Judgment : 1. Both these matters are heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. Petitioner was working as General Manger, Recovery, Credit Monitoring and E-Business Department under the first respondent bank at Kolkata on the date of filing of the writ petition. Petitioner was due to retire on superannuation on 31.01.2012. A few days before his superannuation, he was served with show cause notice dated 14.01.2012 followed by another show cause notice dated 24.01.2012 calling upon him to explain the various irregularities, violations and allegations appearing against him whereby allegedly the respondent bank was put to enormous financial risk. The said show cause notices were questioned by petitioner in this writ petition, which was filed on 30.01.2012 and on the same day, this Court while issuing notice before admission passed the following interim order: ”In the circumstances, the petitioner is directed to submit his explanation to the impugned notices within a period of four days from today. However, the respondents shall not take any punitive action until further orders.” 3. Petitioner is said to have submitted explanation dated 16.01.2012 in reply to the show cause notice dated 14.01.2012 and allegedly, before he could furnish explanation to the show cause notice dated 24.01.2012, the respondent bank served three different charge sheets, on the petitioner, all dated 31.01.2012 together with further proceeding also dated 31.01.2012 issued by the Chairman and Managing Director informing the petitioner that though he would cease to be in service of the bank from the date of superannuation i.e. 31.01.2012, from 01.02.2012 onwards the disciplinary proceedings will continue, as if he is still in service until completion of the disciplinary proceedings and passing of final orders in respect of the three charge sheets, referred to above. The said order was purportedly passed under Regulation 20(3)(iii) of UCO Bank Officers (Service) Regulations, 1979. Alleging that the said three charge sheets and the proceedings issued under Regulation 20(3)(iii) above being contrary to and violative of the interim orders of this Court, extracted above, petitioner filed the present contempt case, C.C.No.117 of 2012, on 02.02.2012. The said order was purportedly passed under Regulation 20(3)(iii) of UCO Bank Officers (Service) Regulations, 1979. Alleging that the said three charge sheets and the proceedings issued under Regulation 20(3)(iii) above being contrary to and violative of the interim orders of this Court, extracted above, petitioner filed the present contempt case, C.C.No.117 of 2012, on 02.02.2012. On the same date petitioner also moved applications, being WPMP.Nos.3496 and 3497 of 2012, seeking amendment of the affidavit in the writ petition by leave to insert para 17-A and consequential amendment of writ prayer challenging the three charge sheets as well as the proceedings under Regulation 20(3)(iii) served on him pending the writ petition. Both the said applications were ordered by this Court on 29.03.2012. 4. Respondents have filed counters and the matter is contested. 5. The writ petition as well as the contempt case was subsequently made over to this Court by order of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice and as per the request of the learned senior counsel appearing on either side, the matters have been heard between 03.07.2012 to 05.07.2012 and reserved for judgment on 05.07.2012. 6. Petitioner now seeks judicial review over the disciplinary action initiated by the respondent bank against the petitioner and raised several contentions questioning the legality and rationale with respect to the decision of the respondent bank in initiating the disciplinary action against the petitioner at the fag end of his career. 7. On the contrary, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent bank defends and justifies the decision of the bank in taking disciplinary action on the basis of serious allegations appearing against petitioner and states that the action of the bank being within the purview of the relevant service regulations, judicial review, at this stage, is clearly premature, unwarranted and impermissible. Learned senior counsel for the respondents has also raised a preliminary objection objecting to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the cause of action, wholly as well as in part, has arisen at Kolkata where the petitioner was working and head office of the bank is situate. He also states that the impugned show cause notices against which the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked were served on the petitioner at Kolkata and that no part of the cause of action arose at Hyderabad and as such, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. He also states that the impugned show cause notices against which the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked were served on the petitioner at Kolkata and that no part of the cause of action arose at Hyderabad and as such, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 8. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner contended against the said preliminary objection that this Court is entitled to entertain the writ petition in view of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, as a part of cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of this Court. 9. Thus, with reference to the preliminary objection as well as the merits, both the learned senior counsel have made elaborate submissions with reference to record as well as legal position settled by various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. During the hearing, it was indicated to both the learned senior counsel that in the event of the preliminary objection being upheld it would not be just and appropriate to give findings on merits and in all fairness, both the learned senior counsel accepted this position. It would, however, be appropriate to briefly notice the contentions of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner so far as the merits of the case are concerned. 10. It is not in dispute that the allegations in the show cause notices as well as the charge sheets with reference to various irregularities, violations, allegedly questionable decisions with respect to several cash, credit and bank guarantees given to various firms relate to the respondent bank at Banjara Hills branch, Hyderabad, at the relevant point of time when the term loans, cash credit and bank guarantee limits were sanctioned by the said branch, the petitioner was functioning as Field General Manager, Chennai and had allegedly committed various acts and omissions including transgression of his lending power in respect of several such borrowal accounts. It is stated that on account of the said acts and omissions of the petitioner, the respondent bank was exposed to serious financial risks with reference to those accounts and thereby, the disciplinary enquiry was proposed to be held against the petitioner. 