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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 625 (HP)

Raj Kapoor v. Ashu Tosh Mishar

2012-09-25

RAJIV SHARMA

body2012
JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, Judge. This revision petition is directed against the order dated 26.6.2002 passed by the learned Appellate Authority-II, Solan in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 12-S/14 of 1997 partly accepting the appeal and partly modifying the order dated 24.4.1997 passed by the Rent Controller in Rent Petition No. 2/2 of 1991, for setting aside the same and to allow the petition for ejectment in its entirety with costs throughout. 2. Material facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that petitioner filed eviction petition against the respondent under section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. Petitioner claimed himself to be landlord of the premises situated in Ward No.4, Salogra Solan, comprised in Khasra Nos. 1196, 1197 and 1256 which were mortgaged to him by respondent for Rs. 40,000/-, which thereafter were let out to the respondent on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,800/- per month with effect from 10.8.1987 and thereafter Rs. 2,100/- per month with effect from 11.9.1989. Respondent was in arrears of rent of 64,200/-, which was liable to be paid alongwith interest and costs. 3. Respondent No.1 did not contest the petition. Respondent No.2, who is the wife of respondent No.1, filed an application under order 1 rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for being impleaded as respondent in the petition. She was allowed to be impleaded by the Rent Controller. She contested the petition. According to her, petitioner was served with a notice on 8.9.1991 for taking Rs. 40,000/-, the mortgage amount and his attorney was served with the notice on 8.9.1994. A telegram was also sent to them. According to her, respondent was living in the premises as owner and only Rs. 400/- per month as interest was being paid and that was towards rent also. The agreement was stated to be result of collusion between the petitioner and respondent No.1. Respondent No.1 has left the place long back and did not come back to Salogra. 4. Rejoinder was filed by the petitioner. Petitioner denied that the property in question was agricultural land and also denied the receipt of any notice and also challenged the locus standi to discharge or pay the mortgage amount. He has also denied the payment of any amount by respondent No.2 towards rent or interest. Issues were framed by the Rent Controller on 11.8.1993 and 16.11.1994. He dismissed the petition on 24.4.1997. He has also denied the payment of any amount by respondent No.2 towards rent or interest. Issues were framed by the Rent Controller on 11.8.1993 and 16.11.1994. He dismissed the petition on 24.4.1997. Petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority-II, Solan. The Appellate Authority-II partly allowed the appeal and partly dismissed the same on 26.6.2002. Hence, this revision petition against order dated 26.6.2002. 5. Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate has vehemently argued that respondent No.2 could not be impleaded as party. According to him, respondent No.2 could not deposit the mortgage amount. He also argued that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and respondent No.2. According to him, the finding recorded by the Appellate Authority that the mortgage stood redeemed is without jurisdiction. He has also argued that no adverse inference can be drawn against the petitioner for not appearing in the witness box. 6. Mr. Suneet Goel has supported the order passed by the Appellate Authority. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record carefully. 8. Respondent No.1 was the owner of the premises. He had mortgaged the same without possession with the petitioner for Rs. 400/- per month vide Ex.P-3. It was registered on 10.8.1987. According to petitioner, there was a tenancy agreement entered between him and respondent No.1 vide Ex.P-2 whereby the premises were rented out at Rs. 1,800/- per month with effect from 10.8.1987 to 10.8.1989. Ex.P-2 has not been signed by the petitioner. It only bears the signatures of respondent No.1. Petitioner has not examined any witness to prove the execution of Ex. P-2, though it has been signed by as many as three witnesses. 9. PW-1 Susheel Batta has testified that he was the General Attorney of the petitioner. According to him, Raj Kapoor was the owner of the premises and the premises were given on rent to respondent No.1 as per agreement Ex.P-2. According to him, monthly rent was Rs. 1,800/- per month from 10.4.1988 to 10.9.1989. According to him, the tenant has not paid any rent. Thereafter, the rent was enhanced and monthly rent was fixed @ Rs. 2,100/- per month. According to him, the premises were mortgaged by Ashu Tosh and Raj Kapoor was mortgagee. He has proved Ex.P-3. According to him, the mortgage deed was written by Sh. According to him, the tenant has not paid any rent. Thereafter, the rent was enhanced and monthly rent was fixed @ Rs. 2,100/- per month. According to him, the premises were mortgaged by Ashu Tosh and Raj Kapoor was mortgagee. He has proved Ex.P-3. According to him, the mortgage deed was written by Sh. B.R. Sharma, Advocate and the possession was also delivered. Thereafter, rent deed was executed inter se the parties. According to him, premises were not given on rent to respondent No.2. However, in his cross-examination, he has admitted that respondent No.2 is the wife of respondent No.1. He has also admitted that respondent No.2 was residing alongwith children in the premises. 