Judgment : This common order disposes of the three petitions. The second respondent in the three petitions is common. While there are only two petitioners in Crl. Petition Nos.5013 and 5168 of 2010, there are three petitioners in Crl. Petition No.5014 of 2010. The petitioners in Crl. Petition Nos.5013 & 5168 of 2010 are one and the same. The third petitioner in Crl. Petition No.5014 of 2010 is not a party to Crl. Petition Nos.5013 and 5168 of 2010. For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to the parties as they are arrayed in Crl. Petition No.5014 of 2010, as the parties in the three petitions are common except for the third petitioner in Crl. Petition No.5014 of 2010. 2. The third petitioner in Crl. Petition No.5014 of 2010 is not a party to the other two petitions. For this reason, I refer to the parties as they are arrayed in Crl. Petition No.5014 of 2010. The petitioners seek for the quashment of First Information Reports (FIRs) in Crime No.38 of 2009 (in Crl. Petition No.5013 of 2010), Crime No.392 of 2008 (in Crl. Petition No.5014 of 2008) and Crime No.400 of 2008 (in Crl. Petition No.5168 of 2010) on the file of the Gandhinagar Police Station, Hyderabad. The second respondent stiffly resisted the petitions contending that the complaints involved triable issues and that the petitions cannot be smothered at the threshold. 3. The point for consideration is whether the FIRs in Crime Nos.38 of 2009, 392 and 400 of 2008 are liable to be quashed. 4. The second respondent along with her husband Ashwin Yada was going in a car in October 2008 from Hyderabad to Tirupati for pilgrimage. Their minor child was accompanying them. On 16.10.2008, the car met with a ghastly accident at a distance of about 20 kilometres from Nandyal town. The husband of the second respondent as well as their minor child met with instantaneous death in the accident. It is the claim of the second respondent that she was in coma for about a week and that she recovered after she was shifted to Hyderabad. The second petitioner is the mother-in-law of the second respondent, being the mother of Ashwin Yada. The first petitioner was the elder brother of Ashwin Yada. The third petitioner is the wife of the first petitioner. 5. The second petitioner is the mother-in-law of the second respondent, being the mother of Ashwin Yada. The first petitioner was the elder brother of Ashwin Yada. The third petitioner is the wife of the first petitioner. 5. The deceased husband of the second respondent was running a TVS show room in Secunderabad. The second respondent and her husband owned immovable property at Uppal. It is the case of the second respondent that the title deeds of the property situate at Uppal as well as cash of ` 5,00,000/-and jewellery of the second respondent were at the house and the show room of the second respondent and her husband. Sri S. Pradeep Kumar, learned counsel for the second respondent who is the de facto complainant in their complaints contended that believing that the second respondent was also going to breath her lost, petitioners 1 and 2 created a spurious agreement of sale and other documents with a view to grab the property belonging to the second respondent and her husband. 6. The second respondent after her discharge from the hospital verified the records at the show room of her husband and went on realising one act of treachery on the part of the petitioners after another. The second respondent consequently went on lodging complaint after complaint against the petitioners. The second respondent initially filed a complaint with Gandhinagar Police Station, Hyderabad, which was registered as Crime No.38 of 2009. In that case, it was alleged that one Smt. Srivani, another accused in the case suppressed the fact of filing a suit in O.S.No.102 of 2009 on the file of the II Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District by Smt. M. Srivani seeking for specific performance of the agreement of sale in her favour. Smt. M. Srivani was arrayed as one of the accused on the ground that the alleged agreement of sale was forgery and that Smt. M. Srivani was one of the parties to the forgery. Inter alia, it is the contention of the second respondent that the agreement of sale does not bear the signature of her late husband and that the agreement of sale consequently is spurious. 7. Further, the allegation against the petitioners is that the petitioners received ` 25,00,000/-from the agents of M/s.Priyadarshni Yarn Mill to which the husband of the second respondent supplied raw material. 7. Further, the allegation against the petitioners is that the petitioners received ` 25,00,000/-from the agents of M/s.Priyadarshni Yarn Mill to which the husband of the second respondent supplied raw material. The second respondent contends that the petitioners have taken away the account books of the second respondent and her husband and have failed to pay the money received by them on behalf of the second respondent and her husband from various sources. She also contended that the second respondent was threatened when she demanded for the payment of money received by the petitioners on behalf of late husband of the second respondent. 8. It is contended by the learned counsel for the second respondent that prima facie cases are made out against the petitioners and that the FIRs do not deserve to be quashed. 9. It may first be noticed that so far as Crime No.400 of 2008 is concerned, it is the case of the second respondent that charge sheet was already filed. The relief sought for in Crl. Petition No.5168 of 2010 is the quashment of Crime No.400 of 2008. When the charge sheet was already filed, the very petition becomes infructuous. The petitioners shall have to move the court for quashment of the charge sheet. Inasmuch as the relief sought for is for the quashment of FIR in Crime No.400 of 2008, the petition has become infructuous, as the charge sheet was already filed. Consequently, Crl. Petition No.5168 of 2010 is liable to be dismissed in limini. 10. Regarding the merits of Crl. Petition Nos.5013 and 5014 of 2010, Sri Challa Ajay Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the second respondent has made it a point to malign and damage the character of the petitioners and to blackmail the petitioners by lodging series of complaints. He pointed out that the second respondent has already lodged five complaints and that she has not even left Smt. M. Srivani from the array of the accused when Smt. Srivani filed O.S.No.102 of 2009 on the file of the II Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District seeking for the specific performance of the agreement of sale in her favour. 11. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that at the time of the accident of the vehicle (on 16.10.2008) and consequent death of Ashwin Yada, the first petitioner and his wife (third petitioner) were in United States and that it would be preposterous to make allegations against them. On the other hand, it is the case of the second respondent that after the accident, petitioners 1 and 3 have come down to India and in connivance with the second petitioner have committed several criminal acts punishable under law. The learned counsel for the second respondent further submitted that petitioners 1 and 2 are more or less out of the reach of the court as on today since they had return to United States and that when the petitioners 1 and 3 are not prepared to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, they are not entitled to seek for the quashment of FIRs in Crime Nos.392 of 2008 and 38 of 2009. I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the second respondent that by the date of the accident the petitioners 1 and 3 were in United States cannot be a ground to disbelieve the case of the second respondent and to conclude that the case is patently and prima facie false. I am afraid that the contention of the second respondent relating to the overt acts of the petitioners 1 to 3 are triable issues and that the two complaints, therefore, do not deserve to be quashed, merely because petitioners 1 and 3 were not in India at the time of the death of Ashwin Yada. 12. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the second respondent has subsequently married and she begot a child through her second marriage. The second respondent is an I.T. software professional. The learned counsel for the second respondent did not answer the allegation of the petitioners that the second respondent had since married and begot a child as well. Assuming that these contentions are true they do not alter the nature of the complaints lodged by the second respondent against the petitioners. It is not as though the second respondent lost interest in prosecuting the cases after her subsequent marriage. She engaged a counsel and contested these petitions. Assuming that these contentions are true they do not alter the nature of the complaints lodged by the second respondent against the petitioners. It is not as though the second respondent lost interest in prosecuting the cases after her subsequent marriage. She engaged a counsel and contested these petitions. It is evident that the second respondent is anxious to prosecute the cases lodged by her with the police/court. The subsequent marriage of the second respondent, therefore, is not relevant for consideration in these petitions. 13. It is the case of the petitioners that the second respondent merely made omnibus allegations and that the complaint deserves to be rejected on the ground that the allegations are not concrete. In her complaint, dated 27.11.2008, which was registered as FIR in Crime No.400 of 2008, the second respondent alleged that petitioners 1 and 2, in a well nit strategy had stolen her gold jewellery, cash and certificates including blank signed cheques and promissory notes. These allegations cannot be considered to be omnibus and sweeping allegations. Similarly, with reference to Crime Nos.392 of 2008 and 38 of 2009 also, the allegations were not vague and elusive but are concrete and definite. Added to it, it is the case of the second respondent that her husband never executed an agreement of sale and that the agreement of sale, which is the subject matter of O.S.No.102 of 2009 on the file of the II Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District, is forgery. The learned counsel for the second respondent submitted that it is the enquiry, which alone decides whether the agreement of sale is forgery or a genuine document and till then the petitioners cannot seek for the quashment of the FIRs or the charge sheet. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioners questioned the propriety of the second respondent in arraying Smt. M. Srivani as one of the accused. He further contended that the second respondent invoked civil remedies and that the criminal complaints are not maintainable. In Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. V. Biological E. Ltd. (2000 (1) ALD (Crl.) 729 (SC)), relied upon by the learned counsel for the second respondent, it was held that redressal under criminal law and civil law can be perused at one and the same time simultaneously. It, therefore, is not open for the petitioners to contend that the FIRs deserve to be quashed. 15. It, therefore, is not open for the petitioners to contend that the FIRs deserve to be quashed. 15. The learned counsel for both sides referred to Bhajanlal’s case (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal ( AIR 1992 SC 604 )) in support of their contentions. Bhajan Lal referred to seven parameters as the grounds to interfere with the police investigation. It was observed by the Supreme Court: “108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciate by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognisable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognisable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. 5. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognisable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.” 16. The learned counsel for the petitioners contend that the present case falls within the guidelines of Bhajan Lal, while the learned counsel for the second respondent contends that the present case is beyond the parameters provided by Bhajan Lal. The very first condition is that the allegations of the complaint should not constitute a prima facie case even if the allegations are taken at their face value. While so, the allegations in the two complaints would clearly make out prima facie case against the petitioners. I, therefore, consider that the FIRs in the two cases do not deserve to be quashed. Criminal Petition Nos.5013 and 5014 of 2010 deserve to be dismissed in this background. Conclusion: 17. For the reasons stated above, Crl. Petition No.5168 of 2010 deserves to be dismissed in limini on the ground that charge sheet was already filed. Further, it is found that the complaints in Crime Nos.400 & 392 of 2008 and 38 of 2009 established the prima facie case of the second respondent and that the FIRs do not deserve to be quashed at this stage without trial. Consequently, Criminal Petition Nos.5013 and 5014 of 2010 deserve to be dismissed. 18. Accordingly, these three Criminal Petitions are dismissed.