ORDER T. Nanda Kumar Singh, J. 1. The challenge in this writ petition is to-(i) the detention order being No. Cril/NSA/No.100 of 2011, Imphal the 24th August, 2011 issued by the District Magistrate Imphal West Manipur in exercise of the powers conferred by sub section-3 of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA for short) read with Home Department's order No. 17(1)/49/80-H (Pt-I) dated 09.8.2011 directing the petitioner-detenu, Shri Thiyam Imocha Singh, who is now in police custody, be detained under Section 3(2) of the NSA, 1980 until further orders; (ii) the order of the Governor of Manipur being No. 17(1)158/2011-H: Imphal the 1st Sept. 2011 for approving the detention order dated 24.8.2011 and also (iii) the order of the Governor being No. 17(1)158/2011-H: Imphal the 7th Oct. 2011 for confirming the detention order dated 24.8.2011 and fixed the period of detention for 12(twelve) months from the date of detention only on the ground that rights of the petitioner-detenu guaranteed under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India had been infringed. Heard Mr. A. Bimol, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-detenu, Mr. S. Nepolean, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos-1 and 2 as well as Mr. Amarjit Naorem, learned CGSC appearing for the respondent No. 3. FACTUAL BACK GROUND 2. The petitioner is a citizen of India and retired from his service as Rifleman in the 7th Bn. Manipur Rifles in 1997 on medical grounds. Thereafter, the petitioner-detenu along with his wife and their children (four in number) resided at Pallen Wajang Village in Thoubal District and he was leading a peaceful life along with the members of his family doing part time small business and cultivating his agricultural land. The petitioner-detenu came to Imphal along with his second son, who is studying in Standard College, Kongba to drop his said son at his rented place at New Chekon in Imphal East District. Thereafter, petitioner went to visit the family members of his cousin brother, Shri Thiyam Shyamkeshwore Singh who is residing at Uripok Huidrom Leikai in Imphal West District. The father of the petitioner-detenu and the father of Shri Thiyam Shyamkeshwore Singh were brothers born by the same parents and as such they are close relatives. 3. Thereafter, petitioner went to visit the family members of his cousin brother, Shri Thiyam Shyamkeshwore Singh who is residing at Uripok Huidrom Leikai in Imphal West District. The father of the petitioner-detenu and the father of Shri Thiyam Shyamkeshwore Singh were brothers born by the same parents and as such they are close relatives. 3. When the petitioner-detenu was leaving his cousin's home, his cousin Shri Thiyam Shyamkeshwore Singh requested the petitioner detenu to drop him at Keishampat on the way back to petitioner-detenu's home. When they were proceeding across Keishampat, they were detained and arrested by some Manipur Police personnel on the mere suspension that the petitioner-detenu's cousin brother is a member of PREPAK. No incriminating document and article were seized from the possession of the petitioner-detenu and he was assured by those police personnel that he will be released as soon as they reach Imphal Police Station. Later on petitioner-detenu came to know that many untrue, false and serious allegations had been made against him and detained on the basis of those false allegations and charges. On the mere allegation that the petitioner is having nexus with the Underground organization, the Superintendent of Police, Imphal West District made a report to the District Magistrate, Imphal West for detaining the petitioner-detenu under the provisions of NSA, 1980. It is the further case of the petitioner-detenu that copy of the Police Report which accompanied with the history sheet of the petitioner-detenu containing the false allegations against the petitioner-detenu regarding some manufactured and concocted incidents, was not furnished to the petitioner-detenu. Basing on the said police report which was accompanied with the material documents and history sheet of the petitioner-detenu, the District Magistrate Imphal West issued the impugned detention order dated 24.8.2011 while the petitioner-detenu was in police custody. 4. For appreciation of the case of the petitioner-detenu, it would be required to peruse the impugned detention order dated 24.8.2011 which read as follows : ORDERS Imphal the 24th August, 2011 No. Cril/NSA/No.100 of 2011 : Whereas, a police report has been laid before me that Shri Thiyam Imocha Singh @ Imphal City (52 yrs) s/o (L) Th. Chaoba Singh of Pallen Wajang Village, P.S. Kakching, District-Thoubal Manipur is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Chaoba Singh of Pallen Wajang Village, P.S. Kakching, District-Thoubal Manipur is acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Whereas, I, K. Radhakumar Singh, District Magistrate, Imphal West, Manipur am satisfied that his activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order under Section 3(2) of National Security Act, 1980; Whereas, it is considered necessary to detain Shri Thiyam Imocha Singh @ Imphal City (52 yrs) s/o (L) Th. Chaoba