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Calcutta High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 620 (CAL)

P. Ramaswamy v. State

2012-07-13

JOYMALYA BAGCHI

body2012
Judgment JOYMALYA BAGCHI, J. 1. THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Special Judge, Andaman and Nicobar Islands in Special Case No.2 of 2004 convicting the appellant for commission of offence punishable under section 3(1)(xi)of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1989) and sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.3000/-(Rupees three thousand only) in default to suffer three months imprisonment more. 2. THE prosecution case against the appellant is to the fact that the defecto complainant Dr. Harold Charles (PW-3) is the father of the victim girl (PW-6), who was aged about 9 years at the time of the occurrence; on 15.03.2004 around 1.30 PM, PW-3 sent the victim girl to the shop of the appellant to purchase some eatables; when the victim went to the shop, the appellant made her wait till other customers had left; thereafter, the appellant caught hold of her right hand and dragged her inside the shop room and molested her; after such sexual assault, the victim returned home sobbing and on repeated queries informed her father (PW-3) about the incident; her father immediately rushed to the shop and demanded an explanation from the appellant; initially the appellant denied the incident, but subsequently he came to the residence of PW-3 and begged for pardon and pleaded with PW-3 not to divulge the incident to his family members; on the same day, PW-3 informed the incident to his superior officer and such complaint was forwarded to the Superintendent of Police, Car Nicobar who in turn forwarded the same to PW-7 Narendra Dubey, S.I of Police posted with Anti Corruption Unit, Andaman and Nicobar Administration, Port Blair resulting in the registration of FIR at Car Nicobar, Police Station being Case No.10 of 2004 on 17.03.2004 under section 354 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 3(1)(IX) of the Act of 1989 against the appellant. 3. IN the course of investigation which was conducted by PW-8, a Dy. 3. IN the course of investigation which was conducted by PW-8, a Dy. Superintendent of Police, the statement of the victim (PW-6) was recorded before a Judicial Magistrate under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and a charge sheet was filed against the appellant under section 354 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 3(1(IX) of the Act f 1989. 4. BY an order dated 21.06.2004, the learned Special Judge, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, took cognizance of the aforesaid offence. Subsequently by an order dated 27.01.2004 charge was framed under section 3(1)(xi)of the Act of 1989. It is pertinent to mention here that no charge was framed under section 354 of the Indian Penal Code although the charge sheet had been submitted against the appellant in respect of such section. The charge framed against the appellant reads as follows: "That you, not being a Member of Scheduled Tribes, on 15.3.2004 at about 1.30 PM at Car Nicobar (Gobar Basti) in your shop used criminal force against X (name withheld), aged about 9 years, a female (woman) belonging to Scheduled Tribes of Car Nicobar with intent to dishonour or outrage her modesty by forcibly dragging her by holding her hand inside your shop and pressed her breast within the congnizance of the Court." 5. IN the course of trial, the prosecution examined seven(7) witnesses including the victim and her father as PW-3 and PW-6 respectively. In conclusion of trial, the Trial Judge convicted the appellant for commission of offence punishable under section 3(1)(xi)of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989. Hence, this appeal. 6. MR. Krishna Rao, learned counsel appearing for the appellant had assailed the order of conviction on the following grounds. (a) The cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge in the instant case under section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure without the case being committed to the Court of Sessions under section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was illegal. Mr. Rao, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gangula Ashok and Another Vs. State of A.P reported in (2000) 2 SCC 504 , argued that the cognizance taken being contrary to law, the consequential trial and conviction of the appellant were illegal and void ab initio. (b) Mr. Mr. Rao, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gangula Ashok and Another Vs. State of A.P reported in (2000) 2 SCC 504 , argued that the cognizance taken being contrary to law, the consequential trial and conviction of the appellant were illegal and void ab initio. (b) Mr. Rao argued that the star prosecution witness namely; PW-6, the victim girl had not supported the prosecution case and had categorically stated in the witness box that she could not recollect the incident. In spite of that the Trial Judge illegally came to a finding of guilt against the appellant on the basis of vague surmises and conjectures. (c) Mr. Rao also argued that although the prosecution witnesses had admitted that there were independent witnesses at the place of occurrence, the said independent witnesses who were examined had not supported the prosecution case and, therefore, the conviction of the appellant was unwarranted in law and in fact. (d) Finally, Mr. Rao submitted that the sine qua non for attracting Section 3(1)(IX) of the Act of 1989 is that the assault or use of criminal force to dishonour or outrage the modesty of the victim, who is a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe must be on the score that the said victim is a member of the community and not otherwise. 