JUDGEMENT Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. This petition is directed against the order dated 9.8.2005, passed by the learned Rent Controller, Court No.2, Shimla in case No. 51/2 of 2001. 2. Material facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as transferor landlord) filed petition under section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity sake) against the petitioners/tenants (hereinafter referred to as ‘tenants’ for convenience sake) on the grounds of non-payment of arrears of rent, tenant has acquired premises which are reasonably sufficient for him and his family requirement, sub-letting and lastly on the ground that premises under the occupation of tenant No.1, namely, Brijesh Kumar Sood are bona fide required for carrying out construction of the building and rebuilding. Respondent No.2 (hereinafter referred to as ‘transferee landlord’) moved an application under order 1 rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for impleading him as party in the main petition, i.e. 51/2 of 2001. According to the averments contained in the application preferred by transferee landlord, he has purchased the premises in question vide sale deed dated 25.9.2004. According to him, he has stepped into the shoes of transferor landlord. The tenant filed reply to the same. The Rent Controller vide order dated 9.8.2005, allowed the application preferred under order 1 rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The tenants preferred an appeal before the learned Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal on 8.5.2007. Thereafter, tenants approached this Court. This Court dismissed the petition vide order dated 19.10.2010. However, while dismissing the petition, the Court had observed that the tenants had right to file revision against the impugned order dated 9.8.2005. It is in these circumstances, the present petition has been preferred against the order dated 9.8.2005. 3. Mr. Inderjit Singh Narwal has strenuously argued that the application preferred under order 1 rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not maintainable before the learned Rent Controller. He further contended that the transferee landlord has no locus standi to be impleaded as party. He further contended that the rights of the transferor landlord had extinguished after the sale of the suit premises to the transferee landlord on 25.9.2004. He further contended that the transferee landlord has no locus standi to be impleaded as party. He further contended that the rights of the transferor landlord had extinguished after the sale of the suit premises to the transferee landlord on 25.9.2004. He lastly contended that the learned Rent Controller ought to have dismissed the petition since the same could not be continued on behalf of transferee landlord. 4. Mr. K.D. Sood, Sr. Advocate and Mr. Satyen Vaidya have supported the impugned order. Mr. Satyen Vaidya has strenuously argued that the transferee landlord could continue the proceedings on the grounds of non-payment of arrears of rent, the tenant has acquired premises which are reasonably sufficient for him and his family requirements and sub-letting. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record carefully. 6. In the instant case, the transferee landlord has moved an application under order 1 rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court is of the view that the transferee landlord should have moved application under section 146 or under order 22 rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, in the interest of justice, an application under order 1 rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure preferred by transferee landlord will be deemed to have been moved under section 146 or under order 22 rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dhurandhar Prasad Singh versus Jai Prakash University and others, (2001) 6 SCC 534 have held that seeking leave to continue suit after devolution of any interest during pendency of a suit is not obligatory. Their Lordships have further held that order 22 rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is based on principle that trial of a suit cannot be brought to an end merely because the interest of a party in the subject matter of the suit has devolved upon some other person or entity. Their Lordships have held as under: “6. In order to appreciate the points involved, it would be necessary to refer to the provisions of Order 22 of the Code, Rules 3 and 4 where of prescribe procedure in case of devolution of interest on the death of a party to a suit. Their Lordships have held as under: “6. In order to appreciate the points involved, it would be necessary to refer to the provisions of Order 22 of the Code, Rules 3 and 4 where of prescribe procedure in case of devolution of interest on the death of a party to a suit. Under these Rules, if a party dies and right to sue survives, the Court on an application made in that behalf is required to substitute legal representatives of the deceased party for proceeding with a suit but if such an application is not filed within the time prescribed by law, the suit shall abate so far as the deceased party is concerned. Rule 7 deals with the case of creation of an interest in a husband on marriage and Rule 8 deals with the case of assignment on the insolvency of a plaintiff. Rule 10 provides for cases of assignment, creation and devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit other than those referred to in the foregoing Rules and is based on the principle that the trial of a suit cannot be brought to an end merely because the interest of a party in the subject matter of suit is devolved upon another during its pendency but such a suit may be continued with the leave of the Court by or against the person upon whom such interest has devolved. But, if no such a step is taken, the suit may be continued with the original party and the person upon whom the interest has devolved will be bound by and can have the benefit of the decree, as the case may be, unless it is shown in a properly constituted proceeding that the original party being no longer interested in the proceeding did not vigorously prosecute or colluded with the adversary resulting in decision adverse to the party upon whom interest had devolved. The legislature while enacting Rules 3, 4 and 10 has made clear cut distinction. In cases covered by Rules 3 and 4, if right to sue survives and no application for bringing legal representatives of a deceased party is filed within the time prescribed, there is automatic abatement of the suit and procedure has been prescribed for setting aside abatement under Rule 9 on the grounds postulated therein. In cases covered by Rules 3 and 4, if right to sue survives and no application for bringing legal representatives of a deceased party is filed within the time prescribed, there is automatic abatement of the suit and procedure has been prescribed for setting aside abatement under Rule 9 on the grounds postulated therein. In cases covered by Rule 10, the legislature has not prescribed any such procedure in the event of failure to apply for leave of the Court to continue the proceeding by or against the person upon whom interest has devolved during the pendency of a suit which shows that the legislature was conscious of this eventuality and yet has not prescribed that failure would entail dismissal of the suit as it was intended that the proceeding would continue by or against the original party although he ceased to have any interest in the subject of dispute in the event of failure to apply for leave to continue by or against the person upon whom the interest has devolved for bringing him on the record. 7. Under Rule 10, Order 22 of the Code, when there has been a devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against persons upon whom such interest has devolved and this entitles, the person who has acquired an interest in the subject matter of the litigation by an assignment or creation or devolution of interest pendente lite or suitor or any other person interested, to apply to the Court for leave to continue the suit. But it does not follow that it is obligatory upon them to do so. If a party does not ask for leave, he takes the obvious risk that the suit may not be properly conducted by the plaintiff on record, and yet, as pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Moti Lal v. Karab-ud­Din, (1898) ILR 25 Cal 179, he will be bound by the result of the litigation even though he is not represented at the hearing unless it is shown that the litigation was not properly conducted by the original party or he colluded with the adversary. It is also plain that if the person who has acquired an interest by devolution, obtains leave to carry on the suit, the suit in his hands is not a new suit, for, as Lord Kingsdown of the Judicial Committee said in Prannath v. Rookea Begum, (1851-59) 7 Moo Ind App 323, a cause of action is not prolonged by mere transfer of the title. It is the old suit carried on at his instance and he is bound by all proceedings up to the stage when he obtains leave to carry on the proceedings.” 8. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar versus Sardari Lal and others, (2004) 2 SCC 601, have held that who is entitled to be but has not been brought on record under order 22 rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure in a pending suit or proceeding, would be entitled to prefer an appeal against the decree or order passed. Their Lordships have further held that an application not filed under order 22 rule 10 CPC stricto sensu could yet be held to be maintainable by having recourse to section 146 CPC. Their Lordships have held as under: “10. The law laid down by a four-Judges Bench of this Court in Smt. Sajla Bala Dassi v. Sm. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and anr., 1958 SCR 1287, is apt for resolving the issue arising for decision herein. A transferee of property from defendant during the pendency of the suit sought himself to be brought on record at the stage of appeal. The High Court dismissed the application as it was pressed only by reference to Order 22 Rule 10 of the CPC and it was conceded by the applicant that, not being a person who had obtained a transfer pending appeal, he was not covered within the scope of Order 22 Rule 10. In an appeal preferred by such transferee this Court upheld the view of the High Court that a transferee prior to the filing of the appeal could not be brought on record in appeal by reference to Order 22 Rule 10 of the CPC. However, the Court held that an appeal is a proceeding for the purposes of Section 146 and further the expression “claiming under” is wide enough to include cases of devolution and assignment mentioned in Order 22 Rule 10. However, the Court held that an appeal is a proceeding for the purposes of Section 146 and further the expression “claiming under” is wide enough to include cases of devolution and assignment mentioned in Order 22 Rule 10. Whoever is entitled to be but has not been brought on record under Order 22 Rule 10 in a pending suit or proceeding would be entitled to prefer an appeal against the decree or order passed therein if his assignor could have filed such an appeal, there being no prohibition against it in the Code. A person having acquired an interest in suit property during the pendency of the suit and seeking to be brought on record at the stage of the appeal can do so by reference to Section 146 of the CPC which provision being a beneficient provision should be construed liberally and so as to advance justice and not in a restricted or technical sense. Their Lordships held that being a purchaser pendente lite, a person will be bound by the proceedings taken by the successful party in execution of decree and justice requires that such purchaser should be given an opportunity to protect his rights.12. In Sardar Govindrao Mahadik and anr. v. Devi Sahai and others, 1982(1) SCC 237, this Court held that an application not falling under Order 22 Rule 10 of the CPC stricto sensu could yet be held to be maintainable by having recourse to Section 146 of the CPC.” 9. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amit Kumar Shaw and another versus Farida Khatoon and another, (2005) 11 SCC 403 have held that transferee can be joined both under order 22 rule 10 or order 1 rule 10 and section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Their Lordships have explained the entire gamut of order 22 rule 10 or order1 rule 10 and section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure as under: “11. The application under Order XXII Rule 10 can be made to the appellate Court even though the devolution of interest occurred when the case was pending in the trial Court. In the instant case, the suit was decreed in favour of Fakir Mohammad by judgment and decree dated 03.11.1989. The application under Order XXII Rule 10 can be made to the appellate Court even though the devolution of interest occurred when the case was pending in the trial Court. In the instant case, the suit was decreed in favour of Fakir Mohammad by judgment and decree dated 03.11.1989. The suit was contested by two sets of defendants, one set of defendants was Birendra Nath Dey and Kalyani Dey and other set of defendants was Jagat Mohan Das alone. The appeals were preferred by the parties. Both the appeals were heard and by a common judgment and order dated 25.6.1992, the said appeals were allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the Munsif was set aside. By a deed of Assignment dated 15.12.1995, the said Birendra Nath Dey assigned his leasehold right in respect of 132 A Circular Garden Reach Road, presently known as 132 A, Karl Marx Sarani), Kolkata in favour of the appellants. By a deed of sale executed on 15.12.1995, duly registered with the Additional Registrar of Assurances, Calcutta, Kalyani Dey Sold the property being 132 B of the above address to the other appellant. The second appeals filed by the parties were pending on the file of the High Court at Calcutta. The appellants had no knowledge of the second appeals. Thereafter on verification, the appellants came to know about the pendency of the appeals which necessitated them to file the applications for substitution in the second appeals. In the meanwhile, the appellants filed the applications before the Municipal authorities for mutation of their names in respect of the property on 24.12.2002 and the Municipal authority informed the appellants that they are not in a position to mutate the names of the appellants of the property in question because of the pendency of the two second appeals before the High Court at Calcutta. Thereafter the appellants engaged an advocate to find out whether any such appeals have been filed by the parties. The advocate so engaged informed the appellants that two appeals being S.A.Nos. 631 and 632 of 1993 were filed by Fakir Mohammad, Farida Khatoon & Ors. Respondent Nos. herein. It was also informed that the said appeals were admitted by the High Court but the impugned judgment and order was neither prayed for stay nor stayed. The advocate so engaged informed the appellants that two appeals being S.A.Nos. 631 and 632 of 1993 were filed by Fakir Mohammad, Farida Khatoon & Ors. Respondent Nos. herein. It was also informed that the said appeals were admitted by the High Court but the impugned judgment and order was neither prayed for stay nor stayed. Therefore, it was also submitted by the appellants that since the appellants have become the absolute owners of the property, their interest will be highly prejudiced and they will be vitally affected, if any order is passed by the High Court without hearing the appellants in the matter. Therefore, they prayed that the appellants are to be substituted in place and stead of the present respondents, since they have no existing and subsisting right, title or interest in the property.12. Under Order XXII, Rule 10, no detailed inquiry at the stage of granting leave is contemplated. The Court has only to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its discretion in granting leave for continuing the suit by or against the person on whom the interest has devolved by assignment or devolution. The question about the existence and validity of the assignment or devolution can be considered at the final hearing of the proceedings. The Court has only to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its discretion in granting leave for continuing the suit.17. In the instant case, the applications for substitution were filed by the respective appellants in the second appeals which are still pending on the file of the High Court though it was filed in the year 1993. The appellants have properly, sufficiently and satisfactorily explained the delay in approaching the Court. We see bona fide in their explanation in not coming to the Court at the earliest point of time. Therefore, the appellants who are transferees pendente lite should be made as parties to the pending second appeals as prayed for by them. In our opinion, the High court has committed serious error in not ordering the applications for substitution filed by the appellants. In our view, the presence of the appellants are absolutely necessary in order to decide the appeals on merits. Since the High Court has committed error by rejecting the appellants’ applications for substitution treating the same as additional parties and thereby rendering the appellants non-suited. In our view, the presence of the appellants are absolutely necessary in order to decide the appeals on merits. Since the High Court has committed error by rejecting the appellants’ applications for substitution treating the same as additional parties and thereby rendering the appellants non-suited. We have no hesitation in setting aside the said orders and permit the appellants to come on record by way of substitution as prayed for. The High Court proceeded on a wrong premise that the appellants had made the application for addition of party whereas the application under consideration was for substitution as the owner had sold the suit property to the appellants and had no interest in the pending litigation.18. In our opinion, the presence of the appellants was absolutely necessary since the appellants are the only persons who has got subsisting right, title and interest in the suit. The appellants are at liberty to contest the matter on merits.” 10. Learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in Roshan Lal Devi Dass and others versus Man Mohan Chopra, AIR 1971 Delhi 201 has held that the eviction proceeding does not become incompetent on transfer of property by landlord during its pendency and same can be maintained and continued by the landlord and the transferee. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “17. As regards the objection raised by Mr. Marwah to the application that applicants in C.M. No. 1408-J of 1970 be impleaded, I find that there is no force in it. If the contention of Mr. Marwah is that because of conveyance the applicants alone are entitled to maintain the present revision petition, then no objection can be taken if permission is given to them to be impleaded to the present petition. If, on the other hand, as was contended by Mr. Marwah that the assignment had not taken place even then, the original petitioners are on record and are competent to maintain the petition. It is laid down in Sukhdip Singh v. Arjan Singh, AI 1961 Punj 326 that the person acquiring the interest of a party to legal proceedings may continue the same but it does not by itself incapacitate the original party from continuing the proceedings and the former is bound and can benefit by the steps taken by the latter. It is laid down in Sukhdip Singh v. Arjan Singh, AI 1961 Punj 326 that the person acquiring the interest of a party to legal proceedings may continue the same but it does not by itself incapacitate the original party from continuing the proceedings and the former is bound and can benefit by the steps taken by the latter. Thus the original petitioners can maintain the present the present petition even if they had assigned their full rights to the applicants in C.M. No. 1408-J of 1970.18. It has also been held by7 the Supreme Court in Ramchander Narsey and Co. V. Warmanrao V. Shenoy, 1969 Ren CR 398+ (AI 1969 NSC 72) that if a suit has been validly instituted the same cannot be dismissed on the