Singh of Pallen Wajang Village, P.O. Kakching, District-Thoubal, Manipur who is now in Police custody, is likely to be released on bail since one accused Shri L. Manikanta Singh @ Mani s/o L. Iboton Singh of Iroisemba Maning Leikai a member of UNLF who was arrested on 19.4.2010 in connection with FIR No. 32(4)2010 LPS under Section 20 UA(P)A. Act & 25(1-B)A. Act was released on bail by the court on 26.4.2010 and also likely to continue to act in the manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order, and also that an alternative preventive measure is called for. Now, therefore, I.K. Radhakumar Singh, District Magistrate, Imphal West, Manipur in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-Section 3 of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 read with Home Department's Order No. 17(1)/49/80-H(Pt.I) dated 09.08.2011 make this order directing that the above said person who is now in Police custody be detained under Section 3(2) of National Security Act, 1980 until further orders. Given under my Hand and Seal of the Court on this twenty-fourth day of August, 2011. Sd/- (K. Radhakumar Singh) District Magistrate, Imphal West. 5. In pursuance of section 8 of the NSA, 1980 the learned District Magistrate Imphal West under his letter being No.Cril/NSA/100 of 2011, Imphal the 26th August, 2011 furnished not only the grounds of detention but also the copies of the documents which form the bases of the grounds of detention. The copies of the documents which form the bases of the grounds of detention furnished to the petitioner-detenu are mentioned in para 5 of the said letter dated 26.8.2011 which read as follows : '5. That, the copies of the following documents which form the basic grounds of your detention are enclosed herewith for your reference :- a) Your statement given before the I.O. on 20.8.2011. b) Statement of S.I. Gunachandra Ch. That, the copies of the following documents which form the basic grounds of your detention are enclosed herewith for your reference :- a) Your statement given before the I.O. on 20.8.2011. b) Statement of S.I. Gunachandra Ch. Of CDO/IW, recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC in connection FIR No. 486(8) 2011 IPS under Section 17/20 UA(P)A Act. c) State of C/No.0901060 Ng. Gupta Singh of CDO/IW, recorded under Section 161 Cr. PC in connection FIR No. 486(8) 2011 IPS under Section 17/20 UA(P)A Act. d) Statement of C/No.0901781 N. Vidyakumar Singh of CDO/IW, recorded under Section 161 Cr. PC in connection FIR No. 486(8) 2011 IPS under Section 17/20 UA(P)A Act. e) Copy of the Arrest Memo dated 19.08.2011. f) Copy of the Seizure Memo dated 19.08.2011. g) Copy of Notification under No. S.O. 2883(E) dated 13.11.2009. h) Copy of local daily "Poknapham" dated 8.3.99. i) Copy of FIR No. 486(8) 2011 IPS under Section 17/20 UA(P)A Act. j) Copy of FIR No. 32(4) 2010 LPS under Section 20 UA(P)A Act & 25(I-B)A Act. k) Copy of release order dated 26.4.2010. l) Copy of the Government of Manipur, Home Department's Order No. 17(1)49/80-H(Pt-I) dated 09.08.2011. 6. The Governor of Manipur, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 3(4) of the NSA, 1980 was pleased to approve the order of detention (impugned detention order) dated 24.8.2011 vide order No. 17(1) 158/2011-H Imphal, the 1st September, 2011 and subsequently the Governor of Manipur, after consideration of the past activities of the petitioner-detenu being a member of the banned organization, namely Peoples' Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and potential danger of the past activities which were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and also likelihood of his continuing such activities the moment he is released from detention, was of the firm opinion that petitioner-detenu should be detained for a period of 12(twelve)months as provided under Section 13 of the NSA in consonance with the opinion expressed by the Advisory Board and accordingly the Governor of Manipur, in exercise of the powers conferred under sub section 12(1) of the NSA was pleased to confirm detention of the petitioner-detenu by the District Magistrate, Imphal West under his order dated 24.8.2011 and fix the period of detention for 12(twelve) months from the date of detention vide order of the Governor, Manipur being No. 17(1) 158/2011-H Imphal, the 7th October, 2011. 7. 7. The petitioner-detenu filed representation dated 31.10.2011 to the Chief Secretary, Government of Manipur against the impugned detention order dated 24.8.2011, the approval order dated 1.9.2011 and the confirmation order dated 7.10.2011 and prayed for an appropriate action to secure the petitioner-detenu released from detention without further delay. In the said representation dated 31.10.2011 the petitioner-detenu made various grounds for revocation of the detention order for violation of the rights of the petitioner-detenu guaranteed under the Constitution of India and also vide para No. 10 of the representation the petitioner-detenu requested the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Manipur to furnish copy of the police report containing his history sheet so as to enable him to make an effective and purposeful