7. MR. Rao took me through the evidence on record at length to establish that nowhere in the length and breadth of the prosecution case it has been established that the alleged act was committed on the victim because she was a member of the aforesaid community. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ramdas and others vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2007)2 SCC 170 and that of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bimal Gorai vs. State of West Bengal reported in 2012 Cr. L.J. 200, Mr. Rao argued that in the absence of any evidence that the alleged act was perpetrated on the victim, who is a member of the Scheduled Tribe, on the score that she is a member of such community the offence under section 3(1)(xi)of the Act of 1989 can not said to have been made out. Per contra Mr. L.J. 200, Mr. Rao argued that in the absence of any evidence that the alleged act was perpetrated on the victim, who is a member of the Scheduled Tribe, on the score that she is a member of such community the offence under section 3(1)(xi)of the Act of 1989 can not said to have been made out. Per contra Mr. Santosh Kumar Mandal, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State submitted that the evidence of the victim girl, who was aged about 9 years at the time of incident and is a member of the Scheduled Tribe, must be read in its totality and her inability to articulate the incident with photogenic clarity in the witness box should not be a ground to reject her evidence outright. 8. MR. Mandal further submitted that the evidence of PW-6 stood corroborated by the evidence of her father PW-3 to whom the victim had narrated the alleged incident immediately after the occurrence and also drew my attention to the fact that her statement had been recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before a Judicial Magistrate in the course of investigation. Mr. Mandal further submitted that the evidence of PW- 6 when read as a whole along with the evidence of the other witnesses clearly established the act of indecent assault on the victim by the appellant with the intent to dishonour or outrage her modesty. 9. MR. Mandal further submitted that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses established beyond any doubt that the victim is a member of the Scheduled Tribe and her caste certificate was also exhibited in the instant case. He argued that it was never the case of the defense that the appellant was also a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community and, therefore, can not be prosecuted under the provision of the Act of 1989. Mr. Mandal finally concluded that the evidence on record clearly established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. To decide the issues raised by the respective counsels, a brief of synopsis of evidence on record as led by the prosecution may be apposite. 10. IN the instant case, PW-1 Dr. Mr. Mandal finally concluded that the evidence on record clearly established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. To decide the issues raised by the respective counsels, a brief of synopsis of evidence on record as led by the prosecution may be apposite. 10. IN the instant case, PW-1 Dr. Sharfudeen who was posted as Medical Superintendent at Car Nicobar deposed in the court to the effect that he received a complaint in writing on 15.3.2004 from the father of the victim PW-3 herein and forwarded the same to the Deputy Commissioner, Car Nicobar for necessary action. PW-2 Salomi Sabial was the Staff Nurse of the hospital to whom it was claimed that the victim girl, immediately after the occurrence, narrated the incident. PW-2, became hostile and was cross- examined by the prosecution. She, however, admitted that seeing the victim proceeding to the shop of the appellant on the fateful day. PW-3 is the father of the victim who was a Medical Officer posted at BJR Hospital at Car Nicobar. He stated that, on 15.3.2004 at 1.30 PM, he had sent the victim to buy some edible from the shop of the appellant. 