JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, Judge. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 11.6.2002 rendered by the learned Additional District Judge, Shimla, Circuit Court at Rohru in Civil Appeal No.99-S/13 of 2001. 2. Material facts necessary for the adjudication of this Regular Second Appeal are that respondents No.2 and 3, namely, Shakur Dass and Jitoo alias Jhakka, arrayed as defendants No. 1 and 2 in the original suit, sold their entire share pertaining to Khasra Nos. 1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1048 and 1051 comprised in Khata Khatauni No. old 177 min/271 min in revenue Chak Dhak Gaon and put the plaintiff in possession vide registered sale deed No. 28/49 dated 7.3.1994, qua which mutation No.7 dated 6.6.1995 has been attested. Defendant No.1, namely, Shakur Dass sold Khasra No. 1052 measuring 2 bighas 11 biswas comprised in Khata Khatauni No. 177 min/271 min in Chak Dhak Gaon to the plaintiff and put him in possession vide agreement to sell dated 7.5.1994 when a sum of ` 1,500/- was paid by the plaintiff and remaining amount was agreed to be paid within 8 months at the time of registration of sale deed. Sale deed could not be made within 8 months, which led to execution of another agreement dated 9.7.1995 by defendant No.1 whereby he agreed to execute sale deed and acknowledged the receipt of balance consideration of ` 500/- on 23.3.1995. During the course of settlement operation, old Khasra Nos.1051 and 1052 have been substituted by new Khasra Nos. 614/1 and 696. In the third week of December, 1995, plaintiff came to know that defendants No.1 and 2, namely, Shakur Dass and Jitoo have executed registered sale deed No. 245/95 qua the suit land in favour of appellants, who were arrayed as defendants No.3 and 4 in the original suit. Plaintiff requested defendant No.1 to execute sale deed in the last week of November, 1995 but to no avail. Plaintiff requested defendant No.1 to execute sale deed in the last week of November, 1995 but to no avail. It is in these circumstances, plaintiff has filed suit for declaration to the effect that sale deed No. 245/95 dated 4.12.1995 Ex.PW-1/A executed by defendants No.1 and 2, namely, Shakur Dass and Jitoo alias Jhakka in favour of defendants No. 3 and 4, namely, Harinder Singh and Sarvinder Singh be declared illegal, null and void with consequential relief of specific performance of contract dated 7.5.1994 and 9.7.1995 and for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in any manner whatsoever over the land comprised in Khasra Nos. 1051 and 1052 old, new Khasra Nos. 614/1 and 696 situated in revenue Chak Kharot, Tehsil Chirgaon, District Shimla, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘suit land’). 3. Suit was contested by the original defendants No.1 & 2 and defendants No.3 & 4 by filing separate written statements. On merits, it is admitted by defendants No.1 and 2- Shakur Dass and Jitoo that they have sold 2/3rd share in the land mentioned in para 1 of the plaint and one Nikharu was having share to the extent of 1/3rd in the land. It is denied that Khasra No. 1052 was ever sold by defendants No.1 and 2 to the plaintiff. Defendant No.1 executed a document dated 7.5.1994 with respect to Khasra No. 1052, which could not be acted upon as the plaintiff was not paying the amount demanded. According to the defendants, plaintiff has made over-writing on document dated 7.5.1994. Second document dated 9.7.1995 was also forged. It is denied that plaintiff paid ` 500/- to defendant No.1 on 23.3.1995. 4. Present appellants No.1 and 2, who were defendants No.3 and 4, have also filed written statement. According to them, there was no sale deed, particularly, qua Khasra No. 1051 and 1052. It has been sold by defendants No.1 and 2 to them. 5. Learned Sub Judge 1st Class framed the issues on 4.101997 and additional issues were framed on 30.11.1998. He decreed the suit on 30.6.2001. Defendants No.3 and 4, namely, Harinder Singh and Sarvinder Singh preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 30.6.2001 before the Additional District Judge, Shimla. In this appeal, original defendants No.1 and 2 were added as respondents No.2 and 3. Learned Additional District judge dismissed the appeal on 11.6.2002. Hence, the present Regular Second Appeal. Defendants No.3 and 4, namely, Harinder Singh and Sarvinder Singh preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 30.6.2001 before the Additional District Judge, Shimla. In this appeal, original defendants No.1 and 2 were added as respondents No.2 and 3. Learned Additional District judge dismissed the appeal on 11.6.2002. Hence, the present Regular Second Appeal. It was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. “Whether the judgments of both the courts below are vitiated for want of mandatory compliance of order 32 C.P.C., according to which the court was duty bound to appoint guardian of appellants who are admittedly minors? 