1. This Criminal Revision is directed against the order dated 4th July, 2012, passed by the learned Sub Judge, (Judge, Small Causes Court), Srinagar, in a complaint titled Mst. Rifat Farooq v. Sheikh Mohammad Amin, on the grounds taken in the memo of Revision petition. 2. A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘Act’) was presented before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, which was assigned and transferred to earned City Judge, Srinagar, on 20.11.2008, and, subsequently, transferred to the Court of Judge, Small Causes, Srinagar, in terms of the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, on 20.10.2009. 3. The record reveals that the learned Magistrate, after recording statements of the complainant and a witness produced by him, took cognizance of the complaint and issued process against the accused for the commission of offence under Section 138 of the Act. During the pendency of the complaint, the accused appeared on 29.11.2008, and laid an application for revocation of order dated 22.11.2008, which was considered and dismissed on merits by the court vide order dated 05.05.2009. The petitioner, accused, invoked the jurisdiction of this Court in terms of 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short Cr. P. C.), bearing 561-A petition No. 44/2009, seeking quashment of the entire proceedings together with order dated 05.05.2009. The said petition was dismissed by this Court vide judgment and order dated 29.06.2009. It would be beneficial to quote the relief sought for by the petitioner in the aforesaid 561-A Cr. P. C. petition No. 44/2009, which reads as under: “In the premises, it is, therefore, prayed that this application of the petitioners under Section 561 be accepted and the cognizance taken vide order dated 22.11.2008 on the complaint filed by respondent No. 1 under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act in complaint titled Mst. Rifat Farooq Versus Mr. Sheikh Mohammad Amin and others be quashed and also the complaint including the proceedings so initiated and taken in pursuance of the order of cognizance dated 22.11.2008.” 4. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, while dismissing the said petition, recorded in the order that no other ground was urged. It would be apt to reproduce paragraph 2 and the penultimate paragraph of the judgment hereunder: “Heard learned counsel for petitioner. Considered the matter. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, while dismissing the said petition, recorded in the order that no other ground was urged. It would be apt to reproduce paragraph 2 and the penultimate paragraph of the judgment hereunder: “Heard learned counsel for petitioner. Considered the matter. Learned counsel for petitioners submit that complaint filed by respondent through attorney is not maintainable, hence this petition seeking quashment of the proceedings… …. No other ground was urged….” 5. Consequent upon dismissal of the 561-A Cr. P. C. petition by this Court, the trial court proceeded ahead and recorded the statement of the accused under Section 242 Cr.P.C. and of the witnesses produced by the complainant. 6. The record reveals that the accused again filed an application on 14.11.2011 before the trial court under Section 253(2) of Cr.P.C. for his discharge on the grounds taken therein. The said application came to be dismissed by the trial court vide order dated 04.07.2012. 7. Mr. Qureshi vehemently argued that the trial court has not recorded the preliminary statements of the complainant and his witness on oath, as mandated by the provision of Section 200 Cr. P.C. Thus, according to him, taking cognizance and issuance of process thereon is bad in law and that is why the accused was constrained to move an application for discharge under Section 253(2) of Cr. P.C. In support of his argument, he has laid reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in SLJ (2) 2006 page 571. 8. Mr. Lateef, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent, in rebuttal, argued that the petitioner has himself used the process of the Court by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 561-A Cr. P.C. and, thereafter, by laying two applications before the trial court, the mention of which has been already made in the preceding paragraphs, which, too, came to be dismissed. It is submitted by the learned counsel that, in order to cause delay and frustrate the complainant and the proceedings thereon, the learned counsel for the petitioners has resorted to attritional litigation which, apart from resulting in wastage of the Court time, tantamounts to abuse of the process of the Court. 9. The argument of Mr. Qureshi, though appears to be attractive, is devoid of any force. 9. The argument of Mr. Qureshi, though appears to be attractive, is devoid of any force. The Act, in Chapter XVII, provides the mechanism as to how a complaint is to be presented, in what manner cognizance is to be taken, what is the mode of service of summons, how the evidence on affidavits is to be taken and how the trial is to be conducted. It will be useful to reproduce Section 142 of the Act, 1881 hereunder: “142. Cognizance of offences:- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)- (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause-of-action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138: (Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a compliant within such period.) (c) No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138.]” 