sole ground that the original landlord had assigned his rights to a subsequent transferee. Their Lordships have held that once a suit has been validly instituted, a decree must necessarily follow unless the law prescribes otherwise. The argument that as arrears of rent were due to the previous landlord and by assigning they became mere debt and therefore would not furnish a cause of action subsequently was not accepted by their Lordships. In that case they distinguished the decision of AIR 1960 Cal 278 which was cited by Mr. Marwah. Mr. Marwah in this connection referred me to the authority of Madan Lal V. Harkishan Lal, (1966) 68 Pun L 14 and contended that after the transfer was made by the original landlord the eviction proceedings could not have been continued. Assuming that this authority lays down the law correctly, the present application in C.M. 1408-J of 1970 has been filed to serve this very purpose. In this very authority it has been observed that no application was made by the transferor landlord to implead the transferee or by the transferee to be impleaded as a party in these proceedings. In the absence of such an application, his Lordship held that the eviction proceedings could not be continued. In the present case, however C.M. 1408-J of 1970 has been filed with a specific request that the transferee of the original landlord be impleaded as parties to the petition. If that application is allowed, the objection that the original petitioners were landlords and had transferred their rights and that there was no landlord before the Court no longer survives. In the present case, however C.M. 1408-J of 1970 has been filed with a specific request that the transferee of the original landlord be impleaded as parties to the petition. If that application is allowed, the objection that the original petitioners were landlords and had transferred their rights and that there was no landlord before the Court no longer survives. This is another good reason why the application of the applicants for being impleaded should be allowed. I may observe that the observations of the learned Judge in (1966) 68 Pun LR 14 that the moment the property was sold by the landlord, the eviction proceedings could not continue would seem to run counter to the AIR 1961 Punj 326 (to which Mahajan, J. was a party) wherein it has been observed that the original party is not incapacitated from continuing the proceedings even if he has transferred rights during the pendency of the suit. Another Division Bench of Punjab High Court in Pritam Singh V. Raja Ram, AIR 1964 Punj 363 has also held that a transferee from a landlord can claim ejectment of the tenant on the ground of a subsisting sub-lease which was entered into during the time of his predecessor-in-interest so long as sublease took place after the commencement of the Act and without the written consent of the landlord. It was sought to be urged before the Bench that the word ‘landlord’ must be restricted to the landlord during whose terms the sublease had taken place. This plea was negatived and it was held that a transferee from a landlord can maintain eviction petition and that right was not restricted to the original landlord. The observations of Mahajan , J. in (1960) 68 Pun LR 14 if meant to lay down that an application for eviction becomes incompetent if during its pendency the landlord transfers the property even though the transferee seeks to be impleaded would seem to run counter to 1969 Ren CR 398= (AIR 1969 NSC 72) where their Lordships did not accept the plea that the eviction application has to fail simply on the ground that there has been a transfer of interest by the landlord after the filing of an eviction application. It has been clearly laid down in that authority that a suit validly instituted will not be defeated by the mere fact of the transfer of the property, the eviction application which may have been properly filed could not be proceeded by the transferee. As a tenant can take benefit of a permission having been given by the original landlord and cannot be evicted because no permission was taken from the transferee of the landlord as was held in AIR 1964 Punj 363 similarly if a proper application had been filed by the original landlord the same can be maintained and continued by the transferee of the landlord and it will not be dismissed on the mere ground that the application is no longer maintainable. This argument restricts the meaning of the word ‘landlord’ to the person who filed eviction application and seeks to bar the transferee or even the legal representatives from continuing the application. No justification in any principle can be spelled out for such an extreme proposition. It would be seen that the judgment of Mahajan J. was based on the fact that before him there was no landlord because the transferee had not applied to be impleaded as a Lordship took the view that the original landlord had ceased to be landlord and the transferee was not before him and therefore eviction order could not be passed. This authority, therefore cannot support the contention that applicants in C.M. No. 1408-J of 1970 cannot be impleaded in the revision petition. I would, therefore direct that applicants in Civil Misc. No. 1408-J of 1970 be also impleaded as petitioners to the Civil Revision No. 450-D of 1963 and I order accordingly.” 11. It is not in dispute that the transferee landlord has purchased the suit premises vide sale deed 25.9.2004. The transferor landlord has filed petition under section 14 of the Act on the grounds of non­payment of arrears of rent, tenant has acquired premises, which are reasonably sufficient for him and his family members’ requirements, sub-letting and the suit premises were bona fide required by the transferor landlord for building and re-building. It is also pleaded that the transferor landlord has sufficient resources at his disposal for carrying out building and re-building. 12. It is also pleaded that the transferor landlord has sufficient resources at his disposal for carrying out building and re-building. 12. The application has been preferred by the transferee landlord under order 1 rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure after he purchased the property vide sale deed dated 25.9.2004. The Court is of the considered view that after the suit premises have been purchased by the transferee landlord, this subsequent development has to be taken into consideration by the Court. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Om Prakash Gupta versus Ranbit B. Goyal, AIR 2002 SC 665 has held that the ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. However, the court has power to take note of subsequent events. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “11. The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. However, the Court has power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the following conditions being satisfied:(I) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (II)that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and (III)that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders this Court held that a fact arising after the lis, coming to the notice of the court and having a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it and brought diligently to the notice of the court cannot be blinked at. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders this Court held that a fact arising after the lis, coming to the notice of the court and having a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it and brought diligently to the notice of the court cannot be blinked at. The court may in such cases bend the rules of procedure if no specific provision of law or rule of fair play is violated for it would promote substantial justice provided that there is absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. The Court speaking through Krishna Iyer, J. affirmed the proposition that the court can, so long as the litigation pends, take note of updated facts to promote substantial justice. However, the Court cautioned: (I) the event should be one as would stultify or render inept the decretal remedy, (II)rules of procedure may be bent if no specific provision or fair play is violated and there is no other special circumstance repelling resort to that course in law or justice, (III)such cognizance of subsequent events and developments should be cautious, and (IV)the rules of fairness to both sides should be scrupulously obeyed. 12. Such subsequent event may be one purely of law or founded on facts. In the former case, the court may take judicial notice of the event and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the law. In the latter case, the party relying on the subsequent event, which consists of facts not beyond pale of controversy either as to their existence or in their impact, is expected to have resort to amendment of pleadings under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. Such subsequent event, the Court may permit being introduced. into the pleadings by way of amendment as it would be necessary to do so for the purpose of determining real questions in controversy between the parties. In Trojan & Co. v. RM. Such subsequent event, the Court may permit being introduced. into the pleadings by way of amendment as it would be necessary to do so for the purpose of determining real questions in controversy between the parties. In Trojan & Co. v. RM. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar this Court has held that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found; without the amendment of the pleadings the Court would not be entitled to modify or alter the relief. In Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho Their Lordships observed that, as a rule, relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted.” 14. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu versus The Motor and General Traders, 1975 R.C.R. 486, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceedings, however, the Supreme Court has held that the procedure is the hand-maid and not the mistress of the judicial process and equity justifies bending the rules of procedure with a view to promote justice. 