representation to the concerned authority. Para 10 of the said representation dated 31.10.2011 read as follows: 10. I have not been furnished a true copy of the police report containing my history sheet which has been laid before the detaining Authority and on the basis of which the detaining Authority has been satisfied to detain me under the provisions of NSA. I am badly in need of perusing the aforesaid police report containing/including all documents enclosed therein in order to enable me to make an effective and purposeful representation to the concerned Authorities. You are, therefore, requested kindly to furnish to me the copies of the aforesaid documents at the earliest possible time. 8. The relevant pleadings of the petitioner-detenu in the writ petition for assailing the impugned detention order, approval order and the confirmation order on the ground of violation of the rights of the petitioner-detenu guaranteed under Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India for non furnishing of the police report which contained the history sheet are in para 6 and 12 (b) of the writ petition which read as follows : 6. That on mere allegation of the petitioner having nexus with underground organization, the Superintendent of Police, Imphal West District, made a report to the District Magistrate, Imphal West for detaining the petitioner under the provisions of NSA, 1980. However, a copy of the said report including the history sheet of the petitioner was not furnished to the petitioner despite his request made to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Manipur to furnish the same so as to enable the Petitioner to make an effective and purposeful representation for his release from such detention. 12(B). However, a copy of the said report including the history sheet of the petitioner was not furnished to the petitioner despite his request made to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Manipur to furnish the same so as to enable the Petitioner to make an effective and purposeful representation for his release from such detention. 12(B). For that although the order of detention dated 24.08.2011 (at Annexure-A/1 hereof) as well as the grounds of detention dated 26.08.2011 (at Annexure-A/2(Colly hereof) are materially and conspicuously based on the report and history sheet of the Petitioner furnished by the Police, the Petitioner has not been supplied copies of the said report and his history sheet prepared by the Police despite the request made by the Petitioner in his representation for furnishing the same; accordingly the petitioner is deprived of his valuable right to make an appropriate and meaningful representation to the concerned Authorities. 9. The respondent No. 1, District Magistrate Imphal West District, had filed affidavit in-opposition in the writ petition. It is worth to note that in the affidavit in-opposition it is clearly stated that the detaining authority (District Magistrate) after having thorough examination of all the relevant and material documents with due application of mind and after arriving at the subjective satisfaction, the detention order dated 24.8.2011 was passed as a preventive measure. The police report consisting of several documents, material documents along with a forwarding letter was also submitted by the sponsoring authority (Superintendent of Police Imphal West) to the detaining authority. However, the District Magistrate in quite contradictory to the earlier statements in his affidavit in-opposition, stated that the history sheet was not a relied document in arriving at the subjective satisfaction. The relevant portion of the para No. 4 of the affidavit in-opposition of the respondent No. 1 read as follows: 4..................................... It is to submit further that after having thorough examination of all the relevant and material documents with due application of mind and after arriving at the subjective satisfaction the said detention order dated 24.8.2011 was passed as a preventive measure. That, as regards to the police report, it is humbly submitted that the same is a report consisting of several relevant and material documents along with a forwarding letter which was submitted by the Sponsoring Authority to the Detaining Authority. After examining the said material documents thoroughly, the present detention order was passed. That, as regards to the police report, it is humbly submitted that the same is a report consisting of several relevant and material documents along with a forwarding letter which was submitted by the Sponsoring Authority to the Detaining Authority. After examining the said material documents thoroughly, the present detention order was passed. These were the relied upon documents which were also reflected at para No. 5 of the grounds of detention. The said forwarding letter and history sheet were not the relied upon document in arriving at the subjective satisfaction. 10. The State respondent, i.e. Respondent No. 2, also filed affidavit in-opposition wherein it is stated that the detaining authority is the proper authority to give reply to the material documents and material facts considered by the detaining authority for issuing the impugned detention order dated 24.8.2011. 