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2012 DIGILAW 614 (JK)

Robkar v. Shri Sudhanshu Pandey

2012-09-28

MANSOOR AHMAD MIR

body2012
1. The roots of this Robkar, framed against the respondent-contemnor by the Registry on 10.04.2012, are embedded in the order of the Court dated 05.04.2012 passed in Contempt Petition No. 466/2007, arising out of SWP No. 506/1992. The aforesaid order dated 05.04.2012 was passed by the Court after disallowing the objections raised in opposition to the contempt petition and on recording a finding that respondent No. 2 in the contempt petition, namely, Shri Sudhanshu Pandey, had deliberately and willfully disobeyed the Writ Court order dated 16.10.2000. The Robkar so framed by the Registry is extracted below: “Whereas, the Contempt Petition was again listed before Hon’ble Court on 05.04.2012 and after consideration of material available before it, the Hon’ble Court was pleased to pass an order (copy whereof is enclosed herewith) the operative part of the said order is reproduced as under: …….. ‘21. For the reasons discussed above, I am satisfied that the respondent No. 2 Shri Sudhanshu Pandey, Commissioner Secretary to Government, finance Department has committed Civil Contempt within the meaning of Section 2 (b) of J&K Contempt of Courts Act, 1997 by willfully disobeying the Writ Court order dated 19.10.2000. 22. Rule be framed against the respondent No. 2- Shri Sudhanshu Pandey, Commissioner Secretary to Government Finance Department accordingly, and respondent asked to show cause within two weeks from the date of service of the notice as to why respondent contemnor should not be dealt with and punished for the civil contempt committee by the contemnor as stated, in accordance with law. In the meantime, the Writ Court order dated 19.10.2000 against the backdrop of orders passed from time to time be complied with. List immediately after two weeks.’ It is, therefore, in compliance with the Hon’ble Court order dated 05.04.2012, this Robkar is framed against above named respondent/contemnor to show cause as to why he should not be dealt with and punished for the Civil Contempt committed by him, in accordance with law.” 2. The respondent challenged the order of the Court dated 04.05.2012, by medium of an appeal, LPA No. 99/2012, which came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court on 11.06.2012. The Division Bench dismissed the LPA holding as under: “Having pondered over the submissions made by Mr. The respondent challenged the order of the Court dated 04.05.2012, by medium of an appeal, LPA No. 99/2012, which came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court on 11.06.2012. The Division Bench dismissed the LPA holding as under: “Having pondered over the submissions made by Mr. Aamir, we are of the considered view that the Letters Patent Appeal, at the stage of issuance of show cause notice would not be maintainable because all the pleas which are sought to be raised before us are available to the appellants before the contempt court. At this stage, the issue concerning Empowerment Committee has not been finally decided. The appellant has not taken any stand before the contempt court regarding any additional directions. Therefore, leaving the appellant to raise all the issues before the contempt court, we dismiss the appeal. We are sure that if the issues which are raised before us are also raised before the contempt court, those would be considered in accordance with law by the Bench dealing with contempt matter. We wish to make it clear that any observation made by us in this order shall not be considered as an expression of opinion on the merit of the controversy.” 3. Consequent upon framing of Rule (Robkar) and issuance of show cause notice, the Respondent has appeared and filed his detailed reply which is prefaced by an unconditional apology tendered by the contemnor. 4. Since the contempt petition No. 466/2007 itself is bed rocked on the order dated 19.10.2000 passed in a batch of writ petitions, the lead case being SWP No. 506/1992, coupled with the order passed by the Division Bench on 11.06.2012, it becomes imperative to ascertain as to what directions had been made by the Writ Court while disposing of the batch of writ petitions. The order passed by the Writ Court is reproduced extensio hereunder: “In order to resolve the dispute the learned counsel for the parties have agreed for disposal of the writ petition by the following order: The Chief Engineer will appoint a panel of officers not less than two, to look into the factual aspect with regard to the claim of the petitioners, i.e., the genuineness of the engagement of the petitioners as Daily rated Workers and their subsequent continuation either pursuant to the directions of the court or allowed by the respondents on their own. This exercise shall be done under the supervision of the Chief Engineer and accomplished within three months. The panel shall be constituted by the Chief Engineer before 15.11.2000. In case it is made out from the report of the panel that the petitioners have been continued as daily rated workers till date, have worked uninterruptedly