10. RW-1 Sunil Kumar has deposed that the parties are known to him. According to him, the building was constructed in the year 1982 by Ashutosh and his wife. The same was mortgaged in the year 1987 for Rs. 40,000/-. The mortgage was without possession and rent @ Rs. 400/- was settled. The whereabouts of Ashutosh were not known. He has left his wife and children in the year 1988. Rent was paid by Shashi Mishar. He has further deposed that the rent was paid in his presence. According to him, Mrs. Ashutosh and children were residing in the premises. According to him, premises were maintained by Shashi Mishar. 11. RW-2 Prem Chand has deposed that the parties are known to him. The building was constructed by Ashutosh and Ashutosh, his wife and daughters used to reside in the building. According to him, in the year 1987 quarrel took place between Ashutosh and his wife. Thereafter, Ashutosh went to Delhi alongwith some woman and did not come back. According to him, on 10.8.1987, the building in dispute was mortgaged for consideration of Rs. 40,000/-. The mortgage deed was executed in the presence of Susheel Dutta, Raj Kumar and Ashutosh. According to him, rent was settled @ Rs. 400 per month. The rent was paid by Mrs. Ashutosh and Mrs. Ashutosh and her three daughters were residing in the premises. The building was maintained by Mrs. Ashutosh and the same was not vacated by her. The rent deed was written by Sh. B.R. Sharma, Advocate. 12. RW-3 Shashi Mishar has deposed that the premises were constructed by her and her husband in the year 1983. She used to pay Rs. 400/- per month. The building was maintained by Mrs. Ashutosh and the same was not vacated by her. The rent deed was written by Sh. B.R. Sharma, Advocate. 12. RW-3 Shashi Mishar has deposed that the premises were constructed by her and her husband in the year 1983. She used to pay Rs. 400/- per month. She had paid the rent till December, 1992. She has stated that her husband has re-married. According to her, petitioner had not given any rent receipt to her. She has further stated that no rent agreement was executed inter se the parties and only mortgage deed was executed. She has further stated that possession was not delivered at any time to the petitioner. She was re-examined and she has deposed that she has deposited the mortgaged money amounting to Rs. 40,000/- vide treasury challan No. 67 dated 13.9.1994. 13. RW-4 Jagdish has testified that he has brought the civil court deposit register and stated that on 13.9.1994 Rs. 40,000/- was deposited by Smt. Shashi Mishar, vide challan No. 67. 14. In rebuttal PW-2 Hemant Kumar has deposed that he was posted in Municipal Committee, Solan as Tax Bill Clerk. He has brought the tax demand and collection register for the year 1982 and 1996-97. He has further stated that house No. 38 was situated in Ward No.4, which was initially owned by Atamjit and later on transferred in the name of Ashutosh Mishar. 15. Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate has argued that respondent No.2 could not deposit the mortgage money. It is proved from record that respondent No.2 is wife of respondent No.1. The charge was created on the disputed property vide document Ex.P-1/1, i.e., copy of jamabandi for the year 1994 whereby it has been specifically stated that vide rapat rojnamcha No. 553 dated 16.8.1993 charge was created upon the suit property in favour of respondent No.2, qua her maintenance right, till her life time. It is in these circumstances that respondent No.2 has deposited the mortgage amount of Rs. 40,000/- by way of challan No. 67 dated 13.9.1994. This fact has also been proved by the statement of PW-4 Jagdish, Civil Nazir, Court of Senior Sub Judge, Solan. 16. Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 reads as under: “91. It is in these circumstances that respondent No.2 has deposited the mortgage amount of Rs. 40,000/- by way of challan No. 67 dated 13.9.1994. This fact has also been proved by the statement of PW-4 Jagdish, Civil Nazir, Court of Senior Sub Judge, Solan. 16. Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 reads as under: “91. Persons who may sue for redemption.- Besides the mortgagor, any of the following persons may redeem, or institute a suit for redemption of, the mortgaged property, namely:- (a) any person (other than the mortgagee of the interest sougt to be redeemed) who has any interest in, or charge upon, the property mortgaged or in or upon the right to redeem the same; (b) any surety for the payment of the mortgage-debut or any part thereof, or (c) any creditor of the mortgagor who has in a suit for the administration of his estate obtained a decree for sale of the mortgaged property.” 