11. On careful perusal of the affidavits in-opposition filed separately by the Respondent No. 1 and the Respondent No. 2, it is clear that the police report submitted by the Superintendent of Police, Imphal West consists of several relevant documents, such as history sheet and forwarding letter. The detaining authority, after thorough examination of all relevant material documents with due application of mind, arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the petitioner-detenu is to be detained under the impugned detention order dated 24.8.2011. However, in the affidavit in-opposition filed by the respondent No. 1 again stated that the forwarding letter and history sheet were not relied upon documents in arriving at the subjective satisfaction which are apparently contradictory to the above statement made in the affidavit. Over and above none of the Respondents, i.e. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, by resorting to Art. 22(6) of the Constitution of India, did not state that disclosure of the police report and history sheet will be against public interest; therefore, the State respondents are not claiming privilege under Article 22(6) of the Constitution of India regarding the police report which contains the history sheet and other material documents. 12. Of all human rights the right to personal liberty and individual freedom is probably the most cherished. This right may, however, be curtailed by preventive detention laws, which can be used to consign an individual to the confines of jail without any trial, on the basis of the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority on the basis of the materials placed before him. This right may, however, be curtailed by preventive detention laws, which can be used to consign an individual to the confines of jail without any trial, on the basis of the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority on the basis of the materials placed before him. The Courts, which are empowered to issue prerogative writs have, therefore, to be extremely cautious in examining the matter in which a detention order is passed in respect of an individual so that his right to personal liberty and individual freedom is not arbitrarily taken away from him even temporarily without following the procedures prescribed by law. 13. Deprivation of personal freedom must be founded on the most serious considerations relevant to the welfare objective of the society, specified in the Constitution. The object of law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence. It is resorted when the Executive is convinced that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the persons detained from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain objects which are specified by the law. The framers of the Constitution, being aware that preventive detention involves a serious encroachment on the right to personal liberty, took care to incorporate, in clause (4) and (5) of Article 22, certain minimum safeguards for the protection of persons sought to be preventively detained. These safeguards are required to be "zealously watched and enforced by the Court". The Apex Court in Rattan Singh Vs State of Punjab: (1981) 4 SCC 481 observed that : .... May be that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase!) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralyzed the Indian economy. But the loss of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenus...." (Ref: Para-4 of the SCC in Rattan Singh's case (supra)). The Apex Court (Constitution Bench), by relying on the earlier decision in Rattan Singh's case (supra) held that procedural safeguards provided for protection of persons sought to be preventively detained should be seriously enforced by the Court. (Ref: Kamaleshkumar Iswardas Patel Vs. Union of India & Ors.: (1995) 4 SCC 51 ). The Apex Court (Constitution Bench), by relying on the earlier decision in Rattan Singh's case (supra) held that procedural safeguards provided for protection of persons sought to be preventively detained should be seriously enforced by the Court. (Ref: Kamaleshkumar Iswardas Patel Vs. Union of India & Ors.: (1995) 4 SCC 51 ). 14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of Maharastra Vs. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande: (2008) 3 SCC 613 held that the Court must be conscious and mindful of the fact that jurisdiction of preventive detention is "suspicious jurisdiction" based on suspicion and an action is taken with a view to preventing a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the certain activities enumerated in the detention law. Interference by a court of law at that stage, must be an exception rather than a rule because the exercise can be undertaken by a writ court with extreme care, caution and circumspection. Para 63 of the SCC in Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande (supra) read as follows : 63. From the foregoing discussion, in our judgment, the law appears to be fairly well settled and it is this. As a general rule, an order of detention passed by a detaining authority under the relevant "preventive