2. Whether alleged agreements for sale Ex.PW-5/A and Ex.PW-8/A dated 7.5.1994 and 9.7.1995 between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 are not legal and valid and those are not enforceable under the law and in view of the sale deed Ex.PW-1/A on behalf of the defendant No.1 Shukar Dass and defendant No.2 Jitu dated 4.12.1995, a decree for specific performance could not be granted? 3. Whether the alleged agreement for sale Ex.PW-5/A and Ex.PW-8/A being only between the plaintiff and defendant No.1, therefore, sale deed pertaining to share of the defendant No.2 Jitu could not be declared null and void? 6. Mr. Romesh Verma has strenuously argued that as per provisions of order 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court was bound to appoint guardian for the minor appellants. According to him, agreements Ex.PW-5/A and Ex.PW-8 dated 7.5.1994 and 9.7.1995, respectively were not enforceable in view of sale deed Ex.PW-1/A dated 4.12.1995. He also argued that the agreements Ex.PW-5/A and Ex.PW-8/A were only executed between the plaintiff and defendant No.1, namely, Shakur Dass. 7. Mr. Ajay Kumar Sood, learned Senior Advocate has supported the judgments and decrees of the Courts below. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records and pleadings carefully. 9. Since all the substantial questions of law are interconnected and interlinked they are taken up together for determination to avoid repetition of discussions of evidence. 10. Plaintiff has appeared as PW-1. According to him, defendants Shakur and Jitoo have sold land to him comprising of Khasra No. 1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1048 and 1051 vide registered sale deed in the month of March, 1994. The sale deed was scribed by Deed Writer Sh. Banka Ram. This was prepared at Chirgaon. 10. Plaintiff has appeared as PW-1. According to him, defendants Shakur and Jitoo have sold land to him comprising of Khasra No. 1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1048 and 1051 vide registered sale deed in the month of March, 1994. The sale deed was scribed by Deed Writer Sh. Banka Ram. This was prepared at Chirgaon. Shakur Dass and witnesses Jambi Ram and Banka Ram have also signed the sale deed after admitting the contents of the same to be correct. Thereafter, it was produced before the Sub-Registrar. The Tehsildar read over the contents to them vide mark ‘X’. The possession of the land was also handed over by them and the same was in his possession. The mutation was also attested. Besides this land, he has also purchased another land bearing Khasra No. 1052 from Shakur Dass. It was situated in Dak Gaon Chak. This agreement was also prepared in the month of May, 1994. He has paid ` 1,500/- at the time of execution of agreement. This was prepared at Chirgaon in the presence of Thakur Singh and Supan Lal witnesses vide mark ‘Y’. Shukar Dass signed the same after admitting the same to be correct. It was to be registered within 8 months. Second agreement was also executed in the month of July, 1995 and a sum of ` 500/- was paid. Total sum of ` 2,000/- was paid. The copy of agreement is mark ‘Z’. This agreement was witnessed by Micher Sain and Kanwar Singh. It was scribed by Micher Sain. The contents of the same were read over to Sh. Shakur Dass. The possession of the land was also handed over on the spot. He was in possession of the same. He has removed the bushes. He has requested the defendants to execute the sale deed. However, the land was sold by them to defendants No.3 and 4 in the month of December, 1995. He came to know about this after 2-3 days. Thereafter, he got the copy of the sale deed Ex.PW-1/A. He has also produced copies of jamabandi Ex.PW-1/B and Ex.PW-1/C, copies of Khatauni Ex.PW-1/D, Ex.PW-1/E, Ex.PW-1/F, Ex.PW-1/G and Ex.PW-1/H. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that no tatima was got prepared at the time when he purchased the land nor any demarcation was undertaken. 11. PW-2 Banka Ram has deposed that he knew the parties. 