informed nor he was aware about the order. He also submitted that the petitioner came to know about the order only in April 2012 and immediately application came to be filed and that, therefore, the application cannot be treated as time barred. He further submitted that the competent authority has not considered the application preferred by the petitioner with a request to condone delay and the reasons mentioned in support of the request for condonation of delay. Mr. Patel submitted that the authority is not justified in refusing to entertain the application without even affording opportunity of hearing at least as regards the application seeking condonation of delay. He submitted that the decision of the competent authority to not to entertain the application under Section 53 of the Act and/or not to entertain even the application seeking condonation of delay amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. He also submitted that in the facts of the case, even if the authority considered that the application was filed after expiry of prescribed period of 90 days, then also the competent authority should have condoned the delay and decided the application on merits. The decision of refusing to entertain the application on merits is arbitrary and unjust. 10. Mr. Yagnik, learned AGP has resisted the petition. He submitted that it is not in dispute that the application under Section 53 came to be filed after expiry of 90 days from the date of the order and that, therefore, the decision of the competent authority treating the application as time barred on the ground that it was filed after expiry of prescribed period of limitation is, not and cannot be said to be, arbitrary or unjust. He submitted that Section 53 of the Act prescribes period of 90 days from the date of order of the first adjudicating authority as the period of limitation for filing application under Section 53 of the Act and if any application is filed after the prescribed period, then the application would be barred by prescribed period of limitation and the decision treating the application time barred cannot be treated as arbitrary. Since the power to condone delay is not conferred on the authority, the authority could not have entertained the application for condonation of delay. So far as the submission that authority should have condoned delay, it is necessary to take a look at Section 53 of the Act. The section reads thus: “53. Control of and statement of case to Chief Controlling Revenue Authority: (1) The powers exercisable by a Collector under Chapter III except sub section (3) of section 32A Chapter IV and Chapter V and under clause (a) of the first proviso to section 27 shall in all cases be subject to the control of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. Provided that the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority shall not entertain an application made by a person under sub-section (1) unless (a) such application is presented within a period of ninty days from the date of order of the Collector. (b) such person deposits twenty-five per cent of the amount of duty or as the case may be, amount of difference of duty payable by him in respect of subject matter of the instrument for which application has been made. Provided further that where in any particular case the Chief Controlling Authority is of the opinion that the deposit of the amount by the applicant may cause undue hardship to him, the authority may in its discretion, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may think fit to impose, dispense with a part of the amount deposited so however that the part of the amount so dispensed with shall not exceed fifty per cent of the amount deposited or required to be deposited. (2) If any Collector, acting under section 31, section 32, section 39 or section 40, feels doubt as to the amount of duty with which any instrument is chargeable, he may draw up a statement of the case, and refer it, with his own opinion thereon, for the decision of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. (3) Such authority shall consider the case and send a copy of its decision to the Collector, who shall proceed to assess and charge the duty (if any) in conformity with such decision.” 11. On examination of the section, it emerges that the legislature has not conferred, on the competent authority, power to condone delay. It also appears legislature has consciously not conferred the said power on the authority. 12. However that does not mean that the period should be artificially curtailed by giving restricted meaning and scope to the said section. 12.1 True it is that in the section the words ’from the date of order’, are used, however the said words are not to be construed in such a manner so as to reject, without scrutiny, all applications which might have been filed after 90 days ‘from the date of order’ but within period of 90 days from service of the order of first adjudicating authority. 12.2 In present case, it is not in dispute that delay is caused in filing the application under Section 53. 12.3 The petitioner, however, claims that the order of the first adjudicating authority was never served to the petitioner and that, therefore, the petitioner had no knowledge about the order. 12.4 Since the petitioner has alleged that the order was not served to him, learned AGP was asked to place on record material to demonstrate that the order of the first adjudicating authority was forwarded to and served on the petitioner. 13. