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2012 DIGILAW 644 (KER)

Malabar Sand & Stones (Pvt. ) Ltd v. Catholic Syrian Bank Limited

2012-07-09

P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON

body2012
ORDER The legal question involved in this writ petition is, whether Ext. P16 communication issued by the Bank is in conformity with the mandatory requirement under Section 13 (3A) of the SARFAESI Act, in dealing with Ext. P15 representation preferred by the petitioner in response to Ext. P14 notice under Section 13(2) of the Act. 2. The petitioner, a Company incorporated under the relevant provisions of the Companies quarrying unit in stone crusher unit and a Act, with intent to set up a Kannur district, proceeded with steps for procuring all the requisite licences and sought to avail financial assistance from the respondent Bank. As a matter of fact, four different loans were sought for; among which, three loans were granted on 14-08-2009 and one loan was granted on 17-08-2010, on the strength of guarantee given by the parties concerned and of course on the basis of security interest created over different extents of property. On receipt of Ext. P14 notice under Section 13(2), the petitioner preferred Ext. P15 reply/representation, pointing out the various adverse circumstances relevant to be considered and seeking not to wilful defaulter and to refrain from further proceedings. declare the petitioner as a This however was not properly considered, while summarily rejecting the same as per Ext. P16 order dated 06-06-2010, which in turn is under challenge, stating that, by virtue of the mandate under Section 13(3A), reasons for rejection have necessarily to be communicated within one week, which requirement is conspicuously not satisfied while issuing Ext. P16. 3. The sequence of events as narrated in the writ petition shows that, the petitioner, in the stone crusher unit had to obtain different licenses from different attempt to set up a corners, like clearance certificate to be given by the Pollution Control Board, the licence to be issued by the local authority/panchayath, fire & rescue licence, explosive licence etc. The petitioner obtained the necessary licenses for setting up the unit and the installation of the trial run conducted in the presence of Pollution machinery was effected; followed by Control Board. At this juncture, some of the local people intervened and forcefully obstructed the activities, which forced the petitioner to approach this Court by filing W.P. (C) No. 33452 of 2010, which was disposed of as per Ext. P2 judgment dated 18-01-2011. The operative portion of the said judgment reads as follows : 10. At this juncture, some of the local people intervened and forcefully obstructed the activities, which forced the petitioner to approach this Court by filing W.P. (C) No. 33452 of 2010, which was disposed of as per Ext. P2 judgment dated 18-01-2011. The operative portion of the said judgment reads as follows : 10. This writ petition is in these circumstances allowed in part to the above extent. Police protection shall be afforded to the petitioner to establish and work the stone crusher unit under Ext.P3 subject to the condition that raw materials for the crusher shall be brought to stone crusher in accordance with law in due compliance with all relevant laws and on the undertaking that blasting with explosives and quarrying shall not be done at the or near the site. We do however make it clear that if requisite permission etc. are obtained for undertaking the work of blasting rocks with due permission from the authorities and after the orders of the civil Courts are vacated, the petitioner shall be at liberty to undertake such activity and this judgment will not stand against the same. We further make it clear that if while working the stone crusher there is any threat to environment it shall be open to the party respondents or concerned officials to complain about such violation and seek appropriate orders from Courts/authorities. Police protection shall be afforded only if the conditions are complied with strictly. As obvious from Ext. P2, there was some civil litigation as well, pursued by somebody before the concerned Civil Court, wherein an interim order of injunction was in existence. After obtaining Ext. P2 judgment, the petitioner moved the Civil Court and the interim order was got vacated as per Ext. P4 order dated 28-02-2011. 4. In the meanwhile, some other public spirited citizens approached this Court by filing W.P. (C) No. 33689 of 2010, wherein Ext.P5 interim order was passed on 08-11-2010, holding that, quarrying operation shall be conducted by the petitioner herein (who was the 14th respondent in the said writ petition), unless all proper licenses were sought for and obtained. explosive licence was Since the application preferred by the petitioner for granting pending consideration before the District Collector, Kannur, the petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P. (C) No. 35630 of 2010, which culminated in Ext. explosive licence was Since the application preferred by the petitioner for granting pending consideration before the District Collector, Kannur, the petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P. (C) No. 35630 of 2010, which culminated in Ext. P6 judgment dated 29-11-2010, directing the District Collector to consider and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law, as specified. Pursuant to Ext. P6 verdict, the application was considered and the petitioner was granted Ext. P7 licence under the relevant provision of the Explosive Rules, 2008 on 15-02-2011. 5. Despite satisfaction of the requirements as above, the local Panchayath did not grant necessary licence to the petitioner, which compelled the petitioner again to approach this Court, by filing W.P.