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2012 DIGILAW 64 (CHH)

DHRUV KUMAR DUBEY v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

2012-02-21

MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA

body2012
JUDGMENT:- Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, J [1] By this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"), the petitioner has prayed for quashing of Criminal Case No. 2003/06, pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur, on the allegation of violation of petitioner's fundamental right to speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The factual premises and circumstances on which the petitioner has approached this Court to invoke power under Section 482 of the Code, as gleaned from the petition and documents are that during the period when the petitioner was working on the post of Assistant Grade-Ill in the Public Works Department (in short "PWD") at Bilaspur, it was alleged that in the year 1993, PWD ordered for supply of 1339.6 M.T. of bitumen with Indian Oil Corporation, Terminal Vishakhapattnam. The supplies are alleged to have been made between the period from 1993 to 1996. In the year 1997, Executive Engineer, after receiving certain complaint, conducted a raid and upon inquiry, it was discovered that only 681.11 M.T. was received in the stores and without there being actual supply of remaining 658.43 M.T. of bitumen, payment for the entire supply was made to the Indian Oil Corporation by the PWD. FIR was, therefore, registered under Crime No. 36/97 by State Economic Offences Investigation Bureau. Bhopal alleging commission of offences under Sections 468, 471, 409, 120B and 420 of the IPC against the petitioner and other accused. The investigation continued for almost 9 years until a charge sheet was submitted before the Magistrate on 12-10-2006. The summary of charges as contained in the charge sheet has been placed on record as Annexure A-2. On 23-7-2010, charges under Sections 407, 120B, 420 and 471 of the IPC were framed against the petitioner and other accused and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, thereafter, fixed the case for evidence of the prosecution on days subsequent thereto. [2] The petitioner has now filed this petition seeking termination of criminal proceedings against him on the sole ground of delay in trial. [3] Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously argued that in the matter of the allegation leading to registration of FIR on 7-7-1997, under Crime No. 36/97, the investigating agency prolonged investigation for almost 9 years when charge sheet was filed in the year 2006. [3] Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously argued that in the matter of the allegation leading to registration of FIR on 7-7-1997, under Crime No. 36/97, the investigating agency prolonged investigation for almost 9 years when charge sheet was filed in the year 2006. He submits that the petitioner had earlier filed Writ Petition (Cr.) No. 2325/09 seeking appropriate direction for early conclusion of the criminal case, which was disposed of vide order dated 5-5-2009, directing the trial Court to expedite the trial and conclude the same preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt of copy of the order. In spite of direction issued by this Court, the matter is being adjourned on one or the other pretext, without being any fault on the pan of the petitioner and the petitioner is not responsible for delay which is being caused in conclusion of trial against him for alleged offences. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is facing criminal prosecution for the past 14 years since the date of lodging of FIR and the snail's pace at which the trial is going on, wherein, prosecution has cited 62 Witnesses, there is no likelihood of early disposal of trial, notwithstanding category direction of the Court. It is then urged that be-cause of pendency of a criminal case against the petitioner since 1997, the petitioner, apart from facing agony of being branded as an accused, lost promotional avenues in service and even after his retirement on 30th June 2009, retrial benefits like gratuity, leave encashment etc. have not been finalized and the family pension has also been confined only to the extent of 50%. The petitioner and his family is facing serious financial crunch. The substance of the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, is that unduly long delay in conclusion of the criminal case against the petitioner has utterly violated petitioner's fundamental right to speedy trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India and in these extraordinary situation and circumstances of delay of almost 11/2 decades, the criminal proceedings are liable to be terminated and petitioner set free from all the charges. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the cases of Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the cases of Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. v. R.S. Nayak and another, 1992 1 SCC 225 , Mahendra Lal Das v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2001 AIR(SC) 2989P. Ramchandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, 2002 AIR(SC) 1856, Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2008 AIR(SC) 3077and Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, 2009 AIR(SC) 1822. [4] On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has opposed the prayer of the petitioner. It has been submitted that the delay in conclusion of trial is for various reasons attributable to systemic delay. He submitted that the allegation against the petitioner and other accused are serious, wherein approximately Rs. 46,00,000/- public money has been embezzled by showing false receipt of 658.43 M.T. of bitumen, which was never received, but yet payments released. He further submits that the case of the prosecution shows that number of receipts of supply of huge quantity of bitumen were prepared by the applicant, which, upon investigation have been found to be false and huge loss to public exchequer caused by the criminal act of the petitioner. Therefore, looking to the magnitude and gravity of allegation against the petitioner and other accused, the petitioner is not entitled to prayer made in the petition only on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial. Learned counsel for the State further argued that after the charge sheet was filed in the year 2006, the delay in framing of charges is mainly because of non-appearance of all the accused and various orders passed by the trial Court from time to time, placed on record by the petitioner himself, shows that the accused in the case are mainly responsible for delay in framing of charges. He further submits that the delay in examination of prosecution witnesses is because of the reason that even though summons have been issued by the Court time and again, some of the witnesses are not served leading to issuance of fresh summons and at times, when prosecution witnesses