Judgment :- S.A.No.1906 of 2004: 1. This appeal is directed against the common judgment passed by the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.270 of 2002 dated 21.11.2003 in allowing the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court made in a common judgment in O.S.No.4078 of 1994 in decreeing the suit. The appellant in this appeal was the plaintiff in O.S.No.4078 of 1994 and the respondent in A.S.No.270 of 2002. The respondent in this appeal was the defendant in O.S.No.4078 of 1994 and was the appellant in A.S.No.270 of 2002. 2. The case in brief of the plaintiff before the trial Court in O.S.No.4078 of 1994 would be as follows: The suit property belonged to the defendant . The plaintiff became the tenant of the suit property by agreeing a sum of Rs.100/- per month towards monthly rent after paying an advance of Rs.1000/- to one Ramaiah. The plaintiff has also paid a sum of Rs.10,000/-as advance to the defendant to which, the defendant did not pass any receipt. The plaintiff had invested a sum of Rs.50,000/- in the tenant premises. However, the defendant wanted to evict the plaintiff immediately. When the plaintiff approached the police, they advised him to approach Civil Court for his remedy and therefore, he has filed a suit for permanent injunction against the defendant. 3. The case of the defendant would be as follows: The defendant was conducting a hotel in the name and style of ‘Lakshmi Sagar’ in the suit property and he became the owner of the building and when he attempted to put up construction in the month of June 1994, the plaintiff with the help of his brothers had encroached the suit property. The defendant was assaulted by the plaintiff and his brothers and therefore, the defendant gave a complaint to the police. The plaintiff is attempting to get permanent injunction in order to prolong his unlawful occupation. The plaintiff is a trespasser. The plaintiff was not inducted as a tenant in the suit property by the defendant. There was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, he would request the Court to dismiss the suit. 4. The plaintiff is attempting to get permanent injunction in order to prolong his unlawful occupation. The plaintiff is a trespasser. The plaintiff was not inducted as a tenant in the suit property by the defendant. There was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, he would request the Court to dismiss the suit. 4. S.A.No.1907 of 2004 This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.271 of 2002 dated 21.11.2003 in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court made in O.S.No.8088 of 1994 dated 28.9.2001 in a suit for recovery of possession. The appellant herein was the defendant in the suit and the respondent in the First Appellate Court. The respondent was the plaintiff before the trial Court and the appellant in the First Appellate Court. 5. The case of the plaintiff before the trial Court would be as follows: The plaintiff is the owner of the suit property. The plaintiff took the hotel from one Raman and was conducted the hotel business in the name and style ‘Vasantha Bhavan’ and thereafter, he purchased the said property in the year 1996 only after the defendant had vacated and handed over possession to the plaintiff. Thereafter the plaintiff was conducting the hotel ‘LakshmiSagar’ and at that time, the defendant requested him to permit to put his bunk stall in the said places and the plaintiff had denied the request since it was required by him. However, when the development in the construction were offing during 5.6.1994, the defendant had unlawfully entered into the property and occupied the premises. The construction work was not completed at that time and the defendant had put up certain wooden holdings in the place where he encroached. The defendant was not a tenant under the plaintiff. He is only a stranger. In the plaint sketch, the red washed portion shown is in unlawful occupation of the defendant since, the defendant is in unlawful occupation as a trespasser, he is liable to pay damages for use and occupation. The plaintiff gave a complaint to the Assistant Commissioner, Adyar, against the defendant and no action was taken against the defendant. In the plaint sketch, the red washed portion shown is in unlawful occupation of the defendant since, the defendant is in unlawful occupation as a trespasser, he is liable to pay damages for use and occupation. The plaintiff gave a complaint to the Assistant Commissioner, Adyar, against the defendant and no action was taken against the defendant. Therefore, the suit has been filed before this Court for recovery of possession of the suit property from the defendant and also for damages for use and occupation at Rs.50/- per day from 5.6.1994 onwards. Therefore, the suit may be decreed against the defendant with an order of eviction. 