for a period of seven years as on date and their engagement is genuine, the respondents shall process their cases for regularization under SRO 64/94. It is clarified that if the petitioners were continuing on 31.3.1994 and they have been discontinued by the respondents, their absence or discontinuation will not b e counted by the respondents as an impediment in their way for their entitlement to seek consideration for regularization as Rule 8 of SRO contemplates continuation till they complete seven years. The petitioners are at liberty also to file evidence of their engagement orders and other documents in support of their claim, on or before 15.11.2000 before the Chief Engineer. The petitioners are further at liberty to represent themselves personally or through their counsel as prayed for by the petitioners but their non representation will not come in the way of the panel to submit the report. Registry will return the record back to the learned counsel for the respondent. Petitioners, if feel aggrieved of the report they are at liberty to challenge it. Writ petitions are disposed off alongwith connected CMPs and contempt petitions.” 5. It is thus axiomatic from a bare reading of the aforesaid order that the Chief Engineer was required to appoint a panel of officers, not less than two, to look into the factual aspects with regard to the claim of the petitioners. The committee was required to ascertain: i) Whether the engagement of the petitioners as daily rated workers was genuine? ii) Whether the petitioners had continued as daily rated workers till the aforesaid order was passed by the Court; iii) Whether the petitioners had worked uninterruptedly for a period of seven years till the date of the order, i.e., till 19.10.2000; and iv) Whether the petitioners were in place as on 31.03.1994. 6. In compliance to the aforesaid order of the Writ Court, the Chief Engineer vide order No. PHE/Estt/CCS/272/15824 dated 30.10.2000, constituted a two-member committee of two Executive Engineers, which was later substituted by a three-member committee, to undertake the exercise directed by the Writ Court. 6. In compliance to the aforesaid order of the Writ Court, the Chief Engineer vide order No. PHE/Estt/CCS/272/15824 dated 30.10.2000, constituted a two-member committee of two Executive Engineers, which was later substituted by a three-member committee, to undertake the exercise directed by the Writ Court. The committee first met on 09.12.2000, issued a notice via publications in two local dailies on 12.12.2000, notifying to all the petitioners to produce their original documents to substantiate their claims. In response thereto, 119 persons produced photocopies of their documents much after the period mentioned in the notice. However, later, on an application submitted before the Committee by Mr. A. G. Mir, counsel for the petitioners, time to submit the original documents was extended to enable all the concerned persons to submit their documentary proof. Despite extension in time, only 13 more persons filed their documents. The committee finally scrutinized the documents produced by 132 persons in its meetings held on 22nd and 23rd January, 2001. After examining these documents, namely, photocopies of engagement orders, the committee found that none of the petitioners had produced the original engagement orders; that all these engagements had been made in or after August, 1990; that none of these persons were continuing on the date of issue of SRO 64 of 1994; that after imposition of ban on engaging persons on daily wage basis, the number of daily rated workers in PHE Division, Handwara, had increased from 702 to 1064; that these daily wagers included school going students and persons working in other departments. The Committee, accordingly, made a report and opined that “none of the concerned have been in a position to substantiate their continuation pursuant to a genuine order and as such they are not entitled to regularization in terms of SRO 64 of 1994, nor are they entitled to any continuation. 7. Having regard to the directions contained in the Writ Court order dated 19.10.2000, in view of the above factual position, the same stood complied with, inasmuch as the committee was constituted, the petitioners were required to furnish documents to substantiate their engagements and continuation; the documents produced by them were scrutinized and the committee concluded that the petitioners were not entitled to regularization in terms of SRO 64 of 1994. 8. 