T. Nandakumar Singh, J.:— This is an appeal (Second Appeal) against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Manipur East, dated 29.12.2005 allowing Civil Appeal No. 18/2004 by setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, i.e. Civil Judge, (Sr.Divn.), No.2, Manipur East dated 23.08.2004 granting reliefs sought for in the Original Suit (O.S) No.14 of 1996. 2. Heard Mr.L.Sharat Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr.Th. Modhu, learned counsel for the respondent. 3. The appellant-plaintiff filed Original Suit against the respondent-plaintiff for the reliefs: (i) A decree for declaration that the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 which was registered under Registration No. 1103 dated 18.09.1986 being fraudulent is invalid, inoperative and null and void; (ii) A decree for declaration that the order of the SDO/IE dated 21.10.1987 in his Mutation Appeal Case No.7 of 1987 is illegal and not binding upon the plaintiff with a direction to the learned D.C., Imphal to correct the land records by canceling the name of the defendant (respondent) Shri Angom Ashok Singh, and replacing it with the name of the plaintiff, Shri Palungbam Hitler, who died during pendency of the suit, in the land records in respect of the suit land; (iii) A decree for declaration thereby permanently restraining the defendant (respondent) and his men from entering the suit land from attempting to demarcate it and from taking possession of it thereby restraining the defendant and his men from disturbing the plaintiff in his quite possession and enjoyment of the suit land; (iv) A decree for the costs of the suit; (v) Any other decree for declaration of permanent nature which this Hon'ble Court deems proper according to law, equity and natural justice. 4. The pleaded case of the appellant-plaintiff in his plaint is briefly noted: The plaintiff is the owner in possession of 1/3 of the homestead covered by C.S.Dag No.350/784 of old Patta No.15/273 (P) corresponding to new Patta No. 15/400/590 measuring .02 acre situated at Khurai Sajor Leikai within Imphal East Tahsil, more fully described in Schedule 'A' to the plaint. On 29.11.1985 the plaintiff borrowed a sum of Rs. On 29.11.1985 the plaintiff borrowed a sum of Rs. 10,000/- for a period of one year at an interest of 5% per month from the defendant-respondent by executing a Mortgage Deed mortgaging 1/3 of the plot of the shop site described in Schedule ‘A’, which is his share in its southern portion (described in Schedule 'B' to the plaint), as a security. The land described in Schedule CB' i.e. 1/3 portion of the said plot of land described in Schedule ' A' is the suit land. The said Mortgage Deed was submitted before the Sub-Registrar, Head Quarter (HQ) Imphal on 29.11.1985 for registration. Before registration of the said Mortgage, but four months after its execution, the appellant-plaintiff fell ill and his business of running a shop over the suit land was relapsed. As a result, he lost all hope for repayment of the loan and its interest on the expiry of a term of one year. Therefore, the appellant-plaintiff, Palungbam Hitler Singh and one Shri Chabungbam Ibomcha Singh (PW. 1) approached the defendant-respondent with a proposal for enhancement of the term of loan to five years and also enhancement of the amount of loan to Rs.20,000/- on the security of the same mortgaged property, i.e. the suit land on cancellation/supersession of the earlier Mortgage Deed dated 29.11.1985 on the condition that the enhanced sum of Rs.20,000/- be adjusted in satisfying the mortgage debt of the earlier mortgage i.e. Rs.10,000/- with a sum of Rs.2,000/- as interest thereon for four months and in paying another sum of Rs.8,000/- which will be the lump sum interest of the amount of Rs. 20,000/- plus Rs.2,000/- for the entire period of five years and the said sum of Rs.8,000/-will be considered to have been paid in advance thereby allowing him (appellant-plaintiff) to redeem the mortgaged property on payment of a sum of Rs.20,000/- to the defendant on expiry of five years without further interest. 5. On 10.03.1986 at 12.00p.m. the appellant-plaintiff, along with the said Chabungbam Ibomcha Singh, PW.2 went to the Sub-Registrar, Imphal where the respondent-defendant was found sitting with the Deed Writer, Shri Laishram Brajachand Singh, DW.2. 5. On 10.03.1986 at 12.00p.m. the appellant-plaintiff, along with the said Chabungbam Ibomcha Singh, PW.2 went to the Sub-Registrar, Imphal where the respondent-defendant was found sitting with the Deed Writer, Shri Laishram Brajachand Singh, DW.2. Before arrival of the appellant-plaintiff and his friend Shri Ch.Ibomcha Singh, PW.2, respondent-defendant had already engaged Deed Writer, Shri Laishram Brajachand Singh, PW.2 for drafting new Mortgage Deed; and on their arrival the appellant-plaintiff and the said Ch.Ibomcha Singh, DW.2 were asked to put their signatures on the said alleged new Mortgage Deed dated 10.03.1986 (Ext A-11 i.e. Ext P.3). Before putting their signatures, the Deed Writer, Laishram Brajachand Singh, DW.2 read out the alleged new Mortgage Deed dated 10.03.1986 as if it were a new Mortgage Deed proposed by the appellant-plaintiff to the defendant-respondent for a term of five years for a loan of Rs.20,000/-. Having heard the contents of the alleged new Mortgage Deed dated 10.03.1986 from the reading of the Deed Writer, Shri L. Brajachand Singh, DW 2, the appellant-plaintiff and the said Ibomcha Singh, PW.2 without any hesitation put their signatures on