11. While the petitioner denies any omissions on his part and asserts that he had accorded approvals and sanctions strictly and duly following the procedure as per the bank norms and regulations, nothing is attributable to him. 11. While the petitioner denies any omissions on his part and asserts that he had accorded approvals and sanctions strictly and duly following the procedure as per the bank norms and regulations, nothing is attributable to him. It is also specifically alleged that after petitioner submitted his explanation to the first show cause notice, the respondent bank allegedly conducted an internal enquiry and allegedly, had taken a decision to impose minor penalty. Learned senior counsel, therefore, disputes that any vigilance angel is involved in the case. As according to him, for a minor irregularity, in the internal enquiry, it was decided to impost a minor penalty. However, the bank sought advice of Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) (impleaded in the writ petition as R3). It is also alleged that CVC rendered advise regarding disagreement with the proposal of the bank to impose minor punishment against the petitioner and advised the respondent bank to initiate process for inflicting major punishment and based on the said directive, the impugned disciplinary proceedings are taken up against the petitioner on the dictates of the third respondent. It is, therefore, alleged that the decision to take up regular departmental action against the petitioner is on the directions and dictates of the third respondent and contrary to the regulations and circulars of the bank regarding disciplinary action against the petitioner, as such, the same is liable to be interfered with under powers of judicial review of this Court. 12. Counter affidavit filed by the respondents refers to Regulation 19 of the UCO Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations 1976, which reads as follows: 19. Consultation with Central Vigilance Commission: The bank shall consult the Central Vigilance Commission wherever necessary, in respect of disciplinary cases having a vigilance angle. Counter affidavit also refers to circular of the respondent bank dated 15.07.1994 dealing with the manner in which the CVC is to be consulted. The operative portion thereof so far as is relevant is as follows: ‘…Accordingly, a note may please be made about the following and compliance ensured. 1… 2. Refer to CVC, through CVO, all vigilance cases involving officers in Scale-V and above to obtain its first stage advise before initiating departmental action against such officers. 3. The operative portion thereof so far as is relevant is as follows: ‘…Accordingly, a note may please be made about the following and compliance ensured. 1… 2. Refer to CVC, through CVO, all vigilance cases involving officers in Scale-V and above to obtain its first stage advise before initiating departmental action against such officers. 3. Make reference again to CVC, through CVO, for its second stage advice, after completion of enquiry against such officers in scale-V and above, before final orders are passed by respective Disciplinary Authorities. 13. Based on the above, the counter affidavit proceeds to state that even as per the circulars of the bank relating to regular departmental action, time limit of four years is not applicable to cases where frauds or criminal offences or malafides are inferable and as such, it is stated that the said circular is not violated in the present case. It is also stated that as required under circular regulations advice of CVC was sought and the said advice to initiate major penalty proceedings was considered and the disciplinary authority has decided initiation of departmental proceedings against the petitioner. It is also stated that consultation with CVC was required under service regulations, extracted above and as such, the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings was taken. It was also necessary to invoke regulation 20(3)(iii) in view of superannuation of the petitioner pending the disciplinary proceedings. 14. In view of the above contentions, the following questions arise for consideration: 1. Whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition, keeping in view the provisions of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India? 2. Whether the challenge to the charge memos impugned is premature as contended by the respondents? 3. Whether the action of the respondent bank in initiating disciplinary case against the petitioner by issuance of impugned charge memos as well as the impugned proceeding under Regulation 20(3)(iii) is violated in law? Question No.1: 15. While considering question No.1, both the learned senior counsel on either side have placed reliance upon various decisions of the Supreme Court, as referred to hereunder. As per the ratio of the said decisions, the said question is required to be considered and decided on the basis of the averments of the petitioner in support of the writ petition irrespective of the defence as well as the merits of the petitioner’s allegations. 16. As per the ratio of the said decisions, the said question is required to be considered and decided on the basis of the averments of the petitioner in support of the writ petition irrespective of the defence as well as the merits of the petitioner’s allegations. 16. It is also to be kept in mind that the writ petition was filed on 30.01.2012 challenging the show cause notices dated 14.01.2012 and 24.01.2012. Thus, the events up to the service of the said charge memos are referred to in the affidavit. Admittedly, the petitioner was working at Kolkata and the respondent bank’s head office at Kolkata had served show cause notices on the petitioner at Kolkata. The averments in the affidavit with respect to the jurisdiction of this Court is only found in para 18, which is as follows: 18. In the above circumstances, I have no other effective alternative remedy except to approach this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 and 226(2) of the Constitution of India. I have not filed any other proceedings for the relief sought for in the present Writ Petition. 17. Subsequent to the interim order passed by this Court, the petitioner challenged the said charge memos by amending the writ petition vide orders of this Court in WPMP.Nos.3496 and 3497 of 2012. The affidavit filed in support of the said applications for amendment states that on 31.01.2012 petitioner attended the duties through out the day and allegedly, at 05.10 pm, the respondent bank sought to serve the charge sheets, all dated 31.01.2012. Petitioner, however, states that he secured the said orders through website including the separate order passed extending the petitioner’s service to the extent of disciplinary case under Regulation 20(3)(iii). Petitioner has taken a stand that he ceased to be in service, having been retired, on the close of business on 31.01.2012 and that the issuance of impugned charge memos cannot unsettle the said retirement. Though the challenge to the charge memos is a subsequent event, even in the aforesaid affidavit there is no averment justifying invocation of the jurisdiction of this Court. 18. Though the challenge to the charge memos is a subsequent event, even in the aforesaid affidavit there is no averment justifying invocation of the jurisdiction of this Court. 