JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, Judge: This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 16.04.2002, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Shimla in Civil Appeal No. 96-S/13 of 2001. 2. Material facts necessary for adjudication of this Regular Second Appeal, are that the appellant-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as “the plaintiff” for the sake of convenience) has filed a suit for declaration and injunction by claiming that he was in possession of land comprised in Khasra No. 1352/2 from the time of his ancestors and he has also raised an apple orchard on the suit land. It has also been pleaded that the plaintiff being in adverse possession of the suit land for more than 30 years, i.e., from the time of his ancestors, has become owner in possession and the order passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Rohru, dated 20th October, 1998 in case No. 90 of 1992 and thereafter, dismissal of appeal by the Sub Divisional Collector, Rohru, District Shimla, H.P. vide order, dated 25.08.1999, were illegal. According to the plaintiff, the Assistant Collector 1st Grade ought to have decided the matter after converting himself into Civil Court. According to the plaintiff, even the report of the Patwari was not qua the suit land, but it was qua other land, whereas the orders have been passed qua the suit land. 3. The suit was contested by the respondent-defendant (hereinafter referred to as ‘the defendant” for the sake of convenience). According to the defendant, the possession of the plaintiff was recent and he has not become owner by way of adverse possession. On receipt of information that the defendant has encroached upon the suit land, the Assistant Collector 1st Grade proceeded with under Section 163 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for the sake of brevity) and found that the encroachment is fresh and no title by way of adverse possession has been acquired by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was ordered to be evicted. It was also specifically pleaded by the defendant that in case the possession was old, the same ought to have been shown in the settlement proceedings, but in the settlement proceedings, the defendant has been entered to be owner in possession of the suit land. The defendant has also supported the order passed by the S.D.O. (Civil) affirming the order of A.C. 1st Grade, dated 20.10.1998. The defendant has also supported the order passed by the S.D.O. (Civil) affirming the order of A.C. 1st Grade, dated 20.10.1998. The defendant has also taken a specific plea regarding jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 4. Learned trial Court framed the issues and dismissed the suit on 09.07.2001. The plaintiff preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Shimla. The same was also dismissed vide judgment dated 16.04.2002. Hence, this Regular Second Appeal. 5. This Regular Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 24.07.2002: “1. Whether the Revenue Authorities having failed to exercise the jurisdiction in accordance with the prescribed procedure, therefore, Civil Court is competent to try the suit and to declare the proceedings un-lawful? 2. Whether the plea of adverse possession having been raised before the Revenue Courts was required to be decided by them and on their failure to do so, jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred? 6. Mr. Romesh Verma, learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued that once the plea of adverse possession was raised by the plaintiff, the Assistant Collector 1st Grade was required to convert himself into Civil Court, as provided under Section 163 of the Act. He further contended that since the orders passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Rohru, dated 20.10.1998 and Sub Divisional Collector, Rohru, dated 25.08.1999 were illegal, the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to decide the matter. 7. Mr. Vikas Rathore, learned Deputy Advocate General has supported the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings carefully. 9. Since both the substantial questions of law are interconnected and interlinked, the same are taken up together for determination to avoid the repetition of discussion of evidence. 10. Plaintiff has appeared as PW-1. According to him, the suit land was in possession of his ancestors and thereafter, he came in possession of the same. He has planted apple plants and before that they used to grow potatoes on the suit land. He further deposed that a notice was issued to him by the Tehsildar and he filed reply to the same, stating therein that he has become owner in possession of the suit land. He has planted apple plants and before that they used to grow potatoes on the suit land. He further deposed that a notice was issued to him by the Tehsildar and he filed reply to the same, stating therein that he has become owner in possession of the suit land. According to him, the Tehsildar has not converted himself into a Civil Court nor he has recorded the statements of Patwari and Kanungo and in view of this, the orders passed by the Tehsildar and Sub Divisional Collector, Rohru were illegal. He has placed on record copy of Jamabandi for the year 1998-1999, Ex. PW-1/A. He has also placed on record copy of the order passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade vide Ex. PW-1/B, copy of Misal Haquiat, Ex. PW-1/D and copy of reply Ex. PW-1/E. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that he did not know the Khasra number of the suit land. According to him, he was looking after the property and his brothers were living separately. He also deposed that his father died in 1985 and thereafter, he started looking after the land. He also deposed that he has submitted an application for correction of revenue entries, but he did not know when the same was submitted. He could not produce the copy of the application. 11. PW-2, Sh. Gulab Singh has deposed that Tehsildar has decided the matter on 20.10.1998 and the S.D.M. has passed the order in appeal on 25.08.1999. 12. PW-3, Sh. Bihari Lal has deposed that he knew the plaintiff. He has seen the suit land, on which apple trees were planted. According to him, before the possession of the plaintiff, the land was in possession of his father, Sh. Jagan Nath. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he did not know Khasra number of the suit land. He also admitted that the apple plants were not planted in his presence nor he knew who has planted the same. 13. DW-1, Birbal has produced the report of Patwari, Ex. DW-1/A with copy of Jamabandi, Ex. DW-1/B and Tatima Ex. DW-1/C. DW-2, Sh. Tek Ram Patwari has deposed that he has prepared the report of encroachment Ex. DW-1/A. He has denied the suggestion that the possession of the land was with the forefathers of the plaintiff for more than 30 years. 14. DW-1/A with copy of Jamabandi, Ex. DW-1/B and Tatima Ex. DW-1/C. DW-2, Sh. Tek Ram Patwari has deposed that he has prepared the report of encroachment Ex. DW-1/A. He has denied the suggestion that the possession of the land was with the forefathers of the plaintiff for more than 30 years. 14. DW-3, Mohan Singh has visited the spot on 11.01.1994 and has found that on Khasra Nos. 1352/1 and 1352/2, measuring 0-50-12 hects., small plants of apple were planted. 15. The proceedings were initiated against the plaintiff under Section 163 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, on the basis of Ex. DW-1/A. Thereafter, a notice was issued to the plaintiff under Section 163 of the Act by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Rohru. Plaintiff submitted reply to the same vide Ex. PW-1/E. Thereafter, the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade has passed an order of eviction against the plaintiff on 20.10.1998. The Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Rohru has taken into consideration all the pleas raised by the plaintiff before him. Plaintiff has alleged before the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade that his forefathers were in possession of the suit land and thereafter, he was in possession of the suit land for the last 30-35 years. The age of the plaintiff when he made the statement before the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade was 43 years. This aspect has also been taken into consideration by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade. Thus, even according to the plaintiff, he was 10-15 years old when he came in possession of the suit land. Learned Assistant Collector, 1st Grade has also pointed out that in case the plaintiff has encroached upon the suit land, an entry to this effect should have been carried out in the recent settlement operation. The Assistant Collector, 1st Grade has also taken into consideration the revenue entries placed on record, whereby the ownership of the State has been shown. The plaintiff has preferred an appeal against the order of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, dated 