11. PW-2 Banka Ram has deposed that he knew the parties. According to him, sale deed was prepared at Chirgaon. It was scribed by Deed Writer. It was read over by the Deed Writer. Thereafter, he, Shakur Dass, Jitoo and Jambi signed the same. 12. PW-3 is Sh. Micher Sain. Initially, his statement was recorded on 23.9.1999 and on that date it was deferred and subsequently it was recorded on 20.10.2004 as PW-8 in continuity, though it should have been PW-9. According to him, the agreement was executed between Shakur Dass and plaintiff qua khasra No. 1052 on 9.7.1995. Possession of the land was with the plaintiff. Shakur Dass has received a sum of ` 2,000/- at the time of execution of agreement. He has written whatever was dictated by Shakur Dass to him. Kanwar Singh was also present at the time of preparing the agreement Ex.PW-8/A. He has read over the contents to the Shakur Das after scribing the agreement. He and Kanwar Singh have signed as witnesses. 13. PW-4 Jambi Ram has deposed that the sale deed was prepared in his presence whereby the land was sold by Shakur Dass to Shamsher. He has signed Ex.PW-2/A. 14. PW-5 Surat Ram has deposed that he was working as Petition Writer. He has read over the contents to Shakur Dass of Ex.PW-5/A. Supan Lal and Thakur Sain have signed the same. 15. PW-6 Khushi Ram has deposed that he was given contract of removing bushes by the plaintiff. 16. PW-7 Thakur Sain has deposed that the agreement was prepared between Shakur Dass and Shamsher for sale of land whereby plaintiff has paid a sum of ` 1,500/- to Shakur Dass. The copy of agreement is Ex.PW-5/A. He has identified the signatures on the same. 17. PW-8 Supan Lal has deposed that the agreement was prepared between Shakur Dass and Shamsher. He has seen the agreement Ex.PW-5/A. He has signed the same. 18. Defendant No.1 has appeared as DW-1. He has admitted the execution of agreements Ex.PW-5/A and Ex.PW-8/A dated 7.5.1994 and 9.7.1995 entered into between him and Shamsher. According to him, he has not received the amount as per terms and conditions of sale deed. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that the land which has been sold by him and his brother Jitoo, the same has been duly registered. According to him, he has not received the amount as per terms and conditions of sale deed. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that the land which has been sold by him and his brother Jitoo, the same has been duly registered. He has seen Ex.PW-2/A. He has admitted his signatures on the same. He has also admitted that he and his brother after admitting the contents of the same to be correct have signed the document. He has also admitted that the possession of the land, as per agreement, was also handed over to the plaintiff. He has admitted his signatures Ex.PW-5/A. He has also admitted his signatures Ex.PW-8/A. He has admitted that he has signed Ex.PW-5/A and Ex.PW-8/A after admitting the contents of the same to be correct. He has admitted in his cross-examination that the possession was handed over as per agreements Ex.PW-5/A and Ex.PW-8/A. According to him, he was not ready to execute the sale deed. 19. DW-2 Attar Singh is the father of defendants No.3 and 4, namely, Harinder Singh and Sarvinder Singh. According to him, defendants No.3 and 4 are minors. Shukar Dass and Jitoo have sold land to his sons in the year 1995. Initially, he stated that Khasra Nos. 1951 and 1952, thereafter stated Khasra Nos. 1051 and 1052 measuring 7 bighas were sold. In his cross-examination, he has categorically admitted that he knew that Jitoo and Shakur have sold the land to the plaintiff when sale deed Ex.PW-1/A was prepared. 20. Plaintiff has duly proved Ex.PW-2/A. He has produced the scribe and the marginal witnesses to prove this document. Similarly Ex.PW-5/A and Ex.PW-8/A have been duly proved by the plaintiff by producing the scribe as well as marginal witnesses. Defendant has admitted the execution of these documents. According to him, the possession was also handed over to the plaintiff. Since the land has already been sold vide Ex. PW-2/A. Ex.PW-5/A and Ex.PW-8/A, the same could not be sold by defendants No.1 and 2, namely, Shakur Dass and Jitoo to defendants No.3 and 4, namely, Harinder Singh and Sarvinder Singh in the month of December, 1995. According to him, the possession was also handed over to the plaintiff. Since the land has already been sold vide Ex. PW-2/A. Ex.PW-5/A and Ex.PW-8/A, the same could not be sold by defendants No.1 and 2, namely, Shakur Dass and Jitoo to defendants No.3 and 4, namely, Harinder Singh and Sarvinder Singh in the month of December, 1995. According to Jamabandi Ex.PW-1/E prepared during the course of settlement, old Khasra No. 1051 corresponding to Khasra No. 696 was owned by Nikharu son of Rawal Nath to the extent of 1/3rd share and defendants No. 1 and 2 have been shown owners of remaining 2/3rd share. So far as Khasra No. 1051 old and new Khasra No. 696 is concerned, in the column of possession, name of defendant No.2 Jitoo is recorded. It is, thus, evident that Jitoo was exclusive owner of old Khasra No. 1051 and new Khasra No. 696 min whereas defendant Shakur has been shown in exclusive possession of old Khasra No. 1052, new Khasra No. 614/1 as per Jamabandi Ex.PW-1/F. Thus, it is proved that defendants No.1 and 2 were in exclusive possession of old khasra Nos. 1051 and 1052, new Khasra Nos. 696 and 614/1, respectively. In view of this, no title could be conveyed in favour of defendants No.3 and 4 on the basis of Ex.PW-1/A dated 4.12.1995. Sale deed Ex.PW-2/A and agreements Ex.PW-5/A and Ex.PW-8/A are prior in time. The plea of defendants No.3 and 4 that they are bona fide purchaser has neither been pleaded nor proved. 