S. Talapatra, J,;— 1. For filing the writ appeal against the judgment and order, dated 6.6.2012, as passed in WP(C) No.296/2011, the delay of 146 days has occurred and for condoning such delay this miscellaneous application, under Chapter VA of the Gauhati High Court Rules, has been filed by the State-appellants. 2. Heard Mr. J. Majumder, learned counsel, appearing for the State-appellants and Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. S.B. Debnath, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent No. 1. 3. In response to the notice, as issued by the order dated 25.1.2012, the respondents appeared and filed objection to the prayer for condonation of delay. Causes as assigned in this application for explaining the delay can be encapsulated as follows : (a) The copy of the impugned judgment and order, dated 6.6.2011, was received on 9.6.2011. Thereafter, the Government Advocate sent his office of the Director General of Police along with the note dated 13.6.2011. As per the Memorandum No.F.29(9)-FIN(G)/2004, dated 18.4.2011, before taking any legal action the opinion of the Law Department and the Finance Department is required to be taken on the judgment. Accordingly, the file was moved to the Law Department on 20.6.2011. (b) The Administrative Department placed the case file to the Government Advocate on 30.6.2011. Again the Government Advocate gave his note on 7.7.2011 for placing the case file to the Additional Government Advocate and accordingly, he marked the case file to the Nodal Officer of the Police Headquarters. The Police Headquarters placed the file to the Additional Government Advocate on 12.7.2011. Learned Additional Government Advocate suggested for engagement of the Advocate on record to prefer appeal on 25.7.2011. Thereafter, the file moved for engagement of the Advocate on record. Letter of engagement was issued on 2.8.2011 and thereafter, the file routed to the Police Headquarters on 5.8.2011. For preparation of memo of appeal a clarification was sought by the said Advocate on 17.8.2011. The file reached to the Police Headquarter and finally, on 19.8.2011, the same was placed before the Advocate General. (c) The Advocate General sought for further clarifications over the matter by his note dated 26.8.2011. The clarification was given by the note dated 29.8.2011 and on the next date, the case records were placed at the office of the Advocate General. (c) The Advocate General sought for further clarifications over the matter by his note dated 26.8.2011. The clarification was given by the note dated 29.8.2011 and on the next date, the case records were placed at the office of the Advocate General. Ultimately, the view of the Advocate General was available on 9.9.2011 but as there was conflict of opinions between the Law Department and the learned Advocate General the case file again routed to the Law Department on 12.9.2011. The Law Department gave its view on 17.9.2011 and thereafter, the case file routed back to the Home Department. (d) The Home Department placed the file to the Finance Department on 23.9.2011 whereas the Finance Department gave its view on 13.10.2011. The case file routed back to the Police Headquarter on 17.10.2011. Afterwards, the case file was again placed before the learned Advocate on record. At that time said Advocate was out of the city from 1.10.2011 to 30.10.2011 for enjoying the long vacation in the High Court. Accordingly, the memo of appeal was prepared on 14.11.2011. Thereafter, the draft of the memo of appeal along with the connected application was sent to the Government for filing the appeal after complying the necessary formalities. On vetting the drafts, on 26.11.2011, the affidavit was sworn on 12.12.2011 and in the course, delay of 146 days occurred. In the objection, the respondents contended that there was no explanation of delay for quite some long period. Moreover, in para 2 of the said objection the respondents pointed out to some incongruous statements. Apart that, it is stated that the causes of the delay, as assigned, cannot be accepted as sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The settled principle of condoning the delay of such long period is that the court shall not condone the delay mechanically and liberally unless it is found that such condonation is essentially required for securing the ends of justice. 4. Mr. J. Majumder, learned counsel, appearing for the State-appellants, quite vehemently emphasized that the High Court does not have any jurisdiction authorized by law to grant compensation for the death of one Gourchan Sarkar, husband of the petitioner No.1 and father of the petitioner No. 2 as consequence of an incidental firing occurred on 3.8.2000. Mr. 4. Mr. J. Majumder, learned counsel, appearing for the State-appellants, quite vehemently emphasized that the High Court does not have any jurisdiction authorized by law to grant compensation for the death of one Gourchan Sarkar, husband of the petitioner No.1 and father of the petitioner No. 2 as consequence of an incidental firing occurred on 3.8.2000. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel also contended that the decisions as relied for passing the impugned judgment and order in Writ Appeal No.65/2002 - Sint. Chandrapati Debbarma v. State of Tripura and Ors., (2011) 1 GLR 704 and Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141 , are or the custodial death or for the custodial torture and those decisions cannot have any manner of implication in this case. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel for the State-appellants, strenuously highlighted that only in the cases of custodial death or torture the State can be saddled with liability of paying compensation and not otherwise. He further contended that the quantum of compensation as well has no reasonable basis. It is exorbitant and illogical and as such, interference in the appeal is essentially required. 