remained present, for one reason or the other, the case has been adjourned for reasons stated in various orders, which included suspension of proceedings due to death of lawyer, non-production of records. He submits that two prosecution witnesses have so far been examined. He submits that two prosecution witnesses have so far been examined. In these circumstances, petitioner's prayer for termination of criminal proceedings would frustrate the cause of justice and the petitioner, who is charged with serious offence of misappropriation of huge public funds along with other accused, would go scot free. [5] I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. [6] The allegations against the petitioner and other accused as revealed from the summary contained in the charge sheet disclose that without there being actual of 659.52 M.T. of bitumen, forged receipt of transport and supply was prepared by the petitioner and other accused and payments to the tune of Rs. 46,00.000/- were released. As far as the present petitioner is concerned, the allegations are that the petitioner also issued large number of invoices without there being any receipt of bitumen and all the accused in conspiracy, obtained Rs. 46,00,000/- without there being any receipt of bitumen of the quantity, in the name of which, aforesaid amount was released. The FIR was lodged on 7-7-1997, the investigating agency took more than 9 years to complete the investigation and filed charge sheet on 12-10-2006. The petitioner had earlier filed a writ petition which was finally disposed of vide order dated 5-5-2009 (Annexure A-3), directing early conclusion of the trial preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt of copy of the order. However, the charges could be framed only on 23-7-2010 and thereafter, the order sheet shows that summons are being issued to the prosecution witnesses and out of 62 cited prosecution witnesses, so far, only 2 witnesses have been examined. In these circumstances, it has to be examined as to whether present is a fit case for quashing criminal proceedings only on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial. [7] Before examining various factors and circumstances of the present case to conclude one way or the other, this Court deems it appropriate to examine the legal position through survey of various decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with right to speedy trial. [7] Before examining various factors and circumstances of the present case to conclude one way or the other, this Court deems it appropriate to examine the legal position through survey of various decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with right to speedy trial. [8] Inspired by the broad sweep and content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India as interpreted by seven Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 1 SCC 248 , the Supreme Court in its subsequent decision in the case of Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. Home Secretary. State of Bihar, 1980 1 SCC 81 , authoritatively pronounced that Article 21 of the Constitution of India confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law. It was held that such procedure is not some semblance of a procedure but the procedure should be "reasonable, fair and just". It was also held that the right to speedy trial flows from the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as "reasonable, fair or just". It was also clarified that speedy trial means reasonably expeditious trial which is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Speedy investigation and trial are also mandate by the letter and spirit of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, in particular. Sections 197, 173, 309, 437 (6) and 468 and so on. [9] The exposition of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the case Hussainara Khatoon again came-up for consideration by another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in a well known decision in the case of Abdul Rahman Antulay. The matter was considered in great detail and referring to a number of decisions, as many as eleven propositions were formulated though with a note of caution that those were not exhaustive and were meant only to serve as guidelines. The guidelines are contained in paragraph-86 of he aforesaid judgment (Abdul Rehman Antulay), which are extracted as below : 86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. The guidelines are contained in paragraph-86 of he aforesaid judgment (Abdul Rehman Antulay), which are extracted as below : 86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are : (1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any the less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. (2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view. (3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are : (a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction; (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise. (4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often pointed out, "delay is a known defence tactic". Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is - who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior Court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex parte representation. (5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the Court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on - what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and States includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one. (6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker "it cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate". The same idea has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell (1966) 15 Law Ed 2d 627 in the following words : ....the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredients; and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case. (7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the 'demand' rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the Court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in USA, the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker and other succeeding cases. (8) Ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors - 'balancing test' or 'balancing process' - and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. (9) Ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the Court to make such other appropriate order - including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded - as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. (10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. (10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the Court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit in effectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial. (11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis. [10] However, discordant note was struck in subsequent judgments in "Common Cause" A Registered Society v. Union