JUDGMENT K.N. KESHAVANARAYANA, J.—Appellant alongwith his mother and younger brother, took trial before the Fast Track Court-IV at Mysore in S.C. No. 139/2003 for the offences punishable under Sections. 498-A, 304 read with 34 of IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (for short, ‘D.P. Act’). 2. After a full-pledged trial, the learned Sessions Judge by the judgment under appeal, acquitted Accused Nos. 2 and 3 of all the charges and convicted appellant/Accused No. 1 for the offences punishable under Section 498A of IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, while acquitted him of the charges levelled against him for the offences punishable under Section 304B read with 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 6 of the D.P Act. Aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge, appellant/Accused No. 1 is before this Court with this appeal. 3. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as the learned Additional S.P.P. appearing for the Respondent-State and perused the records secured form the Court below. 4. The case of the prosecution in brief is as under: The marriage of deceased Vasantha, daughter of P.W. 1-Narayanashetty, with Accused No. 1 was solemnized on 4.8.2000 and at the time of the marriage, P.W. 1 had paid dowry of Rs. 25,000/- in cash and 40 grms. of gold as demanded by the accused and not satisfied with the said dowry, after the marriage, the accused started coercing the deceased to get further amount of Rs. 50,000/- and since his demands were not complied with, he subjected the deceased to mental and physical cruelty and unable to bear the said cruelty, she committed suicide by hanging in the matrimonial home on 2.2.2003. Thus, according to the case of the prosecution, the death of the deceased was a dowry death. 5. As noticed supra, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted Accused Nos. 2 and 3 of all the charges and the appellant/Accused No. 1 was also acquitted of the offences punishable under Section 304 Part B and Sections 3 and 6 of the D.P. Act. Therefore, in this appeal, the points that arise for my consideration are,- (i) Whether the learned Sessions Judge is justified in holding that the appellant/accused demanded Rs. 2 and 3 of all the charges and the appellant/Accused No. 1 was also acquitted of the offences punishable under Section 304 Part B and Sections 3 and 6 of the D.P. Act. Therefore, in this appeal, the points that arise for my consideration are,- (i) Whether the learned Sessions Judge is justified in holding that the appellant/accused demanded Rs. 50,000/- as further dowry, thereby committed the offence punishable under Section 4 of the D.P. Act? (ii) Whether the learned Sessions Judge is justified in holding the appellant/accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC? 6. Reading of the evidence of the material witnesses including the evidence of P.W. 1, the father of the deceased, would only indicate that the appellant/accused, after the marriage, wanted his wife to get a sum of Rs. 50,000/- from her father for the purpose of constructing the house. The learned Sessions Judge during the course of the judgment has held that this demand of Rs. 50,000/- was nothing but a demand for dowry within the meaning of Section 2 of the D.P. Act and therefore, the appellant-accused is guilty of Section 4 of the D.P. Act. 7. It is in the evidence on record that the accused alongwith other family members started constructing a house in the site allotted by the Housing Board at Nanjangud and he was in need of money for completing construction. Even according to the evidence of the material witnesses, the demand by the accused was only for the purpose of construction of the house. It is now fairly well-settled that every demand made by the husband or his relative/s would not constitute as dowry demand. Having regard to the fact that the alleged demand of Rs. 50,000/- by the accused was for the purpose of construction of the house and since it is in evidence on record that the accused were constructing the house, in my opinion, the alleged demand cannot be construed as a demand for dowry, as held by the learned Sessions Judge. The finding recorded by the learned Sessions Judge in this regard, in my opinion, is not justified. Assuming for the purpose of argument that the evidence of the witnesses with regard to appellant/accused demanding Rs. The finding recorded by the learned Sessions Judge in this regard, in my opinion, is not justified. Assuming for the purpose of argument that the evidence of the witnesses with regard to appellant/accused demanding Rs. 50,000/- is acceptable, even then, the said demand cannot be construed as a demand for dowry within the meaning of Section 2 of the D.P. Act punishable under Section 4 of the said Act. Therefore, the finding of guilt recorded by the learned Sessions Judge for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the D.P. Act cannot be sustained. 