6. The case of the defendant raised in the written statement would be as follows: The plaintiff has suppressed the relationship of landlord and tenant in between the parties. The reason would be to avoid the rent control proceedings. The father of the defendant was in a portion of the property in Door No.123, Kamaraj Avenue, Second Street, Adyar, Chennai-20 and was conducting a shop in the name and style of ‘Vani News Mart’ from 1974 onwards on a monthly of Rs.100/- and a sum of Rs.1000/- was paid as advance to the previous owner of the property namely Lakshmi Natarajan through one Ramaiah since he was in full in charge of the conduct of the hotel business in the name of ‘ Karpaga Vilas’ in the premises. The said then landlord, Lakshmi Natarajan was not having the habit of issuing the receipt for the payment of rent. Thereafter, the plaintiff became the sub-tenant in the place of Ramaiah and was conducting a hotel in the name of ‘Vasantha Bhavan’. The father of the defendant accepted the defendant as landlord and paid an advance of Rs.10,000/- to the plaintiff and after the demise of his father , the defendant enhanced the rent from Rs.100/- to Rs.250/- and was paying the rent to the landlord, to which, the plaintiff was not having the habit of issuing receipt. Since the plaintiff did not accept the rent payable to the premises, he sent the rent through money order and it was also refused by him. The defendant had removed the wooden planks on the eastern and western sides and put up two walls. Since the plaintiff did not accept the rent payable to the premises, he sent the rent through money order and it was also refused by him. The defendant had removed the wooden planks on the eastern and western sides and put up two walls. Therefore, the plaintiff sent an advocate notice stating that the defendant had encroached the suit property since the plaintiff threatened the defendant with the help of rowdy elements, he had filed a suit in O.S.No.4078 of 1994. Since the defendant is a tenant, he cannot be evicted without undergoing the legal procedures. Therefore, the suit may be dismissed. 7. The trial Court, namely, the VII Assistant City Civil Judge, Chennai had clubbed both the suits in O.S.No.4078 of 1994 and O.S.No.8088 of 1994 and entered trial. The common evidence was recorded in O.S.No.8088 of 1994 and common judgment was rendered by the trial Court. The trial Court had thus dismissed the suit in O.S.No.8088 of 1994 and consequently decreed the suit in O.S.No.4078 of 1994 on 28.9.2001. 8. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in both the suits, the plaintiff in O.S.No.8088 of 1994 / the defendant in O.S.No.4078 of 1994 preferred appeals before the First Appellate Court in A.S.Nos.270 and 271 of 2002 respectively. The First Appellate Court had clubbed both the appeals and heard arguments in common and pronounced a common judgment on 21.11.2003 and thereby allowed both the appeals. Consequently, the suit in O.S.No.8088 of 1994 was decreed and two months time was granted for handing over of possession of the suit property by the defendant to the plaintiff and the suit in O.S.No.4078 of 1994 was dismissed. 9. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court in A.S.Nos. 270 and 271 of 2002, the defendant in O.S.No.8088/94 and plaintiff in O.S.No.4078 of 1994 has preferred the present second appeals in S.A.No. 1907 of 2004 and S.A.No.1906 of 2004 respectively. 10. While admitting both the appeals, this Court has formulated the following substantial questions of law for consideration in both the appeals. "1.) Whether the tenant in occupation of the suit property under the erstwhile owner can be treated as trespasser by the subsequent purchaser without attornment of tenancy? 10. While admitting both the appeals, this Court has formulated the following substantial questions of law for consideration in both the appeals. "1.) Whether the tenant in occupation of the suit property under the erstwhile owner can be treated as trespasser by the subsequent purchaser without attornment of tenancy? 2.) Whether the tenant in occupation of the suit property under the erstwhile owner should prove the existence of tenancy when defendant himself had taken a plea as if the tenant vacated and then forcefully occupied the same property and hence trespasser liable to pay damages? 3.) While a building consisting of ground and first floorl is sold to five different persons whether the claim of absolute right by the defendant over a particular piece of land before partition is sustainable in law? 4.) When the defendant failed to prove his pea of forceful occupation of suit property, trespass, etc., against the plaintiff, the finding of the lower appellate court that "the plaintiff failed to prove his tenancy and hence trespasser " is sustainable in law? 5.) Whether the plaintiff is a tenant holding over in view of his pre-existing tenancy right? 6.) When the lower appellate court gave a finding as if the defendant failed to prove the quantum of damages @ Rs.50/-per day, whether the permission directing the defendant to take separate action for finding the quantum of damages under Order 20 Rule 12 of CPC is sustainable in law?" 11. Heard, Mr.J.Kalidass, learned counsel representing for Mr.S.Jayanathan, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff in O.S.No.4078 of 1994 and defendant in O.S.No.8088 of 1994 and Mr.D.Durairajan, learned counsel for the respondent in O.S.No.4078 of 1994 and plaintiff in O.S.No.8088 of 1994. 12. For convenience, the ranking of the parties before the trial Court in O.S.No.8088 of 1994 is maintained in these appeals. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant in O.S.No. 8088 of 1994 would submit in his argument that the first appellate Court erred in reversing the judgment of the trial Court which was based on the evidence. He would also submit that the lower appellate Court had held that the plaintiff was a tenant in respect of the suit property but found the plaintiff as a trespasser and fixed the damage for use and occupation, which would not arise. He would also submit that the lower appellate Court had held that the plaintiff was a tenant in respect of the suit property but found the plaintiff as a trespasser and fixed the damage for use and occupation, which would not arise. He would also submit that the previous owner namely Lakshmi Natarajan sold the building in different portions with undivided interest on land entitling them to commonly enjoy all the amenities such as staircase, balcony, rear side passage and the suit shop being situated in the passage and the rear side, the plaintiff alone can not maintain the suit. He would also submit that the defendant was a tenant, through Raman, with one Lakshmi Natarajan and when the same has been established automatically the plaintiff who was the purchaser from the said Lakshmi Natarajan has to attorn tenancy in favour of the defendant and the failure on the part of the plaintiff would not disqualify the defendant from the status of the tenant. He would further submit that the defendant would be a tenant by sufferance till the plaintiff accepts the tenancy and on accepting the rent by the plaintiff, he would be a tenant by holding over and he cannot at any circumstance, be termed as a trespasser. He would further submit that the rent control proceedings filed by the defendant before the Rent Controller was dismissed for default and it was not decided on merits by holding that the defendant was not a tenant under the plaintiff. He would further submit that the First Appellate Court had perceived a wrong notion that the Rent Controller had decided that the defendant was not a tenant but a trespasser, and it cannot be a correct one. He would further submit that the case of the plaintiff that the defendant suddenly trespassed into the shop was not proved by production of any complaint given to the police. He would also submit that the suit filed by the defendant for injunction in O.S.No.4078 of 1994 was sufficiently prior to the alleged encroachment on 5.6.1994 and therefore, the theory of encroachment was found for the purpose of the case. He would also submit that the suit filed by the defendant for injunction in O.S.No.4078 of 1994 was sufficiently prior to the alleged encroachment on 5.6.1994 and therefore, the theory of encroachment was found for the purpose of the case. He would further submit that the alleged vacating of the premises by the defendant and handing over of possession to Raman could be established only through the examination of the said Raman as one of the witnesses on the side of the plaintiff and in the absence of such proof of handing over of possession, the subsequent sudden occupation of the property, on 5.6.1994 could not be established, and therefore, the defendant would be considered in possession and enjoyment of the suit property only as a tenant of the previous owner. He would further submit in his argument that the property is located in a common passage and the said portion was owned by several owners and therefore, the plaintiff alone was not a person to file a suit against the defendant. He would further submit that the plaintiff ought to have received the rent when it was tendered by the defendant and similarly, he would have accepted the rent sent by him through money order and the refusal of the plaintiff, would not in any way disentitle the defendant’s right of tenancy continued from the previous owner in respect of the suit property. He would further submit that the finding of the First Appellate Court that the defendant was a trespasser is not based upon the evidence, when especially, the previous licensee Raman under the said Lakshmi Natarajan was not at all examined by the plaintiff. He would also submit that the existence of tenancy would continue even after the transfer of the said building in favour of the plaintiff and the defendant cannot be termed as a trespasser but he continued to be a tenant by sufferance and the remedy available to the plaintiff would be only under Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. He would also submit that the finding of the First Appellate Court that he was a trespasser was not sustainable and therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court have to be interfered and set aside and the judgments and decrees passed by the trial Court have to be restored. 14. He would also submit that the finding of the First Appellate Court that he was a trespasser was not sustainable and therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court have to be interfered and set aside and the judgments and decrees passed by the trial Court have to be restored. 14. The learned counsel for the respondent / plaintiff in O.S.No.8088 of 1994 would submit in his argument that the defendant was not a tenant in respect of the suit schedule shop and if really he was a tenant under the plaintiff, he would have continued to send the rent through the money order and since the plaintiff refused the same, he had deposited in his account in any one of the banks to show his bonafide. He would also submit that the dismissal of R.C.O.P. seeking for a prayer to deposit the rent filed by the defendant would go to show that he was not a tenant under the plaintiff and the said dismissal order was not taken to appeal and therefore it would be binding upon the defendant. He would further submit in his argument that the defendant did not examine the previous owner to show that he was a tenant under him or atleast he could have examined the previous licensee viz., Raman in order to prove that he has paid the rent regularly to the owner Lakshmi Natarajan. He would further submit in his argument that the defendant did not produce any document to show that he was continuing as a tenant in the suit shop and in the absence of such proof, he would be termed only as a trespasser. He would also submit that the First Appellate Court has correctly come to the conclusion that there was no landlord and tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and it was confirmed by the dismissal of the deposit petition by the Rent Controller. He would also submit that the First Appellate Court has correctly come to the conclusion that there was no landlord and tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and it was confirmed by the dismissal of the deposit petition by the Rent Controller. He would also submit that the lower Appellate Court had correctly interfered with the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in both the suits and the reasons putforth by the First Appellate Court for reversing the judgments and decrees are perfectly alright and there is no reason submitted to interfere with the judgments and decrees passed by the First Appellate Court and therefore, the present appeals filed by the defendant against the First Appellate Court’s decision may be dismissed. 15. I have given anxious thoughts to the arguments advanced on either side. 16. The suit in O.S.No.4078 of 1994 was filed by the appellant seeking for permanent injunction against the respondent in any way resorting to unlawful methods for the eviction of the appellant from the suit premises namely, the bunk shop, except under due process of law. The suit in O.S.No.8088 of 1994 was filed by the respondent seeking for the following reliefs: "a) directing the defendant to quit and deliver vacant possession of the shop in his occupation in extent 75 sq.ft. In the ground floor of the suit premises bearing door No.123, Kamaraj Avenue, Adyar, madras-20 which is mentioned in the Schedule hereunder and marked 'RED' in the plan annexed hereto; b) directing the defendant to pay damages at the rate of Rs.50 per day from 5.6.1994 till the defendant vacates and hands over vacant possession of the shop occupied by him, which is mentioned in the schedule hereunder; c) directing the defendants to pay the cost of the suit; d) granting such further or other orders as this Honourable court may deem fit under the circumstances of the case. 17. According to the pleadings put forth by the plaintiff in O.S.No.8088 of1994 that the defendant in the said suit was in a permissive occupation in the suit property with the erstwhile occupier namely Raman and he had handed over possession to the said Raman and thereafter, he purchased the said business of Raman and conducted hotel business as 'Lakshmi Sagar' in the said place. The further case of the plaintiff would be that the defendant had suddenly and unlawfully encroached the suit premises on 5.6.1994 and put up a bunk stall in the said property without the permission of the plaintiff. The stand of the plaintiff is that the defendant was in occupation of the said premises as a trespasser. 18. The rival contentions of the plaintiff and the defendant in the respective suits have been considered by the trial Court and the trial Court had come to the conclusion that the defendant was continuing as a tenant on the basis of the alleged admission of the plaintiff in the plaint filed in O.S.No.8088 of 1994 and in support of the document that the defendant had approached the Rent Controller for the deposit of the rents payable to the said premises and therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff in O.S.No.8088 of 1994 was dismissed and the suit filed by the defendant in O.S.No.4078 of 1994 was decreed. However, in the appeal, it has been reversed by the First Appellate Court on finding that the defendant was a trespasser and therefore, the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession from the defendant and the defendant was not entitled to any injunction from interfering with his possession, except under due process of law. 19. On a careful perusal of the plaint filed by the plaintiff in O.S.No.8088 of 1994, it is seen that there was no admission given by the plaintiff as to the relationship of landlord and tenant in between the plaintiff and the defendant or regarding the payment of rent by the defendant to the plaintiff. The trial Court had erroneously come to the conclusion on the basis of the alleged admission in the plaint filed in O.S.No.8088 of 1994. It had also drawn the support from RCOP proceedings filed under section 8 of the said Act for deposit of rent into Court. It has categorically discussed that the money orders were sent to the plaintiff and they were returned by the plaintiff and therefore, there was a jural relationship of landlord and tenant in between the parties. However, the First Appellate Court had rejected the plea of the defendant that the filing of the rent control proceedings under Section 8 of the said Act to deposit the rent itself will not confer any relationship of landlord and tenant in between the parties. However, the First Appellate Court had rejected the plea of the defendant that the filing of the rent control proceedings under Section 8 of the said Act to deposit the rent itself will not confer any relationship of landlord and tenant in between the parties. It had also found that the said RCOP proceedings for depositing the rent was also dismissed for default and no further action was taken by the defendant to pursue the same. No document was produced to evidence the filing of RCOP proceedings. However, I could see that the defendant is found to be in possession of the suit property namely, the bunk stall, in the property belonging to the plaintiff. Whether his possession in respect of the bunk stall is amounting to a trespasser or a tenant was the question before the first appellate Court. The admitted case of the plaintiff was that the defendant was in a permissive occupation to conduct the bunk stall, while the said Raman, the previous occupier of the premises, was conducting the hotel business in the name and style of 'Karpaga Vilas Hotel', and he was granted with the said license and thereafter, the said bunk stall was taken away and the property was surrendered to the said Raman. However, it has been denied by the defendant and asserted that he had not handed over the possession of the property either to Raman or to the plaintiff. 