8. It appears that subsequently the Government vide order No. 366-PW (Hyd) of 2004 dated 08.09.2004 appointed another four-member committee to examine all related issues case by case. The said Committee, after examining the matter, recorded as under: “the committee after considering all the aspects of the case has reached to the conclusion that it is absolutely difficult, rather impossible, to identify the genuine daily wagers at this belated stage. However, the circumstantial evidence raises many doubts about their genuineness. But the fact remains that by appointing various committees by the Government, it has given a ray of hope to these so called daily wagers and may be most of them or some of them have lived with a hope that they will be engaged some day. It is perhaps because of that fact the Govt. has considered engagement of 236 such so called daily wagers on need basis out of the list of 446 daily wagers on the basis of the fact that they have drawn wages from 8/90 to 3/92 for some period of time. It can be seen from the enclosed statement that out of 355 numbers daily wagers only 323 have drawn wages from time to time. Out of this, 236 numbers stand already engaged on need basis. It would be advisable if the Govt. considers engagement of remaining 87 persons on need basis who have drawn their wages during the period from 8/90 to 3/92 for one month or more as indicated in Annexure ‘A’ on the same analogy on which 236 persons have already been engaged subject to condition that they are alive and are not already working in any Govt./Semi Govt. organization.” 9. It is noteworthy that the aforesaid committee was constituted by the Government of its own and not pursuant to any direction of the Court. In any case, as is clear from the recommendations made by the committee, these daily wagers did not fit in the conditions and parameters stipulated by the Writ Court in its order dated 19.10.2000, so as to warrant their regularization. The Government on its part can go beyond the directions made by the Court. Any concessions, not flowing from the Court directions, made by the Government cannot be pressed in, to allege disobedience of the Court orders. The Government on its part can go beyond the directions made by the Court. Any concessions, not flowing from the Court directions, made by the Government cannot be pressed in, to allege disobedience of the Court orders. The directions of the Court stood complied with by constituting the earlier two-member committee by the Chief Engineer, which came to the conclusion that the engagement of the petitioners was not genuine etc. Therefore, the recommendations made by the said four-member committee or any other committee constituted thereafter is inconsequential for the present proceedings. This is one aspect of the matter having a vital bearing on the outcome of the present proceedings. 10. The other aspect of the matter is with regard to the maintainability of the contempt proceedings in context of the period of limitation. In this connection reference may be made to Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1997, which provides as under: “No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.” 11. Admittedly, the contempt petition was filed on 12.12.2007. It is seen from the record that the finding recorded by the Committee constituted by the Chief Engineer pursuant to the Court directions dated 19.10.2000 was within the knowledge of the petitioners, inasmuch as on 23.12.2004 they filed a writ petition, SWP No. 1673/2004, wherein they specifically averred that the respondents have not complied with the Court direction. The said writ petition was dismissed by the Writ Court on 16.09.2005, holding as under: “[T]he present petition cannot be maintained on the ground that the issue has already been decided and judgment passed by this court on the points in issue in the aforementioned writ petition. Another writ petition on the same subject matter and for the same reliefs cannot lie. The proper course for the writ petitioners is to seek proper remedy for implementation of the order through appropriate proceedings or for initiation of action against the defaulters.” 12. The petitioners despite alleging non-compliance of the Court orders in the writ petition filed on 23.12.2004 did not file the contempt. Besides, while dismissing SWP No. 1673/2004, the learned Writ Court had clearly indicated to the petitioners that they should initiate action against the defaulters. The petitioners despite alleging non-compliance of the Court orders in the writ petition filed on 23.12.2004 did not file the contempt. Besides, while dismissing SWP No. 1673/2004, the learned Writ Court had clearly indicated to the petitioners that they should initiate action against the defaulters. In face of the said observation made by the Writ Court, the petitioners ought to have been diligent enough to file the contempt petition immediately. Instead, they chose to file the present contempt only on 12.12.2007, i.e., almost three years after the filing of the writ petition and two years and three months after the dismissal of the writ petition. In the event the petitioners felt that the conclusions recorded by the Committee were contumacious, they ought to have filed the contempt petition within the limitation period. But, as indicated above, that was not so. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act provides that ‘no Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. 13. That apart, the petitioners had a remedy available to them to challenge the conclusions arrived at by the committee constituted pursuant to the Court orders. In fact, the petitioners did file a fresh writ petition, SWP No. 1673/2004, but they did not challenge the findings and conclusions of the committee in that petition. They rather sought mandamus against the respondents for regularization of their services and payment of salaries. 