8. The learned Sessions Judge while considering the question as to whether the death of the deceased was dowry death within the meaning of Section 304B of IPC, has held that the death was not a dowry death. This finding has been recorded on the basis that the death of the deceased was not sequel to any cruelty meted-out to her in connection with demand for dowry. On the other hand, as per the findings recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, on the date of the incident, in the night, the deceased demanded her husband to fetch her a night dress, but the husband told her that, by that time the shops would have been closed and that since he is suffering from night blindness, he will not be in a position to go out of the house at that hour. Annoyed by the answer given by her husband, she alongwith the child went inside the bedroom, bolted the door from inside and did not respond to the call of the husband and other family members for dinner. It is only late in the night, the family members heard the child crying inside the room and though they tapped the door of the room, there was no response from inside and at that time the appellant/accused brought one Subramanyam, a neighbourer, who also tried to get response from inside the room, but there was no response. Thereafter, when they peeped through window, they noticed the deceased having hanged to the ceiling fan inside the bedroom. Thereafter, they broke-down the door and informed the police. Under these circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge has held that the deceased committed suicide on account of refusal on the part of her husband to fetch her a night-dress. Thereafter, when they peeped through window, they noticed the deceased having hanged to the ceiling fan inside the bedroom. Thereafter, they broke-down the door and informed the police. Under these circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge has held that the deceased committed suicide on account of refusal on the part of her husband to fetch her a night-dress. Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge held that the death was not a dowry death and consequently, the appellant was acquitted of the charge punishable under Section 304B of IPC. In the light of this finding, the question to be considered is, whether the appellant could be held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC? 9. Every ‘cruelty’ meted-out to a married woman by her husband or his relative/s would not constitute ‘Cruelty’ punishable under Section 498A of IPC. 10. Reading of Clause (a) and (b) of Explanation to Section 498A of IPC makes it clear that the ‘Cruelty’ or ‘Harassment’ should be of such a nature so as to drive the married woman to commit suicide or cause danger to her life or limb. 11. Reading of entire evidence of P.W. 1, father of the deceased indicates that he has not whispered even a word about the appellant/accused subjecting the deceased to any kind of cruelty. It is not the say of P.W. 1 that at any point of time his daughter (deceased) informed him about she being subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. The acts of cruelty on a married woman would generally takes place within the four walls of matrimonial home, therefore, there would be no out-side, who could witness such incident. Under those circumstances, the kith and kin of the married woman could come to know of such acts only through the victim herself. It is quite natural that whenever a married woman is subjected to such kind of cruelty and harassment, she would disclose the same to her parents and blood-relatives. In the case on hand, the mother of the deceased is not examined as a witness, therefore, we are deprived of the best piece of evidence. The father of the deceased has not stated anything with regard to the deceased having been subjected to any kind of cruelty or harassment. In the case on hand, the mother of the deceased is not examined as a witness, therefore, we are deprived of the best piece of evidence. The father of the deceased has not stated anything with regard to the deceased having been subjected to any kind of cruelty or harassment. In the light of the evidence of P.W. 1, stray sentences in the evidence of other witnesses with regard to the cruelty meted-out to the deceased cannot be the basis to hold that she had been subjected to cruelty or harassment. 12. Assuming for the purpose of argument that the deceased had been subjected to some kind of cruelty, having regard to the definite finding recorded by the learned Sessions Judge with regard to the charge under Section 304B of IPC, the alleged cruelty was not of such a nature so as to drive the deceased to commit suicide, since the background in which the deceased committed suicide was not the alleged cruelty, but was refusal on the part of her husband to fetch her nightdress as demanded by her. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the finding recorded by the learned Sessions Judge holding the appellant/accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC is also perverse and cannot be sustained. Therefore, the judgment under appeal convicting the appellant-accused for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act cannot be sustained. The appellant is entitled for acquittal of the said charges also. 13. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 6.9.2005 convicting the appellant/Accused No. 1 for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act is hereby set aside. The appellant/Accused No. 1 is acquitted of those charges also. 14. The bail and surety bonds executed by the appellant are ordered to be discharged. 15. Fine amount, if any deposited by the appellant is ordered to be refunded to him.