the new Mortgage Deed dated 10.03.1086. The appellant-plaintiff and the said Ch.Ibomcha Singh, are not illiterate; they are capable of reading the local vernacular, 'Manipuri'. The alleged Mortgage Deed dated 10.03.1986 was written in 'Manipuri', translated version in English read as follows: "DEED EXECUTED ON 10.3.1986: "Sd/-P. Hitler Singh. Be it known to all to whom it may come that I, Palungbam Hitler Singh, s/o late Manimohon Singh, by occupation a Businessman, resident of Khurai Lamlong Bazar, with a view to enabling me to make purchase of a new land have this day sold to Shri Angom Ashok Singh, s/o late Ibomha Singh of Khurai Chingabam Leikai, the southernmost 1/3rd portion being my own share, out of .02 acre of land being divided into 3 equal shares from north to southward, covered under C.S.Dag No. 350/784 of patta no. 15/400.590 (village number fifteen, new patta number four hundred and five hundred ninety) now recorded and standing in my name as well as in those of Sarvashri Devendra Singh and Ibobi Singh as co-patttadars, Imphal East Tahasil, together with all trees/plants growing inside the ingkhol, at a consideration amount of Rs.20,000/- (rupees twenty thousand) only with delivery of possession thereof from today, that let the possession be taken over from today, with transfer of the land being mutated in the name of the purchaser (Mahajan), that I shall be held responsible for any or all of the objections coming up in this connection and further that I, having received the consideration money in full, having known the contents being read over to me I put my signature on this deed and delivered the same to the purchaser today, 10.3.1986 together with the patta. The sold portion of the land is the shop plot, and there remained no land as my share in the parent patta. PLACE AND BOUNDARIES: The land situate in Khurai Sajor Leikai, under Imphal East Tahasil U/P No. 15/273/400/ 590 as bounded on the - North: The remaining portion of the parent patta; South : Road (Sorok); West: Jugeswar Singh's Ingkhol; and East: Road (Sorok) Sd/-Shri Laishram Brajachand Singh of Brahmapur. Dt. 10.3.1986 Witness : Sd/-Chabungbam Ibocha Singh, Late Khamba Singh of Khurai Lamlong Bazar." 6. The respondent-defendant filed mutation report for mutation of his name in the record of right of the suit land stating that he had purchased the suit land from the appellant-plaintiff. The appellant-plaintiff objected to the mutation proceedings before the SDC/IE(II) Sawombung on the grounds of possession and non-existence of sale transaction between himself and the Defendant. The SDC by his order dated 12.02.1987 dismissed the mutation case No.125/SDC/IE (II) 1987 filed by the respondent-defendant. On appeal before the SDO, Imphal East by the respondent-defendant the learned SDO, Imphal East vide his order dated 21.10.1987 allowed the mutation of the name of the respondent-defendant in the record of right of the suit land. The second appeal filed by the appellant-plaintiff against the said order of the learned SDO, Imphal East dated 21.10.1987 had been dismissed by the D.C., Imphal. The appellant-plaintiff also further pleaded in his plaint that the market value of the suit land would be Rs.78,000/-. The second appeal filed by the appellant-plaintiff against the said order of the learned SDO, Imphal East dated 21.10.1987 had been dismissed by the D.C., Imphal. The appellant-plaintiff also further pleaded in his plaint that the market value of the suit land would be Rs.78,000/-. One Smt.Pheiroijam Ningol Angom Ongbi Shama Devi of Khurai Lamlong Bazar had purchased 1 /6 of the land having an area of .02 acre from the original pattadar of the suit land on a consideration amount of Rs.78,000/- under a registered Sale Deed dated 30.07.1990. The only particulars for fraud alleged to have been committed by the defendant-respondent for executing the said Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 (Ext-A.11 i.e, Ext P/3) by the appellant-plaintiff as a Mortgage Deed are that the contents of the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 had been read out by the scribe of the Sale Deed, Shri L.Brajachand Singh, DW.2, as if it were Mortgage Deed and consideration amount of the Sale Deed is inadequate inasmuch as the prevailing market value of the suit land would be Rs.78,000/-. 7. The defendant-respondent filed written statement wherein the defendant-respondent had categorically denied the allegations and assertions of the appellant-plaintiff regarding the alleged fraud pleaded in the plaint. The defendant-respondent further pleaded that the appellant-plaintiff mortgaged the suit land to the defendant-respondent for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- for a period of one year at an interest of 5% per month by executing a registered Deed of Mortgage on 29.11.1985. After three months of the said mortgage i.e., in the last week of February, 1986 the appellant-plaintiff expressed his intention to the defendant-respondent to sell the suit land because of his urgent need of money to buy another plot of land; and initially the appellant-plaintiff demanded a sum of Rs.25,000/- as consideration amount above the mortgage money i.e. Rs. 10,000/- from the defendant-respondent, if the respondent-defendant desire to purchase the suit land. However, ultimately the appellant-plaintiff agreed to sell the suit land at the consideration amount of Rs.20,000/- above the said mortgage money; and a Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 was executed by the