15. Now, this Court will advert to the question: whether the transferee landlord will step into the shoes of transferor landlord as far as the non-payment of arrears of rent are concerned. This question is no more res integra in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh versus P. Jagannadhan and others, (1982) 3 SCC 364. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that arrears of rent do not lose their character and become an actionable claim on assignment. It has further been held that eviction proceedings can be maintained by successor landlord on ground of arrears of rent. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “1. This special leave petition is directed against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High court confirming an order of eviction passed against the petitioner. I do not see any reason to interfere With the Order passed by the High court, but there is one point to which I must refer) and that arises out of a decision of the Calcutta High court in Daya Debi v. Chapala Debi. I do not see any reason to interfere With the Order passed by the High court, but there is one point to which I must refer) and that arises out of a decision of the Calcutta High court in Daya Debi v. Chapala Debi. That decision has taken the view that when a claim for arrears of rent is assigned by A to B, it loses the character of a claim for rent as Soon as it is assigned and it becomes merely an actionable claim. This view is, of course, not shared by most of the other High courts and even the Calcutta High court itself in other decisions has not accepted this view. It does appear to me that this view is not correct because it is difficult to see how a claim for arrears of rent ceases to be such when it is assigned by the owner when he transfers his properties to another. So far as the tenant is concerned, the amount remains payable by him to the successor landlord as arrears of rent because that is his own liability and it does not acquire any other character. And so also when the successor landlord claims the amount assigned to him his cause of action against the tenant would be for arrears of rent because there is no other basis on which he found his cause of action against the tenant. There is, therefore, no doubt that in the present case the 151 respondent who was the assignee of the claim for arrears of rent from the predecessor landlady was entitled to recover the arrears of rent from the petitioner and the arrears of rent were due from tile petitioner to the 1st respondent at the date when the application was made before the Rent Controller by the 1st respondent for an order of eviction against the petitioner. The special leave petition is accordingly rejected but in view of the fact that the petitioner has been in possession of the premises for a considerable time, I direct that the order for eviction passed against the petitioner shall not be executed against him until 30/05/1978 and on the petitioner filing an affidavit in this court on or before July 55, 1077 undertaking to thi9 court that he will hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the premises to the 1st respondent on or before that date. In case such affidavit is not filed by the petitioner, the order for eviction shall become executable forthwith.” 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Girdhari Lal (dead) by legal representatives versus Hukam Singh and others, 1977 (1) R.C.J. 509 has held as under: “9. An objection based upon the proviso the Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act was, we think rightly, disposed of by the High Court as follows: “The next objection is that under the proviso to Section 109 of the Transfer, of Property Act the transferee is not entitled to arrears of rent due before the transfer. In our opinion he is ordinarily not so entitled unless there is a contract to the contrary. There was an express contract to the contrary contained in the compromise petition which was incorporated in the compromise decree passed by the Court.” 17. Learned Single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Shankar Sahai versus Kanmal and others, 1971 R.C.R. 826 has held that after the transfer of property, all rights are transferred, including right to recover rent. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “5. It is an admitted fact that on June 4, 1957, Kanmal ceased to have any right, title or interest in the suit property and the same was relinquished in favour of Dashrathmal. That being so, the principle laid down in section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act will apply and Dashrathmal alone became the principle underlying section 109 of the Act is that the rights attached to property which arise out of possession and control of property will pass with the property. Qui in jus deminiunve alterius succeedit jure ejus uti debet. When Kanmal ceased to have any right, title interest in the suit property he ceased to be the defendant’s landlord and it is Dashrathmal who became the landlord and the right to recover rent vested in Dashrathmal with effect from June 4, 1957. 6. Shri Patankar’s contention is that attornment is automatic. A change of relationship of landlord and tenant will require an act of the lessee to so elect. 6. Shri Patankar’s contention is that attornment is automatic. A change of relationship of landlord and tenant will require an act of the lessee to so elect. The learned counsel reads the words “and, if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long as he is the owner of it” as to mean that a tenant of the transferee continues until the lessee so elects to become tenant of the transferee. In my opinion that is not a correct reading of the section. The words just now quoted relate to the liability of the lessor. The rule is that obligations without the consent of him to whom they are owed cannot be assigned. Therefore, if an obligation is transferred by the lessor, even so, the liabilities of the lessor continue until the lessee so elects that the transferee be subject to such liabilities. There is nothing in section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act which makes it dependent on the election of the lessee to continue to be the lessee of the transferor and not become the lessee of the transferee. This view was also taken in Pyarelalsa v. Garanchandsa (supra) and is supported by the decision in Jagannath v. Ramzan (supra).” 18. The Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Pallapothu Narasimha Rao and another versus Kidanbi Radha Krishnamacharyulu, AIR 1978 A.P. 319 has held that the definition of ‘landlord’ would include not only the original owner but every person who becomes the owner of the building by reason of transfer or otherwise. The Full Bench has further held that the transferee would be also a landlord within the meaning of section 2(6) and would be entitled to continue the proceedings initiated by the original owner. The Full Bench has further held that the provisions of order 22 rule 10 C.P.C. in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act may be applied to the proceedings under the Act. The Full Bench has held as under: “22. In that case the landlord filed a petition for eviction which was ordered by the Rent Controller. The tenant preferred an appeal to the learned Subordinate Judge. The Full Bench has held as under: “22. In that case the landlord filed a petition for eviction which was ordered by the Rent Controller. The tenant preferred an appeal to the learned Subordinate Judge. During the pendency of the appeal, the landlord sold the premises to the petitioner herein and the petitioner was added as the second respondent in the appeal before the Sub Court on 9.7.1974 in I.A. No. 1713/72. The appeal was allowed and the petitioner (Purchaser of the property) has preferred this revision. It is contended by Sri Suryanarayanamurthy that the revision petition is not maintainable at the instance of the petitioner who is the purchaser of the property. He submitted that the lower appellate court erred in adding the petition as second respondent in the appeal before it under order 22 rule 10 CPC. His case is that order 22 rule 10 CPC is not applicable to proceedings under the Rent Control Act and it is the original owner alone that has to continue the proceedings and file a revision petition. We regret we are unable to accept this contention. Section 2 (6) defines ‘landlord’ meaning the owner of a building and includes a person who is receiving and who is entitled to receive rent of a building. It is clear therefore that the definition of ‘landlord’ would include not only the original owner but every person who becomes the owner of the building by reason of transfer or otherwise. The transferee would therefore be also a landlord within the meaning of section 2 (6) and would be entitled to continue the proceedings initiated by the original owner. As a matter of fact he could have come on record in the place of the original owner in the appeal by virtue of this definition alone without having regard to order 22 rule 10 CPC and the order of the court below impleading him as the respondent could be justified even without referring to order rule 10 CPC. Further we are of the view that the provisions of CPC in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act may be applied to the proceedings under the Act. Vide Hari Kishan Singh v. B. Narayana (1969 (2) APLJ 290). Further we are of the view that the provisions of CPC in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act may be applied to the proceedings under the Act. Vide Hari Kishan Singh v. B. Narayana (1969 (2) APLJ 290). Further even if the provisions of CPC are strictly not applicable, the principles underlying them can be applied to kproceedings under the Rent Control Act so long as they are not inconsistent with the provision of the Act or the rules made thereunder. Reliance was placed upon the decision of this court in Seetharama Murthy Raju v. Rama Raju (1964 (1) And WR 213). We do not think it has any application to the facts of the case. In that case the landlord filed a petition for eviction and during the pendency of the proceedings sold the property under a sale deed, one of the conditions of which was that the vendor will take all proceedings at his own coast to get the tenants evicted from the land and deliver possession of the same. The original owner therefore preferred an appeal. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that as the landlord had parted with his right he could not prefer the appeal. This court held that the landlord could continue the proceedings. It is therefore seen that this court was concerned with a converse case, namely, whether the landlord who had parted with the property could continue the proceedings or whether it was necessary for the transferee to come on record and continue the proceedings. The decision is not an authority for the proposition that the transferee is not entitled to step into the shoes of the original owner and continue the proceedings. It is to be noted that this decision related to Andhra Tenancy Act which is not in pari materia with the Rent Control Act.Further it is also to be noticed that the transferee was added as second respondent in the appeal in the lower court. No objection was taken by the tenant to the present petitioner being added as second respondent. We do not think this is a proper case to permit the respondent to raise a contention that the petitioner cannot continue the proceedings and file a revision petition as he had not questioned the order of the court below permitting him to come on record as second respondent.” 19. We do not think this is a proper case to permit the respondent to raise a contention that the petitioner cannot continue the proceedings and file a revision petition as he had not questioned the order of the court below permitting him to come on record as second respondent.” 19. Learned Single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ashok Kumar Kailashc hand versus Ram Charan Mool Chand and others, 1979 (1) R.C.J. has held that the transferee is entitled to continue with the proceedings and to obtain decree of eviction if there is default in payment of arrears of rent by the tenant. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “3. Seeming ingenuity does not pay in the Court of law as elsewhere. The argument put forth by the respondent No.1 is absolutely misconceived as demonstrated hereinafter. The original landlord had the right to claim eviction on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent despite service of notice of demand. He himself had actually instituted the suit on the said ground. The effect of assignment of the suit house during the pendency of the suit naturally was that the assignee got all the rights of the lessor including the right to enforce the claim in suit for eviction of the tenant. The right to evict the defendant-tenant also passed with the transfer of the demised premises. This is the effect of section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. All the rights including the right to enforce the claim in suit for eviction automatically reverted to the assignee. Even otherwise, there remains no doubt in this position because the wide definition of the terms ‘landlord’ as given in section 2 (1) of the Act covers an assignee of the landlord also. The definition is in consonance with the provisions of section109 of the Transfer of Property Act. One, therefore, cannot say that after obtaining the suit house on transfer from the original landlord, the transferee could not prosecute the suit for eviction on the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. 4. The definition is in consonance with the provisions of section109 of the Transfer of Property Act. One, therefore, cannot say that after obtaining the suit house on transfer from the original landlord, the transferee could not prosecute the suit for eviction on the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. 4. It is true that in cases where eviction is sought on grounds, which are personal to the particular landlord there may be scope to contend that the particular need cases to exists, but, where eviction is sought not on such personal grounds like that of bona fide genuine need of the landlord but is on such grounds like default in payment of rent which had given rise to a right in favour of the landlord to evict the tenant, the said right definitely passed to the transferee and the suit on such a ground can be continued and decreed. The argument put forth by the landlord counsel for the respondent No.1 could have been sustained if the original landlord might not have instituted the suit on the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act after making the demand of arrears of rent before, transferring the suit house. In that case, the amount of arrears of rent, even if assigned to the transferee, could have been in the nature of a debt and could not be demanded and recovered as arrears of rent by the assignee. But in the present case, the position is not so and this is the distinguishing feature of the present case with that of the decision in N.K. Kame v. Biharilal (1969 R.C.J. 307. In that case, the suit was instituted by the transferee landlord by contending that the amount of arrears of rent which had been assigned to him while selling the house was not paid by the tenant on demand. In that case it was held that on assignment of the amount due towards arrears of rent, the same became a debut and, therefore, could not be made the basis for claiming eviction under section 12 (1) (a) read with section 13 of the Act. In that case it was held that on assignment of the amount due towards arrears of rent, the same became a debut and, therefore, could not be made the basis for claiming eviction under section 12 (1) (a) read with section 13 of the Act. In the present case, the suit having been already instituted after making a demand of arrears of rent and the defendant-tenant having failed to comply with the same within the prescribed period of two months, the original plaintiff did acquire a righty to evict the tenant under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. It was the said right which he enforced by filing the present suit. With the assignment of the demised premises those rights passed over to the transferee, i.e., the present appellant and, if the trial court decreed the claim for eviction in the context of the undisputed circumstances, as stated earlier, there was no error of law or of fact in the judgment and decree of said court. Similar was the view taken in the case of Chandmal v. Inayat Khan and others ( 1972 J.L.J. Note 23.). The lower appellate Court, therefore, committed an error of law in setting aside the judgment and decree of trial court.” 20. It is evident in view of the definitive law laid down in the above cited judgments that the transferee landlord can continue proceedings seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent. 21. Now, the Court will advert to the question: whether the transferee landlord could continue the proceedings on the ground that the premises are required bona fide by him for building and rebuilding, which could not be carried out without evicting the tenant. This question is also no more res integra in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 22. In M.M. Quasim versus Manohar Lal Sharma and others, (1981) 3 SCC 36, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “14. This question is also no more res integra in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 22. In M.M. Quasim versus Manohar Lal Sharma and others, (1981) 3 SCC 36, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “14. The expression ‘landlord’ has been defined in S. 2 (d) of the Rent Act which reads as under: “landlord” includes the persons who for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf or for the benefit, of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant.” The inclusive definition is couched in very wide language. However, this wide amplitude of the expression has been cut down by the explanation appended to sub-cl. (c) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 11 which reads as under: “11. Eviction of tenants: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and to those of Section 12, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one or more of the following grounds :-. (c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord; Provided that where the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall thenceforth constitute the building within the meaning of cl, (aa) of Section 2, and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under Section 5; Explanation: In this clause the word “landlord” shall not include an agent referred to in clause (d) of S. 2.” Therefore, while taking advantage of the enabling provision enacted in S. 11 (1) (c), the person claiming possession on the ground of his reasonable requirement of the leased building must show that he is a landlord in the sense that he is owner of the building and has a right to occupy the same in his own right. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression landlord in its wide amplitude, cannot be treated as a landlord for the purposes of S. 11 (1) (c). This becomes manifestly clear from the explanation appended to the sub-section. By restricting the meaning of expression landlord for the purpose of Section 11 (1) (c), the legislature manifested its intention namely that that landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building himself and exclude any one holding a title lesser than his own. Such landlord who is an owner and who would have a right to occupy the building in his own right, can seek possession for his own use. The latter part of the section envisages a situation where the landlord is holding the building for the benefit of some other person but in that case landlord can seek to evict tenant not for his personal use but for the personal requirement of that person for whose benefit he holds the building. The latter part of the section envisages a situation where the landlord is holding the building for the benefit of some other person but in that case landlord can seek to evict tenant not for his personal use but for the personal requirement of that person for whose benefit he holds the building. The second clause contemplates a situation of trustees and costui que trust but when the case is governed by the first part of sub-cl. (c) of sub-section (1) of S. 11, the person claiming possession for personal requirement must be such a landlord who wants possession for his own occupation and this would imply that he must be a person who has a right to remain in occupation against the whole world and not someone who has no subsisting interest in the property and is merely a rent collector such as an agent, executor, administrator or a receiver of the property. For the purposes of S. 11 (1) (c) the expression landlord could, therefore, mean a person who is the owner of the building and who has a right to remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else. It is such a person who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not entitled to occupy the house in his own right. Even if such a person be a lessor and, therefore, a landlord within the expanded inclusive definition of the expression landlord, nonetheless he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants to personally occupy the house He cannot claim such a right against the real owner and as a necessary corollary he cannot seek to evict the tenant an the ground that he wants possession of the premises for his own occupation. That can be the only reasonable interpretation one can put on the ingredients of sub-clause (c) of Section 11 (1) which reads: “Where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation “ Assuming that the expression ‘landlord’ has to be understood with the same connotation as is spelt out by the definition clause, even a rent collector or a receiver of the property appointed by the Court in bankruptcy proceedings would be able to evict the tenant alleging that he wants the building for his own occupation, a right which he could not have claimed against the real owner. Therefore, the explanation to clause (c) which cuts down the wide amplitude of the expression ‘landlord’ would unmistakably show that for the purposes of clause (c) such landlord who in the sense in which the word ‘owner’ is understood can claim as of right to the exclusion of everyone, to occupy the house, would be entitled to evict the tenant for his own occupation.” 23. In Sheikh Jehangir versus Smt. S. Kaushilyabai and others, 1987 (Supp) SCC 630, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the ground that premises are required bona fide by the landlord cannot survive after the landlord sold out the demised premises. It has further been held that purchaser of the premises can file a fresh suit. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held under: “In this case, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are unable to sustain the judgment of the High court. The finding reached by the sub-court as to the bona fide requirement of the previous landlord who was the plaintiff under S. 10(iii)(c) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 could not survive after the plaintiff had transferred his right, title and interest in the demised premises by executing a registered sale deed dated 11/05/1973 in favour of the present purchaser. The High court treated this as a subsequent event necessitating a remand of the suit tor a fresh disposal and the present purchaser on remand was impleaded as a party respondent. The High court treated this as a subsequent event necessitating a remand of the suit tor a fresh disposal and the present purchaser on remand was impleaded as a party respondent. There is clear inhibition contained in S. 10(3) (iii) against institution of a suit by a purchaser on the ground of bona tide personal necessity for a period of 3 months from the date of purchase and therefore a suit could not be brought by the purchaser till the expiry of the said period calculated from the date of sale deed. After the suit was remanded, the only remedy to the plaintiff was to seek liberty to withdraw it. The purchaser was to institute a separate suit for his own personal requirement which he never did. In view of the decision of this court in Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala the judgment and decree passed by the High court as well as the courts below will stand vacated and the suit for eviction will stand dismissed. But the dismissal of the suit will not preclude the purchaser from bringing a fresh suit on the ground of his bona tide requirement. The appeal is accordingly allowed but with no order as to costs.” 24. The Apex Court in P.V. Papanna and others versus K. Padmanabhaiah, (1994) 2 SCC 316 has held as under: “9. This Court has consistently held that when eviction of a tenant is sought for on the ground of personal need of the landlord, such need must not only exist on the date of the suit but must also exist when higher courts deal with the order of eviction in appeal or in revision. Reference in this connection may first be made to Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 1711, where relying upon its earlier decision in the case of P. Vehkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409, this Court held that it was incontrovertible that where possession was sought for personal requirement it would be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action but must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction was made. This Court emphasised that if during the progress and passage of the proceeding from Court to Court subsequent events had occurred which, if noticed, would non-suit the landlord, the Court had to examine and evaluate the same and mould the decree accordingly. This Court observed that the tenant was entitled to demonstrate that the need or requirement of the landlord no more existed by pointing out such subsequent events to the Court, including the appellate Court. In such a situation, it would be incorrect to say that as the decree or order for eviction was passed against the tenant he could not invite the Court to take into consideration subsequent events. The Court lastly observed:- “He (the tenant) can be precluded from so contending when the decree or order for eviction has become final.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. From the various observations made in the cases referred to above it is patently clear that this Court, while laying down that in a suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of premises by landlord the subsequent events ought to be taken into account for the purpose of finding out whether the landlord still required the premises in possession of the tenant, has also laid down that such an enquiry can be made so long as the decree for eviction does not become final. In other words, once the matter has become final in the sense that the order of eviction has been upheld by the highest Court in which it was sought to be challenged. it would not be open to further challenge, which necessarily can be in the execution stage. This conclusion inevitably follows from the well settled principle that a Court executing the decree cannot go behind the decree for it binding and conclusive between the parties to the suit. Therefore, the Executing Court is required to execute the decree as it finds; save in exceptional cases where the decree on the face of it may be found to be without jurisdiction. To put it differently, the Executing Court cannot enquire as to why the decree was passed but for the purpose of finding out whether the decree is a valid one or a nullity it can go into the question as to whether the Court which passed the decree was competent to do so. To put it differently, the Executing Court cannot enquire as to why the decree was passed but for the purpose of finding out whether the decree is a valid one or a nullity it can go into the question as to whether the Court which passed the decree was competent to do so. Besides, the Executing Court may if need be, look into the pleadings of the parties and the proceedings of the trial, for the limited purpose of construing the decree or the meaning of the words used therein.” 25. The Apex Court in Prabha Arora and another versus Brij Mohini Anand and others, (2007) 10 SCC 53 has held that eviction suit based on personal grounds would fail if the property is transferred to a third party who is not party to the proceedings. The Apex Court has held as under: “5. In Keclar Nath Agrawal (dead) & Anr: v. Dhanraji Devi (dead) by LRs. & Am: [2004 (8) SCC’ 76] this Court held that the court has to consider the changed circumstances during the pendency of the litigation. This decision relied on the earlier decision of this Court in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad [1981 (3) SCC 103:AIR1981 SC 1711] in which it was observed that where possession is sought for personal requirement, the said requirement must not only exist on the date of the filing of the petition but must also subsist till the final decree for an order for eviction is made. If, in the meantime, events crop up which would show that the landlord’s requirement no longer subsists then the action must fail.” 26. In a latest judgment in Sheshambal (dead) through LRs versus Chelur Corporation Chelur Building and others, (2010) 3 SCC 470, the Apex Court has reiterated that since the requirement pleaded by original petitioners was their own personal requirement and not of members of their family whether dependent or otherwise, after the death of the petitioners their right to seek eviction on ground of personal requirement for demised premises became extinct. The Apex Court has held as under: “7. It is not in dispute that during the pendency of the revision petition before the High Court the landlord Shri K. Sachindanda Iyer passed away on 24th April, 1996 leaving behind his wife Smt. A. Sheshambal Sachindanda Iyer as the sole revision petitioner seeking eviction of the respondent- tenant. The Apex Court has held as under: “7. It is not in dispute that during the pendency of the revision petition before the High Court the landlord Shri K. Sachindanda Iyer passed away on 24th April, 1996 leaving behind his wife Smt. A. Sheshambal Sachindanda Iyer as the sole revision petitioner seeking eviction of the respondent- tenant. Consequent upon the dismissal of the revision petition the present appeal was filed by Smt. A. Sheshambal Sachindanda Iyer alone who too passed away before this appeal could be heard for final disposal. IA No.7/2008 filed on 14th November, 2008 sought substitution of the legal representatives of the appellant on the basis of a Will left behind by the deceased according to which the property in question has to devolve upon the three daughters left behind by the deceased. It is common ground that two of the daughters are living in India one each at Coimbatore and Bihar the third daughter is settled in America. 