25.08.1999, before the Sub Divisional Collector, Rohru, District, Shimla H.P. The Sub Divisional Collector, Rohru has dismissed the appeal after taking into consideration all the pleas raised by the plaintiff, including the adverse possession on 25.08.1999. The plaintiff has preferred an appeal against the order of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, dated 25.08.1999, before the Sub Divisional Collector, Rohru, District, Shimla H.P. The Sub Divisional Collector, Rohru has dismissed the appeal after taking into consideration all the pleas raised by the plaintiff, including the adverse possession on 25.08.1999. The plaintiff has preferred a Civil Suit, claiming that the orders passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Rohru, dated 20.10.1998 and Sub Divisional Collector, Rohru, District, Shimla, H.P., dated 25.08.1999 were in violation of Section 163 of the Act. The proceedings have been initiated against the plaintiff under Section 163 of the Act. Section 171 of the Act excludes jurisdiction of Civil Courts in matters falling within the jurisdiction of Revenue Officers. Sub-section (2)(xxv) of Section 171 reads thus: “any question, as to any land or any right to, or title or interest in, in land which is an encroached land or in relation to which any person claims that it has vested or is deemed to have vested in him and that he can not be ejected therefrom under sub-section (1) of section 163; and” 16. Thus, it is clear from the plain language of Subsection (2)(xxv) of Section 171 that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted. Thus, both the Courts below have come to the right conclusion that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction in the matter. 17. Mr. Romesh Verma, learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued when the plaintiff has raised the plea of adverse possession, the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade ought to have converted himself into Civil Court. He then contended that no decree was drawn by the Revenue Officer. The Assistant Collector, 1st Grade has found that the encroachment was of recent origin and there was no entry made in the recent settlement operations, showing the possession of the plaintiff, while rejecting the plea of adverse possession. The Assistant Collector, 1st Grade after issuing a notice has ordered the eviction of plaintiff and has also rejected the plea of adverse possession. 18. Sub-section (5) of Section 163 of the Act provides that in case the procedure as per Sub-section (3) and Sub-section(4) was not followed, the plaintiff could file an appeal before the learned District Judge. The Assistant Collector, 1st Grade after issuing a notice has ordered the eviction of plaintiff and has also rejected the plea of adverse possession. 18. Sub-section (5) of Section 163 of the Act provides that in case the procedure as per Sub-section (3) and Sub-section(4) was not followed, the plaintiff could file an appeal before the learned District Judge. The plaintiff has not chosen to do so, but he has assailed the order of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, dated 20.10.1998 before the Sub Divisional Collector, Rohru. 19. This Court in State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Chet Ram 2000 (3) Shimla L.C. 344, in a similar case where an appeal was filed against the order of the Revenue Officer, has held as under: “18. To be fair to the learned counsel for the respondent, it may be observed that learned counsel contended that in the present case, the Revenue Officer did not try the proceedings as Civil Suit and no decree was drawn by the Revenue Officer to enable the plaintiff-respondent to file an appeal before the District Judge as contemplated under sub-section (5) of Section 163 of the Revenue Act. True it may be but yet appeal could have been filed by the plaintiff on the ground that the question has not been decided in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure and formal decree has not been drawn. This was a matter to be agitated before the learned District Judge in a appeal under subsection (5) of Section 163 of the Revenue Act. Non compliance with the procedure by the Assistant Collector in exercise of the jurisdiction under subsection (3) to Section 163 will not clothe the civil courts with the jurisdiction to try such suits inspite of the bar in terms of Section 171(2) (xxs) of the Revenue Act. I have no hesitation to hold that the civil court lacked jurisdiction to try this suit.” Thus, it is well established that merely if the procedure has not been followed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, though in the present case it has been followed, it cannot be held that the Civil Court acquire the jurisdiction to try suit, inspite of the specific bar in terms of Section 171(2) (xxv) of the Revenue Act. 20. Mr. Romesh Verma, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon State of H.P. & Ors. Vs. 20. Mr. Romesh Verma, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon State of H.P. & Ors. Vs. Ganga Ram, Latest HLJ 2008 (HP) 269. This judgment is distinguishable. In this case, no proceedings have been commenced under Section 163 of the Act. However, in the instant case, the proceedings have been initiated under Section 163 of the Act and the orders have been passed by the Revenue Officer. 21. Mr. Romesh Verma, learned counsel for the appellant has also argued that his client may be permitted to file an appeal/revision before the Divisional Commissioner against the order of Sub Divisional Collector, Rohru, District, Shimla, H.P., dated 25.08.1999, Ex. PW-1/C. He also argued that the plaintiff is entitled to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 22. The Court is of the considered view that since the order was passed by the Sub Divisional Collector, Rohru, District Shimla, H.P. on 25.08.1999, this Court cannot permit the plaintiff to file an appeal/revision against the same, by giving him the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The matter has remained pending before the Revenue Courts and Civil Courts for more than 20 years. 23. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dhruv Green field Ltd. Vs. Hukam Singh and others (2002) 6 Supreme Court Cases 416 have held that the question as to whether the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred must be answered on the basis of the following principles: “10. In the light of the above discussion, the following principles may be re-stated- (1) If there is express provision in any Special Act barring the jurisdiction of a civil court to deal with matters specified thereunder the jurisdiction of an ordinary civil court shall stand excluded. (2) If there is no express provision in the Act but an examination of the provisions contained therein lead to a conclusion in regard to exclusion of jurisdiction of a civil court, the Court would then inquire whether any adequate and efficacious alternative remedy is provided under the Act; if the answer is in the affirmative, it can safely be concluded that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred. If, however, no such adequate and effective alternative remedy is provided then exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil court cannot be inferred. If, however, no such adequate and effective alternative remedy is provided then exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil court cannot be inferred. (3) Even in cases where the jurisdiction of a civil court is barred expressly or impliedly the court would nonetheless retain its jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the suit provided the order complained of is a nullity. 24. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of A.P. Vs. Prameela Modi and others (2006) 13 Supreme Court Cases 147, while interpreting Section 8 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 have held that the Special Court has jurisdiction to decide questions relating to title, ownership and possession of the land in question and Civil Court’s jurisdiction was excluded from trying cases falling within the jurisdiction of Special Court. Their Lordships have held as under: “ 28. It is thus seen that the Special Court can play the role of a civil court and decide the disputed question of title and possession. The extent of jurisdiction as is permitted by the statute, therefore, is rather wide in its application. Three specific situations have been noted, namely, (i) Jurisdiction can be had in regard to a case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing, (ii) Jurisdiction can be had in a case where determination of questions of title and ownership are involved, and (iii) Jurisdiction can be had where lawful possession of any land grabbed under the Act is involved. All these three specific situations as envisaged by and under the statute would be triable in the Special Court. The condition precedent for assuming jurisdiction by the Special Court is that the case must have arisen out of any alleged act of land grabbing and a District Judge while acting as a Special Court merely acts as a Presiding Officer of the court. Having regard to the provisions of Section 8(2) read with Section 15 of the Act, no suit for title in respect of the disputed land which was alleged to be grabbed by the party could be entertained by the civil court. In other words, the civil court is barred from trying the matters which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court constituted under the Act. 29. In other words, the civil court is barred from trying the matters which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court constituted under the Act. 29. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall apply to the proceedings before the Special Court and for the purposes of the provisions of the said enactments, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a civil court under Section 9. 30. The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or custom, usage or agreement or decree or order of a court or any other tribunal or authority. 31. Thus it is seen that the arguments advanced by Mr A.K. Ganguly are totally contradictory to the above provisions of the Act and that the Special Court alone has the jurisdiction to try the matters with respect to the ownership, title and lawful possession.” 25. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hemaji Waghaji Jat Vs. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan and others (2009) 16 Supreme Court Cases 517 have held that the law of adverse possession, which ousts an owner on the basis of inaction within limitation is irrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate. Their Lordships have held as under: “32. Before parting with this case, we deem it appropriate to observe that the law of adverse possession which ousts an owner on the basis of inaction within limitation is irrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate. The law as it exists is extremely harsh for the true owner and a windfall for a dishonest person who had illegally taken possession of the property of the true owner. The law ought not to benefit a person who in a clandestine manner takes possession of the property of the owner in contravention of law. This in substance would mean that the law gives seal of approval to the illegal action or activities of a rank trespasser or who had wrongfully taken possession of the property of the true owner. 35. We fail to comprehend why the law should place premium on dishonesty by legitimizing possession of a rank trespasser and compelling the owner to loose its possession only because of his inaction in taking back the possession within limitation. 26. 35. We fail to comprehend why the law should place premium on dishonesty by legitimizing possession of a rank trespasser and compelling the owner to loose its possession only because of his inaction in taking back the possession within limitation. 26. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amarjeet Singh and others Vs. Devi Ratan and others (2010) 1 Supreme Court Cases 417 have held that an undeserved benefit taken by a party under interim order has to be neutralized. Their Lordships have held as under: “17. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a Court of Law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs by getting interim order and thereafter blame the Court. The fact that the writ is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim "Actus Curiae neminem gravabit”, which means that the act of the Court shall prejudice no-one, becomes applicable in such a case. In such a fact situation the Court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the Court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised, as institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor from delayed action by the act of the Court. (Vide Shiv Shankar & Ors. Vs. Board of Directors, Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation & Anr., 1995 Suppl. (2) SCC 726; M/s. GTC Industries Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1566 ; and Jaipur Municipal Corporation Vs. C.L. Mishra, (2005) 8 SCC 423 ). 18. In Ram Krishna Verma & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 1888 this Court examined the similar issue while placing reliance upon its earlier judgment in Grindlays Bank Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1566 ; and Jaipur Municipal Corporation Vs. C.L. Mishra, (2005) 8 SCC 423 ). 18. In Ram Krishna Verma & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 1888 this Court examined the similar issue while placing reliance upon its earlier judgment in Grindlays Bank Limited Vs. Income Tax Officer, Calcutta & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 656 and held that no person can suffer from the act of the Court and in case an interim order has been passed and petitioner takes advantage thereof and ultimately the petition is found to be without any merit and is dismissed, the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralized. 19. In Mahadeo Savlaram Sheke & Ors. Vs. Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr., (1995) 3 SCC 33 , this Court observed that while granting the interim relief, the Court in exercise of its discretionary power should also adopt the procedure of calling upon the plaintiff to file a bond to the satisfaction of the Court that in the event of his failing in the suit to obtain the relief asked for in the plaint, he would adequately compensate the defendant for the loss ensued due to the order of injunction granted in favour of the plaintiff. Even otherwise the Court while exercising its equity jurisdiction in granting injunction is also competent to grant adequate compensation to mitigate the damages caused to the defendant by grant of injunction. The pecuniary award of damages is consequential to the adjudication of the dispute and the result therein is incidental to the determination of the case by the Court. The Court can do so in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in doing ex debito justitiae mitigating the damage suffered by the defendant by the act of the Court in granting injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding with the action complained of in the suit. Such a procedure is necessary as a check on abuse of the process of the Court and adequately compensate the damages or injury suffered by the defendant by act of the Court at the behest of the plaintiff. 20. In South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Such a procedure is necessary as a check on abuse of the process of the Court and adequately compensate the damages or injury suffered by the defendant by act of the Court at the behest of the plaintiff. 20. In South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. State of M.P. & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 4482 , this Court examined this issue in detail and held that no one shall suffer by an act of the Court. The factor attracting applicability of restitution is not the act of the court being wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the court; the test is whether on account of an act of the party persuading the court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the court and the act of such party. There is nothing wrong in the parties demanding being placed in the same position in which they would have been had the court not intervened by its interim order when at the end of the proceedings the court pronounces its judicial verdict which does not match with and countenance its own interim verdict. The injury, if any, caused by the act of the court shall be undone and the gain which the party would have earned unless it was interdicted by the order of the court would be restored to or conferred on the party by suitably commanding the party liable to do so. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust if not disastrous consequences. 21. The Court further held : “…..Litigation may turn into a fruitful industry. Though litigation is not gambling yet there is an element of chance in every litigation. Unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged to approach the courts, persuading the court to pass interlocutory orders favourable to them by making out a prima facie case when the issues are earlier to be heard and determined on merits and if the concept of restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim order even though the battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be countenanced. This cannot be countenanced. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated……” 22. Similarly, in Karnataka Rare Earth & Anr. Vs. Senior Geologist, Department of Mines & Geology & Anr., (2004) 2 SCC 783 , a similar view has been reiterated by this Court observing that the party who succeeds ultimately is to be placed in the same position in which they would have been if the Court would not have passed an interim order. 