appellant-plaintiff. The said Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 was drafted by the scribe, Lalshram Brajachand Singh, DW.2, who read out the contents of the Sale Deed clearly to the appellant-plaintiff, who after knowing fully the contents thereof, put his signature on the Sale Deed. The said Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 was drafted by the scribe, Lalshram Brajachand Singh, DW.2, who read out the contents of the Sale Deed clearly to the appellant-plaintiff, who after knowing fully the contents thereof, put his signature on the Sale Deed. It is also further pleaded in the written statement that the contents of the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 was also read over to the witness Shri Ch.Ibocha Singh, PW.2, who also signed the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986, after fully knowing the contents thereof. 8. It is nobody disputes that the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 was registered. The learned Trial Court, i.e. Civil Judge (Sr.Divn No.II) Imphal East, vide judgment and decree dated 23.08.2004 held that the registered Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986, which was registered under Registration No. 1103 dated 18.09.1986 of the Sub-Registrar's office, Head Quarter (HQ), Imphal, executed by the appellant-plaintiff in favour of the respondent-defendant (Ext.P/3 i.e. Ext A. 11) shall be treated as a Mortgage Deed, not as a Sale Deed, inasmuch as consideration amount for transferring the suit land under the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 is grossly inadequate and also the contents of the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 are not the real intention of the appellant-plaintiff and defendant-respondent and the defendant-respondent managed to execute the Sale Deed by committing fraud. On appeal, i.e. Civil Appeal No. 18 of 2002 filed by the defendant-respondent against the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dated 23.08.2004, the learned District Judge, Manipur East, vide judgment and decree dated 29.12.2005, after careful appreciation of the statements of PWs and DWs and exhibited documents, held that there was variance between pleadings and proof of the case of the appellant-plaintiff and also the appellant-plaintiff had failed to prove the particulars of the fraud pleaded in the plaint. However, the District Judge, Manipur East, further held that the record shows that the prevailing market price of the suit land varies from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 1,65,000/- in or around the area in which the suit land situated. Only on the score of alleged inadequacy of consideration amount of the suit land, it cannot be held that the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 is liable to be cancelled for the fraud alleged to have been committed by the respondent-defendant. 10,000/- to Rs. 1,65,000/- in or around the area in which the suit land situated. Only on the score of alleged inadequacy of consideration amount of the suit land, it cannot be held that the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 is liable to be cancelled for the fraud alleged to have been committed by the respondent-defendant. The First Appellate, the learned District Judge, Manipur East further held that the appellant-plaintiff has failed to establish that possession of the suit land was never delivered to the respondent-defendant. The learned District Judge, Manipur East had allowed the appeal i.e. Civil Appeal No. 18 of 2004 vide judgment and decree dated 29.12.2005 and in the result the suit was dismissed. Hence the present Second Appeal filed by the appellant-plaintiff. 9. Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC provides the particulars to be given in the pleadings in cases in which the party relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default or undue interest. The principles of 'finality of litigation' cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigation. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court must come with clean hands. A person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. 10. The Apex Court (Constitution Bench) in Bishundeo Narain & Anr Vs. Seogeni Rai & Ors: AIR (38) 1951 SC 280 held that "In cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars & the case can only be the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Ct. ought to take notice however strong the language in which they are couched may be, & the same applies to undue influence & coercion." A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. (Ref: S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath & Ors: (1994) 1 SCC 1 . 11. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. (Ref: S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs Jagannath & Ors: (1994) 1 SCC 1 . 11. The Apex Court in Afsar Sheikh & Anr. Vs. Soleman Bibi & Ors: (1976) 2 SCC 142 (in para 15 and 17) held as under: "15. While it is true that 'undue influence', 'fraud', 'misrepresentation' are cognate vices and may in part, overlap in some cases, they are in law distinct categories, and are, in view of Order 6 Rule 4, read with Order 6, Rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, required to be separately pleaded, with specificity, particularity and precision. A general allegation in the plaint, that the plaintiff was a simple old man of ninety who had reposed great confidence in the defendant, was much too insufficient to amount to an averment of undue influence of which the High Court could take notice, particularly when no issue was claimed and no contention was raised on that point at any stage in the trial Court, or, in the first round, even before the first appellate Court. 