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2012 DIGILAW 64 (PNJ)

Mukhtiar Singh v. State of Haryana

2012-01-11

MAHESH GROVER, RANJAN GOGOI

body2012
JUDGMENT Mr. Ranjan Gogoi, CJ.: (Oral) - This writ petition has been filed challenging a notification dated 31.1.1974 (Annexure P-1) issued under the provisions of The Court Fees (Haryana Amendment) Act, 1974. The challenge to the notification is on the ground that Schedule/slabs of court fees payable is highly disproportionate as compared to what is prevailing in the neighbouring State of Punjab and U.T. Chandigarh. During the pendency of the present writ petition the Supreme Court in P.M. Ashwathanarayana Sectty and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and others 1989 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 696 had occasion to deal with a similar matter. In paragraph 98 of its judgment the Supreme Court has observed as follows:- “Though we have abstained from striking down the legislation, yet, it appears to us that immediate steps are called for and are imperative torationalise the levies. In doing so the States should realise the desirability of levying on the initial slab of the subject matter--say upto Rs.15,000-- a nominal court fees not exceeding 2 to 2-1/2 per cent so that small claims are not priced out of courts. “Those who have less in life” it is said “should have more in law”. Claims in excess of Rs.15,000/- might admit of an ad valorem levy at rates which, preferably should not exceed 7-1/2 per cent subject further to an upper limit which, having regard to all circumstances, could be envisaged at Rs.75,000. The upper limit even prior to 1974 under the ‘Bombay Act’ was Rs.15,000/- and prior to 1961 under the ‘Rajasthan Act’ at Rs.7500. Having regard to steep inflation over the two decades the upper limit could perhaps go up to Rs.75,000. After that limit is reached, it is apportionate to impose on gradually increasing slabs of the value of the subject matter, progressively decreasing rates, say from 7-1/2 per cent down to 1/2 per cent in graduated scales. The governments concerned should bestow attention on these matters and bring about a rationalisation of the levies.” 2. Following the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court in P.M. Ashwathanarayana Sectty and Others (supra) the Court Fees (Haryana Amendment) Act 2009 alongwith new Schedule came into force which has been again challenged by the writ petitioner by amending the writ petition. 3. Following the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court in P.M. Ashwathanarayana Sectty and Others (supra) the Court Fees (Haryana Amendment) Act 2009 alongwith new Schedule came into force which has been again challenged by the writ petitioner by amending the writ petition. 3. The short contention in support of the renewed challenge appears to be that in framing of the Schedule to the amended Act, the views and observations of the Apex Court in para 98 of the judgment in P.M. Ashwathanarayana Sectty and Others (supra) have not been followed. 4. Having read para 98 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in P.M. Ashwathanarayana Sectty and Others (supra) and the Schedule to the Court Fees (Haryana Amendment) Act, 2009 we do not find the arguments advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner to be substantiated in any manner. In para 98 of its judgment the Supreme Court had expressed certain observations with regard to the Schedule of the Court fees that are paid by the litigants. The views expressed cannot be understood to be laying down any law inasmuch as the very nature of the subject matter would not have permitted the court to direct the concerned Government to frame a law relating to Court Fees in any particular manner. We, therefore, are of the opinion that views of the Apex Court in P.M. Ashwathanarayana Sectty and Others (supra) are to be understood to be general observations which are required to be considered by the law making authority at the time of enactment of the relevant law. A reading of the Court Fees ( Haryana Amendment) Act, 2009 would go to show that once the court fee payable is Rs. 75000/- further ad valorem court fee is on a declining scale and such decline is upto the level of 0.5 per cent ad valorem, as observed by the Apex Court. The aforesaid provision contained in the Schedule, according to us, is in full conformity with the views of the Apex Court contained in para 98 of the judgment in P.M. Ashwathanarayana Sectty and Others (supra). Accordingly, we are of the opinion that this writ petition is wholly without any merit and substance. We, therefore, dismiss the same. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. ------------