5. For appreciation, the factual matrix of the case is required to be reconsidered: The pleaded case of the writ petitioners is that Gourchan Sarkar husband of the writ petitioner No.1 and father of the writ petitioner No. 2 while selling the jackfruits and other vegetables on 3.8.2000 at Mohorcharra market had received bullet injuries from firing by the police and CRPF personnel and he had succumbed to those injuries on the spot. Initially by the judgment and order dated 22.2.2002, learned Single Judge directed the State-appellants to pay a sum of Rs.2,00,000 to the writ petitioners, namely, Smt. Sulekha Sarkar and Sri Dilip Sarkar with further observations that since the CRPF personnel accompanied the State Police under the command of the S.D.P.O., the Union of India could not be held responsible. As corollary to that observation, the learned Single Judge also directed to pay the compensation to the extent of Rs.2,00,000 out of which, an amount of Rs.50,000 was to be invested in beneficial deposit scheme to be withdrawn by the two minors, namely, Ms. Purnima Sarkar and Shri Uttam Sarkar on their attaining majority and the rest amount of Rs. 1.50,000 was to be paid to the mother, widow wife and marriageable daughter of the deceased in equal shares. Purnima Sarkar and Shri Uttam Sarkar on their attaining majority and the rest amount of Rs. 1.50,000 was to be paid to the mother, widow wife and marriageable daughter of the deceased in equal shares. Being aggrieved by that judgment and order, dated 22.2.2002, the State-appellants filed a writ appeal being WA No. 37/2002 and the writ petitioners also filed another writ appeal being WA No. 56/2002. Both the writ appeals were disposed of by the judgment and order, dated 5.6.2007, appointing District and Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala as the Fact Finding Authority/Inquiry Officer, who should make an independent inquiry irrespective of any observation made in the order and should also contemplate on the following aspects, inter alia, on other points at his pleasure for giving report: (i) cause and the circumstances leading to the firing; (ii) justification of firing; (iii) persons responsible for inflicting injuries to the writ petitioner and to the public; and (iv) degree of responsibility and accountability of the State Government authorities, role of the State Government and Police Personnel in such firing. It was further directed that report should be submitted preferably within a period of six months. With this appointment of the Fact Finding Authority the writ petition being WP(C) No.296/2011 was relegated to the learned Single Judge for a fresh decision. After the report was received from the learned District Judge, the writ petition was again taken up for hearing. In the report the Fact Finding Authority observed that the police personnel were surrounded by a mob of 300/400 and it was at that time the police personnel opened fired. The District and Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, the Fact Finding Authority, came to the conclusion that while CRPF and the police personnel were performing their duties, yet there was no cause for unjustified firing in violation of the law which not only resulted in the death of Gourchan Sarkar, an innocent vegetable vendor, but also resulted in injuries of other person, namely, Biswajit Gope alias Ghosh. The District and Sessions Judge noted that PW39, one Sub-Inspector of Police, namely, Samiran Chakraborty, who had investigated the incident stated specifically that during investigation it was not revealed that any villager was armed with any fire arm at the time of said incident. The District and Sessions Judge noted that PW39, one Sub-Inspector of Police, namely, Samiran Chakraborty, who had investigated the incident stated specifically that during investigation it was not revealed that any villager was armed with any fire arm at the time of said incident. It has been further noted in the report that no one from the CRPF or from the police personnel gave any explanation why such preliminary steps of 'Lathi Charge' or using of 'Tear Gas' were not taken before opening fire on the mob in the market area. The learned Single Judge awarded compensation of Rs.2,50,000 in another case in favour of Biswajit Gope alias Ghosh who suffered injuries. The award as made in favour of Biswajit Gope @ Ghosh was taken as the basis for assessing the compensation for the death of Gourchan Das, who was aged about 42 years. The learned Single Judge assessed the compensation at Rs.4 lakhs. The State-appellants was directed to make the payment of the said quantified compensation to the writ petitioners within such period not later than 15th August, 2011. Failure thereof would obligate the appellants to pay interest @ 9% per annum. 6. On a close scrutiny of the entire records, the case of the State-appellants, as it reveals is that for maintaining the law and order situation the police and the CRPF personnel were compelled to open fire and the mob also fired some rounds to the police personnel. In the said firing Gourchan Sarkar died out of the bullet injury but the State-appellants were not liable to pay any compensation. They also contended that the unruly mob started throwing brick bats, etc., on the police/ CRPF personnel. The agitated mob became so furious that there was possibility of loss of life of the police/CRPF and the Government properties like arms and ammunitions. Finding no other effective alternative, the pro forma respondent No. 7 herein ordered to open fire in the air with a view to disperse the unruly mob. But the Fact Finding Authority/learned District and Sessions Judge had debunked the theory holding that the investigating officer of that incident had specifically stated that member of the mob was unarmed and the fire was opened without giving sufficient caution. 7. Mr. But the Fact Finding Authority/learned District and Sessions Judge had debunked the theory holding that the investigating officer of that incident had specifically stated that member of the mob was unarmed and the fire was opened without giving sufficient caution. 7. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel raised a jurisprudential objection as to power of this court under article 226 for grant of compensation to the victim of the police firing for purpose of demonstrating the element of the substantive justice as contemplated in the writ appeal. It is well found that the police opened fire unprovoked and without sounding proper alarm in a market. In the case in hand, Gourchan' Sarkar, the deceased, was the victim of such unwarranted State action, invading the right to life as observed under article 21 of the Constitution of India. 