20-25 minutes later, her daughter came back weeping and when she was questioned, she told that an indecent sexual assault was committed on her by the appellant. Hearing such version, PW-3 went to the shop and confronted the appellant. The appellant initially denied the incident but, subsequently came to the residence of PW-3 and begged pardon and requested him not to divulge the same to his family members. PW-3 admits of lodging a written complaint to his superior on the self same date. He also states of the seizure of caste certificate of the victim. PW-4 is the husband of the PW-2 and was also declared hostile and did not support the prosecution. PW-5 is the neighbor of the appellant and has not deposed anything against him. PW-6 is the victim who was 9 years of age at the time of the incident was aged about 13 years when she was examined in court. She admits that an incident happened but during the deposition states that she cannot remember exactly what had happened. She was declared hostile by the prosecution and cross-examined. During such cross-examination, she admitted of narrating the incident of indecent sexual assault by the appellant to the police as well as to others. She admits that an incident happened but during the deposition states that she cannot remember exactly what had happened. She was declared hostile by the prosecution and cross-examined. During such cross-examination, she admitted of narrating the incident of indecent sexual assault by the appellant to the police as well as to others. When she was confronted with her previous statement to the police she admitted making such statement. She further admitted that a wrong thing was done to her by the appellant as narrated by her to the police. She also stated that she told the truth to the police. She even admitted that her statement was recorded by Judicial Magistrate under section 164 of Code Criminal Procedure, 1973. 11. IN the course of her cross-examination by the defense, the Trial Judge recorded that the said victim became perturbed and was unable to given any answer properly. However, when the court examined her as to whether the appellant had committed any misdeed upon her, she again stated in the affirmative. PW-7 and PW-8 are the police witnesses who deposed about registration of the FIR and investigation conducted in the instant case. 12. IN this backdrop, let me examine the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant against the impugned order of conviction and sentence. 13. THE first ground taken by Mr. Rao is that the procedure adopted in the instant case in transmitting the records to the Court of learned Sessions Judge without committal proceeding was contrary to the law as declared by the apex court in Gangula Ashok (supra). A perusal of the lower court records would show that by order dated 7.7.2004 the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had taken cognizance of alleged offences upon the charge sheet was being filed before him. Thereafter, in the course of the committal proceeding, pursuant to an order dated 15.5.2004 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, the records of the case were transmitted to the learned Special Judge. The learned Sessions Judge, who is also a special judge under the Act of 1989, took cognizance of the alleged offences under section 193 Cr. P.C and proceeded to try the appellant. 14. The learned Sessions Judge, who is also a special judge under the Act of 1989, took cognizance of the alleged offences under section 193 Cr. P.C and proceeded to try the appellant. 14. IT is true that in the case of Gangula Ashok (supra) the apex court had held that the case ought to be committed to the court of the learned Special Judge before the latter can take cognizance under Section 193 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It appears that in the instant case the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had taken cognizance of the alleged offences on 7.4.2004 and thereafter the case records were transmitted to the court of learned Special Judge for enquiry and trial. Hence the infraction in the instant case is not a patent illegality but a mere irregularity as the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had taken cognizance earlier on the charge sheet filed before him and the learned Special Judge did not take cognizance directly of the alleged offences. 15. FURTHERMORE, such infraction was not raised by the appellant at the earliest opportunity but the trial was permitted to continue to its natural conclusion and this issue has been raised for the first time before the appellate court. Moreover it appears that there was no failure of justice and the appellant did not suffer any prejudice by the procedure adopted by the court below and, therefore, this belated challenge that the committal proceeding was not properly adhered to cannot be a ground to set aside the order of conviction and sentence. This aspect has been dealt with by the apex court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bhooraji and Others reported in (2001) 7 SCC 679 wherein the apex court referring to section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure categorically held that the belated and post conviction challenge in the matter of taking of cognizance by the Special Judge without appropriate committal proceeding cannot be a ground to set aside such conviction recorded by the trial court in the event no prejudice can be demonstratively shown to have been caused to the accused person. 16. ON such premise, I feel that this contention of Mr. Rao is clearly without any substance and is rejected. 17. THE second issue raised by Mr. 16. ON such premise, I feel that this contention of Mr. Rao is clearly without any substance and is rejected. 