17. We are, with due respect, unable to appreciate this antic construction put on the defendant's pleading. All that has been said in the written statement is that the relationship subsisting between the plaintiff and the defendant was marked by love and affection, and was akin to that of father and son. Normally, in such paternal relationship, the father, and not the son, is in a position of dominating influence. The defendant's pleading could not be reasonably construed as an admission, direct or inferential, of the fact that he was in a position to dominate the will of the plaintiff. In spelling out a plea of undue influence for the plaintiff by an 'inverted' construction of the defendants' pleading, the High Court overlooked the principle conveyed by the maxim secundum allegata et probata, that the plaintiff could succeed only by what he had alleged and proved. He could not be allowed to travel beyond what was pleaded by him and put in issue. On his failure to prove his case as alleged, the court could not conjure up a new case for him by stretching his pleading and reading into it something which was not there, nor in issue, with the aid of an extraneous document. He could not be allowed to travel beyond what was pleaded by him and put in issue. On his failure to prove his case as alleged, the court could not conjure up a new case for him by stretching his pleading and reading into it something which was not there, nor in issue, with the aid of an extraneous document. Thus considered, the High Court was in error when by its judgment, dated October 16, 1963, it remanded the case to the first appellate Court with a direction to determine the question of undue influence "on material already on record". 12. No doubt, decision of the Privy Council is binding on High Court. The High Court erred in dis-agreeing with a ratio laid down by the Privy Council without referring to any decision of the Supreme Court to the contrary. The Privy Council in A.L.N. Narayanan Chettyar & Anr Vs. Official Assignee, High Court Rangoon & Anr : (28) AIR 1941 Privy Council 93 held that the fraud like any other charge of criminal offence, whether made in civil or criminal proceedings, must be established beyond reasonable doubt. A finding as to fraud cannot be based on suspicion and conjecture. 13. The first appellate Court is the final court of facts. The finding of fact by the First Appellate Court cannot be interfered with by the High Court on the appreciation of evidence inasmuch as the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence for coming to the fact contrary to that of the finding of the First Appellate Court. However, the High Court can interfere with the finding of fact by the First Appellate Court when the evidence is not in line with the pleading and is at variance, and in virtual self contradiction, adverse inference has to be drawn and evidence cannot be looked into or relied upon. The Apex Court in Kashi Nath Vs Jaganath: (2003) 8 SCC 740 (para 17 of the SCC) held as follows: "17. From the judgment of the trial court, first appellate court and the High Court it is clear that there was no consistency so far as the claim regarding the adoption is concerned, particularly as to who and at what point of time it was made. From the judgment of the trial court, first appellate court and the High Court it is clear that there was no consistency so far as the claim regarding the adoption is concerned, particularly as to who and at what point of time it was made. The High Court has taken great pains to extract the relevant variations to indicate as to how it cut at the very root of the plaintiffs claim. As noted by the Privy Council in Siddik Mohd Shah v Saran: AIR 1930 PC 57 (1) and Trojan & Co v Rm.N.N.Nagappa Chetiar: AIR 1953 SC 235 when the evidence is not in line with the pleadings and is at variance with it and as in this case, in virtual self-contradiction, adverse inference has to be drawn and the evidence cannot be looked into or relied upon. Additionally, as rightly submitted, the conclusion whether there was adoption is essentially one of fact merely depending upon pure appreciation of the evidence on record. This position has been stated in several decisions of this Court e.g. Rajendra Kumar v Kalyan : (2000) 8 SCC 99 and Raushan Devi v Ramji Sah: (2002) 10 SCC 205. Consequently, no exception could be taken to the well-merited findings concurrently recorded by the courts below, with which the High Court also rightly declined to interfere on the facts and circumstances of this case. 14. It is equally well settled that in the absence of a plea, no amount of evidence led in relation thereto, can be looked into. Pleadings in civil cases has its own importance, giving each sides a prior notice of the other, they may be met to enable the court to determine the real issue on the controversy. There can be no departure from the pleading without a proper amendment. If the finding of the subordinate court of fact is contrary to the evidence on record, and the perverse finding of such fact can be set aside by the High Court in appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. The High Court can not shut its eyes to the perverse finding of facts arrived at by the court below. The Apex Court in Bondar Singh & Ors Vs. The