21. Now, the Court will advert to: whether the provisions of order 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure have been complied with or not? Plaintiff has filed an application for appointment of guardian on 28.2.1996. Plaintiff has also filed an affidavit alongwith application on 28.2.1996. Trial court has issued notice to the guardian on 30.12.1995. The notice was duly served upon the natural guardian Sh. Attar Singh. Sh. Attar Singh has executed special power of attorney in favour of his father, namely, Sh. Nihal Chand to protect the interest of minor defendants. Sh. Nihal Chand has filed the written statement on behalf of minor defendants to the original plaint as well as to the amended plaint. He had been looking after the interest of minor defendants. Attar Singh, father of minor defendants, has appeared as DW-2. Nihal Chand to protect the interest of minor defendants. Sh. Nihal Chand has filed the written statement on behalf of minor defendants to the original plaint as well as to the amended plaint. He had been looking after the interest of minor defendants. Attar Singh, father of minor defendants, has appeared as DW-2. He has filed an appeal on behalf of minor defendants before the learned Additional District Judge. In this case, notice was issued to DW-2 and he himself has further given special power of attorney to his father to defend the minors. It is not one of those cases where minor defendants have gone undefended. The interests of minor defendants have been protected by filing written statement on their behalf by their grand-father and they were defended by the learned Advocates throughout the proceedings before the trial court and the first appellate court. 22. Mr. Romesh Verma has also argued that there is no formal order of appointment of guardian. It was only an irregularity since the notice was issued in the present case to the natural guardian and thereafter he has appointed his father as special power of attorney to defend the minor defendants. There is no material on record that the grand-father of defendant No.2 and 3, namely, Sh. Nihal Chand, has colluded with other parties. Rather, he has defended the case of the minors by ensuring that the written statement is filed on their behalf and the lawyer was also engaged. There is also no evidence on record that the interest of grand-father was adverse to the interests of minor defendants. 23. Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Ram Rekha Singh and others versus Ganga Prasad Mukaraddhwaj and others, AIR 1926 Allahabad 545 has held that mere irregularities in the appointment of the guardian ad litem who allowed the suit to proceed ex parte, do not entitle the minor to re-open the decree unless he can satisfy the court that he has been prejudiced and deprived of some good defence which was open to him. Full Bench has held as under: “2. Full Bench has held as under: “2. Assuming that there have been such irregularities in the appointment of the guardian ad litem in the previous suit as to entitle the plaintiff's to re-open the question, they cannot by merely showing irregularities succeed unless they can satisfy the Court that they have been prejudiced and have been deprived of some good defence which was open to them………..” 24. Learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in Brij Kishore Lal versus Satnarain Lal and others, AIR 1954 Allahabad 599 has held that if some formalities for the appointment of a guardian have not been observed, but if the guardian has agreed to act as guardian and has done something in the suit to show that he accepted his appointment as a guardian, the mere fact that some formalities were over looked or not observed, or there was no formal order of appointment, would not vitiate the proceedings. Learned Single Judge has observed as under: “4. It has been held in a number of reported cases that if some formalities for the appointment of a guardian have not been observed, but if the guardian has agreed to act as guardian and has done something in the suit to show that he accepted his appointment as a guardian, the mere fact that some formalities were overlooked or not observed, or there was no formal order of appointment, would not vitiate the proceedings or would not affect the result of the suit, provided there has, been no prejudice to the minor.” 