detention" law cannot be set aside by a writ court at the pre-execution or pre-arrest stage unless the court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances specified in Addl. Secy, to the Govt. of India vs. Alka Subhash Gadia, 1992 Sukpp(1) SCC 496: 1992 SCC (Cril)301. The Court must be conscious and mindful of the fact that this is a "suspicious jurisdiction" i.e. jurisdiction based on suspicion and an action is taken "with a view to preventing" a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to certain activities enumerated in the relevant detention law. Interference by a court of law at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule and such an exercise can be undertaken by a writ court with extreme care, caution and circumspection. A detenu cannot ordinarily seek a writ of mandamus if he does not surrender and is not served with an order of detention and the grounds in support of such order. 15. The Hon'ble Apex Court (3 Judges) in Rekha Vs. State of T.N. : 2011 4 Scale 387 also reiterated that the preventive detention is often described as jurisdiction of suspicion. 15. The Hon'ble Apex Court (3 Judges) in Rekha Vs. State of T.N. : 2011 4 Scale 387 also reiterated that the preventive detention is often described as jurisdiction of suspicion. Para No. 40 of the SCC in Rekha's case (supra) read as follows : 40. It must be remembered that in cases of preventive detention no offence is proved and the justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability, and there is no conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive detention is often described as a 'jurisdiction of suspicion', (Vide State of Maharashtra Vs. Bharurao Punjabrao Gawande, (supra) - para 63). The detaining authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction. Since clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability of clauses (1) and (2), the detenu is not entitled to a lawyer or the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. 16. From the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande's case (supra) and Rekha Devi's case (supra), it is clear that jurisdiction to order preventive detention is a suspicious jurisdiction i.e. jurisdiction based on suspicion and an action is taken with a view to preventing a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the certain activities enumerated in the relevant detention law. The interference of Court of law at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule. It is quite well settled that the suspicion should be based on materials i.e. on the objective basis. 17. Mr. A. Bimol, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, in support of the grounds mentioned above for assailing the impugned detention order dated 24.8.2011, the subsequent approval order dated 1.9.2011 and the confirmation order dated 7.10.2011, had relied on the decisions of the Apex Court in :- (a) (1975) 2 SCC 81 (Prs. 3(c), 13-15) :Khudiram Das Vs. State of West Bengal, (b) (1975) 2 SCC 4 , (Prs. 5, 7-9) :Golam Vs. State of WB, (c) (1975) 4 SCC 108 : AIR 1975 SC 1513 : Bablu Das Vs. State of West Bengal, (d) (1990) 2 SCC 1 (Prs 19, 20 and 27) : M. Ahamed Kutty Vs. Union of India, (e) (1999) 2 SCC 413 (Pr. 9): Pawanmmal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (f) (2006) 11 SCC 339 , (Prs. 27, 29-32) : Adishwar Jain Vs. State of West Bengal, (d) (1990) 2 SCC 1 (Prs 19, 20 and 27) : M. Ahamed Kutty Vs. Union of India, (e) (1999) 2 SCC 413 (Pr. 9): Pawanmmal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (f) (2006) 11 SCC 339 , (Prs. 27, 29-32) : Adishwar Jain Vs. Union of India, (g) (2008) 17 SCC 348 (Prs. 25-31) : Union of India Vs. Ranu Bhandari, (h) (2009) 11 SCC 438 , (Prs. 5, 6, 10-33): Thahira Maris Vs. Govt. of Karnataka. 18. To the contra Mr. S. Nepolean, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State respondents relied on the decisions of (a) AIR 1981 SC 2166 : Wasi Uddin Ahmed Vs. District Magistrate, Aligarh, (b) (2011) 2 GLT 202: K. Dimajit Singh Vs. District Magistrate, (c) (2010) 5 GLT 158: K. Gunaban Singh Vs. District Magistrate, Imphal West, (d) (2009) 1 SCC 333 , and (e) (2011) 5 SCC 244 : Rekha Vs. State of Tamil Nadu. 19. The constitutional imperatives enacted in Article 22 of the Constitution of India are two folds- (i) detaining authority must, as soon as may be, that is, as soon as practicable after the detention, communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, and (2) the detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. These are the barest minimum safeguards which must be observed before an executive authority can be permitted to preventively detain a person thereby drown his right of personal liberty in the name of public good and social scrutiny. It is also settled beyond controversy that even if a law of preventive detention may pass a test of Article 22, it has yet to satisfy the requirements of other fundamental rights such as Article 19. So, a law relating to preventive detention must meet the requirements of Art. 14 and 19. 