(C) No. 7973 of 2011. The said writ petition was disposed of, as per Ext. P8 judgment dated 18-03-2011, directing the Panchayath to consider the application and to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law within one month. Pursuant to this, the matter was considered and Ext.P9 licence was issued by the Panchayath on 17-05-2011, enabling the quarrying operation using the explosive substances petitioner to conduct the. 6. Even before granting licence by the Panchayath on 16-05-2011, the petitioner had approached the respondent Bank by filing Ext. P10 representation on 14-03-2011, pointing rescheduling the repayment under the out the adverse circumstances and seeking for loan. This was followed by Ext.P11 representation dated 07-05-2011. According to the petitioner, without any regard to the same, the petitioner was served with Ext. P12 communication dated 20-08-2011, intimating the proposal to classify the petitioner as a wilful defaulter and seeking for explanation, if any, to be submitted within 15 days. On receipt of the same, the petitioner submitted a detailed representation, as borne by Ext.P13 a to leading to final sanction/licence issued by the Panchayath on 16-explaining 05-2011 and sought for the indulgence of the Bank to regularize the account granting a short over dueamount. Quite to the shock and surprise, the petitioner time to discharge the was served with Ext.P14 notice under Section 13(2) on 16-03-2012, upon which, the petitioner submitted Ext. P15 reply/representation dated 16-05-2012 explaining the hard realities and seeking to reschedule the loan. Obviously, Ext.P14 notice was issued prior to the date of licence given by the Panchayath and Ext. P15 representation was preferred on 16-05-2011, i.e. the date on which Ext. P9 licence was issued by the Panchayath. P15 reply/representation dated 16-05-2012 explaining the hard realities and seeking to reschedule the loan. Obviously, Ext.P14 notice was issued prior to the date of licence given by the Panchayath and Ext. P15 representation was preferred on 16-05-2011, i.e. the date on which Ext. P9 licence was issued by the Panchayath. This representation submitted by the petitioner in tune with Section 13(3A) has been summarily rejected by the Bank, issuing Ext. P16 on 06-06-2012, which in turn is under challenge in this writ petition. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent Bank, submits, on instructions that, much opportunity has already been extended by the Bank, enabling the petitioner to clear the liability, which however was not made use of by the petitioner. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the Bank, that Ext. P12 notice was issued to the petitioner on 20-08-2011, in March, 2011 and it was still much after the declaration of the account as months thereafter, that Ext. P14 notice was issued under Section 13(2). The reply submitted by the petitioner by way of Ext.P15 has been considered and rejected vide Ext. P16 showing the reasons, which hence is not assailable under any circumstances. The learned counsel also submits that the opportunity given to the borrowers/ defaulters for submitting the objection is dispute if any, with regard to the liability to be satisfied, the with reference to the property to be proceeded against and such other lapses/violation on the part of the respondent rescheduling the Bank; whereas in Ext. P15, the request made by the petitioner is for loan account, referring to some adverse circumstances stated as suffered by the petitioner, which according to the Bank, is not germane for deciding the issue. 8. For the purpose of proper adjudication, it is necessary to have a reference to the relevant provision, Section 13(3A) of the SARFAESI Act reads as follows : 13 (3A) If, on receipt of the notice under sub-section (2), the borrower makes any representation or raises any objection, the secured creditor shall consider such representation or objection and if the secured creditor comes to the conclusion that such representation or objection is not acceptable or tenable, he shall communicate within one week of receipt of such representation or objection the reasons for non-acceptance of the representation or objection to the borrower. Provided that the reasons so communicated or the likely action of the secured creditor or the stage of communication of reasons shall not confer any right upon the borrower to prefer an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 or the Court of District Judge under Section 17A. It becomes also necessary to have a look at the relevant Rule i.e. Rule 3A of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, which is extracted below : 3A. Reply to representation to the borrower : (a) After issue of demand notice under sub-section (2) of Section 13, if the borrower makes any representation or raises any objection to the notice, the Authorised Officer shall consider such representation or objection and examine whether the same is acceptable or tenable. (b) If on examining the representation made or objection raised by the borrower, the secured creditor is satisfied that there is a need to make any changes or modifications in the demand notice, he shall modify the notice accordingly and serve a revised notice or pass such other suitable orders as deemed necessary, within seven days from the date of receipt of the representation or objection. (c) If on examining the representation made or objection raised, the Authorized Officer comes to the conclusion that such representation or objection is not acceptable or tenable, he shall communicate within one week of receipt of such representation or objection, the reasons for non-acceptance of the representation or objection, to the borrower. 