12. It is not in dispute that in the eviction petition the owners had pleaded their own requirement for the premises to be occupied by them for residential as well as commercial purposes. The eviction petition was totally silent about the requirements of any member of the family of the owners- petitioners leave alone any member of their family who was dependant upon them. That being so the parties went to trial before the Rent Controller on the basis of the case pleaded in the petition and limited to the requirement of the owners for their personal occupation. 13Neither before the Rent Controller nor before the Appellate Authority was it argued that the requirement in question was not only the requirement of the petitioner- owners of the premises but also the requirement of any other member of their family whether dependant upon them or otherwise. Not only that, even in the petition filed before this Court the requirement pleaded was that for the deceased- widowed owner of the demised premises and not of any member of her family. 14. Super added to all this is the fact that the legal representatives who now claim to be the family members of the deceased are all married daughters of the deceased couple each one settled in their respective matrimonial homes in different cities and at different places. 14. Super added to all this is the fact that the legal representatives who now claim to be the family members of the deceased are all married daughters of the deceased couple each one settled in their respective matrimonial homes in different cities and at different places. That none of them was dependant upon the deceased- petitioner is also a fact undisputed before us. Even otherwise in the social milieu to which we are accustomed, daughters happily married have their own families and commitments financial and otherwise. Such being the position we find it difficult to see how the legal representatives of the deceased- appellant can be allowed to set up a case which was never set up before the Courts below so as to bring forth a requirement that was never pleaded at any stage of the proceedings. Allowing the legal heirs to do so would amount to permitting them to introduce a case which is totally different from the one set up before the Rent Controller the Appellate Authority or even the High Court. 15.The position may indeed have been differentiated if in the original petition the petitioner-owners had pleaded their own requirement and the requirement of any member of their family dependant upon them. In such a case the demise of the original petitioners or any one of them may have made little difference for the person for whose benefit and bona fide requirement the eviction was sought could pursue the case to prove and satisfy any such requirement. 16.Confronted with the above position Mr. Vishwanathan made in generous submission. He contended that the rights and obligations of the parties get crystalized at the time of institution of the suit so that any subsequent development is not only inconsequential but wholly irrelevant for determination of the case before this Court. Learned counsel sought to extend that principle to the case at hand in an attempt persuade us to shut out the subsequent event of the death of the original petitioners from consideration. We regret to say that we do not see any basis for the submission so vehemently urged before us by Mr. Vishwanathan. Learned counsel sought to extend that principle to the case at hand in an attempt persuade us to shut out the subsequent event of the death of the original petitioners from consideration. We regret to say that we do not see any basis for the submission so vehemently urged before us by Mr. Vishwanathan. 17.While it is true that the right to relief must be judged by reference to the date suit or the legal proceedings were instituted, it is equally true that if subsequent to the filing of the suit, certain developments take place that have a bearing on the right to relief claimed by a party, such subsequent events cannot be shut out from consideration. What the Court in such a situation is expected to do is to examine the impact of the said subsequent development on the right to relief claimed by a party and, if necessary, mould the relief suitably so that the same is tailored to the situation that obtains on the date the relief is actually granted. 28. In the light of what we have stated above, we have no hesitation in holding that on the death of the petitioners in the original eviction petition their right to seek eviction on the ground of personal requirement for the demised premises became extinct and no order could on the basis of any such requirement be passed at this point of time. 29. There is one other aspect to which we must advert at this stage. The High Court had, while disposing of the revision petition filed before it, come to the conclusion that the demised premises is large and located in a popular commercial area of the city of Cochin. It has found that the rent for the premises was very low and had not been revised since the year 1973. The High Court accordingly revised the rent to Rs.10,000/- per month payable w.e.f. 1.11.2003 onwards leaving it open to the parties to get the fair rent determined for the demised premises. “ 27. Learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in Bankey Lal versus The XII Additional District Judge, Morabada, 1995 (1) RCR 166 has held that no court can ignore change of ownership resulting in changing of landlord during pendency of litigation and direct delivery of possession to a person who had ceased to have any concern with the disputed accommodation. Learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in Bankey Lal versus The XII Additional District Judge, Morabada, 1995 (1) RCR 166 has held that no court can ignore change of ownership resulting in changing of landlord during pendency of litigation and direct delivery of possession to a person who had ceased to have any concern with the disputed accommodation. The learned Single Judge has held as under: “5. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a copy of a notice dated 7.8.1993 which was served by landlord Krishna Autar Agarwal upon tenant Bankey Lal informing him that a family settlement had taken place in his family on 2.8.1993 according to which all the property owned by the co-owners had been divided amongst them and in terms of the same, the shop in dispute had fallen in the exclusive share of his son, Dinesh Kumar. He further directed Bankey Lal to pay rent to the shop in dispute for the period subsequent to 2.8.1993 to his son, Dinesh Kumar. He very clearly disclosed in the last line of the said notice that he had ceased to be the owner and landlord of the shop which was in the tenancy of Bankey Lal. It was also contended for the petitioner that Dinesh Kumar had not submitted any construction plan of the shop in dispute to the Municipal Board, Hasanpur nor he had disclosed that he was possessed of sufficient means for reconstruction of the shop in dispute after demolition that he thus did not fulfil the requirements of Rule 17 of the Rent Control and Ejectment Rules, 1972; that the release was claimed on the sole ground that the shop having become dilapidated was to be got demolished and reconstructed by the landlord and that due to the changed circumstances, the order of release of the shop in favour of Krishna Autar Agarwal was liable to be quashed. It was also contended forcefully that the learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Moradabad was faced with the said difficulty and, therefore, he did not name the person to whom Bankey Lal was to hand over vacant possession. 6. It was also contended forcefully that the learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Moradabad was faced with the said difficulty and, therefore, he did not name the person to whom Bankey Lal was to hand over vacant possession. 6. For respondents Nos.2 and 3 it was argued that the change which had taken place during the pendency of the appeal could not be taken note of as the rights of the parties were to be decided as on the date of the presentation of the release application before the learned prescribed authority and Krishna Autar Agarwal, therefore, even now was entitled to get possession of the shop in dispute by eviction of appellant Bankey Lalo. The argument, however, appeared to be devoid of merits. The proceedings before the learned Prescribed Authority and, thereafter the Court of appeal were of a nature in which changes during the pendency of the release application and the appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority could not be ignored by this Court. Evidently the landlord namely Krishna Autar Agarwal had ceased to have any concern with the shop in dispute and therefore no order requiring the tenant to hand over the possession of the shop to him could be validly passed by any court of law. Krishna Autar Agarwal, thus, was faced with a great difficulty and that is why in para 22 of his counter affidavit filed in this petition, he raised a false plea that in spite of the family settlement, he continued to be the owner of the shop in dispute and his son was given a limited right to collect and realize the rent only of the shop in dispute. The letter sent by him to Bankey Lal in this behalf has already been discussed above in which he has very clearly disclosed that he had ceased to have any concern at all with the shop in dispute and his Dinesh Kumar in terms of the family settlement had become the owner thereof. He (Dinesh Kumar) consequently was the sole landlord of the petitioner (Bankey Lal). 7. He (Dinesh Kumar) consequently was the sole landlord of the petitioner (Bankey Lal). 