JUDGMENT As per Hon'ble Shri S.. Gangele, J. : 1. Appellant has filed this appeal against the order dated 23-11-2011 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 4595/2009. 2. One Harmukha son of Samle Jatav, resident of Kheriya Mrityu, Tehsil and District Gwalior, had been granted a patta by Tehsildar vide order dated 4-1-1994 in regard to land bearing Survey No. 55/1/M-3 having area 0.470 hectare and Survey No. 85/5 having area 0.627 hectare in Village Kheriya Mfitya, Tehsil and District Gwalior. Earlier, the said land was of the ownership of a society, named as Gandhi Harijan Agriculture Co-operative Society. Harmukha was a member of the society. On account of dissolution of the society, the lease of the aforesaid land was granted in favour of Harmukha son of Samle. The appellant purchased the aforesaid land from Harmukha vide registered sale-deeds dated 15-1-2008 and 5-4-2008. Thereafter, the appellant submitted an application for mutation before Patwari, who forwarded the same to Tehsildar, Gwalior. During pendency of the mutation proceedings appellant submitted an application before Nazul Officer, District Gwalior for grant of 'No Objection Certificate'. 3. During pendency of the mutation application the appellant came to know the fact that seller, Harmukha son of Samle, had not received permission from the Government under Section 165 (7-b) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code for transfer of the land, hence, the appellant submitted an application before the Collector on 26-8-2008 for ratification the transfer and validation of the transaction. On 15-9-2008 the appellant further submitted another application for permission/ratification. That application was marked to the Tehsildar and thereafter, Tehsildar registered Case No. 245/2008-09/B 121. 4. In the meanwhile one Pushpendra Singh Senger made a complaint to the Collector in regard to forged registration of land of poor Scheduled Castes agriculturists by the Land-Mafias. On the aforesaid application the Collector registered a case in suo motu revision and issued a show-cause notice to the appellant. 5. In the meanwhile, appellant filed a writ petition before this Court. The appellant also filed reply before the Collector and after considering the reply vide order dated 14-1-2010 the Collector set aside the sale-deeds executed in favour of the appellant and ordered registration of First Information Report against the appellant. Thereafter, appellant amended the petition, which was pending before the Writ Court and also challenged the order passed by the Collector dated 14-2-2010. Thereafter, appellant amended the petition, which was pending before the Writ Court and also challenged the order passed by the Collector dated 14-2-2010. The aforesaid petition has been rejected by the learned Single Judge vide impugned order. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that the appellant purchased the land bonafide and the land was recorded as Bhumiswami in the Khasra entries and in Bhu Adhikar Evam Rin Pustika of Harmukha, hence, the transaction of the appellant was bonafide and the Collector ought to have exercised its power for ratification of the transaction. Learned Counsel further submitted that the Collector had no power and authority to take the matter in suo motu revision. In support of his contentions, learned Counsel relied upon the following judgments :- (1) Ranveer Singh and others Vs. State of M.P., 2010(5) MPHT 137 (FB) : 2010(4) MPLJ 178 : AIR 2011 MP 27 (2) Kusheshwar Prasad Singh Vs. State of Bihar and others, (2007) 11 SCC 447 (3) Sultana Begum Vs. Premchand Jain, (1997) 1 SCC 373 : AIR 1997 SC 1006 (4) CIT Vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57 and (5) State of Bihar Vs. Yogendra Singh, (1982) 1 SCC 664 : AIR 1982 SC 882 . 7. It is an admitted fact that no permission had been taken by Harmukha son of Samle Jatav under Section 165 (7-b) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code before sale of the aforesaid land. The provision of Section 165 (7-b) has been quoted by the learned Single Judge in the order impugned, which is as under :- "(7 -b) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a person who holds land from the State Government or a person who holds land in Bhumiswami rights under subsection (3) of Section 158, or whom right to occupy land is granted by the Slate Government of the Collector as a Government lessee and who subsequently becomes Bhumiswami of such land, shall not transfer such land without the permission of a Revenue Officer, not below the rank of a Collector, given for reasons to be recorded in writing." 8. The appellant filed an application before the Collector under Section 165 (6-b) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code for ratification of transfer. The appellant filed an application before the Collector under Section 165 (6-b) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code for ratification of transfer. The aforesaid provision is as under:- "(6-b) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 (No. 36 of 1963), the Collector may On his own motion at any time or on an application made in this behalf within three years of such transaction in such form as may be prescribed, make an enquiry as he may deem fit, and may, after giving treasonable opportunity of being heard to the persons affected by the transfer, pass an order ratifying the transfer or refusing to ratify the transfer." 9. The Collector in his order has noted the fact that Harmukha son of Samle Jatav submitted his reply before him and he pleaded the fact that he had not sold any land in favour of the appellant nor any power of attorney or agreement was executed by him in regard to sale of the land. In view of the aforesaid finding, it was necessary for the appellant to add Harmukha son of Samle Jatav as a party in the writ petition. He is a necessary party, because appellant wants ratification of the transfer of the land, which is said to have been sold by Harmukha, who specifically denied the aforesaid fact before the Collector, the appellant did not make the affected person party in the writ petition. In the present appeal also the appellant did not add Harmukha as a party, which is strange. In our opinion, the appellant has purposefully did not add Harmukha as a party in the writ petition or in this appeal in order to avoid his reply. Even if, the version of the appellant be accepted, then also, the appellant has to establish the fact that he has purchased the land from Harmukha Jatav and it is important in the light of the pleadings and averments made by Harmukha Jatav before the Collector that he had not executed any sale-deed in favour of the appellant. This act of the appellant is highly objectionable and in our opinion, it amounts playing fraud upon the Court. 10. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of K.D. Sharma Vs. This act of the appellant is highly objectionable and in our opinion, it amounts playing fraud upon the Court. 10. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of K.D. Sharma Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others, (2008) 12 SCC 481 in Paras 26 and 27 after quoting its earlier judgments has observed, as under, in regard to practice of fraud : "26. It is well settled that "fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" proclaimed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries before. Reference was made by the Counsel to a leading decision of this Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1 , wherein quoting the above observations, this Court held that a judgment/decree obtained by fraud has to be treated as a nullity by every Court. 27. Reference was also made to a recent decision of this Court in A. V. Papaya Sastry Vs. Govt. of A.P. Considering English and Indian cases, one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) stated: (SCC p. 231, Para 22) "22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the Court, Tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order by the first Court or by the final Court has to be treated as nullity by every Court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings." The Court defined "fraud" as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage or another. In fraud one gains at the loss and cost of another. Even the most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam." 11. From the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the decision reported in the case of Vrjay Sayal Vs. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 401 it is clear that if any party attempts to make misrepresentation in concealing materials facts, it does so at his risk and costs. Such party must be ready to face consequences that follow on account of its own doing. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 401 it is clear that if any party attempts to make misrepresentation in concealing materials facts, it does so at his risk and costs. Such party must be ready to face consequences that follow on account of its own doing. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that there is a compelling need to take a serious view in such matters to ensure expected purity and grace in the administration of justice. 12. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Venture Global Engineering Vs. Satyam Computer Services Limited and another, (2010) 8 SCC 660 has held, as under, in regard to fraud :- "36. It is well known that fraud cannot be put in a straitjacket and it has a very wide connotation in legal parlance. In the decision of the House of Lords in Frank Reddaway and Co. Ltd. Vs. George Banham, 1896 Appeal Cases 199 = (1895-99) All ER 133 (HL), Lord Macnaghten explained the multifarious aspects of fraud very lucidly, and which we quote :- "But fraud is infinite in variety; sometimes it is audacious and unblushing; sometimes it pays a sort of homage to virtue, and then it is modest and retiring; it would be honesty itself if it could only afford it. But fraud is fraud all the same; and it is the fraud, not the manner of it, which calls for the interposition of the Court." (AC at P. 221 of the report). 37. The aforesaid elucidation by the learned Law Lord has also been accepted in celebrated treaties on fraud (See: Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 7th Edn. p. 1). Kerr has also referred to Story's Equity Jurisprudence and defined fraud as :- "Fraud, in the contemplation of a Civil Court of Justice, may be said to include properly all acts, omissions, and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue or unconscientious advantage is taken of another." 38. In Indian law, namely the Contract Act, the said common law doctrine of fraud has been assimilated in Section 17 of the said Act. A very wide definition of fraud has been given, which is as under : "17. In Indian law, namely the Contract Act, the said common law doctrine of fraud has been assimilated in Section 17 of the said Act. A very wide definition of fraud has been given, which is as under : "17. 'Fraud' defined.- 'Fraud' means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract;- (1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (3) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (4) any other act fitted to deceive; (5) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent. Explanation :- Mere silence as to facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud, unless the circumstances of the case are such that, regard being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence to speak, or unless his silence, is, in itself, equivalent to speech." 13. Section 165 (7-b) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code contains a provision in regard to taking permission from the Collector before transfer of the land, which was granted by the State Government on lease. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Keshabo and another Vs. State of M.P. and others, (1996) 7 SCC 765 , which has been quoted by the learned Single Judge in the order impugned, has clearly held that non-compliance of the aforesaid section makes the transaction void. The same proposition has been held by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Budhuwa Chamar Vs. Board of Revenue, M.P. and others, 2002(1) MPLJ Note 2. 14. From the facts of the case, we have gathered an impression that the appellant has deliberately tried to get the land of land owner, who had been granted patta by the Government. Prima facie, we are satisfied that the act of the appellant has to be investigated thoroughly, so that a proper action can be taken against the appellant, hence, the Collector has rightly ordered registration of First Information Report against the appellant. 15. Prima facie, we are satisfied that the act of the appellant has to be investigated thoroughly, so that a proper action can be taken against the appellant, hence, the Collector has rightly ordered registration of First Information Report against the appellant. 15. Learned Counsel for appellant has pleaded that the Collector has no power and authority to lake the matter in suo motu revision in view of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ranveer Singh and others Vs. State of M.P. 2010(5) MPHT 137 (FB): 2010(4) MPLJ 178 : AIR 2011 MP 27 . However, this argument is not tenable because, prima facie, in our opinion, the appellant has played a fraud and a by some illegal means he has tried to get ownership of the land in question. This Court came to this conclusion on the basis of the act of the appellant that appellant did not made the person, Harmukha Jatav, a party in the writ petition as well as in the present appeal, though Harmukha Jatav has specifically pleaded before the Collector that he had not sold any land in favour of the appellant. In accordance with the Full Bench judgment of this Court, quoted above, the authority has power of suo motu revision within 180 days from the date of knowledge. In the present case, Collector exercised the power after I receipt of complaint of Mr. Pushpendra Singh Sengar. Hence, in our opinion, the order passed by the Collector is within jurisdiction. 16. In our opinion, this litigation can be termed as an vexatious litigation. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed with an exemplary cost of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand) only. Appeal Dismissed.