9. From the statutory provisions as above, it is very much clear that the issuance of notice representation or under Section 13(2) enables the party concerned to file a objection simultaneously making it obligatory on the part of the Bank to consider such objection as the case may be, and to pass reasoned order and representation or communicate the same to the party concerned, if same is not acceptable. The question to be considered is, whether the word/term used in the statutory provision as above, by way of objection, will tilt the balance in any representation over and above the term manner, with regard to the idea and understanding of the Bank, as now projected before this Court is wrong. 10. The question to be considered is, whether the word/term used in the statutory provision as above, by way of objection, will tilt the balance in any representation over and above the term manner, with regard to the idea and understanding of the Bank, as now projected before this Court is wrong. 10. True, there may be circumstances, when some or other lapses may occur on the part of the Bank in proceeding with the property or with regard to the quantum of liability or as to the proper compliance with the statutory prescriptions. This appears to be the circumstances, objection is filed/put by the objection can be raised and if any such where party concerned, of course, it is a matter to be considered by the Bank, under Section 13(3A) objection is not acceptable. The opportunity and to communicate the reasons, if the representation stands for conferred upon the party by the Statute enabling to file a lapses or something else, which need not necessarily constitute any objection as to the failure on the part of the Bank, but will take in such other circumstances as well, which according to the petitioner/defaulter is relevant for persuading the Bank from not proceeding with further steps under Section 13(4). The adverse circumstances, as faced by the petitioner herein, by way of different litigations before different for a, including this Court and Civil Court, because of the objection raised by the local public and necessity to have obtained police protection; the hurdles placed in procuring the necessary licenses and to start commercial production of the unit, which has come to a reality only on getting the requisite rainy season licence issued by the Panchayat on 16.05.2011, followed by immediate and such other adverse circumstances may be the matters to be considered and dealt with by representation. In other words, the term the Bank, as projected in the objection is not a representation used in the provision over and above the term substitute or cannot be considered as otiose under any circumstance. The word has been used consciously by the law makers, with a definite purpose and it has to be given effect to. No word used in the Statute is to be considered as something unnecessary and the Rules of Interpretation require it to be read and understood, as to give meaning/effect to every such word, adopting a course of harmonious interpretation. No word used in the Statute is to be considered as something unnecessary and the Rules of Interpretation require it to be read and understood, as to give meaning/effect to every such word, adopting a course of harmonious interpretation. Rule 3A of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules 2002 brought in the Statute book w.e.f. 02.02.2007, stipulates under objection raised, representation or the clause (b), that on examining the secured creditor is satisfied that there is need to make any changes/modification in the demand notice, he shall modify the notice accordingly and serve notice and pass such other suitable orders as deemed necessary, within the time as prescribed. 11. True, sending of reply showing the reason by itself will not give rise to any cause of proviso to Section 13 (3A). But the opportunity action to the defaulter, in view of the objection is representation or given to the party concerned, enabling to file not an empty formality. This is more so, in view of the observations made by the Apex Court in Mardia Chemicals Limited v. Union of India ( AIR 2004 SC 2371 ), paragraphs 45 and 80 are relevant, which read as follows : 45. In the background we have indicated above, we may consider as to what forums or remedies are available to the borrower to ventilate his grievance. The purpose of serving a notice upon the borrower under sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Act is, that a reply may be submitted by the borrower explaining the reasons as to why measures may or may not be taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13 in case of non-compliance of notice within 60 days. The creditor must apply its mind to the objections raised in reply to such notice and an internal mechanism must be particularly evolved to consider such objections raised in the reply to the notice. There may be some meaningful consideration of the objections raised rather than to ritually reject them and proceed to take drastic measures under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. There may be some meaningful consideration of the objections raised rather than to ritually reject them and proceed to take drastic measures under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. Once such a duty is envisaged on the part of the creditor it would only be conducive to the principles of fairness on the part of the banks and financial institutions in dealing with their borrowers to apprise them of the reason for not accepting the objections or points raised in reply to the notice served upon them before proceeding to take measures under sub-section (4) of Section 13. Such reasons, overruling the objections of the borrower, must also be communicated to the borrower by the secured