High Court can not shut its eyes to the perverse finding of facts arrived at by the court below. The Apex Court in Bondar Singh & Ors Vs. Nihal Singh & Ors: (2003) 4 SCC 161 (in para 4 and 7 of the SCC) held as under: "4............the High Court while exercising power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, had no jurisdiction to upset the findings on this question recorded by the lower appellate court. An appeal under Section 100 CPC can be entertained by the High Court only on a substantial question of law. There can be no quarrel with this legal proposition. The scope of powers of the High Court under Section 100 CPC is a matter of settled law. The learned counsel for the appellant cited several judgments in support of his contention. We do not consider it necessary to discuss these decisions because so far as the question of powers of High Courts under Section 100 CPC is concerned, it needs no discussion. If the findings of the subordinate courts on facts are contrary to the evidence on record and are perverse, such finding can be set aside by the High Court in appeal under Section 100 CPC. A High Court cannot shut its eyes to perverse findings of the courts below. In the present case the findings of fact arrived at by the lower appellate court were contrary to the evidence on record, and therefore, perverse and the High Court was fully justified in setting aside the same resulting in the appeal being allowed and suit being decreed. 7.As regards the plea of sub-tenancy (shikmi) argued on behalf of the defendants by their learned counsel, first we may note that this plea was never taken in the written statement the way it has been put forth now. The written statement is totally vague and lacking in material particulars on this aspect. There is nothing to support this plea except some alleged revenue entries. It is settled law that in the absence of a plea no amount of evidence led in relation thereto can be looked into. Therefore, in the absence of a clear plea regarding sub-tenancy (shikmi), the defendants cannot be allowed to build up a case of subtenancy (shikmi). Had the defendants taken such a plea it would have found place as an issue in the suit. Therefore, in the absence of a clear plea regarding sub-tenancy (shikmi), the defendants cannot be allowed to build up a case of subtenancy (shikmi). Had the defendants taken such a plea it would have found place as an issue in the suit. We have perused the issues framed in the suit. There is no issue on the point." 15. It is the well settled law that parties are to prove their own cases; and cannot succeed on the weakness of other party. The Apex Court in Ram Das Vs. Salim Ahmed & Anr: (1998) 9 SCC 719 (in para 4 of the SCC) held that: "4. It, however, appears to us that although the High Court indicated in the impugned judgment that the defendant's claim of easement right and also the claim of title by way of adverse possession could not be accepted, such weakness in the defendant's title to the suit property cannot establish the plaintifTs title. The High Court has failed to consider the specific finding made by the lower appellate court that the plaintiff had failed to establish the plaintiff's title. It may be noted that the plaintiff was not entitled to get declaration of title if such title could not be established by the plaintiff by leading convincing evidence. The lower appellate court had considered the evidence in detail and by giving cogent reasons had come to the finding that the plaintiff failed to establish the title to the property. Such finding was not reversed by the High Court by indicating any reason for such reversal but indicating the weakness of the defendant's title the plaintiff's suit was decreed. Even if it is assumed that the property in question was bequeathed by Bandi Jaan by executing the Will, the title to the suit property cannot be declared in favour of the plaintiff unless the title of the executor of the Will is fully established. In the aforesaid facts, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and the same is therefore set aside by allowing this appeal. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are restored. There will be, however, no order as to costs." 16. In the aforesaid facts, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and the same is therefore set aside by allowing this appeal. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are restored. There will be, however, no order as to costs." 16. One of the particulars for fraud pleaded in the plaint is that the Deed Writer of the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 read out the contents of the alleged Mortgage Deed dated 10.03.1986 (Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986) as if it were a new Mortgage Deed proposed by the appellant-plaintiff to the defendant-respondent, but the appellant-plaintiff (PW. 1), the said Ch.Ibomcha Singh, PW.2 deposed before the court that on the day of executing the Deed i.e. Deed dated 10.03.1986 they went to the Sub-Registrar's office at Lamphel. The Deed dated 10.03.1986 had already been drafted. The appellant-plaintiff, and the said Ch.Ibomcha Singh, P W.2 were asked to put their signatures on the Deed without reading it; the contents of the Deed were never read out to them. It is clear that there is variance between the pleadings and proof which would have the adverse consequence in proving the most vital particulars of the fraud pleaded in the plaint. The First Appellate Court in the impugned judgment and decree dated 29.12.2005, after careful appreciation of the statement of PWs, made a clear finding that prevailing market price of the suit land varies and as such, the appellant-plaintiff could not prove another particular of the fraud in executing the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986; and that the mere inadequacy of consideration amount of the suit land in the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 will not prove that the respondent-defendants had committed the fraud in the execution of the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 by the defendant-respondent. 