17. THE second issue raised by Mr. Rao is to the effect that since the victim PW-6 could not recollect the incident in the witness box, there was no direct evidence on the basis of which the appellant could be held guilty of the alleged offence. In this regard, it may be prudent to appreciate the age and the circumstances under which the victim deposed in the instant case. The victim was a minor girl belonging to a tribal community aged about 9 years when the incident occurred.. She was deposing in the instant case after three to four years and that too of an alleged indecent sexual assault perpetrated upon her by the appellant. It is common knowledge that victims of such tender age at the time of deposing would be extremely hesitant and bashful and may find it difficult and embarrassing to articulate the exact nature of the sexual assault upon her. It may be apposite to refer to the safeguard engrafted in the Cr. P.C relating to the recording of evidence of victims of sexual assault. Section 327(2) of the Cr. P.C, inter-alia provides that the trial of rape cases are to be held in camera. 18. IN the case of Sakshi vs. Union of India and others reported in (2004) 5 SCC 518 , the Apex Court dealt with the safeguards which ought to be followed in cases of sexual assault including offences punishable under section 354 of the IPC. In the said judgment, the Apex Court, inter alia, held the following safeguards to be adopted in cases of child sexual abuse:- "(1) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 327 CrPC shall, in addition to the offences mentioned in the sub-section, also apply in inquiry or trial of offences under Sections 354 and 377 IPC. In the said judgment, the Apex Court, inter alia, held the following safeguards to be adopted in cases of child sexual abuse:- "(1) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 327 CrPC shall, in addition to the offences mentioned in the sub-section, also apply in inquiry or trial of offences under Sections 354 and 377 IPC. (2) In holding trial of child sex abuse or rape:- (i) a screen or some such arrangements may be made where the victim or witnesses (who may be equally vulnerable like the victim) do not see the body or face of the accused; (ii) the questions put in cross-examination on behalf of the accused, insofar as they relate directly to the incident, should be given in writing to the presiding officer of the court who may put them to the victim or witnesses in a language which is clear and is not embarrassing; (iii) the victim of child abuse or rape, while giving testimony in court, should be allowed sufficient breaks as and when required." 18. In the instant case the minor victim belonging to a tribal community was a witness in a offence relating to indecent sexual assault. The procedure as envisaged under Section 327(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as elucidated in Sakshi Vs. UOI (supra) ought to have been resorted to in order to create congenial atmosphere of confidence in the mind of such victim while deposing in the trial.. 19. WITHOUT resorting to such safeguards the victim was examined in open court and subjected to scathing cross examination. Naturally she exhibited great diffidence and nervousness and found it most difficult to articulate the exact incident in open court. This state of the victim was also noted by the trial Judge in the deposition sheet. The evidence of such witness therefore requires to be examined with some latitude and also in the light of other evidence on record which may lend corroboration to the same. The evidence of PW-6, notwithstanding being declared hostile, gives out the tell tale indication of an indecent sexual assault perpetrated on her by the appellant. She had, in course of her deposition, admitted that an incident happened on the fateful day and also to a query made by the court stated that the appellant committed misdeed upon her. The evidence of PW-6, notwithstanding being declared hostile, gives out the tell tale indication of an indecent sexual assault perpetrated on her by the appellant. She had, in course of her deposition, admitted that an incident happened on the fateful day and also to a query made by the court stated that the appellant committed misdeed upon her. During her cross examination by the prosecution she also stated she told the truth to the police and that a wrong had been committed by the appellant in the manner as described by her to the police. Merely because she initially showed unwillingness to describe the incident with exactitude and stated that she could not remember it, it would be unwise to reject her evidence on such score alone particularly when reading such evidence in its totality it appears that the act of indecent assault by the appellant is clearly admitted by her during her cross-examination and also from her replies to the queries from the court. 