14. It appears that the petitioners, noticing that the limitation period prescribed in the Act for initiating contempt proceedings had elapsed, they filed the writ petition, bearing No. SWP No. 1673/2004, to renew the limitation period. It would be apt to reproduce paragraphs 10 and 20 of the writ petition (SWP No. 1673/2004) hereunder: “10. 14. It appears that the petitioners, noticing that the limitation period prescribed in the Act for initiating contempt proceedings had elapsed, they filed the writ petition, bearing No. SWP No. 1673/2004, to renew the limitation period. It would be apt to reproduce paragraphs 10 and 20 of the writ petition (SWP No. 1673/2004) hereunder: “10. The petitioners say and submit that although in faithful compliance with the judgment and order of this Hon’ble Court dated 19.10.2000, the respondent No. 3 was required to constitute a Committee to verify and scrutinize the number of Daily-wagers genuinely engaged and to complete the exercise including the regularization of the services of those found to be genuinely engaged, within a period of three months from the date of the Judgment, yet the Respondent No. 3 did not comply with the terms of the Judgment and Order of this Hon’ble Court dated 19.10.2000 and in contumacious disregard thereof, allowed the process to protract not only beyond the period of time stipulated by this Hon’ble Court, not by months but by years. 20. That all the entreaties and Representations made in the matter to the respondents by way of demand for compliance with the mandate of the Judgment and order of this Hon’ble Court dated 19.10.2000 as well as the mandate of SRO 64 of 1994, having proved to be an exercise in futility, the petitioners having thus been denied justice even on demand, the instant Writ Petition is the only appropriate remedy available in law to the Petitioners in order to secure compliance of the Respondents with the mandate of the Judgment and Order of this Hon’ble Court dated 19.10.2000 as well as the mandate of SRO 64 of 1994.” 15. The writ petitioners in their pleadings unambiguously averred that the respondents had not complied with the judgment till the date of filing of the writ petition. Apart from that, in paragraph 20 of the writ petition, they specifically stated that they had no other remedy available to them. In face of such averments made in the writ petition, it is beyond comprehension as to how the contempt petition could be filed, that too, beyond the prescribed limitation period. 16. Respondent, Mr. Sudhanshu Pandey, in paragraph 8 of his reply has spelled out the action that was required to be taken by the department. In face of such averments made in the writ petition, it is beyond comprehension as to how the contempt petition could be filed, that too, beyond the prescribed limitation period. 16. Respondent, Mr. Sudhanshu Pandey, in paragraph 8 of his reply has spelled out the action that was required to be taken by the department. He has also given the details as to from what stage he was associated with the decision making process. In paragraph 9, he has disclosed how the Committee was constituted and what was the condition imposed by the Court (see annexure R-A of the Reply). Annexure ‘R-B’ appended to his reply reveals that another Committee was constituted by the Government which, too, made an adverse report about the petitioners. Paragraph 11 reveals that a false impression was created that the Committee was appointed by the High Court, which had concluded that 236 daily wagers have been found genuine. In paragraph 15 of the reply the role of the contemnor is delineated, and it is averred that it was because of his efforts that a memo was placed before the Chief Minister, who, in turn, convened the meeting immediately, and it was resolved that a proposal be submitted to the Cabinet for revival of the Empowered Committee to consider these cases afresh. It is further submitted that the Finance Department, accordingly, sent a memorandum to the cabinet for revival of the Empowered Committee and, accordingly, the Empowered Committee was revived vide Government Order No. 239-F of 2011 dated 30.09.2011, which met on 03.10.2011 and 04.10.2011, examined the entire record and made some observations. A memorandum was, accordingly, submitted to the Cabinet along with the detailed history of the case as well as findings of the Empowered Committee for taking a decision as per the directions of this Court. It is averred in paragraph 15 (j) & (k) that the cabinet, vide its decision No. 196/23/2011 dated 19.10.2011, considered the matter and resolved that the report of the Empowered Committee may be considered by the administrative department for further necessary action. It is stated further that in furtherance of cabinet decision, the Finance Department forwarded the decision of the Cabinet as well as the findings of the Empowered Committee to the PHE Department for further action at their end and it is specifically stated that the respondent, the alleged contemnor, had no role to play thereafter. It is