of India, 1996 4 SCC 33 , "Common Cause". A Registered Society v. Union of India, 1996 6 SCC 775 , Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, 1998 7 SCC 507 and Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar, 1999 7 SCC 604 , laying down time-limits as bar beyond Which a criminal trial shall not proceed. The aforesaid issue of constitutional importance again came up for consideration by a seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of P. Ramchandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, 2002 AIR(SC) 1856. Per majority, the law laid down in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay was re-affirmed and re-stated. It was held that the law laid down in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R S NAYAK, 1992 AIR(SC) 1701 is correct and holds the field and propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in the said case adequately take care of the right to speedy trial. It was also exhaustively held that guidelines laid down in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay are not exhaustive but only illustrative and are not intended to operate as hard-and-fast rules or to be applied like a straitjacket formula. The Supreme Court went on to observe that applicability of the guidelines would depend on the fact situation, of each case as it is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made. It was further held that it is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. Nonetheless, the criminal Courts should exercise their available powers such as those under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of the Code to effectuate the right to speedy trial. In appropriate cases, jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 of the Code and Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions. [11] In a more recent decision in the case of Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2008 AIR(SC) 3077, the law laid down in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay and P. Ramchandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, 2002 AIR(SC) 1856has been re-affirmed. It has been held : 22. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal prosecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in Court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal prosecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. 23. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed the Court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Where the Court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the Court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. Where the Court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the Court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the Court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time for the conclusion of trial. [12] Recently in the case of Vakil Prasad Singh (,: 2009 AIR(SC) 1822, the settled legal position, as referred to above, is again noted and followed. It has been held:-- 24. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions (sic prosecutions) is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in Court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal prosecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the Court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. 25. Where the Court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the Court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the Court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of timeframe for conclusion of trial. [13] Upon examination of legal position through survey of the aforesaid celebrated decisions, the principle of law, which emerges, is that in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed. [13] Upon examination of legal position through survey of the aforesaid celebrated decisions, the principle of law, which emerges, is that in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed. Court has to perform balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances as enumerated by the Supreme Court in the cases of Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R S NAYAK, 1992 AIR(SC) 1701 and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. However, what follows from the aforesaid decision is that where the Court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of a case has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the Court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice and in such a situation, it would be open to the Court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time for conclusion of trial. [14] The undisputed facts of the present case reveal that the FIR was registered on 7-7-1997 by the State Economic Offences Investigation Bureau, Bhopal, under Crime No. 36/97. It took more than 9 years for the investigating agency to complete investigation and submit charge sheet in the Court. It was ultimately done on 12-10-2006. In the decisions, which have been referred to above, it has been clearly held that right to speedy trial is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in the Court, but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigation as well and the right to speedy trial extends equally to all the criminal prosecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. True it is that the matter required specialized investigation by special investigation agency dealing with the economic offences and it had to deal with large number of documents, records, take statements, collect expert opinion, but, such a long period consumed in investigation cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be categorized as prompt or diligent investigation. The reply of the State does not specifically deal with any extraordinary circumstances which resulted in such prolonged investigation, particularly, when the investigation was being held by a specialized investigating agency. The reply of the State does not specifically deal with any extraordinary circumstances which resulted in such prolonged investigation, particularly, when the investigation was being held by a specialized investigating agency. There is hardly any justification put up by the State to justify unduly prolonged investigation in the matter. It is high time when the State is required to tone-up and make more effective and speedy its investigating agency. The time consumed in completion of investigation is more than 9 years and this Court is unable to comprehend that the nature of case would have normally consumed such a long period for completion of investigation. In its decision in the case of Hussainara Khatoon, Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court declared that right to speedy trial is essential concomitant of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay, the Supreme Court, in no uncertain words, declared that right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India encompasses all the stages, including