20. The personal liberty protected under Art.21 is so sacrosanct and so high in the scale of constitutional value that it is the obligation of the detaining authority to show that the impugned detention meticulously accords with the procedures established by law. The history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards. 20. The personal liberty protected under Art.21 is so sacrosanct and so high in the scale of constitutional value that it is the obligation of the detaining authority to show that the impugned detention meticulously accords with the procedures established by law. The history of liberty is the history of procedural safeguards. These procedural safeguards are required to be jealously watched and enforced by the Court; their rigours cannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of the nature of the alleged activities of the detenu. It is an exception to Article 21 of the Constitution and it cannot override Article 21 which is the most important fundamental right. However, Art.22 (3) (b) which permits the preventive detention, is not itself a fundamental right, but only an exception to Article 21. An exception can be applied only in rare and exceptional cases. 21. It is now well settled in preventive law that for filing an effective representation against the detention order by the detenu, the material documents which form the bases of the grounds of detention should be furnished to the petitioner-detenu normally. It is also well settled that material documents relied upon by the detaining authority for coming to the subjective satisfaction even if the detaining authority stated later on that some of the material documents were not relied upon, should be furnished to the detenu. Now the core questions fall for consideration in the present case are - what are the material documents once relied upon by the detaining authority? Can the detaining authority later on say that the said material documents are not the bases of the grounds of detention? The Apex Court in the catena of cases held that the Courts shall look the records to see as to what are the material documents relied upon by the detaining authority keeping in view of the detention order in case the detention order mentions clearly that the detaining authority had relied upon or had considered the material documents mentioned in the detention order itself for coming to his subjective satisfaction that the petitioner is to be detained under NSA but later on while furnishing the grounds of detention the detaining authority stated that only those documents mentioned in the grounds of detention are relied upon, the said documents relied on for passing the detention order will not be the material documents. We are giving our decision for the reasons mentioned in the following paras. 22. In Khudiram's case (supra) the history sheet of the petitioner-detenu was before the District Magistrate when he made the order of detention though the District Magistrate states in his affidavit in reply that beyond the three incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention, he (District Magistrate) did not take any other material in the history-sheet into account in passing the order of detention. In these circumstances the Apex Court held that it would be impossible to say that he (District Magistrate) was not influenced by such other materials such as history sheet. Since no opportunity was given to the petitioner-detenu to make an effective representation against such other materials and grounds of detention, the order of detention was in contravention of Art.22 (5) of the Constitution of India. Regarding this point, the findings of the Apex Court (4 Judges) in Khudiram's case (supra) in para No. 13, 14 and 15 of the SCC read as follows :- 13. That disposes of grounds (a) and (b) and we must now proceed to consider ground (c). Now before we consider ground (c), we must deal with an objection raised by Counsel on behalf of the State, which if well founded, would cut shot an inquiry into this ground. Counsel on behalf of the State submitted that though the District Magistrate in his affidavit in reply admitted that besides the three incidents referred to in the grounds of detention, other material was also placed before him, he stated on oath that he did not take such other material into account in making the order of detention and this statement on oath made by him must be accepted as correct and that should be an end to all further inquiry by the Court. He strenuously protested against the Court requiring the State to produce the history-sheet of the petitioner containing other material which was before the District Magistrate. His argument was that it was not competent to the Court to probe further into the matter for the purpose of examining what was the nature of the other material before the District Magistrate and whether he was influenced by such other material in making the order of detention. His argument was that it was not competent to the Court to probe further into the matter for the purpose of examining what was the nature of the other material before the District Magistrate and whether he was influenced by such other material in making the order of detention. This claim made by Counsel on behalf of the State is indeed a bold claim calculated to shut out judicial intrusion