23. In Dr. A.R. Sircar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (1993) Supp. 2 SCC 734, the dispute arose regarding the seniority of direct recruits and promotees on the post of Professor of Medicine in a medical college. The appellant therein faced the selection process for direct appointment along with the respondents who had been working on the said post on ad hoc basis. The appellant was duly selected, however, the private respondents could not succeed. The respondents filed the writ petition before the High Court and precluded the appointment of appellant pursuant to his selection, by obtaining the interim order and on the other hand they got their ad hoc promotion to the post regularized under the rules. The appellant could succeed in obtaining the appointment only after dismissal of the writ petition against him after several years of his selection. This Court held that in addition to the relief under the statutory provisions the appellant was entitled in equity to get the seniority over the respondents as they succeed in precluding his appointment to the post by obtaining an interim order in a case having no merits whatsoever. 27. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R. Hanumaiah and another Vs. Secretary to Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department and others (2010) 5 Supreme Court Cases 203 have dealt with the nature of proof required in suits for declaration of title against the Government as under: “19. Suits for declaration of title against the government, though similar to suits for declaration of title against private individuals differ significantly in some aspects. The first difference is in regard to the presumption available in favour of the government. All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government. The first difference is in regard to the presumption available in favour of the government. All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land. This presumption available to the government, is not available to any person or individual. The second difference is in regard to the period for which title and/or possession have to be established by a person suing for declaration of title. Establishing title/possession for a period exceeding twelve years may be adequate to establish title in a declaratory suit against any individual. On the other hand, title/possession for a period exceeding thirty years will have to be established to succeed in a declaratory suit for title against government. This follows from Article 112 of Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a longer period of thirty years as limitation in regard to suits by government as against the period of 12 years for suits by private individuals. The reason is obvious. Government properties are spread over the entire state and it is not always possible for the government to protect or safeguard its properties from encroachments. Many a time, its own officers who are expected to protect its properties and maintain proper records, either due to negligence or collusion, create entries in records to help private parties, to lay claim of ownership or possession against the government. Any loss of government property is ultimately the loss to the community. Courts owe a duty to be vigilant to ensure that public property is not converted into private property by unscrupulous elements. 20. Many civil courts deal with suits for declaration of title and injunction against government, in a casual manner, ignoring or overlooking the special features relating to government properties. Instances of such suits against government being routinely decreed, either ex parte or for want of proper contest, merely acting upon the oral assertions of plaintiffs or stray revenue entries are common. Many civil courts deal with suits for declaration of title and injunction against government, in a casual manner, ignoring or overlooking the special features relating to government properties. Instances of such suits against government being routinely decreed, either ex parte or for want of proper contest, merely acting upon the oral assertions of plaintiffs or stray revenue entries are common. Whether the government contests the suit or not, before a suit for declaration of title against a government is decreed, the plaintiff should establish, either his title by producing the title deeds which satisfactorily trace title for a minimum period of thirty years prior to the date of the suit (except where title is claimed with reference to a grant or transfer by the government or a statutory development authority), or by establishing adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years. In such suits, courts cannot, ignoring the presumptions available in favour of the government, grant declaratory or injunctive decrees against the government by relying upon one of the principles underlying pleadings that plaint averments which are not denied or traversed are deemed to have been accepted or admitted. 21. A court should necessarily seek an answer to the following question, before it grants a decree declaring title against the government : whether the plaintiff has produced title deeds tracing the title for a period of more than thirty years; or whether the plaintiff has established his adverse possession to the knowledge of the government for a period of more than thirty years, so as to convert his possession into title. Incidental to that question, the court should also find out whether the plaintiff is recorded to be the owner or holder or occupant of the property in the revenue records or municipal records, for more than thirty years, and what is the nature of possession claimed by the plaintiff, if he is in possession – authorized or unauthorized; permissive; casual and occasional; furtive and clandestine; open, continuous and hostile; deemed or implied (following a title). 22. Mere temporary use or occupation without the animus to claim ownership or mere use at sufferance will not be sufficient to create any right adverse to the Government. 22. Mere temporary use or occupation without the animus to claim ownership or mere use at sufferance will not be sufficient to create any right adverse to the Government. In order to oust or defeat the title of the government, a claimant has to establish a clear title which is superior to or better than the title of the government or establish perfection of title by adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years with the knowledge of the government. To claim adverse possession, the possession of the claimant must be actual, open and visible, hostile to the owner (and therefore necessarily with the knowledge of the owner) and continued during the entire period necessary to create a bar under the law of limitation. In short, it should be adequate in continuity, publicity and in extent. Mere vague or doubtful assertions that the claimant has been in adverse possession will not be sufficient. Unexplained stray or sporadic entries for a year or for a few years will not be sufficient and should be ignored. 23. As noticed above, many a time it is possible for a private citizen to get his name entered as the occupant of government land, with the help of collusive government servants. Only entries based on appropriate documents like grants, title deeds etc. or based upon actual verification of physical possession by an authority authorized to recognize such possession and make appropriate entries can be used against the government. By its very nature, a claim based on adverse possession requires clear and categorical pleadings and evidence, much more so, if it is against the government. Be that as it may.” 28. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action Vs. Union of India and others (2011) 8 Supreme Court Cases 161 have held that a party cannot be allowed to take benefit of his own wrong. A stay obtained by unscrupulous litigant cannot confer a right on him and he cannot take undue advantage by invoking jurisdiction of Court. Their Lordships have further held that the Courts should be careful and pass an order neutralizing the effect of all consequential orders passed in pursuance of interim orders passed by the Court. Their Lordships have held as under: “149. It is settled principle of law that no one can take advantage of his own wrong. Their Lordships have further held that the Courts should be careful and pass an order neutralizing the effect of all consequential orders passed in pursuance of interim orders passed by the Court. Their Lordships have held as under: “149. It is settled principle of law that no one can take advantage of his own wrong. Unless courts disgorge all benefits that a party availed by obstruction or delays or non-compliance, there will always be incentive for non compliance, and parties are ingenious enough to come up with all kinds of pleas and other tactics to achieve their end because they know that in the end the benefit will remain with them. 150. Whatever benefits a person has had or could have had by not complying with the judgment must being disgorged and paid to the judgment creditor and not, allowed to be retained by the judgment-debtor. This is the bounden duty and obligation of the court. In fact, it has to be looked from the position of the creditor. Unless the deprivation by reason of delay is fully restituted, the creditor as a beneficiary remains a loser to the extent of the un-restituted amount. UNJUST ENRICHMENT 151. Unjust enrichment has been defined as: "A benefit obtained from another, not intended as a gift and not legally justifiable, for which the beneficiary must make restitution or recompense." See Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition (Bryan A. Garner) at page 1573. A claim for unjust enrichment arises where there has been an "unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience." 