10. While going through the provision of Section 142, it becomes clear that it has overriding effect and provides how to take cognizance. It is specifically provided therein that the court can take cognizance upon a complaint made in writing. Section 144 of the Act prescribes as to how the summon is to be issued. The aforesaid provisions of the Act nowhere provide that recording of preliminary statement of the complainant or any witness at the time of taking cognizance or, otherwise while drawing the process; statements have to be recorded on oath. It is nowhere provided therein that preliminary statement of the complainant or witnesses has to be recorded. This Act is a special Act and has its purpose. The aim and object of the Act is to prevent commission of commercial offences and put a check on bouncing of cheques. The technicalities, mystic maybes, procedural wrangles and tangles have no role to play in dealing with complaints filed under the provisions of the Act. This Act is a special Act and has its purpose. The aim and object of the Act is to prevent commission of commercial offences and put a check on bouncing of cheques. The technicalities, mystic maybes, procedural wrangles and tangles have no role to play in dealing with complaints filed under the provisions of the Act. The apex Court in case titled M/s Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. V. Galaxy Traders and Agencies Ltd., reported in AIR 2001 SC 676 , has laid down the same principle. It would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant paragraph of the judgment hereunder: “3. The Act was enacted and Section 138 thereof incorporated with a specified object of making a special provision by incorporating a strict liability so far as the cheque, a negotiable instrument, is concerned. The law relating to negotiable instrument is the law of commercial world legislated to facilitate the activities in trade and commerce making provision of giving sanctity to the instruments of credit which could be deemed to be convertible into money and easily passable from one person to another. In the absence of such instruments, including a cheque, the trade and commerce activities, in the present day would, are likely to be adversely affected as it is impracticable for the trading community to carry on with it the bulk of the currency in force. The negotiable instruments are in fact the instruments of credit being convertible on account of legality of being negotiated and are easily passable from one hand to another. To achieve the objectives of the Act, the legislature has, in its wisdom, thought it proper to make such provisions in the Act for conferring such privileges to the mercantile instruments contemplated under it and provide special penalties and procedure in case the obligations under the instruments are not discharged. The laws relating to the Act are, therefore, required to be interpreted in the light of the objects intended to be achieved by it despite there being deviations from the general law and the procedure provided for the redressal of the grievances to the litigants. The laws relating to the Act are, therefore, required to be interpreted in the light of the objects intended to be achieved by it despite there being deviations from the general law and the procedure provided for the redressal of the grievances to the litigants. Efforts to defeat the objectives of law by resorting to innovative measures and methods are to be discouraged, lest it may affect the commercial and mercantile activities in a smooth and healthy manner, ultimately affecting the economy of the country.” The Supreme Court in another case titled Rosy v. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 2000 SC 637 , again, expressed a similar view. Paragraph 45 of the said judgment is fruitfully reproduced hereunder: 45. Further, the aforesaid interpretation would be in consonance with Chapter XXXV of the Cr. P.C. which deals with irregularities in the proceedings, which may or may not vitiate the proceedings. Sections 460 and 461 provide which irregularities would or would not vitiate the proceedings. In these sections, there is no mention of Section 202. For our purpose reference to Section 465 would suffice, which inter alia specifically provides that irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, order or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry shall not be a ground for reversing order passed by the competent Court, unless in the opinion of that Court a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. Sub-section (2) further provides that in determining whether any irregularity in proceedings has occasioned a failure of justice, t he Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings. Hence, the statute does not expressly provide for nullification of the order as a consequence of non-compliance of proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 202, but provides that unless prejudice is caused, the order is not to be set aside. This would mean that during inquiry under Section 202 when Magistrate examines the witnesses on oath, as far as possible proviso is to be complied with but the mandate is not absolute.” 11. This would mean that during inquiry under Section 202 when Magistrate examines the witnesses on oath, as far as possible proviso is to be complied with but the mandate is not absolute.” 11. Then again, the apex Court, while dealing with a similar case titled K. M. Ibrahim v. K. P. Mohammad & anr., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 7500, read with other provisions contained in Chapter XVII of the Act, held that it is a special Act and the purpose cannot be defeated by mere technicalities or any other ground. 12. While going through the minutes of the file, it appears that the accused have not appeared on all the dates before the trial court, but have tried to cause delay, and, thereby frustrate the proceedings. The petitioner herein has himself, thus, abused the process of law. 13. Moreover, it is not understandable as to how an application under Section 253(2) Cr. P.C. could be made before the trial court and why that was not dismissed in limine, for the simple reason that the proceedings in terms of Chapter XVII are to be conducted summarily, i.e., such proceedings constitute a summons case, not a warrant case. Therefore, the proceedings are to be conducted in terms of the provisions of Sections 242 to 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the State and not in the manner as is required for warrant cases. Thus, the petition laid under Section 253 (2) Cr. P. C. was not at all maintainable. 