20. FURTHERMORE, her evidence stands corroborated by that of her father PW-3 to whom immediately after the incident she came sobbing and narrated the same. The evidence of PW-3 that the victim returned sobbing and narrated the incident to him immediately after the occurrence is admissible as corroborative evidence of the incident and also as conduct of the victim as res gestae evidence in terms of section 6 and also under section 8 Illustration (J) of the Evidence Act. Relevant portion of Illustration (J) to sections 8 of the Evidence Act reads as follows: "(j) The question is, whether 'A' was ravished. The facts that, shortly after the alleged rape, she made a complaint relating to the crime, the circumstances under which, and the terms in which, the complaint was made, are relevant." No doubt such illustration uses the word "ravished", but bearing in mind the spirit and context in which that expression is used, I am of the opinion that the said provision would apply to all cases of sexual assault including the present one. Finally, the evidence of PW-6 that the appellant after being confronted about the incident begged pardon and asked PW-6 not to inform his family members are also relevant as conduct of the accused immediately after the incident and lends corroboration to the prosecution case. 21. FOR the aforesaid reasons, I am constrained to rebut the argument of Mr. Finally, the evidence of PW-6 that the appellant after being confronted about the incident begged pardon and asked PW-6 not to inform his family members are also relevant as conduct of the accused immediately after the incident and lends corroboration to the prosecution case. 21. FOR the aforesaid reasons, I am constrained to rebut the argument of Mr. Rao that since the victim PW-6 in a portion of her evidence stated she could not recollect the incident and was declared hostile, the prosecution must fail for lack of direct evidence. 22. THE third argument of Mr. Rao is that the independent witnesses did not support the prosecution case also does not find favour with me. The evidence of PW-3 along with PW-6 and other evidence on record taken together clearly establishes the prosecution case of sexual assault on the victim. It is common experience that outsiders are unwilling to involve themselves in criminal cases and particularly when such witness is a neighbor of the accused person as is the case of PW-5 in the instant case. It is also trite law that if a fact has been proved by a particular witness, plurality of witnesses would not add credence to such fact. Hence, I am of the opinion that lack of support of independent witnesses particularly in a case of indecent sexual assault on a minor girl cannot be a ground to disbelieve the prosecution case. 23. THE final argument of Mr. Rao is that there is no evidence on record to establish that the offence was committed upon the victim girl because she was a member of Scheduled Tribe. It is true that no such evidence has been led by the prosecution that the victim had been singled out for commission of offence as she was a member of a Scheduled Tribe. 24. THE law declared by the apex court in the case reported in (2007)2 SCC 170 and that of this court reported in 2012 Cr. L.J 200 clearly lays down the proposition that to attract the harsher provisions of the Act of 1989, it must be established by the prosecution that the offence was committed on a member of Scheduled Tribe community because of the fact she was a member of such community. 25. TO rebut such contention, Mr. Mandal has relied on the case of the Kailash and Others Vs. 25. TO rebut such contention, Mr. Mandal has relied on the case of the Kailash and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2011) SCC 598. However, I have considered such decision but I do not find that in the said decision, the apex court has laid down any law to the contrary. On the other hand in the facts of the said case, victim was subjected to physical assault and undignified treatment as she being a member of a Scheduled Tribe community had an illicit affair with a person of higher caste and as a consequence there of was subjected to such treatment. In the instant case, I do not find any evidence on record that the victim had been singled out for indecent sexual assault because she is a member of a Scheduled Tribe. Hence applying the law declared by the apex court, as aforesaid, in this regard, I am of the opinion that the essential ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(xi)of the Act of 1989 cannot be said to have been proved in the instant case. The prosecution has not proved that the victim had been subjected to a indecent sexual assault in the instant case because she was a member of the Scheduled Tribe community. Mere perpetration of a crime on a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract aforesaid penal provisions of the Act of 1989. It must also be shown that such offence had been committed upon the victim since she was a member of such community. In the absence of proof of such fact, I am constrained to hold that the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(xi)of the Act of 1989 has not been established. However, in view of the foregoing discussion relating to the evidence on record, there is no escape from the conclusion that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was subjected to criminal force by the appellant with the intention of outraging her modesty and he is liable to be punished for commission of offence punishable under section 354 of IPC. Faced with such situation, Mr. Rao argued that no charge had been framed under Section 354 of the IPC and hence, the appellant cannot be convicted on such score. Mr. Faced with such situation, Mr. Rao argued that no charge had been framed under Section 354 of the IPC and hence, the appellant cannot be convicted on such score. Mr. Mandal on the other hand, submitted that all the ingredient of Section 354 of the IPC were disclosed in the charge under Section 3(1)(xi)of the Act of 1989 which was framed in instant case and the appellant had sufficient notice of all facts constituting such offence (i.e. 354 IPC) and cannot be said to be prejudiced on that score. 