creditor. It will only be in fulfillment of a requirement of reasonableness and fairness in the dealings of institutional financing which is so important from the point of view of the economy of the country and would serve the purpose in the growth of a healthy economy. It would certainly provide guidance to the secured debtors in general in conducting the affairs in a manner that they may not be found defaulting and being made liable for the unsavoury steps contained under subsection (4) of Section 13. At the same time, more importantly we must make it clear unequivocally that communication of the reasons not accepting the objections taken by the secured borrower may not be taken to give an occasion to resort to such proceedings which are not permissible under the provisions of the Act. But communication of reasons not to accept the objections of the borrower, would certainly be for the purpose of his knowledge which would be a step forward towards his right to know as to why his objections have not been accepted by the secured creditor who intends to resort to harsh steps of taking over the management/business of viz. secured assets without intervention of the Court. Such a person in respect of whom steps under Section 13(4) of the Act are likely to be taken cannot be denied the right to know the reason of non-acceptance and of his objections. secured assets without intervention of the Court. Such a person in respect of whom steps under Section 13(4) of the Act are likely to be taken cannot be denied the right to know the reason of non-acceptance and of his objections. It is true, as per the provisions under the Act, he may not be entitled to challenge the reasons communicated or the likely action of the secured creditor at that point of time unless his right to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal as provided under Section 17 of the Act matures on any measure having been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. 80. Under the Act in consideration, we find that before taking action a notice of 60 days is required to be given and after the measures under Section 13(4) of the Act have been taken, a mechanism has been provided under Section 17 of the Act to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The above noted provisions are for the purposes of giving some reasonable protection to the borrower. Viewing the matter in the above perspective, we find what emerges from different provisions of the Act, is as follows :- 1. Under sub-section (2) of Section 13 it is incumbent upon the secured creditor to serve 60 days notice before proceeding to take any of the measures as provided under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. After service of notice, if the borrower raises any objection or places facts for consideration of the secured creditor, such reply to the notice must be considered with due application of mind and the reasons for not accepting the objections, howsoever brief they may be, must be communicated to the borrower. In connection with this conclusion we have already held a discussion in the earlier part of the judgment. The reasons so communicated shall only be for the purposes of the information/knowledge of the borrower without giving rise to any right to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act, at that stage. 2. As already discussed earlier, on measures having been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13 and before the date of sale/auction of the property it would be open for the borrower to file an appeal (petition) under Section 17 of the Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. 3. 2. As already discussed earlier, on measures having been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13 and before the date of sale/auction of the property it would be open for the borrower to file an appeal (petition) under Section 17 of the Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. 3. That the Tribunal in exercise of its ancillary powers shall have jurisdiction to pass any stay/interim order subject to the condition as it may deem fit and proper to impose. 4. In view of the discussion already held on this behalf, we find that the requirement of deposit of 75% of amount claimed before entertaining an appeal (petition) under Section 17 of the Act is an oppressive, onerous and arbitrary condition against all the canons of reasonableness. Such a condition is invalid and it is liable to be struck down. 5. As discussed earlier in this judgment, we find that it will be open to maintain a civil suit in civil Court, within the narrow scope and on the limited grounds on which they are permissible, in the matters relating to an English mortgage enforceable without intervention of the Court. 12. Considering the reply stated as given by the respondent Bank vide Ext. P16, upon Ext. representation preferred by the petitioner in response to Ext. P14 notice under P15 Section 13(2), this Court finds that the various points projected by the petitioner in Ext. P15 representation have not been properly considered with proper application of mind and reasons, if not acceptable, have not been given with necessary clarity. In the said circumstances, this Court finds that Ext. 16 is not in conformity with the statutory mandate under Section 13 (3A) of the SARFAESI Act and Rule 3A of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 and also the law declared by the Apex Court in Mardia Chemicals case ( AIR 2004 SC 2371 ) (cited supra). Accordingly, the same is set aside. The respondent reasoned order and communicate Bank is directed to reconsider Ext. P15 and pass a the same to the petitioner within one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The Writ Petition is allowed to the said extent. No cost. Petition allowed.