20. It is no doubt true that the business of Raman was purchased by the plaintiff and the hotel business was conducted in the name of 'Lakshnmi Sagar' for some time and thereafter, the plaintiff himself had purchased the property from its owners. The defendant had applied for the deposit of rent before the Rent Controller on the foot that the plaintiff was the landlord. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that the plaintiff was not the owner of the property, in which, the plaintiff is in possession of the property. In the said circumstances, what would be the status of the defendant is the question. No doubt, it is true that the plaintiff had pleaded that he was a tenant under Raman. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that the plaintiff was not the owner of the property, in which, the plaintiff is in possession of the property. In the said circumstances, what would be the status of the defendant is the question. No doubt, it is true that the plaintiff had pleaded that he was a tenant under Raman. The said Raman was not examined on the side of the defendant in order to prove that he was continuing as a tenant with Raman and after the purchase of the hotel business by the plaintiff, the defendant was continuing as tenant with the plaintiff. In the said circumstances, whether the attempt to deposit the rent before the learned Rent Controller would be amounting to show the existence or attornment of tenancy. 21. As far as the present case is concerned, the money order sent by the defendant to the plaintiff was not accepted and therefore, the defendant has resorted to deposit the rent as per the procedures contemplated under section 8 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Therefore, there was is no acceptance of the rent on the part of the plaintiff. The document showing the filing of Rent Control proceedings was not filed before the court. Even otherwise, if tenancy is supposed to have accrued in favour of the defendant with Raman, would it create a tenancy with the plaintiff. 22. In the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in AIR 1973 SC 508 (Badrilal v. Indore Municipality) , the Honourable Apex Court has held as follows: "8.) .... The act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not create a tenancy of any kind. If a tenant remains in possession after the determination of the lease, the common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance. A distinction should be drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the determination of the term with the consent of the landlord and a tenant doing so without his consent. The former (sic) (latter?) is a tenant at sufferance in English law and the latter (sic) (former?) a tenant holding over or a tenant at Will. 9.) The appellant being merely a tenant by sufferance there is no need for any notice before he could be evicted. The former (sic) (latter?) is a tenant at sufferance in English law and the latter (sic) (former?) a tenant holding over or a tenant at Will. 9.) The appellant being merely a tenant by sufferance there is no need for any notice before he could be evicted. Thus the judgment of the High court is correct, in so far as it held the appellant was liable to be evicted." As per the aforesaid judgment, if the landlord has refused to receive the rent, the position of the tenant would be a tenant by sufferance and his status will be that of tenant by holding over when the landlord had received the rent. In other words, a fresh tenancy has commenced between the parties in the name of tenant by holding over. As far as the present case is concerned, the plaintiff did not receive the rent from the defendant so as to give a status of tenant by holding over. Even otherwise, the tenancy is said to have been proved by the defendant, the status of the defendant would be tenant by sufferance. 23. Similarly, in yet another judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in 2006(1) SCC 228 (C.Albert Morris v. K.Chandrasekaran) it has been held that the continuous occupation of the demised premises after the expiry of the lease without the rent being received by the landord would not create a tenancy and give the status of tenancy or a right to be in possession. It is laid down in paragraph 26 of the aforesaid judgment as follows: Much argument was advanced on the receipt of the rent by the landlord after the cancellation of the lease. The consensus of judicial opinion in this country is that a mere continuance in occupation of the demised premises after the expiry of the lease, notwithstanding the receipt of an amount by the quondam landord, would not create a tenancy so as to confer on the erstwhile tenant the status of tenant or a right to be in possession in this context, we may refer to the judgment of this court in Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property. In para 13 of the said judgment, this Curt held as under: 13.) in view of the aforesaid settled legal position, it must be held that on the expiry of the period of lease, the erstwhile lessee continues in possession because of the law of the land, namely, that the original landlord cannot physically throw out such an erstwhile tenant by force. He must get his claim for possession adjudicated by a competent court as per the relevant provisions of law. The status of an erstwhile tenant has to be treated as a tenant at sufferance akin to a trespasser having no independent right to continue in possession." In the said judgment, it has been categorically settled the dictum that the status of tenant by sufferance is equivalent to that of the trespasser. 