152. `Unjust enrichment' has been defined by the court as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience. A person is enriched if he has received a benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if retention of the benefit would be unjust. Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another. 153. A person is enriched if he has received a benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if retention of the benefit would be unjust. Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another. 153. Unjust enrichment is "the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience." A defendant may be liable "even when the defendant retaining the benefit is not a wrongdoer" and "even though he may have received [it] honestly in the first instance." (Schock v. Nash, 732 A.2d 217, 232-33 (Delaware. 1999). USA) 154. Unjust enrichment occurs when the defendant wrongfully secures a benefit or passively receives a benefit which would be unconscionable to retain. In the leading case of Fibrosa v. Fairbairn, [1942] 2 All ER 122, Lord Wright stated the principle thus: "... .Any civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is, to prevent a man from retaining the money of, or some benefit derived from another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English law are generically different from remedies in contract or in tort, and are now recognized to fall within a third category of the common law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution." 155. Lord Denning also stated in Nelson v. Larholt, [1947] 2 All ER 751 as under:- "It is no longer appropriate, however, to draw a distinction between law and equity. Principles have now to be stated in the light of their combined effect. Nor is it necessary to canvass the niceties of the old forms of action. Remedies now depend on the substance of the right, not on whether they can be fitted into a particular frame-work. The right here is not peculiar to equity or contract or tort, but falls naturally within the important category of cases where the court orders restitution if the justice of the case so requires." 159. Unjust enrichment is basic to the subject of restitution, and is indeed approached as a fundamental principle thereof. They are usually linked together, and restitution is frequently based upon the theory of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment is basic to the subject of restitution, and is indeed approached as a fundamental principle thereof. They are usually linked together, and restitution is frequently based upon the theory of unjust enrichment. However, although unjust enrichment is often referred to or regarded as a ground for restitution, it is perhaps more accurate to regard it as a prerequisite, for usually there can be no restitution without unjust enrichment. It is defined as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience. A person is enriched if he has received a benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if retention of the benefit would be unjust. Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another. 160. While the term `restitution' was considered by the Supreme Court in South-Eastern Coalfields 2003 (8) SCC 648 and other cases excerpted later, the term `unjust enrichment' came to be considered in Sahakari Khand Udyog Mandal Ltd vs Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs ( (2005) 3 SCC 738 ). This Court said: "`Unjust enrichment' means retention of a benefit by a person that is unjust or inequitable. `Unjust enrichment' occurs when a person retains money or benefits which in justice, equity and good conscience, belong to someone else." 161. The terms `unjust enrichment' and `restitution' are like the two shades of green -one leaning towards yellow and the other towards blue. With restitution, so long as the deprivation of the other has not been fully compensated for, injustice to that extent remains. Which label is appropriate under which circumstances would depend on the facts of the particular case before the court. The courts have wide powers to grant restitution, and more so where it relates to misuse or non-compliance with court orders. 162. We may add that restitution and unjust enrichment, along with an overlap, have to be viewed with reference to the two stages, i.e., pre-suit and post-suit. The courts have wide powers to grant restitution, and more so where it relates to misuse or non-compliance with court orders. 162. We may add that restitution and unjust enrichment, along with an overlap, have to be viewed with reference to the two stages, i.e., pre-suit and post-suit. In the former case, it becomes a substantive law (or common law) right that the court will consider; but in the latter case, when the parties are before the court and any act/omission, or simply passage of time, results in deprivation of one, or unjust enrichment of the other, the jurisdiction of the court to levelise and do justice is independent and must be readily wielded, otherwise it will be allowing the Court's own process, along with time delay, to do injustice. 163. For this second stage (post-suit), the need for restitution in relation to court proceedings, gives full jurisdiction to the court, to pass appropriate orders that levelise. Only the court has to levelise and not go further into the realm of penalty which will be a separate area for consideration altogether. 164. This view of law as propounded by the author Graham Virgo in his celebrated book on "The Principle of Law of Restitution" has been accepted by a later decision of the House of Lords (now the UK Supreme Court) reported as 136 Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellschaft Limited) v Her Majesty's Commissioners of Inland Revenue and Another [2007] UKHL 34 = [2007] 3 WLR 354 = [2008] 1 AC 561 = [2007] All ER (D) 294. 170. This court in Grindlays Bank Limited vs Income Tax Officer, Calcutta (1980) 2 SCC 191 observed as under : "...When passing such orders the High Court draws on its inherent power to make all such orders as are necessary for doing complete justice between the parties. The interests of justice require that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court, by the mere circumstance that it has initiated a proceeding in the court, must be neutralised. The simple fact of the institution of litigation by itself should not be permitted to confer an advantage on the party responsible for it. ..." 171. The simple fact of the institution of litigation by itself should not be permitted to confer an advantage on the party responsible for it. ..." 171. In Ram Krishna Verma and Others vs State of U.P. and Others (1992) 2 SCC 620 this court observed as under :- "The 50 operators including the appellants/ private operators have been running their stage carriages by blatant abuse of the process of the court by delaying the hearing as directed in Jeevan Nath Bahl's case and the High Court earlier thereto. As a fact, on the expiry of the initial period of grant after Sept. 29, 1959 they lost the right to obtain renewal or to ply their vehicles, as this Court declared the scheme to be operative. However, by sheer abuse of the process of law they are continuing to ply their vehicles pending hearing of the objections. This Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs Income-tax Officer - [1990] 2 SCC 191 held that the High Court while exercising its power under Article 226 the interest of justice requires that any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised. It was further held that the institution of the litigation by it should not be permitted to confer an unfair advantage on the party responsible for it. In the light of that law and in view of the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution this Court, while exercising its jurisdiction would do complete justice and neutralise the unfair advantage gained by the 50 operators including the appellants in dragging the litigation to run the stage carriages on the approved route or area or portion thereof and forfeited their right to hearing of the objections filed by them to the draft scheme dated Feb. 26, 1959. ..." 