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1983 Madh Pra 72, Anant Gadre v. Gomtibai, in which it was held that in the case of the death of the landlord pending the decision of his suit for obtaining possession of the disputed property after eviction of his tenant on the ground of bona fide need, the suit could not be decreed after his death. 8. It was no doubt correct that the aforesaid decision was given in relation to the M.P. (Mdhya Pradesh) Accommodation Control Act 41 of 1961, but the underlying principle of law was the same as in the instant petition before this Court. To my mind, no court of law could ignore the change of ownership resulting in change of landlord of the disputed premises during the pendency of the litigation between the parties and direct delivery of possession to a person who had ceased to have any concern whatsoever with the disputed accommodation. 9. Petitioner Krishna Autar Agarwal had tried to prove that he had submitted construction plan to Municipal Board, Hasanpur and also that he was possessed of means sufficient for reconstruction of the shop after its demolition, but landlord, Dinesh Kumar, could not get the benefit of the same, because he, as a result of partition, had become landlord in his own right and not by inheritance. There could be no presumption that respondent No.3, Dinesh Kumar, had got a sum of about Rs. 50,000/- with him which was the approximate cost of the reconstruction of the shop in dispute. The order of eviction in favour of Dinesh Kumar, therefore, could not legitimately be passed. Dinesh Kumar, if he wanted to get the possession of the shop in dispute on the same ground upon which his father had sought the release of the shop, will have to comply with the requirements of Rule 17 aforesaid of which there was neither allegation nor evidence in this case. The writ petition, therefore, succeeded due to this reason alone.” 28. Accordingly, it is held that the transferee landlord cannot continue the proceedings on the ground that the premises are required bona fide for building and rebuilding. The writ petition, therefore, succeeded due to this reason alone.” 28. Accordingly, it is held that the transferee landlord cannot continue the proceedings on the ground that the premises are required bona fide for building and rebuilding. This was personal right of the landlord and after the sale of the suit premises to the transferee landlord, it has become extinct. However, it was always open to the transferee landlord to move fresh petition. 29. Mr. Inderjit Singh Narwal has argued that the transferee landlord cannot continue the proceedings as far as the ground of sub-letting the suit premises is concerned. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have succinctly explained the legal position regarding sub-letting in Celina Coelho Pereira (Ms) and others versus Ulhas Ma habaleshwar Kholkar and others, (2010) 1 SCC 217 as under: “28. The legal position that emerges from the aforesaid decisions can be summarised thus : (i)In order to prove mischief of subletting as a ground for eviction under rent control laws, two ingredients have to be established, (one) parting with possession of tenancy or part of it by tenant in favour of a third party with exclusive right of possession and (two) that such parting with possession has been done without the consent of the landlord and in lieu of compensation or rent. (ii) Inducting a partner or partners in the business or profession by a tenant by itself does not amount to subletting. However, if the purpose of such partnership is ostensible and a deed of partnership is drawn to conceal the real transaction of sub-letting, the court may tear the veil of partnership to find out the real nature of transaction entered into by the tenant. (iii) The existence of deed of partnership between tenant and alleged sub-tenant or ostensible transaction in any other form would not preclude the landlord from bringing on record material and circumstances, by adducing evidence or by means of cross-examination, making out a case of sub-letting or parting with possession in tenancy premises by the tenant in favour of a third person. (iv)If tenant is actively associated with the partnership business and retains the control over the tenancy premises with him, may be along with partners, the tenant may not be said to have parted with possession. (iv)If tenant is actively associated with the partnership business and retains the control over the tenancy premises with him, may be along with partners, the tenant may not be said to have parted with possession. (v) Initial burden of proving subletting is on landlord but once he is able to establish that a third party is in exclusive possession of the premises and that tenant has no legal possession of the tenanted premises, the onus shifts to tenant to prove the nature of occupation of such third party and that he (tenant) continues to hold legal possession in tenancy premises. (vi)In other words, initial burden lying on landlord would stand discharged by adducing prima facie proof of the fact that a party other than tenant was in exclusive possession of the premises. A presumption of sub-letting may then be raised and would amount to proof unless rebutted.” 30. The Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Pritam Singh Jiwan Singh and others versus Raja Ram Kalu Ram and another, AIR Punjab 363 has held that the transferee landlord can claim ejectment on the ground of sub-letting. The Division Bench has held as under: “3. The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act of 1949 came into force on the 25th of March 1949 i.e., before the agreement to sublease the premises to Babu Ram was entered into and no consent of the landlord was obtained for it. Section 13(2) (ii) of the Act gives the landlord right to claim ejectment on the ground that the tenant has after the commencement of the Act without the written consent of the landlord transferred his right under the lease or sublet the entire building or rented land or any portion thereof. The view taken by the authorities below was that the present landlords could not sue for the ejectment of the tenants on the ground of a sub-lease which had taken place in the time of their predecessor in spite of the fact that the sub-lease took place after the commencement of the Act and without the consent of the landlord. The view taken by the authorities below was that the present landlords could not sue for the ejectment of the tenants on the ground of a sub-lease which had taken place in the time of their predecessor in spite of the fact that the sub-lease took place after the commencement of the Act and without the consent of the landlord. In the case to which I have referred above Tek Chand J. has held that a purchaser of the premises cannot take advantage of section 13 (I) (b) (i) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act for a breach committed nearly three years before he purchased the property from a former landlord, and the sub section excludes past breaches committed while the landlord was the predecessor of the present transferee. The provisions of the relevant portion of the Delhi Act are similar to those of the Punjab Act, though not identically worded, and the learned Judge has held that the words “the landlord” clearly refer to the plaintiff who desires to obtain a decree or order for the recovery of possession. He dissented from the views expressed by Beaman, J. in Vishveshvar Wighneshvar v. Mahableshvar Subba, ILR 43 Bom 28: (AIR 1918 Bom 79), a case in which Beaman, J. alongwith Heaton, J. dismissed a letters patent appeal and held that the plaintiff in that case was entitled to recover possession of the property. The facts were that a mulgeni lease provided that the lease was not to alienate the property leased, but the lessee committed a breach of the condition by sale of his rights under the lease to one of the defendants in 1908. In 1911 the plaintiff purchased the landlord’s rights from the lessor and the defence in his suit for possession of the property on account of breach of the condition of the lease was that the plaintiff could not take advantage of the breach of condition incurred before the assignment in his favour. In 1911 the plaintiff purchased the landlord’s rights from the lessor and the defence in his suit for possession of the property on account of breach of the condition of the lease was that the plaintiff could not take advantage of the breach of condition incurred before the assignment in his favour. It may well be that Tek Chand, J. is right in his objections to the grounds on which Beaman, J. upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge, which was in a second appeal, but it is to be noted that Heaton, J. also delivered a separate judgment in which he upheld the decision on completely different grounds holding that the case was clearly covered by section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act.” 31. Accordingly, it is held that the transferee landlord can continue the proceedings as far as the ground of sub-letting, as pleaded by the original landlord, is concerned. 32. The other ground taken by the transferee landlord seeking eviction of the tenant was that he has acquired premises which are reasonably sufficient for him and his family members’ requirement. The Court is of the view that this ground is also available to the transferee landlord seeking eviction of the tenant and he need not file fresh petition. 33. Accordingly, in view of the observations and discussions made hereinabove, the petition is disposed of in the following manner: It is held that the transferee landlord can continue to maintain the petition on the grounds of non-payment of arrears of rent, sub-letting of premises, the tenant has acquired premises, which are reasonably sufficient for tenant and his family members. The transferee landlord cannot continue the proceedings as far as the bona fide requirement for building and rebuilding of the suit premises is concerned. 34. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Rent Controller on 26.3.20 12. The learned Rent Controller is directed to decide the petition within a period of six months from today. No costs.