Judgment : Tarun Agarwala, J. List has been revised. No one appears for respondent No. 3. 2. Heard Shri Arvind Kumar Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Subhash Upadhyaya, the learned Standing Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 & 2. 3. A First Information Report dated 25th January, 1996 was lodged against the petitioner u/S 409, 418 and 420 I.P.C. Based on this first information report, the petitioner was suspended by an order dated 15th February, 1996. The petitioner was also chargesheeted by an order dated 24th May, 1996. Six charges were levelled against the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his reply. The disciplinary authority took no further action instead it chose to await the result of the criminal trial which had already started against the petitioner on the same charges pursuant to the first information report dated 25th January, 1996. The trial court gave a judgment dated 14th January, 2004 acquitting the petitioner honourably from the charges that was levelled against him. This judgment has become final since no appeal or revision was filed before the superior court. 4. Based on this judgment, the petitioner applied for reinstatement of his services. The Co-operative Societies considered the petitioner’s application and, by a Resolution dated 20th September, 2004, accepted the petitioner’s prayer and directed reinstatement of his services. Based on the said Resolution, the Secretary issued an order dated 15th November, 2004 directing reinstatement of his services. Thereafter, the petitioner was reinstated and demanded arrears of salary for the period he remained under suspension, i.e., from 15th February, 1996 to 1st November, 2004, the date when the petitioner was reinstated. Since the arrears of salary was not granted, the petitioner filed the present writ petition praying that arrears of salary be paid for the period when the petitioner was under suspension, i.e., from 15th February, 1996 to 1st November, 2004. 5. In paragraph 7 of the writ petition, the petitioner has categorically stated that the chargesheet issued against the petitioner and the F.I.R. lodged against him was based on the same set of allegations. This fact has not been denied by the respondent No. 3 in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit. 5. In paragraph 7 of the writ petition, the petitioner has categorically stated that the chargesheet issued against the petitioner and the F.I.R. lodged against him was based on the same set of allegations. This fact has not been denied by the respondent No. 3 in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit. From a perusal of the counter affidavit, it is also clear that even though a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner, no action was taken after the reply was submitted by the petitioner and that the disciplinary authority chose to await the result of the criminal trial. It has also come on record that pursuant to the decision of the criminal trial, the petitioner has been reinstated. 6. In G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat and others, (2006) 5 SCC 446 , the question which the court was required to consider was : “Whether acquittal, absolutely on merits amounting to clear exoneration of the appellant by the Special Court under the P.C. Act does ipso facto absolve the appellant from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction when the charges leveled against the appellant in the departmental proceedings and the criminal proceedings are grounded on the same set of facts, charges, circumstances and evidence.” 7. The Supreme Court found that the charges framed in the domestic proceedings and in the criminal proceedings were grounded on the same set of facts and circumstances and held that since the appellant had been exonerated /acquitted by the competent court on the same set of facts and evidence and witnesses, therefore, the dismissal order based on the same set of facts and evidence on the departmental side was liable to be set aside in the interest of justice. 8. In the Corporation of the City of Nagpur, Civil Lines, Nagpur and another Vs. Ramchandra and others, (1981) 2 SCC 714 , the Supreme Court held where the accused is acquitted honourably and is completely exonerated of the charges, it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence. For facility, paragraph 6 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder: “The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. For facility, paragraph 6 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder: “The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court. Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its direction in any way fettered. ” 9. In view of the fact that a specific averment has been made that the chargesheet issued by the disciplinary authority and the charges mentioned in the first information report was based on the same sets of facts and the petitioner having been acquitted honourably by the criminal court, no useful purpose would be served in continuing the domestic proceedings. Further, the Court finds that the disciplinary authority has already reinstated the petitioner. 10. In Brahma Chandra Gupta Vs. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 380 , wherein similar circumstances upon being reinstated, the authority granted 3/4th salary during the suspension period. The Supreme Court held that the order of 3/4th salary was patently erroneous and that the petitioner was entitled for full salary. 11. In the present case, when the petitioner has been reinstated after being honourably acquitted from a criminal trial and no action whatsoever has been taken by the authority in its disciplinary proceedings, there is no justification for the respondents in not releasing the arrears of salary. 12. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed. A writ of mandamus is issued directing the respondent No. 3 to release the salary of the petitioner for the period he was under suspension, i.e., from 15th February, 1996 to 1st November, 2004 within six weeks from the date of the production of a certified copy of this order failing which the respondent No. 3 will be liable to pay interest @ 6% p.a. on the arrears of salary.