172. This court in Kavita Trehan vs Balsara Hygiene Products (1994) 5 SCC 380 observed as under :- "The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every court and will be exercised whenever the justice of the case demands. It will be exercised under inherent powers where the case did not strictly fall within the ambit of Section 144. ..." 172. This court in Kavita Trehan vs Balsara Hygiene Products (1994) 5 SCC 380 observed as under :- "The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every court and will be exercised whenever the justice of the case demands. It will be exercised under inherent powers where the case did not strictly fall within the ambit of Section 144. Section 144 opens with the words: "Where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose, ...". The instant case may not strictly fall within the terms of Section 144; but the aggrieved party in such a case can appeal to the larger and general powers of restitution inherent in every court." 173. This court in Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. and Another (1999) 2 SCC 325 observed as under :- "From the narration of the facts, though it appears to us, prima facie, that a decree in favour of the appellant is not being executed for some reason or the other, we do not think it proper at this stage to direct the respondent to deliver the possession to the appellant since the suit filed by the respondent is still pending. It is true that proceedings are dragged for a long time on one count or the other and on occasion become highly technical accompanied by unending prolixity, at every stage providing a legal trap to the unwary. Because of the delay unscrupulous parties to the proceedings take undue advantage and person who is in wrongful possession draws delight in delay in disposal of the cases by taking undue advantage of procedural complications. It is also known fact that after obtaining a decree for possession of immovable property, its execution takes long time. In such a situation for protecting the interest of judgment creditor, it is necessary to pass appropriate order so that reasonable mesne profit which may be equivalent to the market rent is paid by a person who is holding over the property. In such a situation for protecting the interest of judgment creditor, it is necessary to pass appropriate order so that reasonable mesne profit which may be equivalent to the market rent is paid by a person who is holding over the property. In appropriate cases, Court may appoint Receiver and direct the person who is holding over the property to act as an agent of the Receiver with a direction to deposit the royalty amount fixed by the Receiver or pass such other order which may meet the interest of justice. This may prevent further injury to the plaintiff in whose favour decree is passed and to protect the property including further alienation." 174. In Padmawati vs Harijan Sewak Sangh CM (Main) No.449 of 2002 decided by the Delhi high Court on 6.11.2008, the court held as under:- "The case at hand shows that frivolous defences and frivolous litigation is a calculated venture involving no risks situation. You have only to engage professionals to prolong the litigation so as to deprive the rights of a person and enjoy the fruits of illegalities. I consider that in such cases where Court finds that using the Courts as a tool, a litigant has perpetuated illegalities or has perpetuated an illegal possession, the Court must impose costs on such litigants which should be equal to the benefits derived by the litigant and harm and deprivation suffered by the rightful person so as to check the frivolous litigation and prevent the people from reaping a rich harvest of illegal acts through the Court. One of the aims of every judicial system has to be to discourage unjust enrichment using Courts as a tool. The costs imposed by the Courts must in all cases should be the real costs equal to deprivation suffered by the rightful person." We approve the findings of the High Court of Delhi in the aforementioned case. 175. The Court also stated: "Before parting with this case, we consider it necessary to observe that one of the main reasons for over-flowing of court dockets is the frivolous litigation in which the Courts are engaged by the litigants and which is dragged as long as possible. Even if these litigants ultimately loose the lis, they become the real victors and have the last laugh. Even if these litigants ultimately loose the lis, they become the real victors and have the last laugh. This class of people who perpetuate illegal acts by obtaining stays and injunctions from the Courts must be made to pay the sufferer not only the entire illegal gains made by them as costs to the person deprived of his right and also must be burdened with exemplary costs. Faith of people in judiciary can only be sustained if the persons on the right side of the law do not feel that even if they keep fighting for justice in the Court and ultimately win, they would turn out to be a fool since winning a case after 20 or 30 years would make wrongdoer as real gainer, who had reaped the benefits for all those years. Thus, it becomes the duty of the Courts to see that such wrongdoers are discouraged at every step and even if they succeed in prolonging the litigation due to their money power, ultimately they must suffer the costs of all these years long litigation. Despite settled legal positions, the obvious wrong doers, use one after another tier of judicial review mechanism as a gamble, knowing fully well that dice is always loaded in their favour, since even if they lose, the time gained is the real gain. This situation must be redeemed by the Courts." 182. Graham Virgo in his important book on `The Principles of the Law of Restitution" at pp26-27 has stated and relevant portion is reproduced as under: "In Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v London Borough Council 1996 A.C. 669 the issue for the House of Lords was whether compound interest was available in respect of all restitutionary claims. By a majority it was decided that, since the jurisdiction to award compound interest was equitable, compound interest could only be awarded in respect of equitable restitutionary claims. Consequently, where the claim was for money had and received the claimant could only obtain simple interest because this was a common law claim. The majority supported their conclusion by reference to a number of different arguments. In particular, they asserted that, since Parliament had decided in 1981 that simple interest should be awarded on claims at common law, it was not for the House of Lords to award compound interest in respect of such claims. The majority supported their conclusion by reference to a number of different arguments. In particular, they asserted that, since Parliament had decided in 1981 that simple interest should be awarded on claims at common law, it was not for the House of Lords to award compound interest in respect of such claims. But the Supreme Court Act 1981 does not specifically exclude the award of compound interest in respect of common law claims. Rather, it recognizes that the court can award simple interest for such claims. The equitable jurisdiction to award compound interest is still available in appropriate cases. In two very strong dissenting judgments, Lords Goff and Woolf rejected the argument of the majority. They asserted that, since the policy of the law of restitution was to remove benefits from the defendant, compound interest should be available in respect of all restitutionary claims, regardless of whether they arise at law or in equity. This argument can be illustrated by the following example. In the straightforward case where the claimant pays money to the defendant by mistake and defendant is liable to repay that money, the liability arises from the moment the money is received by the defendant, who has the use of it and so should pay the claimant for the value of that benefit. This was accepted by all the judges in the case. The difficulty relates to the valuation of this benefit. If the defendant was to borrow an equivalent amount of money from a financial institution, he or she would be liable to pay compound interest to that institution. It follows that the defendant has saved that amount of money and so this is the value of the benefit which the defendant should restore to the claimant, in addition to the value of the money which the defendant received in the first place. If it could be shown that, had the defendant borrowed the equivalent amount of money, the institution would only have paid simple interest, it would be appropriate for the interest awarded to the claimant to be simple rather than compound. Usually, however, the interest awarded in commercial transactions will be compound interest." 183. If it could be shown that, had the defendant borrowed the equivalent amount of money, the institution would only have paid simple interest, it would be appropriate for the interest awarded to the claimant to be simple rather than compound. Usually, however, the interest awarded in commercial transactions will be compound interest." 