26. MR. Mandal referred to Section 464 of the Cr. P.C. and argued that in the absence of any prejudice to the accused, omission to frame charge cannot be held to be fatal. He relied on the decision of apex court reported in (2009) 12 SCC 546 . I have considered the submission of the parties and I am of the opinion that Section 354 of the IPC is a lesser offence to Section 3(1)(xi)of the Act of 1989 inasmuch as all the ingredients of Section 354 IPC are incorporated in the graver offence namely Section 3(1)(xi)of the Act of 1989. Furthermore, the punishment of offence under Section 354 of the IPC is lesser than what is provided for under section 3(1)(xi)of the Act of 1989. Section 222(2) of the Cr. P.C clearly provides as follows:- "222(2) when a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduced it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor offence, although he is not charged with it." 27. THE aforesaid provision of law applies with full force to the facts of the instant case and, therefore, I hold that the appellant can be convicted for commission of offence punishable under section 354 of the IPC as a minor offence to the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(xi)of the Act of 1989 for which he was charged. That apart, no prejudice can be said to be caused to the appellant inasmuch as all the facts constituting the offence under Section 354 IPC were disclosed in the charged framed against him and he was fully put on notice with regard thereto when he was called upon to answer such charge. 28. MR. Rao refers to a judgment reported in 2004 Cr. 28. MR. Rao refers to a judgment reported in 2004 Cr. L.J. 1634 to the effect that the charge under Section 354 of IPC cannot be framed along with the offence under Section 3(1)(xi)of the Act of 1989. In the said judgment the Andhra Pradesh High Court was dealing with the amended provision of Section 354 of IPC(as applicable in the State of A.P) which provides for a harsher punishment with regard to that section compared to what is provided in section 3(1)(xi)of the Act of 1989. 29. FURTHERMORE, the ratio of the said decision that two offences from different statues cannot be tried together does not appear to be in consonance to the provision of section 26 of General Clauses Act 1897, which however, was not considered therein. I therefore respectfully fail to agree with the ratio of the said decision cited by the learned counsel for the appellant and hold that in the facts of the instant case the appellant can be convicted for the offence under section 354 of the IPC although no charge had been framed in respect of such offence. 30. FOR the aforesaid reasons, I modify the conviction in the instant case and hold that the appellant is guilty of commission of offence punishable under Section 354 of the IPC. 31. WITH regard to the sentence imposed upon the appellant, it is submitted that the appellant is presently aged over 65 years and that he is suffering from various illness and therefore he may be released on probation. Under such circumstances, I am of the opinion that in view of the nature of the crime perpetrated by him, the appellant is not entitled to be released on probation. However, bearing in mind his advanced age, the period of imprisonment imposed upon him may be reduced. I, therefore, modify the sentence imposed upon the appellant and direct that the appellant shall suffer rigorous imprisonment of six months and pay a fine of Rs.3000/- in default, to suffer imprisonment for three months more. 32. THE appeal is accordingly, partly allowed. 33. BEFORE parting, I record with deep anguish that in the present case the victim girl had to suffer severe trauma and embarrassment while deposing in open Court without the necessary safeguards available in law. 32. THE appeal is accordingly, partly allowed. 33. BEFORE parting, I record with deep anguish that in the present case the victim girl had to suffer severe trauma and embarrassment while deposing in open Court without the necessary safeguards available in law. I, therefore, request the Administration and the Trial Courts to adhere to the safeguards engrafted under section 327 (2) of the Cr. P.C as elucidated in the directions issued by the Apex Court in the case of Sakshi Vs. Union of India (supra), in the trial of offences relating to child sexual abuse. 34. REGISTRY is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the Secretary (Law), Andaman and Nicobar Administration and the learned District and Sessions Judge, Port Blair, Andaman and Nicobar Islands for necessary action in that regard.