stated further that in furtherance of cabinet decision, the Finance Department forwarded the decision of the Cabinet as well as the findings of the Empowered Committee to the PHE Department for further action at their end and it is specifically stated that the respondent, the alleged contemnor, had no role to play thereafter. In paragraph 16 of his reply he has again specifically averred that, while the matter was under consideration in PHE department for passing appropriate orders in compliance with the judgment of this Court, he came to be transferred, vide Government Order No. 1446-GAD of 2011 dated 16.12.2011, from the Finance Department to the Power Development Department, where he joined on 26.12.2011. In paragraph 18 of the reply, it is averred that, after the transfer of the respondent from the Finance Department, he had no knowledge about the happenings or developments that have taken place in the matter. It is further averred in paragraph 17 that, after the transfer of the respondent from the Finance Department, the PHE department has issued an order bearing Government Order No. 52-PWD (Hyd) of 2012 dated 03.02.2012, whereby the claim of the petitioners for regularization has been rejected. In paragraph 19 of the reply, it is stated that he was one of the Members of the Empowered Committee, and whatever has been decided, has been decided unanimously to the effect that none of the petitioners were entitled to regularization in terms of the conditions laid down in the judgment dated 19.10.2000. 17. It may be reiterated here that the Division Bench of this Court, while dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the Respondent, PHE Department, against the order of the Contempt Court directing issuance of Robkar, vide judgment dated 11.06.2012, permitted the Respondent Department to raise all the issues before the Contempt Court. 18. Mr. Jan vehemently argued, once a Robkar is framed, the only course to be adopted by the Court is to award punishment. It was further submitted by him that this Court had already held the contemnor guilty of disobedience of the Court orders; therefore, he was not to be heard at all, but was to be convicted. The argument of Mr. Jan is devoid of any force. It was further submitted by him that this Court had already held the contemnor guilty of disobedience of the Court orders; therefore, he was not to be heard at all, but was to be convicted. The argument of Mr. Jan is devoid of any force. It is the beaten law of the land that Courts always take a prima facie view whether a person is in breach of, or has violated, the Court direction and frame Robkar asking the contemnor to explain why he shall not be dealt with in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. It is always only a prima facie finding and, if the respondents, alleged contemnor, explains his conduct to the satisfaction of the Court, the Robkar has to be dropped and, if the Court is of the view that the alleged contemnor has committed contempt, he has either to be convicted and punished, or unconditional apology tendered has to be accepted or rejected; provided that unconditional apology is according to the mandate of law. Reference in this connection may be made to the judgments of the Apex Court in case titled Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, reported in AIR 2002 SC 1405 . It would be advantageous to reproduce paragraphs 13, 14 & 15 of the judgment hereunder: “13. Before proceeding with the matter further, certain basic statutory features ought to be noticed at this juncture. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced in the Statute Book for the purposes of securing a feeling of confidence of the people in general and for due and proper administration of justice in the country undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the hands of the law Courts but that by itself operates as a string of caution and unless thus otherwise satisfied beyond doubt, it would neither be fair nor reasonable for the law courts to exercise jurisdiction under the Statute. The observation as above finds support from a decision of this Court in Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati & Anr. ( 2001 (7) SCC 530 ), wherein one of us (Banerjee, J.) stated as below :- "As regards the burden and standard of proof, the common legal phraseology "he who asserts must prove" has its due application in the matter of proof of the allegations said to be constituting the act of contempt. ( 2001 (7) SCC 530 ), wherein one of us (Banerjee, J.) stated as below :- "As regards the burden and standard of proof, the common legal phraseology "he who asserts must prove" has its due application in the matter of proof of the allegations said to be constituting the act of contempt. As regards the "standard of proof", be it noted that a proceeding under the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi-criminal, and as such, the standard of proof required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach shall have to be established beyond all reasonable doubt." 