17. For the foregoing discussions, even in civil cases, fraud must be established beyond reasonable doubt and finding of fraud cannot be based on surmise and conjecture. This Courtis in complete agreement with the finding of the First Appellate Court. 18. The case of the appellant-plaintiff is that the Deed dated 10.03.1986 is a Mortgage Deed. It is well settled law that the nature and purpose of a document must be determined with reference to the terms of the document which express intention of the parties; and the title/occupation/nomenclature of the instrument/document is not determinative of the nature and character of the document. It is well settled law that the nature and purpose of a document must be determined with reference to the terms of the document which express intention of the parties; and the title/occupation/nomenclature of the instrument/document is not determinative of the nature and character of the document. The Apex Court in Faqir Chand Gulati Vs. Uppal Agencies Private Limited & Anr : (2008) 10 SCC 345 (para 30 of the SCC) held as follows: "30. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the agreement was titled a "collaboration agreement" which shows an intention to collaborate and, therefore, it is a joint venture. It is now well settled that the title or caption or the nomenclature of the instrument/ document is not determinative of the nature and character of the instrument/document, though the name may usually give some indication of the nature of the document. The nature and true purpose of a document has to be determined with reference to the terms of the document, which express the intention of the parties. Therefore, the use of the words "joint venture" or "collaboration" in the title of an agreement or even in the body of the agreement will not make the transaction a joint venture, if there are no provisions for shared control of interest or enterprise and shared liability for losses." 19. On bare perusal of the terms and conditions indicated in the Deed dated 10.03.1986 or/contents of the Deed dated 10.03.1986 (English version of which is quoted above) the Deed itself clearly shows that the Deed dated 10.03.1986 is a Sale Deed and not a Mortgage Deed. Mr.Sharat Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant- plaintiif contended that the right of redemption of the mortgage under earlier Mortgage Deed dated 29.11.1985 cannot be extinguished by the subsequent Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 inasmuch as once the Mortgage always a Mortgage. In support of his contention he relied on the provisions of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1892. It appears that he lost sight of the first proviso to Section\ 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1892, which reads as "provided that right conferred by this section has not been extinguished by the act of the parties or by decree of a court". The right of redemption is an incident of a subsisting mortgage, which subsists so long as the mortgage itself subsists. The right of redemption is an incident of a subsisting mortgage, which subsists so long as the mortgage itself subsists. It can be extinguished as provided in first proviso to Section 60 of the T.R Act. "The act of parties" mentioned in the first proviso to Section 60 of the TP Act means the act to which both the mortgagor and mortgagee are parties. As such, subsequent on the execution of the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986, which is an outright sale of the suit land by the mortgagor (appellant-plaintiff), the right of the appellant-plaintiff under mortgage dated 29.11.1985 to redeem will be extinguished. 20. Mr.Sarat Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant by referring to Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act contended that earlier Mortgage Deed dated 29.11.1985 between the appellant-plaintiff and the defendant-respondent will prevail over the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1996, again between the appellant-plaintiff and the defendant-respondent. 21. In the case in hand, earlier transferee and subsequent transferee under two Deeds dated 29.11.1985 and dated 10.03.1986 are same i.e. the respondent-defendant and also the transferors are the same i.e. plaintiff-appellant. Such being the situation, for the reasons discussed above, Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act 1892 will not help the case of the appellant-plaintiff. Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 barred the appellant-plaintiff to vary the terms and conditions or/contents of the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 by leading oral evidence to the extent that the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 is a Mortgage Deed. Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that the term of a contract or of a ground or any other disposition of property which had been reduced in the form of a document and in all cases, in which any matter, require under the law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence will be given in proof of the terms of such contract except the document itself. Therefore, under Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, terms and conditions of the contract or/document shall itself be proved by the document itself and no evidence shall be given in prove of the term of the contract. Therefore, under Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, terms and conditions of the contract or/document shall itself be proved by the document itself and no evidence shall be given in prove of the term of the contract. Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that no oral evidence or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to such a document, terms and conditions of which has been proved in the manner as provided in Section 91, to vary the terms and conditions of such contract or/documents. If a stranger to the document is not bind by the terms and conditions of the document and is, therefore, not excluded from administering the untrue or collusive nature of the document or the fraudulent or illegal purpose for which it was brought into being. An inquiry into the reality of the transaction is not excluded merely by the availability of writing/reciting the transactions. But in the instant case, the appellant-plaintiff is not a stranger to the Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986. Ref: Parvinder Singh Vs Renu Gautam & Ors: (2004) 4 SCC 794 . 22. The Apex Court in Roop Kumar Vs Mohan Thedani: (2003) 6 SCC 595 held (in para 18,19 and 20 of the SCC) as follows: "18. In Section 92 the legislature has prevented oral evidence being adduced for the purpose of varying the contract as between the parties to the contract; but, no such limitations are imposed under Section 91. Having regard to the jural position of Sections 91 and 92 and the deliberate omission from Section 91 of such words of limitation, it must be take note of that even a third party if he wants to establish a particular contract between certain others, either when such contract has been reduced to in a document or where under the law such contract has to be in writing, can only prove such contract by the production of such writing. 19. Sections 91 and 92 apply only when the document on the face of it contains or appears to contain all the terms of the contract. Section 91 is concerned solely with the mode of proof of a document with limitation imposed by Section 92 relates only to the parties to the document. 19. Sections 91 and 92 apply only when the document on the face of it contains or appears to contain all the terms of the contract. Section 91 is concerned solely with the mode of proof of a document with limitation imposed by Section 92 relates only to the parties to the document. If after the document has been produced to prove its terms under Section 91, provisions of Section 92 come into operation for the purpose of excluding evidence of any oral agreement or statement for the purpose of contradicting, varying adding or subtracting from its terms. Sections 91 and 92 in effect supplement each other. Section 91 would be inoperative without the aid of Section 92, and similarly Section 92 would be inoperative without the aid of Section 91. 20. The two sections, however, differ in some material particulars, Section 91 applies to all documents, whether they purport to dispose of rights or not, whereas Section 92 applies to documents which can be described as dispositive. Section 91 applies to documents which are both bilateral and unilateral unlike Section 92 the application of which is confined to only bilateral documents. (See: Bai Hira Devi v Official Assignee of Bombai: AIR 1958 SC 448 ). Both these provisions are based on "best-evidence rule". In Bacon's Maxim Regulation 23, Lord Bacon said "The law will not couple and mingle matters of specialty, which is of the higher account, with matter of averment which is of inferior account in law". It would be inconvenient that matters in writing is of inferior account in law". It would be inconvenient that matters in writing made by advice and on consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of parties should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory." 23. Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act in fact supplement each other. Section 91 would be frustrated without the aid of Section 92. The two sections however differ in some material particulars, Section 91 applies to all documents, whether they purport to dispose of right or not, whereas Section 92 applies to the documents which can be described as dispositive. Section 91 applies to documents which are both bilateral and unilateral, unlike Section 92 the application of which is confined only to bilateral documents. 24. Section 91 applies to documents which are both bilateral and unilateral, unlike Section 92 the application of which is confined only to bilateral documents. 