25. The Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Nirmal Chandra Ray and others versus Khandu Ghose and others, AIR 1965 Calcutta 562 has held that where a proper person has been appointed with the sanction of the Court and in compliance with the mandatory provisions of law to act as guardian ad litem in a suit, the decree passed in such suit cannot be challenged on the ground of a mere irregularity in the matter of appointment of such person as guardian ad litem not causing any prejudice, such as the absence of a formal order of appointment by reason of the doctrine of effective representative. The Division Bench has held as under: As per justice D. Basu, J.: “44. The Division Bench has held as under: As per justice D. Basu, J.: “44. (b) Where a proper person had been appointed, with the sanction of the Court and in compliance with the mandatory provisions of law, to act as guardian-ad-litem in a suit, the decree passed in such suit cannot be challenged on the ground of a mere irregularity in the matter of appointment of such person as guardian-ad-litem, not causing any prejudice,--such as the absence of a formal order of appointment, by reason of the doctrine of effective representation.” 26. Justice B.N. Banerjee, J. in the same judgment has held that the doctrine of substantial representation is a matter of substance and not of form. Where a minor was effectively represented in a suit by a guardian, although not formally appointed, and suffered no prejudice on account of the informality, the absence of a formal order of appointment of guardian is not fatal to the suit. Justice B.N. Banerjee, J. has held as under: “57. Mr. Manmohan Mukherjee, learned advocate for the appellants, argued that the minors were effectively represented, in the rent suit and in the proceedings following, by their elder brother, defendant No. 12, who used to look after the joint property in suit, belonging to himself and his co-sharers, including the minors. In my opinion, there is a good deal of infirmity in the argument of Mr. Mukherjee. The doctrine of substantial representation is a matter of substance and not of form. Where a minor was effectively represented in a suit by a guardian, although not formally appointed, and suffered no prejudice on account or the informality, the absence of a formal order of appointment of guardian is not fatal to the suit. In this view I find support from the following observations by Sir Arthur Wilson in 30 Ind App 182 (PC): "The present plaintiffs wore substantially sued in the former suit and the alleged fraud has been negatived. It appears to their Lordships that they were effectively represented in that suit by their mother and with the sanction of the Court, ** there is nothing to suggest that their interests were not duly protected. It appears to their Lordships that they were effectively represented in that suit by their mother and with the sanction of the Court, ** there is nothing to suggest that their interests were not duly protected. The only defects which can be pointed out are that no formal order appointing the mother of the new plaintiffs to be their guardian is shewn to have been drawn up; and that it is not definitely shewn that any attempt was made to serve the summons in the former suit upon the infants personally, or upon their mother, a purdanashin lady, before serving it upon Gajadhar the only adult male member and Karta of the family. It has not been shewn that the alleged irregularities caused any prejudice to the present plaintiffs. * * * * Their Lordships are of the opinion that the defects of procedure alleged in the case are at most irregularities, which under Section 570 of the Civil Procedure Code, would not have furnished ground for reversing the proceedings in the former suit, if they had been raised upon appeal in that suit. * * And the plaintiffs who have brought a separate suit to set aside the judgment and execution proceedings in the former suit and the title acquired under them can certainly not be in a better position than if they had been appellants in that suit". 