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2012 DIGILAW 617 (ALL)

RANI GUPTA v. STATE OF U. P.

2012-03-14

UMA NATH SINGH, VIRENDRA KUMAR DIXIT

body2012
JUDGMENT By the Court.—We have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the pleadings of writ petition. 2. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that Lucknow Development Authority (for short ‘the LDA’) executed sale-deed in respect of land under acquisition without issuing any notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (in short “the Act”). Later the land was acquired by supplementary notification of 2008 and process of acquisition has been completed in as much as now the award has been passed after issuance of notification under Section 6 of the Act. Learned counsel, thus, argued that his land was not acquired and the LDA executed the sale-deed without any sanction of law. Learned counsel also submitted that a large chunk of land being the subject-matter of impugned notification, was later released in exercise of powers under Section 48 of the Act. 3. On the other hand, learned Chief Standing Counsel, Shri Upendra Nath Mishra, submitted that once the award has been rendered after following the procedure, it would not be open for the petitioner to challenge the notification with inordinate delay when the land was acquired for a public purpose. 4. Shri Mishra in support of his contention referred to and relied upon a judgment of Hon’ble the Apex Court in Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. and another v. State of Rajasthan and others, (2008) 4 SCC 695 . In that case, the notification was challenged with inordinate delay after passing of the award. It was, thus, held that since the writ petition was filed after taking over of possession and passing of award, it deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 5. Shri Mishra also referred to another judgment of Hon’ble the Apex Court which is in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and another v. Shah Hyder Beig and others, AIR (2000) SC 671. Para 17 of the judgment having bearing on the issue, is reproduced as under: “In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of recent cases (C. Padma v. Dy. Secretary to the Govt. of T.N., (1997) 2 SCC 627 . This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of recent cases (C. Padma v. Dy. Secretary to the Govt. of T.N., (1997) 2 SCC 627 . This Court observed as below : “The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) in GOR No. 1392 Industries, dated 17.10.1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpatta District in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasiua by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30.4.1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership, was transferred in G.O. Ms. No. 816 Industries, dated 24.3.1971 in favour of another subsidiary company, Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th respondent which is also another subsidiary of the company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in G.O.Ms. No. 439 Industries, dated 10.5.1985. In G.O.Ms.No. 546 Industries, dated 30.3.1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original G.O.Ms. No. 1392 Industries, dated 17.10.1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed.” 6. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed.” 6. In view of all the aforesaid, since the title of land has already passed on in favour of State/Acquiring Body and further that the acquisition process is complete and also that the writ petition has been filed with inordinate delay and laches, we are not inclined to entertain it. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed. ——————