24. The Apex Court in Bai Hira Devi & Ors Vs Official Assignee of Bombay: AIR 1958 SC 448 (para 5 of the AIR) held that: "5. Section 92 excludes the evidence of oral agreements and it applies to cases where the terms of contracts, grants or other dispositions of property have been proved by the production of the relevant documents themselves under Section 91; in other words, it is after the document has been produced to prove its terms under Section 91 that the provisions of Section 92 come into operation for the purpose of excluding evidence of any oral agreement or statement, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from its terms. The application of this rule is limited to cases as between parties to the instrument or their representatives in interest. There are six provisions to this section with which we are not concerned in the present appeal. It would be noticed that Sections 91 and 92 in effect supplement each other. Section 91 would be frustrated without the aid of Section 92 and Section 92 would be inoperative without the aid of Section 91. Since Section 92 excludes the admission of oral evidence for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from the terms of the document properly proved under S.91, it may be said that it makes the proof of the document conclusive of its contents. Like Section 91, Section 92 also can be said to be based on the best evidence rule. The two sections, however, differ in some material particulars. Section 91 applies to all documents, whether they purport to dispose of rights or not, whereas Section 92 applies to documents which can be described as dispositive. Section 91 applies to documents which are both bilateral and unilateral, unlike Section 92 the application of which is confined only to bilateral documents. Section 91 lays down the rule of universal application and is not confined to the executant or executants of the documents. Section 92, on the other hand applies only between the parties to the instrument or their representatives in interest. Section 91 lays down the rule of universal application and is not confined to the executant or executants of the documents. Section 92, on the other hand applies only between the parties to the instrument or their representatives in interest. There is no doubt that Section 92 does not apply to strangers who are not bound or affected by the terms of the document. Persons other than those who are parties to the document are not precluded from giving extrinsic evidence to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of the document. It is only where a question arises about the effect of representatives in interest that the rule enunciated by Section 92 about the exclusion of oral agreement can be invoked. This position is made absolutely clear by the provisions of Section 99 itself. Section 99 provides that "persons who are not parties to a document or their representatives in interest, may give evidence of any facts tending to show a contemporaneous agreement varying the terms of the document." Though it is only variation which is specifically mentioned in Section 99, there can be no doubt that the third party's right to lead evidence which is recognized by Section 99 would include a right to lead evidence not only to vary the terms of the documents, but to contradict the said terms or to add to or subtract from them. If that be the true position, before considering the effect of the provisions of Section 92 in regard to the appellants' right to lead oral evidence, it would be necessary to examine whether Section 92 applies at all to the present proceedings between the official assignee who is the respondent and the donees from the insolvent who are the appellants before us." 25. This Court, (incidentally T. Nanda-kumar SinghJ) held in Anonda Chandra Saikia Vs. Madhu Ram Saikia: 2008(4) GLT84 (in para 25) that: "25. On conjoint reading of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is the forgone conclusion that Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act are applicable to the present case in hand and also that oral evidence to vary the terms of the document/instrument i.e. registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 is excluded. On conjoint reading of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is the forgone conclusion that Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act are applicable to the present case in hand and also that oral evidence to vary the terms of the document/instrument i.e. registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 is excluded. Over and above Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act is applicable only to the parties to the instrument and not to the stranger to the instrument and also that bar under Section 92 is to oral evidence to disprove the terms of the written contract or/ agreement. In the present case in hand as discussed above, the oral evidence on the part of the appellant/plaintiff is only to disprove the terms of the registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext.3) between the parties on one side of the parties in the sale deed dated 3.4.75 and not to disprove the registered sale deed dated 3.4.75 (Ext.3) itself. Ref: R.Janakiraman Vs State represented by Inspector of Police, CBI, SPE, Madras (2006) 1 SCC 697 . As such, the case of the appellant/plaintiff shall confine to the terms and conditions between one side of the parties in the sale deed dated 3.4.75." 26. For the foregoing reasons, the appellant-plaintiff cannot lead oral evidence to vary the terms and conditions or/contents of the registered Sale Deed dated 10.3.1986 in such a manner that the registered Sale Deed dated 10.03.1986 is a mortgage deed. The appellant-plaintiff, for the foregoing reasons had utterly failed to persuade this court to answer the substantial question of law formulated in this second appeal in his favour. In the result, the appeal is devoid of merit and, accordingly dismissed. _____________