17. The Division Bench of Mysore High Court in Sonnakka and another versus Dembara Munekka and others, AIR 1959 Mysore 39 has held that it is not merely the persons, who have interest in, or charge upon, the right to redeem but also the persons who have interest in or charge upon the property mortgaged are entitled to redeem. The Division Bench has held as under: “(10). In the instant case, one of the co-tenants has mortgaged the property belonging to all of them. Can the other co-tenants redeem the mortgage? If they are entitled to do so, could they redeem the entire mortgage or only their share or shares in the property? It must be remembered that the deceased Venkatamma had mortgaged not merely her share in the property but the entire property. Section 91(a) of the Transfer of Property Act provides that any person (other than the mortgageee of the interest shought to be redeemed) who has any interest in, or charge upon, the property mortgaged or in or upon the right to redeem the same, is entitled to file a suit for redemption. Are the plaintiffs persons having any interest in the property mortgaged as contemplated in S. 91 (a) aforesaid? Are the plaintiffs persons having any interest in the property mortgaged as contemplated in S. 91 (a) aforesaid? Be it noted that it is not merely the persons who have interest in, or charge upon, the right to redeem but also the persons who have interest in or charge upon the property mortgaged are entitled to redeem. See Ganesh Raghunath v. Rajaram Laxman, AIR 1934 Bom 32. (14). It has been uniformly held that even the smallest interest in the mortgaged property is sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to redeem the mortgage. See Mirza Yadalli Beg v. Tukaram, 39 Mad LJ 147: (AIR 1921 PC 125); and Shankar Mahadev v. Bhikaji Ramchandra, AIR 1929 Bom 139. In this case the plaintiffs have a substantial interest in the mortgaged property. Hence their right to redeem cannot be questioned.” 18. Learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court in Idol Murli Manoharji versus Dr. Gopilal Garg and others, AIR 1971 Rajasthan 177 has held that even the smallest interest in mortgaged property is sufficient to entitle a person to redeem mortgage. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “6. After a careful consideration of the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, I have come to the conclusion that Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act gives authority to any person who has any interest in the mortgaged property including that of tan owner to institute a suit for redemption of the mortgaged property. The relevant part of Sec. 91 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under:- “91. Besides, the mortgagor, any of the following persons may redeem, of institute a suit for redemption of, the mortgaged property, namely:- (a) Any person (other than the mortgagee of the interest sought to be redeemed) who has any interest in, or charge upon the property mortgaged or in or upon the right to redeem the same: (b) ……………………… (c) …………………… The words ‘any person who has any interest, in the property mortgaged’ do not refer only to persons having any interest in the mortgaged security “interest in the mortgaged property” is not the same as “interest in the mortgaged security”. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is apparent similarity between Section 91(a0 of the Transfer of Property Act and Order 34, Rule 1, Civil P.C. It must, however, be borne in mind that the latter provision speaks of persons having any interest either in the mortgaged security or in the right of redemption. But Section 91 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act speaks of persons having interest in the mortgaged property (not security) and also of persons having interest in the right to redeem. Thus to my mind there is a fundamental distinction between the two provisions and it would not be proper to interpret Section 91(a) of the Transfer of Property Act in light of the language used in Order XXXIV , Rule 1, Civil P.C. As observed by Hidayatullah J. (at present the Chief Justice of India) in Pawankumar v. Jagdeo, AIR 1947 Nag 210, Order XXXIV, R.1, Civil P.C. is merely procedural and does not create substantive rights, and the matter is to be determined by a true construction of Section 91(a0, Transfer of Property Act. 7. In Mirza Yadalli Beg v. Tukaram, AIR 1921 PC 125, it was held that even the smallest interest in the mortgaged property is sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to redeem the mortgage. The same view was taken in AIR 1959 Mys 39, and I respectfully agree with the view taken in these cases and overrule the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the plaintiff does not fall within the definition of “any person, who has any interest in the property mortgaged” as provided in Section 91(a) of the Act. Consequently, I hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to institute a suit for redemption.” 19. Learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Tara Singh and others versus Kehar Singh and others, P.L.R 1978 (Volume 80)- 195 has held that section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 deals with the persons who have a right to file suit for redemption. Clause (a) of this section provides that besides the mortgagor, any person who has a charge upon the property mortgaged can redeem or institute a suit for redemption of the mortgaged property. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “6.................... I am of the opinion that a charge has been created in favour of the plaintiffs. Clause (a) of this section provides that besides the mortgagor, any person who has a charge upon the property mortgaged can redeem or institute a suit for redemption of the mortgaged property. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “6.................... I am of the opinion that a charge has been created in favour of the plaintiffs. Section 91 of the Act deals with the persons who have a right to file suit for redemption. Clause (a) of this section provides that besides the mortgagor, any person who has a charge upon the property mortgaged, can redeem or institute a suit for redemption of the mortgaged property. From the aforesaid section it is evident that a charge holder can file a suit for redemption of the mortgaged property. In this view I find support from Raj Naraini Panday v. Sant Prasad Tewari and Gaviya and another v. Lingiah. In Raj Narain Panday's case, it was held that occupancy tenants of land were entitled to redeem it from the mortgagees. A Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in Gaviya's case observed that under Section 91(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, any person who has any interest in or charge upon the property mortgaged, may redeem the mortgaged property. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion that the plaintiffs had charge over the property and they had become entitled to redeem it.” 20. This view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tara Singh deceased by L.Rs.) and others versus Kehar Singh and others, AIR 1989 SC 1426 . Their Lordships have held as under: “11. Attractive as the arguments of the appellant's counsel seem to be, they do not really have merit in them. As we have already stated the reversion of the land to the State and the right of the State to redeem the mortgage is beyond dispute in the case. The only question for consideration is whether the redemption should have been sought for by the State itself through its officers or whether the redemption can be sought for by a nominee of the State Government under an order or allotment made in his favour. In this case, in addition to the order of allotment made by the Collector, warrants of possession had also been issued in favour of the respondents. In this case, in addition to the order of allotment made by the Collector, warrants of possession had also been issued in favour of the respondents. By reason of these two orders the respondents had acquired a right under, the doctrine of promissory estoppel to call upon the Government to regularise the allotment of the land to them if for any reason the order of allotment made by the Collector was as defective in any manner. Such being the case, even if no registered deed of coveyance or agreement of sale had been executed by the Government, the respondents had become entitled in law to claim title to the land and seek delivery of possession of the allotted land to them and to ask for a charge, in the absence of delivery of possession over the property for the money deposited by them under the allotment order. Viewed from this angle, there is no room whatever for any contention that the respondents would not constitute the buyers of the land and are, therefore, not entitled to claim a charge over the allotted land under S. 55(6)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act. Though the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable to the State of Punjab the principle enunciated in S. 55(6)(b) has been held applicable to Punjab on grounds of justice, equity and good conscience (vide Shankri v. Milkha Singh, AIR 1941 Lahore 407 (FB)). The logical consequence would then be that as charge-holders the respondents would be entitled under S. 91 of the Transfer of Property Act to seek the redemption of the mortgage.” 21. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Narain Pandey and others versus Sant Prasad Tewari and others, (1973) 2 SCC 35 have held that suit for redemption filed by those in whom occupancy rights of the same land subsequently vested is maintainable in view of section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Their Lordships have held as under: “11. In the light of the above mentioned Full Bench decisions, it cannot, be disputed that the status of the defendant-appellants was analogous to that of mortgagees. It also cannot be disputed that the successor of the original mortgagor would be entitled to recover possession of the mortgaged land from the defendant-appellants on payment of the mortgage money. Mr. In the light of the above mentioned Full Bench decisions, it cannot, be disputed that