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to mention that in present case, it is not in dispute that the first adjudicating authority passed the order some time after the hearing was concluded. The order was not passed or pronounced in presence of the petitioner or his representative. The grievance of petitioner has to be, and is, examined in light of this specific and particular fact. The order was not passed or pronounced in presence of the petitioner or his representative. The grievance of petitioner has to be, and is, examined in light of this specific and particular fact. 13.1 In this context, it is necessary to take into account that the provision in the rules framed under the Act prescribes the mode and manner of service of the order by the first adjudicating authority. The relevant provision is under Rule 7 of Bombay Stamp (Determination of Market Value of Property) Rules, 1984. The said Rule 7 reads thus: “7. Manner of service of notice under rule 4:- Any notice or order under these rules shall be served in the following manner, namely:- (1) In the case of any company, … … … (a) … … … (b) … … … (2) In the case of any firm, … … … (a) … … … (b) … … … (3) In the case of a family … … … (4) In the case of any individual person, the notice or order shall be served, -- (a) by delivering or tendering the notice or order to the person concerned or to his advocate or authorised agent ; or (b) by delivering or tendering the notice or order to some adult member of the family; or (c) by sending the notice or order to the person concerned by registered post with acknowledgment due; or (d) if none of the aforesaid modes of service is practicable, by affixing the notice or order in some conspicuous part of the last known place of residence or business of the person concerned.” (Emphasis supplied) 13.2 The said provision prescribes the manner of service of any notice or order in case of an individual. 13.3 The said Rule 7 is provided in the Rules so as to take care of similar cases as present one, i.e. the cases wherein the order is passed some time after the hearing is concluded and is not passed or pronounced in presence of concerned and affected party or his representative. 13.4 Therefore, the learned AGP was asked to demonstrate as to whether the order of the first adjudicating authority was forwarded and served to the petitioner by following procedure prescribed under Sub-rule (4) of Rule 7 of the aforesaid Rules, or not. 13.4 Therefore, the learned AGP was asked to demonstrate as to whether the order of the first adjudicating authority was forwarded and served to the petitioner by following procedure prescribed under Sub-rule (4) of Rule 7 of the aforesaid Rules, or not. 13.5 In response, the respondents could not establish that the procedure prescribed for service of the order was followed. 13.6 In the result, the respondents have failed to produce any material on record to demonstrate that after the order dated 23.12.2011 was passed, it was duly forwarded and served to the petitioner. 13.7 As mentioned earlier, it is not in dispute in present case, and it is an admitted position that the order was passed sometime after the hearing was concluded and that the order was neither passed nor pronounced in presence of the petitioner or his representative. 13.8 Therefore, it was necessary to demonstrate that the service of the order was duly effected. In absence of any material establishing that the said order was duly forwarded and served to the petitioner, benefit of doubt has to be allowed in favour of petitioner and the petitioner’s claim that the order was not served to him and it was upon his inquiry that he came to know that the order was passed, has to be accepted. 14. Before proceeding further, the Court is constrained to take notice of a fact, which is brought to the notice of the Court, that in several cases the petitioners have claimed and alleged that the order of the first adjudicating authority was not served and they had no knowledge that any order was passed against them. 14.1 In all such cases, when the person aggrieved by the order of the first adjudicating authority submitted their applications under Section 53 before the competent authority after having come to know about the order, such applications were not entertained by the competent authority on the ground that the applications were filed after prescribed period of limitation as has been done in present case also. Therefore, the Court is constrained to take note of such default or defect being caused in service of the order to the concerned party and also about the mechanical refusal to entertain the application by the competent authority under Section 53 of the Act. Therefore, the Court is constrained to take note of such default or defect being caused in service of the order to the concerned party and also about the mechanical refusal to entertain the application by the competent authority under Section 53 of the Act. 14.2 In this view of the matter, the Court considers it necessary to direct that in all cases, the first adjudicating authority shall always ensure that the procedure prescribed under the Rules is strictly and diligently followed and shall also ensure that the order is duly forwarded and served to the concerned party and evidence of dispatch and service is preserved at least for sufficient and reasonable period. 15. In all such cases, it is also noticed that the competent authority takes into account only 'date of the order' for determining as to whether the application is time barred and also for calculating period of delay. 15.1 The provision under Section 53 is made with the object that the superior authority can exercise supervisory power as regards the conduct of the proceedings before the first adjudicating authority and is also made for the benefit of the party aggrieved by the order of the first adjudicating authority so that the aggrieved party can get an opportunity and a remedy and forum to challenge the order before the higher authority-forum constituted and provided under the Act. Thus, the said provision has to be construed by keeping the said object and purpose in focus. 