the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial appeal, revision and re-trial. Therefore, the constitutional mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision obliged the investigating agency to hold investigation expeditiously and bring it to logical conclusion one way or the other. [15] The order sheets of the case, which have been placed on record reveal systemic delay in administration of criminal justice. Amongst many reasons responsible for delay, after submission of charge sheet, some of them are as under : (i) non-appearance of all the accused per-sons on given date. (ii) Death of accused Ramesh and Anish Hasan Khan. (iii) Non service of summons on witnesses. [16] Though case was directed to be listed for framing of charges on 27-9-2007, for the reasons stated above and for other reasons, the case did not proceed further. The case did not record material progress. A writ petition was filed by the petitioner before this Court, in which, direction was issued on 5-5-2009 to decide the case expeditiously and preferably within a period of one year. The charges against the petitioner and other accused were finally framed by the trial Court on 23-7-2010. The case did not record material progress. A writ petition was filed by the petitioner before this Court, in which, direction was issued on 5-5-2009 to decide the case expeditiously and preferably within a period of one year. The charges against the petitioner and other accused were finally framed by the trial Court on 23-7-2010. Thereafter, summons have been repeatedly issued to the prosecution witnesses and two prosecution witnesses have been examined whereas, the list of prosecution witnesses contained as many as 62 prosecution witnesses. [17] The trial in the present case, therefore, reveals a sordid state of affair prevailing in the administration of criminal justice system both at the stages of investigation and in the proceedings before the Court after submission of charge sheet. Prolonged investigation followed by snail's pace of trial despite intervening direction of this Court has failed to bring about speedy disposal of the case till now. Therefore, the petitioner's right of speedy trial has definitely been infringed and violated. [18] Important question, however, which arieses for consideration is whether the aforesaid infringement of right to speedy trial should result in termination of criminal proceedings or having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances quashing of proceedings would not be in the interest of justice. As held in decisions referred to above, the Court is required to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances as enumerated by the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R S NAYAK, 1992 AIR(SC) 1701and subsequently referred to and relied upon in the decision in the cases of P. Ramchandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, 2002 AIR(SC) 1856, Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2008 AIR(SC) 3077 and Vakil Prasad Singh vs. STATE OF BIHAR, 2009 AIR(SC) 1822. [19] The allegations against the applicant and another accused persons fall in the category of offences of grave nature, wherein it has been alleged that the applicant and other accused being public servant, prepared forged receipts and without there being actual receipts of material, were instrumental in releasing excess payments to the tune of Rs. 46.00.000/-. The learned trial Court: after taking into consideration the material contained in the charge sheet has framed charges under Sections 407, 120B, 420 and 471 of the IPC. The matter involves siphoning of Rs. 46,00,000/- of public funds. 46.00.000/-. The learned trial Court: after taking into consideration the material contained in the charge sheet has framed charges under Sections 407, 120B, 420 and 471 of the IPC. The matter involves siphoning of Rs. 46,00,000/- of public funds. It is also seen that the matter involves number of accused and voluminous documents and large number of witnesses put up by the prosecution to prove the case against the petitioner and other accused. There is no doubt that the investigation was unduly prolonged for more than 9 years. However, after filing of charge sheet in the Court, the delay is more due to systemic causes and no single person or institution can be held responsible for the delay which has so far been caused. At the same time, it is found that two of the prosecution witnesses have already been examined. Therefore, weighing all the circumstances and balancing and weighing relevant factors particularly taking into consideration the nature of allegations and siphoning of huge public fund by alleged criminal act, in the considered opinion of this Court, quashing of criminal proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. It would be more conductive to the cause of justice if a direction is issued to expedite the trial on top priority by the concerned Court. In the situation and the attending circumstances of the present case, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the trial Court to take all the expeditious steps to conclude the trial within a period of one year from the date of receipt of copy of this order. The Court shall not grant adjournment on mere asking and unless it is found beyond control, no adjournment shall be granted and trial shall be held, expeditiously. The Public Prosecutor as well as the Counsel for the petitioner and other accused are expected to fully co-operate and perform their duty as officer of the Court with utmost zeal and responsibility towards the cause of justice. The concerned trial Court where the case is pending shall give top priority to the trial of the present case to conclude the trial of the case as early as possible. The concerned trial Court where the case is pending shall give top priority to the trial of the present case to conclude the trial of the case as early as possible. [20] Before parting with the case, this Court deems it appropriate to remind and draw attention of the State Authorities and all its investigating agencies dealing with the investigation of criminal cases, to the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above, wherein, it has been declared that the right to speedy trial is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in the Court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigation as well. Therefore, the investigating agencies of the State are obliged to take all expeditious steps to ensure expeditious completion of investigation. The State Government is directed to issue necessary guidelines to all the investigating agencies, for completion of investigation within reasonable time span and take steps to make all investigating agencies efficient, fully equipped, effective and manned with properly trained officers. The speedy, effective and fair investigation has to be ensured under all circumstances in the interest of administration of criminal justice system. The petition is accordingly finally disposed of. Petition disposed.