the status of the defendant-appellants was analogous to that of mortgagees. It also cannot be disputed that the successor of the original mortgagor would be entitled to recover possession of the mortgaged land from the defendant-appellants on payment of the mortgage money. Mr. Agarwal, however, submits that plaintiff-respondents 1 to 6 are not the successors of Laclihman Singh plaintiff No. 7. It is urged that after the surrender of the occupancy rights by Lachhman Singh, the plaintiff-respondents cannot ask for redemption of the mortgage created by Lachhman Singh. This contention, in our opinion, is not well founded. The copy of the compromise decree dated January 4, 1946/February 2, 1945 has been placed on record, and it would appear therefrom that in a suit brought: by the plaintiff-respondents 1 to 6 against the landlords and Lachhman Singh (who was described in that suit as Lachhman Rai), the plaintiffs 1 to 6 were accepted to be occupancy tenants of the land in dispute. The effect of that decree was that while the occupancy, rights of Lachhman Singh came to an end, those of plaintiff-respondents 1 to 6 came into existence at the same time. As plaintiff-respondents 1 to 6 became the occupancy tenants of the land in dispute, they were, in our opinion, entitled to redeem the land from the mortgagees. The material on record also indicates that plaintiff-respondents 1 to 6 have been declared to be the Bhumidars of the land in dispute. Sanad dated October 5, 1949 declaring them to be Bhumidars of the land was issued on October 5, 1949. As plaintiff respondents 1 to 6 were the occupancy tenants of the land in dispute and as they were declared to be Bhumidars, they had, in our opinion, sufficient interest in the land as clothed them with the right to redeem it from the mortgagees. Clause (a) of section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act provides, inter alia, that any person (other than the mortgagee of the interest sought to be redeemed) who has any interest in, or charge upon the property mortgaged or in or upon the right to redeem the same, may institute a suit for redemption of the mortgaged property. Clause (a) of section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act provides, inter alia, that any person (other than the mortgagee of the interest sought to be redeemed) who has any interest in, or charge upon the property mortgaged or in or upon the right to redeem the same, may institute a suit for redemption of the mortgaged property. The case of the plaintiffs, who were the occupancy tenants and Bhumidars of the land in dispute, is clearly covered by clause (a) of section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act. The fact that the present suit has been filed not by the occupancy tenant who mortgaged the property but by others in whom the occupancy rights were subsequently vested would, in our opinion, make no difference and would be no bar to the maintainability of the suit. It is significant in this context to observe that plaintiffs 1 to 6 became the occupancy tenants of the same land of which Lachhman Singh’s father was the occupancy tenant at the time of the mortgage.” 22. According to Mr. Bhupender Gupta there was no relationship of the landlord and tenant between the petitioner and respondent No.2. It has come in the statement of respondent No.2 that she used to pay rent of Rs. 400/- per month to the petitioner as rent. The petitioner has not led any evidence to rebut the statement of respondent No.2. RW-1 Sunil Kumar has also deposed that respondent No.2 used to pay Rs. 400/-per month as rent to the petitioner. Statement of RW-1 Sunil Kumar has remained unrebutted. RW-2 Prem Chand has also corroborated the statement of RW-1. According to him, respondent No.2 was paying rent @ Rs. 400/- per month to the petitioner. This statement also remained unrebutted. 23. As far as writing of agreement Ex.P-2 is concerned, as noticed above, the same was not proved by the petitioner. It is signed only by respondent No.1. The scribe of Ex.P-2 has not been examined. Ex.P-2 was not original rent agreement. It was only photostat copy. Ex.P-2 was required to be signed by the petitioner as well. Respondent No.2 has not admitted the execution of Ex.P-2. It has also not been registered. It has come on record that respondent No.2 is in possession of the premises alongwith her daughters. Petitioner has not led any evidence to prove that he was in physical possession of the premises. Ex.P-2 was required to be signed by the petitioner as well. Respondent No.2 has not admitted the execution of Ex.P-2. It has also not been registered. It has come on record that respondent No.2 is in possession of the premises alongwith her daughters. Petitioner has not led any evidence to prove that he was in physical possession of the premises. RW-2 and RW-3 have categorically stated that respondent No.2 was in possession of the suit premises. The appellate authority has rightly come to the conclusion that Ex.P-2 was not admissible in evidence. 24. Accordingly, in view of the observations and discussions made hereinabove, there is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.