60. Then again the rent suit was one brought by some of the co-sharers landlords under Section 148A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 60. Then again the rent suit was one brought by some of the co-sharers landlords under Section 148A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The procedure to be followed in rent suits is to be found in Section 148 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and Clause (h) of Section 148 reads as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 4(3) of Order 32 in schedule I to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court may serve on the natural guardian of a minor defendant in a suit for arrears of rent a notice informing him that he will be treated as the guardian of such defendant in respect of such suit, unless he appears and objects within such time, not being less than fourteen clear days after the service of the notice, as may be specified in the said notice, and, in default of compliance with such notice, such natural guardian shall, unless the court otherwise directs, be deemed to be duly appointed guardian of the said minor defendant for all the purposes of such suit." That procedure was not correctly followed in the rent suit, because the notice did not go out to the mother the natural guardian of the minors, even if any notice at all went out. There is also nothing to show that defendant No. 12, consented to act as the guardian of the minors at any stage in the rent suit. In the case of 44 Cal WN 391, Edgley, J. very rightly pointed out: "Order 32 Rule 4(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no person shall without his consent be appointed guardian for a suit. Section 148(h) of the Bengal Tenancy Act provides for an exception to the above rule in favour of natural guardian and this section accordingly provides that the court may serve on the natural guardian of a minor defendant in a suit for arrears of rent a notice informing him that he will be treated as the guardian of such defendant in respect of such suit, unless he appears and objects within the specified time. It is, however, clear that only a natural guardian may be thus appointed without his consent to act as the guardian of the minor. It is, however, clear that only a natural guardian may be thus appointed without his consent to act as the guardian of the minor. If a person who is not the natural guardian is so appointed without his consent being taken, it necessarily follows that the minor concerned cannot be regarded as being properly represented in that suit." The position in law, therefore, is that if a natural guardian is proposed to represent a minor defendant in a rent suit the procedure as in Section 148(h) of the Bengal Tenancy Act may be followed. But if anybody else is proposed as the guardian of the minor defendants, the procedure as in Order XXXII of the Civil Procedure Code must be followed. In the instant case, Section 148(h) of the Bengal Tenancy Act did not come into play because the guardian proposed was not the natural guardian of the minors. There is also nothing to show that in trying to appoint the defendant No. 12 as the guardian of the minors, the procedure as in Order 32 was followed. Therefore the minors were not properly represented in the rent suit and the decree as against them was a nullity. That being so, the rent sale did not affect their right, title and interest in the holding. In that view I hold that the plaintiffs respondents in this appeal are entitled to a decree setting aside the rent sale, in so far as it affected their interest, and injuncting the contesting defendants from interfering with their possession. In the result this appeal must be dismissed.” 27. Learned Single Judge of Madras High Court in Kumara Kangaya Goundar versus Arumugha Goundar and others, AIR 1970 Madras 179 has held that irregularity in ppointment of guardian ad litem cannot render decree against minor nugatory. Minor must prove that he was not effectively represented in suit. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “8. If a guardian ad litem has been appointed for a minor defendant and the minor's interests have been duly looked after in the litigation, mere irregularities in the appointment of the guardian cannot render the decree nugatory against the minor. The minor, to avoid the decree, must further prove that he was not effectively represented in the suit and that he was prejudiced by the failure of the guardian to take pleas that could have been validly raised on his behalf. The minor, to avoid the decree, must further prove that he was not effectively represented in the suit and that he was prejudiced by the failure of the guardian to take pleas that could have been validly raised on his behalf. Law insists that the minor's interests in the litigation should be taken care of and the minor represented in the litigation by an