merely on the strength of ipse dixit of the detaining authority. We cannot countenance such a claim. Indeed, in Daktar Mudi v. State of West Bangal : AIR 1974 SC 2086 : (1975)3 SCC 301 a similar claim was made on behalf of the State of West Bengal and it was negatived by this very Bench speaking through one of us (P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J) in the following words : SCC pp. 303-304, 5 & 6; SCC (CRI) pp. 911-912) It was contended by Mr. Mukherjee on behalf of the State Government that this Court ought not look into the record for satisfying itself as to whether the District Magistrate could have arrived at the conclusion when he says he has arrived at that satisfaction only on the grounds mentioned in the detention order. We do not think that this would be a correct approach. Where the liberty of a subject is involved and he has been detained without trial, and a law made pursuant to Article 22 which provides certain safeguards, it is the duty of this Court as the custodian and sentinel on the ever vigilant guard of the freedom of an individual to scrutinize with due care and anxiety that this precious right which he has under the Constitution is not in any way taken away capriciously, arbitrarily or without any legal justification. This Court has held that where grounds are furnished to the detenu those grounds must not be vague and must be such as to enable him to make a proper and effective representation, against his detention. This Court has held that where grounds are furnished to the detenu those grounds must not be vague and must be such as to enable him to make a proper and effective representation, against his detention. This Court has further held that where there are several grounds, even if one ground is vague, then it is difficult to say whether the ground which is vague and in respect of which the detenu could not make an effective representation did not influence the mind of the detaining authority in arriving at his subjective satisfaction that the detenu would in future be likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. If the detention order is held invalid on this count, it would be equally so in a case where there are other materials on which the detaining authority could have been influenced in arriving at this subjective satisfaction but which he has not mentioned in the grounds of detention, nor communicated them to the detenu. In such circumstances whether the other materials on record had any effect on the mind of the detaining authority cannot be accepted solely on his statement, because to admit that he alone has such a right would be to accept that the mere ipse dixit of the detaining authority would be sufficient and cannot be looked into. There is a possibility that certain materials on record would disclose that the activities of the detenu are of a serious nature having a nexus with the object of the Act, namely, the prevention of prejudicial acts affecting the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, and having proximity with the time when the subjective satisfaction forming the basis of the detention order had been arrived at. If these elements exist, then the Court would be justified in taking the view that these must have influenced the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and the omission to indicate those materials to the detenu would prejudice him in making an effective representation, If so, the detention order on that account would be illegal. If these elements exist, then the Court would be justified in taking the view that these must have influenced the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and the omission to indicate those materials to the detenu would prejudice him in making an effective representation, If so, the detention order on that account would be illegal. Where the liberty of the subject is involved, it is the bounden duty of the Court to satisfy itself that all the safeguards provided by the law have been scrupulously observed and the subject is not deprived of his personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with law. Section 8(1) of the Act, which merely re-enacts the constitutional requirements of Article 22(5), insists that all basic facts and particulars which influenced the detaining authority in arriving at the requisite satisfaction leading to the making of the order of detention must be communicated to the detenu, so that the detenu may have an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention. It is, therefore, no only the right of the Court, but also its duty as well, to examine what are the basic facts and materials which actually and in fact weighed with the detaining authority in reaching the requisite satisfaction. The judicial scrutiny cannot be foreclosed by a mere statement of the detaining authority that it has taken into account only certain basic facts and materials and though other basic facts and materials were before it, it has not allowed them to influence its satisfaction. The court is entitled to examine the correctness of this statement and determine for itself whether there were any other basic facts or materials, apart from those admitted by it, which could have reasonably influenced the decision of the detaining authority and for that purpose, the Court can certainly require the detaining authority to produce and make available to the Court the entire records of the case which was before it. That is the least the Court can do to ensure observance of the requirements of law by the detaining authority. 