14. Though Section 142 of the Act has overriding effect and, if at all the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal procedure from Sections 200 to 205 were applicable, the question that arises is whether it is a defect and whether the recording of the statement of the complainant and the witness without oath is a defect, which will warrant grant of Revision petition. As discussed hereinabove, the accused petitioner herein has already exhausted so many remedies without any success and the trial court has recorded the statement of witnesses and the complainant and the trial of the case is at its fag end. It will be too late now to grant Revision on the said ground, that too, when the petitioner has failed to press those grounds in terms of petition filed under Section 561-A Cr.P.C bearing No. 44/2009. It will be too late now to grant Revision on the said ground, that too, when the petitioner has failed to press those grounds in terms of petition filed under Section 561-A Cr.P.C bearing No. 44/2009. The apex Court in a case titled Rosy v. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 2000 SC 637 , has laid down the principle, paragraph 48 of which is reproduced as under: “48. The High Court failed to notice the provisions of Section 465 of the Code as the objection with regard to such error, omission or irregularity in the committal order was required to be raised at the earliest stage. After committal order in the case, the trial was almost over as evidence of the prosecution witnesses was recorded by the Sessions Court, statements of the accused under Section 313 of the Code were also recorded, thereafter witnesses were recalled and examined, further statements were recorded and only at the stage of arguments the contention with regard to the so-called irregularity was raised, which is upheld by the Sessions Court and the High Court. In the background of these facts, we hold that holding of fresh inquiry under Section 202 would be totally unnecessary in the present case and thereafter to commit the case again to the Sessions Court.” 15. This Court also in a case titled Mohammad Yousuf Bhat vs. Mohammad Maqbool Kumar, reported in 2010(1) S.L.J. page 171, laid down that the proceedings drawn under Section 138 of the Act are special in nature and cannot be defeated on the ground which has lost significance. It would be useful to reproduce paragraph 5 of the judgement: “Chapter XVI Code of Criminal Procedure 19, deals with the procedure to be followed by Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence in a complaint. Section 200 requires the Magistrate to examine the complainant and the witness(s), if any, upon oath. The code does not define :Oath” not does it lay down the form or contents of “ the oath”. The ground urged in the petition thus makes it imperative to refer to the Judicial Oath’s rules, 1950 Svt. (1894 AD). Rule 3 enumerates the authorities empowered to administer Oaths and affirmations in discharge of their duties. Rule 4 identifies the person who may be administered Oath or affirmation. Rule 5 lays down that a witness instead of making an Oath may make an affirmation. (1894 AD). Rule 3 enumerates the authorities empowered to administer Oaths and affirmations in discharge of their duties. Rule 4 identifies the person who may be administered Oath or affirmation. Rule 5 lays down that a witness instead of making an Oath may make an affirmation. Rule 6 provides forms of Oaths and Aspiration. Rule 12 of the Act provides that omission to make Oath or affirmation and irregularity in administering Oath or affirmation or irregularity in the form in which it is administered, does not invalidate proceedings or render inadmissible evidence. In the present case the complainant and his witness have made their statements on solemn affirmation. On taking holistic view of the Judicial Oaths Rules it follows that recording statement of the complainant or witness on solemn affirmation instead of Oath, does not have any negative fall out for the proceedings. Even if solemn affirmation may not be taken as substitute for oath, the omission or irregularity does not affect the validity of proceedings or the order taking cognizance of the offence on a complaint. In 1952 Supreme Court 54 (55) It has been held that omission to administer oath even to an adult goes only to credibility of the witness not his competence. The reliance placed on 2006 (II)571 by learned counsel for the petitioner is misplaced for the reasons that in the reported case the statement of the complainant and witness was seemingly not recorded on Oath and not even on solemn affirmation. It was held in the said background that the statement of the complainant and witness was not to form basis for issuance of process. In 1979, Allahabad Law Journal 880 (885), it has been held that where statement is recorded on solemn affirmation, it could not be assailed on ground that Oath was not administered in as much as omission to administer the Oath or make any affirmation does not invalidate the proceedings.” 16. The same view has been taken by the apex Court in a case reported in AIR 2009 SC 422 , which has been discussed in detail by one of the Coordinate Benches of this Court while dismissing the 561-A Cr.P.C. petition No. 44/2009 filed by the petitioners herein. 17. Having a glance of the discussions made hereinabove and the judgments quoted, I am of the considered view that the petitioner has grossly abused the jurisdiction of this Court. 17. Having a glance of the discussions made hereinabove and the judgments quoted, I am of the considered view that the petitioner has grossly abused the jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, this Criminal Revision petition is dismissed along with the connected criminal miscellaneous petition. For the abuse of process of this Court, the petitioner is burdened with costs quantified at Rupees ten thousand, payable to the complainant. 18. Registry is directed to remit the record forthwith alongwith copy of this judgment and the trial court is directed to proceed ahead with the trial as expeditiously as possible. 19. As a corollary, the Criminal Transfer Application shall stand settled.