183. In Marshall sons and company (I) Limited v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Limited and another (1999) 2 SCC 325 this court in para 4 of the judgment observed as under: "...It is true that proceedings are dragged for a long time on one count or the other and, on occasion, become highly technical accompanied by unending prolixity at every stage providing a legal trap to the unwary. Because of the delay, unscrupulous parties to the proceedings take undue advantage and a person who is in wrongful possession draws delight in delay in disposal of the cases by taking undue advantage of procedural complications. It is also a known fact that after obtaining a decree for possession of immovable property, its execution takes a long time. In such a situation, for protecting the interest of the judgment-creditor, it is necessary to pass appropriate orders so that reasonable mesne profit which may be equivalent to the market rent is paid by a person who is holding over the property. In appropriate cases, the court may appoint a Receiver and direct the person who is holding over the property to act as an agent of the Receiver with a direction to deposit the royalty amount fixed by the Receiver or pass such other order which may meet the interest of justice. This may prevent further injury to the plaintiff in whose favour the decree is passed and to protect the property including further alienation. ..." 184. In Ouseph Mathai and others v. M. Abdul Khadir (2002) 1 SCC 319 this court reiterated the legal position that the stay granted by the court does not confer a right upon a party and it is granted always subject to the final result of the matter in the court and at the risk and costs of the party obtaining the stay. After the dismissal, of the lis, the party concerned is relegated to the position which existed prior to the filing of the petition in the court which had granted the stay. After the dismissal, of the lis, the party concerned is relegated to the position which existed prior to the filing of the petition in the court which had granted the stay. Grant of stay does not automatically amount to extension of a statutory protection. 185. This court in South Eastern Coalfields Limited v. State of M.P. and others (2003) 8 SCC 648 on examining the principle of restitution in para 26 of the judgment observed as under: "In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of this submission. The word "restitution" in its etymological sense means restoring to a party on the modification, variation or reversal of a decree or order, what has been lost to him in execution of decree or order of the court or in direct consequence of a decree or order (see Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, U.P - (1984) Supp SCC 505) In law, the term "restitution" is used in three senses: (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; and (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another." 186. The court in para 28 of the aforesaid judgment very carefully mentioned that the litigation should not turn into a fruitful industry and observed as under: "... ... ...Litigation may turn into a fruitful industry. Though litigation is not gambling yet there is an element of chance in every litigation. Unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged to approach the courts, persuading the court to pass interlocutory orders favourable to them by making out a prima facie case when the issues are yet to be heard and determined on merits and if the concept of restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim order even though the battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be countenanced. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated by award of interest at a suitable reasonable rate for the period for which the interim order of the court withholding the release of money had remained in operation." 187. The court in the aforesaid judgment also observed that once the doctrine of restitution is attracted, the interest is often a normal relief given in restitution. Such interest is not controlled by the provisions of the Interest Act of 1839 or 1978. 188. In a relatively recent judgment of this court in Amarjeet Singh and others v. Devi Ratan and others (2010) 1 SCC 417 the court in para 17 of the judgment observed as under: "No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of its own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter blame the court. The fact that the writ is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that the act of the court shall prejudice no one, becomes applicable in such a case. In such a fact situation the court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised, as the institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor from delayed action by the act of the court. ... ..." 189. In another recent judgment of this court in Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania and others (2010) 9 SCC 437 this court in para 15 observed as under: "No litigant can derive any benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges into the final order to be passed in the case and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter blame the court. The fact that the case is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, or the party withdrew the writ petition, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs by getting an interim order and thereafter blame the court. The fact that the case is found, ultimately, devoid of any merit, or the party withdrew the writ petition, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that the act of the court shall prejudice no one, becomes applicable in such a case. In such a situation the court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the court must be neutralised, as the institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by the delayed action of the court." 190. In consonance with the concept of restitution, it was observed that courts should be careful and pass an order neutralizing the effect of all consequential orders passed in pursuance of the interim orders passed by the court. Such express directions may be necessary to check the rising trend among the litigants to secure the relief as an interim measure and then avoid adjudication on merits. 191. In consonance with the principle of equity, justice and good conscience judges should ensure that the legal process is not abused by the litigants in any manner. The court should never permit a litigant to perpetuate illegality by abusing the legal process. It is the bounden duty of the court to ensure that dishonesty and any attempt to abuse the legal process must be effectively curbed and the court must ensure that there is no wrongful, unauthorized or unjust gain for anyone by the abuse of the process of the court. One way to curb this tendency is to impose realistic costs, which the respondent or the defendant has in fact incurred in order to defend himself in the legal proceedings. The courts would be fully justified even imposing punitive costs where legal process has been abused. No one should be permitted to use the judicial process for earning undeserved gains or unjust profits. The court must effectively discourage fraudulent, unscrupulous and dishonest litigation. 192. The court's constant endeavour must be to ensure that everyone gets just and fair treatment. The courts would be fully justified even imposing punitive costs where legal process has been abused. No one should be permitted to use the judicial process for earning undeserved gains or unjust profits. The court must effectively discourage fraudulent, unscrupulous and dishonest litigation. 192. The court's constant endeavour must be to ensure that everyone gets just and fair treatment. The court while rendering justice must adopt a pragmatic approach and in appropriate cases realistic costs and compensation be ordered in order to discourage dishonest litigation. The object and true meaning of the concept of restitution cannot be achieved or accomplished unless the courts adopt a pragmatic approach in dealing with the cases. 197. The other aspect which has been dealt with in great details is to neutralize any unjust enrichment and undeserved gain made by the litigants. While adjudicating, the courts must keep the following principles in view. 1. It is the bounden duty and obligation of the court to neutralize any unjust enrichment and undeserved gain made by any party by invoking the jurisdiction of the court. 2. When a party applies and gets a stay or injunction from the court, it is always at the risk and responsibility of the party applying. An order of stay cannot be presumed to be conferment of additional right upon the litigating party. 3. Unscrupulous litigants be prevented from taking undue advantage by invoking jurisdiction of the Court. 4. A person in wrongful possession should not only be removed from that place as early as possible but be compelled to pay for wrongful use of that premises fine, penalty and costs. Any leniency would seriously affect the credibility of the judicial system. 