adult whose interests are not adverse to that of the minor. The minor's interests in the litigation should not be neglected or prejudiced, and Courts have to be jealous in observing the requirements of the law in this regard in letter and spirit. All the same when it is found that the guardian who had been acting for the minor in the suit had not let down the interests of the minor and when the minor was in no way prejudiced, it is immaterial if some irregularity in the appointment is found. If the purpose for which a guardian ad litem is appointed -- to put forward pleas properly available for the minor in the case and protect his interest in the litigation by necessary representation -- has been achieved, the minor cannot later, by another guardian or on becoming a major avoid the decree if it is against him, on the ground of some irregularity in the procedure adopted for appointing the guardian, Here no procedural irregularity as such is alleged, but it is said that the father should have been appointed and not the grandfather. Even ignoring the fact that a reason has been given for the choice of the grandfather, on the findings of the Courts below, there has been effective representation of the minor in the suit and there has been no omission on the part of the guardian that has prejudiced the interests of the minor in the present suit. Even ignoring the fact that a reason has been given for the choice of the grandfather, on the findings of the Courts below, there has been effective representation of the minor in the suit and there has been no omission on the part of the guardian that has prejudiced the interests of the minor in the present suit. In Rarichan v. Manakkal Raman, 44 Mad LJ 515 = (AIR 1923 Mad 553), while a contention was urged that a guardian appointed by a competent authority under the Guardians and Wards Act, had been improperly superseded and a Court guardian appointed without recording proper reasons under Order 32, Rule 4, clause (2), it was observed at p. 519 (of Mad LJ) = (at p. 555 of AIR): "Now in the first place as I have already said it is not very clear that he was so appointed (appointed by Competent Authority) plaintiff's' own case being that he was not so appointed. But even if we take it that he had been so appointed, the failure to record reasons under Rule 4, Clause (2), is only an irregularity in my opinion and will not by itself vitiate the decree if the minor is in fact properly represented by a guardian appointee by Court." "It follows that the view of the Courts below that the plaintiff was properly represented in the suit, O.S, No. 386 of 1953, on the file of the Sub-Court, Coimbatore, is correct.” 28. Learned Single Judge of Madras High Court in Rangammal versus minor Appasami and others, AIR 1973 Madras 12 has held that where the minor’s interests have been adequately safeguarded by his natural father by representing him in the suit, the mere absence of a formal order appointing the natural father as guardian ad litem will not vitiate the decree against the minor. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “10. Following the above decisions, I am of opinion that the minor's interests have been adequately safeguarded in the former suit by the natural father of the minor representing him and taking part in the proceedings in the court and the mere fact that a formal order was not passed will not vitiate the decree, ad that there has been a substantial representation of the minor in the former suit. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. No leave.” 29. The Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Amrik Singh and another versus Karnail Singh and others, AIR 1974 Punjab & Haryana 315 has held that no irregularity by way of an omission to send a notice as required under order 32 rule 3 shall operate to render void the presumed representation of the minors in a suit, unless such omission has in fact, prejudiced their defence, and such prejudice is not a matter of assumption or presumption but of proof. Full Bench has held as under: “10. In Krishna Behari's case AIR 1954 Pat 349 , the mother was the certificated guardian but in spite of that one Maulvi Muhamad Majeed, a pleader, was appointed guardian ad-litem. The process was also served on the mother but she was not described in the process as the certificated guardian. When the Court In spite of this infirmity it was held as follows:- "When the Court, in ignorance of the fact that the minor has a guardian appointed by a competent authority, appoints another person, that does not by itself vitiate either the decree passed in the suit or the sale held in execution of the decree. The whole question is whether any prejudice has been caused to the minor, and, in the absence of any allegation of fraud or prejudice to the minor caused by the irregularity, the proceedings must be regarded as valid." It will appear that this decision does not support the contention of the learned counsel and is in line with the view which I am inclined to take, namely that the illegality in not strictly adhering to the provisions of Order 32, Rule 3 does not necessarily render the decree void, or, in other words, a nullity. 