15.2 Section 53 of the Act empowers the authority to exercise control on the powers exercised by the Collector under Chapter III (except sub-section (3) of Section 32A), Chapter IV and Chapter V which would include the power to examine the conduct of the proceedings and also to examine the orders passed by the first adjudicating authority. 15.3 The said provision grants opportunity and provides forum to the aggrieved party to make an application to the competent authority under Section 53 within period of 90 days from the date of the order. 15.4 However, if the order is passed some time after the hearing is over and when the order is not passed or it is not pronounced in presence of the concerned party, then the concerned party would not be aware about the details of the decision-order and/or about the date on which the adjudicating authority passed the order. 15.4 However, if the order is passed some time after the hearing is over and when the order is not passed or it is not pronounced in presence of the concerned party, then the concerned party would not be aware about the details of the decision-order and/or about the date on which the adjudicating authority passed the order. 15.5 Consequently, in the cases where the order is passed sometime after the hearing gets concluded and it is not passed or not pronounced in presence of the concerned party or his representative, the concerned party may not be able to file application within 90 days 'from the date of order' as the concerned party will come to know that any order is passed only when the concerned party is informed the date of the order and the decision of the first adjudicating authority or when copy of the order is served to him. 15.6 Therefore, the phrase “... from the date of the order...” has to be construed keeping in focus the said fact. 15.7 The actual “date of the order” can be considered and taken into account as the “relevant date” only if the order is passed or if it is pronounced in presence of the concerned party or his representative and the concerned party or his representative is aware about the date of the order and the decision of the authority. 15.8 When the order is not passed or pronounced in presence of the petitioner or his representative and when the petitioner is not aware about and/or informed about the order, period of delay should not be calculated-considered from the date of the order. 15.9 Otherwise, the purpose and object of the said section would become otiose and would be rendered ineffective. 15.10 So as to make the provision under Section 53 of the Act meaningful and effective in real sense and if it has to serve its real purpose and object, then the “relevant date” for the purpose of determining and calculating the period of limitation in those cases where the order is not passed or if the order is not pronounced in presence of the concerned party or his representative should be the date of the service of order to the concerned party. 16. 16. Therefore, the competent authority under Section 53 of the Act should not, mechanically and without further consideration, take the date of the order as “relevant date” unless it is apparent and evident from the record that the concerned party was aware about or informed about the order and decision of the authority or that the order was passed or pronounced in presence of the concerned party. 16.1 In other cases, i.e. the cases where order is not passed or is not pronounced in presence of concerned party or his representative, it is obligatory for the competent authority under Section 53 to ascertain the date of service of order to the concerned party and to determine and calculate the period of limitation from the “relevant date”, i.e. the date of service/knowledge of the order to the concerned party. 16.2 Otherwise, the spirit and purpose of the said provision would stand frustrated. 16.3 In former case, i.e. in cases where the order is passed and/or pronounced in presence of concerned party or his representative, the relevant date would be the date of order. 16.4 This is relevant and necessary also because ordinarily the Court does not entertain the petitions by the applicant who approach the Court directly against the order passed under Section 32A of the Act and relegates the aggrieved party to the competent authority under Section 53 of the Act on the ground that the aggrieved party should first exhaust the statutory alternative remedy. On the other hand, if the competent authority under Section 53 adopts such mechanical and dogmatic approach (with reference to the applications which, at the first glance, appear to have been filed after expiry of prescribed period of 90 days) and without even examining relevant aspects treats the applications as time barred merely by taking into account the date of the order, then it may render the aggrieved party without any immediate and effective remedy, though provided under the Act. 17. 17. In certain cases, it may so happen that at first glance, it may appear that an application is filed after expiry of prescribed period and is time barred, however, if correct and just method for calculating period of limitation is adopted to determine as to whether application is infected by delay or if applicant is allowed to explain the facts and details, then the applicant may be able to explain and establish that application is not hit by delay. Therefore, it is just, equitable and necessary to allow opportunity of hearing to the applicant with reference to application seeking condonation of delay. Otherwise in certain cases injustice may be caused, which may prove to be lethal for the applicant as it would result into premature demise of such application. Hence, even if the provision does not confer, on the competent authority, power to condone delay, it is not proper for the authority to not even hear the applicant and consider the request and explanation and then take decision about limitation and delay. It is necessary to clarify that this process would be required when request-application for condoning delay is preferred and submitted along with main application. 