5. No litigant can derive benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a court of law. 6. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs. 7. Litigation should not be permitted to turn into a fruitful industry so that the unscrupulous litigants are encouraged to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. 8. The institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by delayed action of courts. 29. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramrameshwari Devi and others Vs. 7. Litigation should not be permitted to turn into a fruitful industry so that the unscrupulous litigants are encouraged to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. 8. The institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by delayed action of courts. 29. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramrameshwari Devi and others Vs. Nirmala Devi and others (2011) 8 Supreme Court Cases 249 have held that wrongdoer should not get benefit out of frivolous litigation and have recommended imposition of penal costs, mesne profits and prosecution for perjury. Their Lordships have held as under: “52. The main question which arises for our consideration is whether the prevailing delay in civil litigation can be curbed? In our considered opinion the existing system can be drastically changed or improved if the following steps are taken by the trial courts while dealing with the civil trials. A. Pleadings are foundation of the claims of parties. Civil litigation is largely based on documents. It is the bounden duty and obligation of the trial judge to carefully scrutinize, check and verify the pleadings and the documents filed by the parties. This must be done immediately after civil suits are filed. B. The Court should resort to discovery and production of documents and interrogatories at the earliest according to the object of the Code. If this exercise is carefully carried out, it would focus the controversies involved in the case and help the court in arriving at truth of the matter and doing substantial justice. C. Imposition of actual, realistic or proper costs and or ordering prosecution would go a long way in controlling the tendency of introducing false pleadings and forged and fabricated documents by the litigants. Imposition of heavy costs would also control unnecessary adjournments by the parties. In appropriate cases the courts may consider ordering prosecution otherwise it may not be possible to maintain purity and sanctity of judicial proceedings. D. The Court must adopt realistic and pragmatic approach in granting mesne profits. The Court must carefully keep in view the ground realities while granting mesne profits. E. The courts should be extremely injunctions or stay orders. Ordinarily short notice should be issued to the defendants or respondents and only after hearing concerned parties appropriate orders should be passed. D. The Court must adopt realistic and pragmatic approach in granting mesne profits. The Court must carefully keep in view the ground realities while granting mesne profits. E. The courts should be extremely injunctions or stay orders. Ordinarily short notice should be issued to the defendants or respondents and only after hearing concerned parties appropriate orders should be passed. F. Litigants who obtained ex-parte ad interim injunction on the strength of false pleadings and forged documents should be adequately punished. No one should be allowed to abuse the process of the court. G. The principle of restitution be fully applied in a pragmatic manner in order to do real and substantial justice. H. Every case emanates from a human or a commercial problem and the Court must make serious endeavour to resolve the problem within the framework of law and in accordance with the well settled principles of law and justice. I. If in a given case, ex parte injunction is granted, then the said application for grant of injunction should be disposed of on merits, after hearing both sides as expeditiously as may be possible on a priority basis and undue adjournments should be avoided. J. At the time of filing of the plaint, the trial court should prepare complete schedule and fix dates for all the stages of the suit, right from filing of the written statement till pronouncement of judgment and the courts should strictly adhere to the said dates and the said time table as far as possible. If any interlocutory application is filed then the same be disposed of in between the said dates of hearings fixed in the said suit itself so that the date fixed for the main suit may not be disturbed.” 30. The same principles have been reiterated by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and others Vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 370 as under: “87. Experience has shown that all kinds of pleadings are introduced and even false and fabricated documents are filed in civil cases because there is an inherent profit in continuation of possession. In a large number of cases, honest litigants suffer and dishonest litigants get undue benefit by grant or refusal of an injunction because the courts do not critically examine pleadings and documents on record. In a large number of cases, honest litigants suffer and dishonest litigants get undue benefit by grant or refusal of an injunction because the courts do not critically examine pleadings and documents on record. In case while granting or refusing injunction, the court properly considers pleadings and documents and takes the pragmatic view and grants appropriate mesne profit, then the inherent interest to continue frivolous litigation by unscrupulous litigants would be reduced to a large extent. 88. The Court while granting injunction should broadly take into consideration the prevailing market rentals in the locality for similar premises. Based on that, the court should fix ad hoc amount which the person continuing in possession must pay and on such payment, the plaintiff may withdraw after furnishing an undertaking and also making it clear that should the Court pass any order for reimbursement, it will be a charge upon the property.” 31. It has come in the evidence that the plaintiff has raised an apple orchard which was yielding 100-150 boxes of apples per year. Thus, it can safely be presumed that the income derived by the plaintiff from the sale of apples was more than `One lac per year. The plaintiff has also been growing potatoes on the suit land. Plaintiff was not evicted due to stay orders passed by the Revenue Courts and Civil Courts. He has derived benefit from the land on the basis of interim orders and the same is required to be neutralized. He has remained in unauthorized occupation of the land for a considerable period and is liable to pay to the State Government a sum of ` 5 lacs by way of mesne profits, penal and exemplary costs. 32. Once the proceedings have been initiated under the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act and for that matter under any special Act, the same are required to be taken to logical end. The parties may not be permitted to assail the orders which have been passed by the Revenue Court in Civil Court in view of specific ouster clause. In case the Courts start interfering with the orders passed by the Revenue Officers, Section 171 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act would become redundant or otiose. The tendency of the parties to litigate the matter earlier before the Revenue Courts and thereafter in the Civil Courts would lead to multiplicity of litigation. In case the Courts start interfering with the orders passed by the Revenue Officers, Section 171 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act would become redundant or otiose. The tendency of the parties to litigate the matter earlier before the Revenue Courts and thereafter in the Civil Courts would lead to multiplicity of litigation. The Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act is a self contained Code and the rights and remedies of the parties are provided under it. 33. Accordingly, in view of the observations and discussions made hereinabove, there is no merit in this Regular Second Appeal and the same is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any. The plaintiff is directed to pay a sum of `5 lacs to the State Government within a period of six weeks from today. In case the amount is not deposited, the Deputy Commissioner, Shimla is directed to recover the same by way of arrears of land revenue. All the Revenue Officers in the State of Himachal Pradesh are directed that while passing the orders of eviction, they must take steps for neutralizing the interim orders by awarding compensation, mesne profits and exemplary/penal costs. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Financial Commissioner-Cum-Secretary (Revenue), Government of Himachal Pradesh, for its due compliance by the Registry of this Court.