15. In Nirmal Chandra Ray's case AIR 1965 Cal 562 , the following propositions were laid:- 1. 15. In Nirmal Chandra Ray's case AIR 1965 Cal 562 , the following propositions were laid:- 1. Where a proper person had been appointed, with the sanction of the Court and in compliance with the mandatory provisions of law, to act as guardian-ad-litem in a suit, the decree passed in such suit cannot be challenged on the ground of a mere irregularity in the matter of appointment of such person as guardian-ad-litem, not causing any prejudice, such as the absence of a formal order of appointment by reason of the doctrine of effective representation. 2. The forgoing doctrine has no application where the Court has not considered any proposal for the appointment of a guardian-ad-item. 3. The provisions of sub-rule (4) of R. 3 and sub-rule (3) of R. 4 of O. 32, are mandatory and a decree obtained against a minor in complete disregard of these provisions is without jurisdiction and void ab initio. Banerjee, J., one of the learned Judges constituting the Bench, further observed:- "The doctrine of substantial representation is a matter of substance and not of form. Where a minor was effectively represented in a suit by a guardian, although not formally appointed, and suffered no prejudice on account of the informality, the absence of a formal order of appointment of guardian is not fatal to the suit." This decision shows that it is only where a minor is not at all represented, in fact or in law, that the decision rendered against him will be void. But where there is substantial representation of the minor the decision will not become void, unless the minor has suffered prejudice by non-compliance of the provisions of Order 32, Rule 3. 16. In Govindan's case AIR 1964 Ker 244 , it was observed that "the failure to appoint the natural guardians of the minors as guardians ad litem is not a mere irregularity in procedure." In this case, no attempt was made to appoint the legal guardians as guardians-ad-litem. Straightway a Court guardian was appointed. This case is, therefore, distinguishable. 23. After going through the case law cited before me, I have come to the conclusion that each case must be settled on its own facts and it would not be appropriate to lay down any general rule. The crux of the matter is that it has to be seen whether the minor was effectively represented in the litigation. 23. After going through the case law cited before me, I have come to the conclusion that each case must be settled on its own facts and it would not be appropriate to lay down any general rule. The crux of the matter is that it has to be seen whether the minor was effectively represented in the litigation. If he was, then the non-compliance with the provisions of Order 32, Rule 3, which are mandatory, would not render the decision void. But if the non-compliance has caused prejudice to the minor or he was not effectively represented, the decision will be void, i.e., the minor can either ignore it or avoid it. This approach is in consonance with justice because where the matter has been properly contested and no prejudice has been caused to the minor, it will be sheer injustice to the other side to re-open the matter again. Litigation is a very expensive affair and the general principle of law is that it should not be encouraged. In this view of the matter, so far as the facts of the present case are concerned, there can be no two opinions that the minors were effectively represented and no prejudice has been caused to them. Their interests were effectively safeguarded by their brothers, who were co-defendants with them and whose interests were identical. They contested the suit on all conceivable grounds. The learned counsel for the minors has been unable to bring to our notice any evidence or any contention which would enable us to hold that a wrong decree was obtained.” 30. Consequently, all the substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 31. In view of observations and discussions made hereinabove, there is no merit in the Regular Second Appeal and the same is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.