18. Under the circumstances, though the statute has not conferred any power to condone delay on the competent authority under Section 53 of the Act, it is not appropriate and justified for the competent authority to not to afford opportunity of hearing to the applicants with reference to the application seeking condonation of delay whereby the applicant may be able to demonstrate that the application has been filed within prescribed period of 90 days considering the date of service of or knowledge about order. In this process, the officer of the department can also demonstrate that the order was duly served to the concerned party or that the party was in knowledge of or aware about the order/date of the order. 18.1 In such cases, it is necessary and appropriate for the competent authority to ascertain as to whether the concerned person was aware about the order or whether the procedure for service of order was followed or not and whether the order was duly forwarded and served on the applicant or not and whether the application has been filed within prescribed period of 90 days from the date of service of the order or not. 18.2 If the competent authority is satisfied, after considering the explanation of the applicant that the application is preferred within prescribed period of 90 days from the date of service or knowledge of order, then the application may be heard and decided on merits. 18.3 On the other hand, if the authority is satisfied that the procedure for service of order was followed and/or the applicant had knowledge about the date of the order and the decision of the first adjudicating authority and the application is not filed within prescribed period of 90 days from such date, then it may pass appropriate order in accordance with law and relevant provision. 18.4 In view of the fact that ordinarily the orders passed by the adjudicating authority are passed some time after the hearing and in absence of the concerned party or his representative, the date of service or knowledge of the order and the decision should be considered relevant date for purpose of determining period of limitation for entertaining the application under Section 53 of the Act on merits. 19. So far as the facts of present case are concerned, the respondents have failed to demonstrate that the procedure prescribed for service of the order was duly followed or that the adjudicating authority had passed the order in presence of the petitioner or his representative and/or that the petitioner or his representative was aware about the date of the order and the decision. 20. In this view of the matter, the competent authority under Section 53 of the Act should have considered the application seeking condonation of delay and the explanation offered by the applicant. 20.1 Undisputedly, the authority has not undertaken the said process nor the procedure prescribed for service of order appear to have been followed. 20.2 Therefore, the Court has to accept the petitioner’s claim that the order of the first adjudicating authority was not served to him and the application under Section 53 was filed within 90 days from the date of knowledge about the order. 21. So far as the other requirement, i.e. the other condition precedent prescribed under Section 53 is concerned, the petitioner has admitted that it has not complied the condition requiring pre-deposit of 25% of the amount determined by the first adjudicating authority and 25% of the determined amount has not been deposited. 21. So far as the other requirement, i.e. the other condition precedent prescribed under Section 53 is concerned, the petitioner has admitted that it has not complied the condition requiring pre-deposit of 25% of the amount determined by the first adjudicating authority and 25% of the determined amount has not been deposited. 21.1 While offering explanation on this count, the petitioner submitted that since the application under Section 53 of the Act and/or the application seeking condonation of delay was not considered, the petitioner could not pay-deposit the amount. 21.2 He also clarified that the petitioner is ready to pay-deposit the said amount. 21.3 The petitioner has alleged and claimed that the application was filed in the office of the competent authority on 5.4.2012 immediately after he came to know about the order dated 23.12.2011. 21.4 However, the petitioner has not expressly mentioned the date on which he came to know that the order was passed and that, therefore, it is not possible to ascertain as to whether the application was tendered in the office of competent authority after expiry of prescribed period of 90 days. 21.5 The learned counsel for the petitioner fairly submitted, during the hearing, that application was filed after delay of 12 days. 21.6 In such circumstances, when the petitioner is allowed benefit of doubt because the respondents are not able to establish that the order was duly forwarded and served to the petitioner and when admittedly delay of 12 days is caused, it is considered appropriate to require the petitioner to pay certain additional amount, i.e. in addition to the amount required to be deposited as per Section 53 of the Act, as condition for entertaining the application on merits. 22. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to mention that the competent authority under Section 53 of the Act has declined to accept and entertain the application-appeal filed by the present petitioner under Section 53 of the Act. So far as petitioner's grievance that the application requesting the authority that delay, if any, may be condoned, was arbitrarily rejected, is concerned, the said aspect has already been considered and dealt with herein above earlier. So far as petitioner's grievance that the application requesting the authority that delay, if any, may be condoned, was arbitrarily rejected, is concerned, the said aspect has already been considered and dealt with herein above earlier. However, so far as the order declining to entertain the application under Section 53 of the Act is concerned, a glance at the said provision brings out that power to condone delay in preferring application under Section 53 is not conferred on the competent authority. 23. Consequently, the authority, according to Section 53, does not have any power to condone delay and that, therefore, if the application is preferred after expiry of 90 days, then such application cannot be accepted and entertained by the concerned authority. It is pertinent to note that though the power to partly dispense with the requirement of pre deposit (not exceeding 50% of the amount required to be deposited) is conferred on the authority, the power to condone delay in preferring the application is not conferred on the authority. 24. Under the circumstances, any fault cannot be found with the decision of the concerned authority whereby, the authority has declined to entertain the application sought to be tendered by present petitioner. 24.1 However, such restriction or inability cannot hold back the Court from exercising discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 24.2 In present petition, the petitioner has, therefore, also prayed that this Court may condone the delay caused in preferring application-appeal under Section 53 of the Act. 25. In this background, the question, which arises, is as to whether the party aggrieved by the first authority's order should be deprived of the remedy available under Section 53 and the opportunity of hearing on the ground that he could not file the application within the prescribed period of limitation, i.e. within 90 days. 26. On this count, in the case of Katira Construction Ltd. v. Chief Controlling Authority in Special Civil Application No.13808 of 2011, this Court has observed that: “17. 26. On this count, in the case of Katira Construction Ltd. v. Chief Controlling Authority in Special Civil Application No.13808 of 2011, this Court has observed that: “17. A 'Court' can pass necessary and appropriate order for ensuring that complete justice is done and/or to ensure that a person is not deprived of right of hearing, if it is established that:- (a) the delay is not caused on account of sheer negligence on part of the applicant-petitioner or plaintiff; (b) conjointly it is also established that the applicant or petitioner or plaintiff has shown due diligence to prosecute available remedy without being indolent or negligent; (c) if the applicant or petitioner or plaintiff can establish and satisfy the Court that he could not prosecute the remedy within the prescribed time limit due to circumstances beyond his control and there is satisfactory explanation and sufficient cause to condone delay; (d) it is also shown to the prima-facie satisfaction of the Court that the applicant or petitioner or plaintiff has reasonably good case and possibility of success, (e) the length of delay or conduct of the applicant do not amount to waiver of the right; (f) the applicant can establish substantial compliance of pre-condition and thereby the applicant could establish that he has not been negligent or indolent, then a “Court”, in exercise of power under Section 5 of Limitation Act and in accordance with said provision or in exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution this Court can condone the delay and direct the authority to consider the application or appeal on merits. 17.1 The above mentioned instances are illustrative and not exhaustive. There could be other germane, compelling, just and equitable reasons and justification to condone delay, for which any straight jacket formula cannot be laid down and it will mostly depend on length of delay and the steps taken by the applicant in the meanwhile i.e. applicant's conduct in the interregnum, the bonafides of the applicant i.e. the intention is not to frustrate the opponent or to merely delay the proceedings in given set of facts and circumstances. 18. Now, therefore, the question which arises in present petition is as to whether the petitioner should be deprived of opportunity of hearing before the Appellate Authority on the ground that the petitioner failed to file memo of appeal within 90 days. 18. Now, therefore, the question which arises in present petition is as to whether the petitioner should be deprived of opportunity of hearing before the Appellate Authority on the ground that the petitioner failed to file memo of appeal within 90 days. 18.1 If the petitioner's request is granted then any right of the opponent will not be irreversibly and adversely affected. In such circumstances, there is no strong and justifiable reason to deny opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 18.2 Besides this, it is ordinarily, considered preferable to decide an application or case on merits rather than rejecting it on ground of delay unless it is shown that the delay was intentional and/or the delay occurred on account of negligence on part of the applicant/plaintiff/appellant or in the interregnum any other or further equities (including third party rights) are created and/or any right accrued in favour of the opponent would be adversely affected if delay is condoned. 