24. However, I could see that the plaint averments would only show that the defendant was in permissive possession under the previous owner Mr.Raman and therefore, his possession would not become that of a tenant under the present owner the plaintiff, unless an express or tacit tenancy is created. In this case, the finding of the trial Court that, there was an admission by the plaintiff regarding the status of the defendant was found to be incorrect and the defendant also did not elect to examine the previous owner namely Raman under whom he had come to the possession of the property, to prove his status as a tenant. In the said circumstances, it cannot be decided that the defendant was tenant under Raman and subsequently under the plaintiff. The defendant did not adduce any evidence to prove his status as to tenant under the plaintiff. The mere referring of the Rent Control proceedings under section 8 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act which was not pursued later cannot give the defendant the status of tenant. It is also an admitted fact that the defendant did not pay any rent or offer any money in the form of rent to the plaintiff towards his occupation. Therefore, the defendant cannot be considered even as a tenant by sufferance but only his possession could be termed as a trespasser. 25. The judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in AIR 1996 SC 129 (V.Krishna Mudaliar Vs. Therefore, the defendant cannot be considered even as a tenant by sufferance but only his possession could be termed as a trespasser. 25. The judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in AIR 1996 SC 129 (V.Krishna Mudaliar Vs. Lakshmi Ammal) is not applicable to the present facts of the case since the defendant was not found to be a tenant. The Judgment cited by the learned counsel for the defendant reported in AIR 1996 SC 129 (V.Krishna Mudaliar Vs. Lakshmi Ammal) and the Judgment reported in AIR 1991 SC 1094 (East India Corporation Ltd. V. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.) and 1992 (1) MLJ 8 (Natesan Pillai vs. Sethumani Ammal) are also not applicable to the present facts of the case, for the same reason. 26. The judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in 2009 (15) SCC 693 (Biswanath Agarwalla v. Sabitri Bera) would lay down the principle which are as follows: "17.) The landlord in a given case although may not be able to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant, but in the event he proves his general, title, may obtain a decree on the basis thereof. But in a case of this nature, a defendant was entitled to raise a contention that he had acquired an indefeasible title by adverse possession. In Radha Devi v. Ajay Kumar Sinha, the Patna High Court accepted that the landlord is entitled to obtain a decree of eviction on the basis of his general title, though he could not prove the relationship of landlord and tenant. It was opined : "9.) .... In other words, where there is relationship of landlord and tenant, order of eviction be passed on the existence of any one of the grounds mentioned in section 11 of the said Act. It is, therefore, clear that proof of relationship of landlord and tenant gives right to a landlord to get an order of eviction under the provisions of the aforesaid Act." In the said judgment of the Honourable Apex Court, it has been categorically found that when the relationship of landlord and tenant has not been established by the landlord or any person who is relying upon the said relationship, the ejectment can be passed against the said person on proving the general title of the landlord. 27. 27. The First Appellate Court had categorically come to the conclusion that the defendant did not establish the relationship of landlord and tenant with the plaintiff and therefore, he cannot maintain the suit filed by him for grant of permanent injunction as sought for by him except under due process of law. The First Appellate Court, having found that the defendant was not a tenant nor a tenant by sufferance but only a trespasser, had also decreed the suit against the defendant for recovery of possession. The said judgments and decrees passed by the First Appellate Court in reversing the judgments and decrees passed by the trial Court are sound and in terms of the principles of law as laid down by the Honourable Apex Court. Therefore, I have no hesitation to uphold the finding of facts by the First Appellate Court and therefore, the judgments and decrees passed by the First Appellate Court are liable to be confirmed. 28. For the foregoing discussions, I am of the considered view that the judgments and decrees passed by the trial court were not in accordance with law and therefore, the reversal judgment and decrees passed by the First Appellate Court in setting aside them are not liable to be interfered. Accordingly, both the second appeals are dismissed, confirming the judgments and decrees passed by the First Appellate Court with costs. Consequently, C.M.P.No.15335 of 2004 is closed. 29. Time for vacating the premises by the defendant in O.S.No.8088 of 1994 is one month from this date.