14. Similar is the situation in Mrityunjoy Das & Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman & Ors. ( 2001 (3) SCC 739 ) and as such we need not dilate thereon further as to the burden and standard of proof vis- a-vis the Contempt of Courts Act - Suffice it to record that powers under the Act should be exercised with utmost care and caution and that too rather sparingly and in the larger interest of the society and for proper administration of the justice delivery system in the country. Exercise of power within the meaning of the Act of 1971 shall thus be a rarity and that too in a matter on which there exists no doubt as regards the initiation of the action being bona fide. 15. It may also be noticed at this juncture that mere disobedience of an order may not be sufficient to amount to a "civil contempt" within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act of 1971 the element of willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act and lastly, in the event two interpretations are possible and the action of the alleged contemnor pertains to one such interpretation the act or acts cannot be ascribed to be otherwise contumacious in nature. A doubt in the matter as regards the wilful nature of the conduct if raised, question of success in a contempt petition would not arise.” The apex Court in two other cases titled Niaz Mohammad and others v. State of Haryana and others, reported in (1994) 6 SCC 332 , and Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati, reported in 2001 CRI. LJ. 4204, has expressed a similar view. LJ. 4204, has expressed a similar view. For facility of convenience, the relevant portion of the paragraph, being paragraph 10 of the judgment, reported in (1994) 6 SCC 332 , is reproduced hereunder: “Nor is a person to be punished for Contempt of Court for disobeying an order of Court except when the disobedience is established beyond reasonable doubt, the standard of proof being similar, even if not the same, as in a criminal proceeding. Where the person alleged to be in contempt is able to place before the Court sufficient material to conclude that it is impossible to obey the order, the Court will not be justified in punishing the alleged contemnor.” Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in a case titled Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai and others v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai and others, reported in 2008 AIR SCW Page 5076. It will be useful to reproduce paragraphs 51, 52 & 53 of the judgement, which reads under: 51. In Kapildeo Prasad Sah & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., (1999) 7 SCC 569 , it was held that for holding a person to have committed contempt, it must be shown that there was wilful disobedience of the judgment or order of the Court. But it was indicated that even negligence and carelessness may amount to contempt. It was further observed that issuance of notice for contempt of Court and power to punish are having far reaching consequences, and as such, they should be resorted to only when a clear case of wilful disobedience of the court's order is made out. A petitioner who complains breach of Court's order must allege deliberate or contumacious disobedience of the Court's order and if such allegation is proved, contempt can be said to have been made out, not otherwise. The Court noted that power to punish for contempt is intended to maintain effective legal system. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of justice. 52. In the celebrated decision of Attorney General v. Times Newspaper Ltd.; 1974 AC 273 : (1973) 3 All ER 54 : (1973) 3 WLR 298; Lord Diplock stated: "There is an element of public policy in punishing civil contempt, since the administration of justice would be undermined if the order of any court of law could be disregarded with impunity." 53. In Anil Ratan Sarkar & Ors. In Anil Ratan Sarkar & Ors. v. Hirak Ghosh & Ors., (2002) 4 SCC 21 , this Court held that the Contempt of Courts Act has been introduced in the statute-book for securing confidence of people in the administration of justice. If an order passed by a competent Court is clear and unambiguous and not capable of more than one interpretation, disobedience or breach of such order would amount to contempt of Court. There can be no laxity in such a situation because otherwise the Court orders would become the subject of mockery. Misunderstanding or own understanding of the Court's order would not be a permissible defence. It was observed that power to punish a person for contempt is undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the hands of Judiciary but that by itself operates as a string of caution and cannot be used unless the Court is satisfied beyond doubt that the person has deliberately and intentionally violated the order of the Court. The power under the Act must be exercised with utmost care and caution and sparingly in the larger interest of the society and for proper administration of justice delivery system. Mere disobedience of an order is not enough to hold a person guilty of civil contempt. The element of willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act.” The learned Single Judge of this Court in an identical matter, in Mohammad Bashir V. Madhu Lal, while dealing with the case, held as under: “Since the direction was only to consider petitioners, the same stands complied and, therefore, judgment is implemented. Whether consideration accorded was good or bad cannot be a ground to initiate contempt proceedings. Assuming that the consideration was bad, this Court will not be in a position to direct petitioners appointment by setting aside the consideration accorded even if it comes to a different conclusion on the basis of the record.” 