19. It is true that the right of appeal is not an absolute right nor essential part or component or ingredient of natural justice, compliance of which must be ensured even by quasi judicial authority. However, as mentioned above, there may be cases and circumstances in which the aggrieved party may not be in position to challenge the order of adjudicating authority within the prescribed period of limitation due to compelling reasons or circumstances beyond control of the aggrieved party. 27. However, since, in present case the petitioner is allowed benefit of doubt because, the respondents are not able to establish that the order of the first adjudicating authority was duly forwarded and served to the petitioner, the relief prayed for by the petitioner in para 6(F), in view of this Court, ought not be granted without imposing appropriate condition. 28. On this count, the learned counsel for petitioner agreed and submitted that the petitioner shall pay-deposit additional 25% of the determined amount, i.e. the petitioner shall pay 50% of the amount determined by order dated 23.12.2001. 29. In the facts of the case, it cannot be said that the petitioner was completely indolent or consciously negligent. 30. It also cannot be said that the petitioner lacks bonafides or that the petitioner has intentionally caused delay. 31. Therefore, the petitioner's request in para 6(F) is accepted and for said limited purpose, the order dated 1.5.2012 is set aside. 32. 30. It also cannot be said that the petitioner lacks bonafides or that the petitioner has intentionally caused delay. 31. Therefore, the petitioner's request in para 6(F) is accepted and for said limited purpose, the order dated 1.5.2012 is set aside. 32. Under the circumstances and in view of the foregoing discussion, below mentioned order is passed. (a) In view of the foregoing discussion and reason, the impugned order dated 1.5.2012 is condoned on the condition that the petitioner shall deposit, within two weeks, additional 25% out of the amount determined by the impugned order which shall be over and above (i.e. in addition to) the 25% amount required to be deposited as per condition under Section-53 of the Act; (b) On the condition that the petitioner shall deposit, on or before 7.9.2012, 25% of the amount determined by the impugned order, in compliance of the condition under Section 53 and shall also, simultaneously i.e. on or before 7.9.2012, deposit further/additional 25% of the amount determined by the impugned order (so as to make total of 50% of the amount determined under order dated 23.12.2001) with the authority under Section 53 of the Act; (c) Such deposit shall be without prejudice to the contentions of both sides and it will be subject to final order by the competent authority; (d) If the requisite amount, as aforesaid, is deposited by the petitioner within above-mentioned time limit, then the delay shall be deemed to have been condoned and the authority will, thereafter, accept, entertain and decide the application-appeal on merits; (e) The application-appeal shall be considered and decided on its own merits by the competent authority, after hearing the petitioner. Thus, on such deposit, the concerned authority shall independently consider the application on its own merits and on the basis of material available on record before it and shall come to its own independent conclusion on merits of the case in light of the relevant and applicable provisions and pass appropriate order, as may be required by law, on merits; (f) for the said purpose, the competent authority shall inform the petitioner the date and time of hearing; (g) the petitioner shall accordingly remain present and shall not, make request for adjournment; (h) If the petitioner remains absent, then it will be open to the authority to proceed ex-parte and decide the appeal on merits on the basis of material available on record and to pass appropriate reasoned and speaking order; (i) The competent authority will accept/receive and entertain the appeal if the requisite amount, as aforesaid, is deposited within the time limit mentioned above. If the amount is not so deposited, then application-appeal will not be entertained; (j) All contentions available to the petitioner and the Department are kept open; (k) The competent authority shall decide the appeal independently and on its own merits without by any order or observations; (l) The petitioner shall place on record the receipt acknowledging the payment/deposit of the amount in question. 33. It is, again, clarified that the delay caused in preferring the appeal shall stand condoned if and after the amount, as aforesaid, is deposited. 34. The Competent Authority will pass appropriate order on merits and strictly in accordance with law and in light of the provisions under the Act and the Rules as expeditiously as possible and preferably within 12 weeks from the date on which the amount is deposited. 35. If the petitioner fails to deposit the amount within the time limit prescribed above, present order will not take effect. 36. The said payment of additional 25% amount (in addition to statutory requirement of 25%) shall be subject to the final decision of the competent authority under Section 53 and shall remain deposited with the competent authority, as deposit, until the decision on petitioner’s application is passed on merits and thereafter it will be subject to the final order that may be passed by the competent authority. 37. With the aforesaid clarifications and directions, the petition is partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No cost. 37. With the aforesaid clarifications and directions, the petition is partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No cost. Appeal allowed.