8. In M. V. Elisabeth v. Harwan Investment and Trading (P.) Ltd., 1993 Supp (2) 433, the Apex Court held as follows : "86. The judicial power of this country, which is an aspect of national sovereignty, is vested in the people and is articulated in the provisions of the Constitution and the laws and is exercised by courts empowered to exercise it. It is absurd to confine that power to the provisions of imperial statutes of a bygone age. Access to court which is an important right vested in every citizen implies the existence of the power of the court to render justice according to law. Where statute is silent and judicial intervention is required. Courts strive to redress grievances according to what is perceived to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience." Following M.V. Elisabeth (supra), the High Court of Delhi in Smt. Kamala Devi v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Anr., WP(C) No.173/ 1997, held at para 16 as under : "16. The public law demand, as distinct from the private law tort remedy, is that crime victims be given compensation even in "no-fault" situations by the State. Compensation cannot be limited to cases of police torture or custodial deaths. It must extend to riot victims and victims of terror, indeed, it must ultimately cover all victims of crime and all criminal injuries. Legislation is lacking in this field. But, that should not deter High Courts, which are courts of unlimited and plenary jurisdiction, from intervening and redressing grievances according to "principles of justice, equity and good conscience". It must extend to riot victims and victims of terror, indeed, it must ultimately cover all victims of crime and all criminal injuries. Legislation is lacking in this field. But, that should not deter High Courts, which are courts of unlimited and plenary jurisdiction, from intervening and redressing grievances according to "principles of justice, equity and good conscience". Not to intervene would amount to shirking the responsibilities which High Courts are expected to shoulder. So, compensation is payable to the petitioner by the State for the death of Uday Singh for the breach of the constitutional guarantee of article 21 that "no person shall be deprived of his life except according to procedure established by law." Even in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, 1997 Crl. LJ 743, the Apex Court held : "The court, where the infringement of the fundamental right is established, therefore, cannot stop by giving a mere declaration. It must proceed further to give compensatory relief, not by way of damages as in a civil action but by way of compensation under the public law jurisdiction for the wrong done, due to breach of public duty by the State of not protecting the fundamental right to life of the citizen. To repair the wrong done and give judicial redress for legal injury is a compulsion of judicial conscience." In D.K. Basu (supra), the Apex Court cleared the ground for the grant of compensation under article 226 of the Constitution in situations where there was a dereliction of public duty on the part of the State. The following passage clarifies the legal position : "44. The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortuous acts of the public servants. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under article 32 or article 226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under article 21, is an exercise of the courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. 45. The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts too much, as the protector and custodian of the indefeasible rights of the citizens. The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. A court of law cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere punishment of the offender cannot give much solace to the family of the victim — civil action for damages is a long drawn and a cumbersome judicial process. Monetary compensation for redressal by the court finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to life of the citizen is, therefore, useful and at time perhaps the only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of the family members of the deceased victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the family." 9. The jurisprudential objection, as raised by Mr. Majumder, learned counsel, appearing for the State-appellants, therefore, does not hold any force. The High Court under the public law jurisdiction has authority to give compensatory relief for the wrong done, due to breach of public duty by the State of not protecting the fundamental right to life. The fact that the State is a welfare-State and not laissez faire State colours the interpretation of right to life. A bona fide action of the public servants may be immune from accountability from the criminal law but justifiability thereof may not be weighed in the golden scale. The fact that the State is a welfare-State and not laissez faire State colours the interpretation of right to life. A bona fide action of the public servants may be immune from accountability from the criminal law but justifiability thereof may not be weighed in the golden scale. An innocent victim is certainly entitled to claim monetary compensation, even there is justification for the police firing. The objection as regards the quantum of compensation is bound to fall through. It can be gathered from the records and the impugned judgment and order, the deceased, the sole breadwinner for the family is survived by many dependents. Had it been assessed in terms of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy and Ors., AIR 2011 SCW 6418, the quantum could not have been assessed less than 10 lakhs. The quantum as assessed by the learned Single Judge is much less than the quantum as was determined by the Apex Court in Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy (supra). As such, no interference is called for in the circumstance of this case as no appeal has been preferred by the writ petitioners. The writ appeal, thus, falls hopelessly far short of any merit. 10. In view of this, we are not inclined to condone the delay and accordingly, the prayer for condoning the delay for filing the writ appeal is hereby dismissed. However, there would be no order as to cost. _____________