18. In the counter affidavits filed by the respondent bank in para 3-A it was specifically averred that originally the impugned show cause notices dated 14.01.2012 and 24.01.2012 were served on the petitioner at Kolkata, as petitioner was working at the head office and he was residing at the designated quarters of the bank at Kolkata and as such, the petitioner as well as the disciplinary authority was located at Kolkata and consequently, no cause of action arose in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 19. The legal position with regard to territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India is settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in OIL & NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v. UTPAL KUMAR BASU (1994) 4 SCC 711 . The relevant portion of the said judgment is as follows: “6.It is well settled that the expression "cause of action" means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh' Lord Watson said: "... the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour." Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition…” 20. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition…” 20. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner places reliance upon NAVINCHANDRA N. MAJITHIA v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (2000) 7 SCC 640 ,which also considers the same questions but the matter therein arose with regard to registration of a criminal offence and the said judgment considered the question of territorial jurisdiction with respect to criminal offence, as the main fact. 21. Another judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Others v. Adani Exports Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC 567 is also relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner and the relevant para 17 is as follows: “17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least in-part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the courts territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in Paragraph 16 of the petition, in our opinion, fall into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad.” 22. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in Paragraph 16 of the petition, in our opinion, fall into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad.” 22. Similarly, para 9 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M/S. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd V. Union Of India (2004) 6 SCC 254 is as follows: “9. Although in view of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the provisions thereof would not apply to a writ proceedings, the phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Clause (2) of Article 226, being in pari materia, the decisions of this Court rendered on interpretation of Section 20(c) of CPC shall apply to the writ proceedings also. Before proceeding to discuss the matter further it may be pointed out that the entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree is the material facts. The expression material facts is also known as integral facts.” 23. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner also referred to an unreported judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Kolkata in MAHANADI COALFIELDS LTD. v. M/S. SHYAM METALLICS & ENERGY LITMITED where also all the aforesaid decisions under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India were considered. 24. The judgment of the Supreme Court in ALCHEMIST LIMITED v. STATE BANK OF SIKKIM (2007) 11 SCC 335 was relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the respondents, which considered all the aforesaid earlier decisions. Hence, it would be appropriate to notice the following para 37 as under: “37. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the petitioner appellant, would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a 'part of cause of action', nothing less than that.” 25. Considering the legal position as settled by the decisions aforesaid, it is already noticed that there are no pleadings on the part of the petitioner, as to how any part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. On the contrary, taking the averments, as noted above, no part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court inasmuch as on the date of service of show cause notices, which were originally impugned at the time of filing of the writ petition and when the charge memos were sought to be served on the petitioner, he was working at head office at Kolkata. It is not only essential for the petitioner to show that a part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court but he must also show that the said cause of action is an integral part having nexus to the substantial cause of action. The mere residence of the petitioner at Hyderabad after his retirement and merely because the charges relate to the alleged omissions and commissions of the branch of the respondent bank at Hyderabad, in my view, has no nexus with the cause of action relating to initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. In a given case, the charges may relate to any event happening in any branch in any part of India but the situs with respect to initiation of disciplinary proceedings cannot be said to have any integral nexus with the omissions and commissions at all/any of such branches. The show cause notices as well as the charge memos in the present case incidentally refer to omissions and commissions at Banjara Hills branch at Hyderabad, but even if it could have been at some other branch in Karnataka or Kerala, it would not be permissible, under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, for the petitioner to invoke the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court within who’s territorial limits, such branch is situated. The preliminary objection raised by the learned senior counsel for the respondents has, therefore, to be held as well founded and sustainable and consequently, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. 26. Since the question of territorial jurisdiction is held against the petitioner, as above, it would not be appropriate to deal with the other two questions lest the parties may be prejudiced by the findings. Moreover, such findings would suffer vice of corum non judice. Hence, giving liberty to the petitioner to approach appropriate court for appropriate relief, the writ petition is accordingly dismissed. As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. CC.No.117 of 2012: 27. Petitioner has filed this contempt case alleging disobedience of the interim orders of this Court, which had directed the respondent bank not to take any punitive action. 28. The facts of the case, as discussed in the writ petition, show that except serving charge memos and a proceeding under Regulation 20(3)(iii), the respondent bank has not taken any other action against the petitioner. Mere service of the charge memos for the disciplinary enquiry proposed to be held cannot be said to be a punitive action and it cannot be said that any cause of action arises for trying the respondents under the Contempt of Courts Act. The contempt case, being misconceived, is dismissed accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.