19. In the aforementioned backdrop and in the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the considered opinion that there is no willful disobedience on the part of the alleged contemnor in complying with the Court directions aforementioned. In the aforementioned backdrop and in the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the considered opinion that there is no willful disobedience on the part of the alleged contemnor in complying with the Court directions aforementioned. Instead, the respondents in the writ petitions have made efforts, from time to time, as discussed above, in carrying out the directions contained in the order dated 19.10.2000 and made the consideration order dated 03.02.2012 read with Cabinet decision dated 19.10.2011. 20. There is yet another aspect of the case: petitioners have filed the instant contempt petition on the basis of the directions of the Court passed in SWP No. 506/1992 on 19.10.2000. From perusal of the writ record, it is revealed that the said writ petition had been filed only by 52 petitioners and the contempt petition is shown to have been filed by 229 persons. It is not understandable as to how the contempt petition could be filed by 229 persons, especially when they were not the petitioners in SWP No.506/1992. Not only that, the Court order, of which violation is alleged to have been committed, is titled as Abdul Hamid Lone and others v. State and others, but the contempt petition is entitled Ghulam Mohidin Malik and others v. State and others. It is not understandable as to how the learned counsel for the petitioners has clubbed the petitioners of various writ petitions and made them petitioners in one contempt petition. Such a course is impermissible in law. The procedure to file the contempt petitions is that it has to be filed on behalf of the petitioners of a particular writ petition and not that of other writ petition. Who are these 229 persons is not forthcoming from the contempt petition as also from the record. It appears that the contempt petition has been filed on the title of the writ petition SWP No. 1674/2004, which stands dismissed in limine. 21. Apart from the above, there is one more very vital lacuna which goes to the root of the matter. As mentioned elsewhere in this judgment, eleven writ petitions came to be disposed of by one single order. Writ petition, SWP No. 506/1992, wherein the present contempt petition has been filed, was one of the eleven matters. That petition was not admitted to hearing, but came to be disposed of alongwith other writ petitions. As mentioned elsewhere in this judgment, eleven writ petitions came to be disposed of by one single order. Writ petition, SWP No. 506/1992, wherein the present contempt petition has been filed, was one of the eleven matters. That petition was not admitted to hearing, but came to be disposed of alongwith other writ petitions. Record reveals that writ petition; SWP No.1717/1994 was admitted to hearing. The question, therefore, arises whether the alleged disobedience of the orders passed in SWP No. 506/1992 in the given facts and circumstances could constitute contempt of the orders of the Court and whether contempt proceedings could be initiated against the concerned governmental functionaries. Law on the point is no more res integra. Reference in this behalf may be made to Union of India v. Dayaram, reported as 1997 SLJ 155 , wherein the Supreme Court has held as under: “It will be noted that both the orders of the learned Single and of the Division Bench, give the respondent some relief ‘without admitting the petition to hearing.’ It is difficult to see how enforceable orders directing the respondent to a writ petition to do certain things can be passed upon a proceeding which, in express terms, is stated to have been not admitted. We appreciate that the writ petition itself was disposed of at the admission stage by consent of parties….” In view of the aforesaid settled position of law, it is hard, rather impermissible, to proceed against the contemnor or any other functionary of the Government for the alleged commission of disobedience of the Court orders by them. 22. The Robkar framed against the contemnor, accordingly, deserves to be dropped, and it is so ordered. Contempt Petition No. 466/2007: 23. In view of what has been discussed hereinabove in Robkar No. 02/2012, this contempt petition is not maintainable. It is, accordingly dismissed. However, if the petitioners are aggrieved of the consideration order, they are at liberty to take appropriate remedy, if so advised. 24. Consequently, Rule framed against the contemnor is discharged.