14. Now, here, it was common ground that the history-sheet of the petitioner was placed by the police authorities before the District Magistrate and it was read by him. That is the least the Court can do to ensure observance of the requirements of law by the detaining authority. 14. Now, here, it was common ground that the history-sheet of the petitioner was placed by the police authorities before the District Magistrate and it was read by him. The history-sheet recited the following facts and particulars : This does not help him in maintaining the family and as such he became associated with the criminals viz Kanani Mondal of Krishnapur, Kuren Monmal of Krishnapur. He picked up the habit of committing theft of copper wire and as such he mixed up with Mohini Ranjan Das alias Nillan of Uttar Lakshipur, P.S. Koliachak and committed theft of copper wires and there were several theft of transformers from villages like Betrabad, Utar Lakshipur, Sultanganj, Nandalpur all under Kuliachack P.S. and then proceeded to narrate the three incidents set out in the grounds of detention as "some of his misdeeds." The material which was before the District Magistrate, thus, consisted of the facts and particulars extracted above from the history-sheet in addition to the three incidents set out in the grounds of detention. This material was not disclosed to the petitioner as, according to the statement of the District Magistrate in his affidavit in-reply, he had not taken it into account in reaching his subjective satisfaction. The question is whether this statement made by the District Magistrate in his affidavit-in-reply should be accepted as correct. Is there anything in this material which should persuade us to say that the District Magistrate must have been influenced by it and we should not, therefore, accept his assertion as its face value ? 15. Now, the proposition can hardly be disputed that if there is before the District Magistrate material against the detenu which is of a highly damaging character and having nexus and relevancy with the object of detention, and proximity with the time when the subjective satisfaction forming the basis of the detention order was arrived at, it would be legitimate for the Court to infer that such material must have influenced the District Magistrate in arriving at his subjective satisfaction and in such a case the Court would refuse to accept the bald statement of the District Magistrate that he did not take such material into account and excluded it from consideration. It is elementary that the human mind does not function in compartments. When it receives impressions from different sources, it is the totality of the impressions which goes into the making of the decision and it is not possible to analyze and dissect the impressions and predicate which impressions went into the making of the decision and which did not. Nor is it an easy exercise to erase the impression created by particular circumstances so as to exclude the influence of such impression in the decision making process. Therefore, in a case where the material before the District Magistrate is of a character which would in all reasonable probability be likely to influence the decision of any reasonable human being, the Court would be most reluctant to accept the ipse dixit of the District Magistrate that he was not so influenced and a fortiori, if such material is not disclosed to the detenu, the order of detention would be vitiated, both on the ground that all the basic facts and materials which influenced the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate were not communicated to the detenu as also on the ground that the detenu was denied an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention. The Apex Court in Khudiram's case (supra) held that the Court is entitled to examine the correctness of the statements of the detaining authority and determine for itself whether there were any other facts or materials apart from those admitted by it which could have reasonably influenced, i.e. the decision of the detaining authority and for that purpose the Court can certainly require the detaining authority to produce and make available to the Court the entire records of the case which was before it. 23. In the present case also Court had directed the learned Government Advocate to make the entire records of the case available before this Court and we have also carefully perused the records. The forwarding letter of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Imphal West District Manipur dated 22.8.2011 to the detaining authority, i.e. the District Magistrate is also available on record. Relevant portion of which is quoted herein :- No. 22/Spl-Cell/2011(97)/4645 Imphal, the 22nd Aug. 2011 To The District Magistrate, Imphal West District, Manipur. Subject: Detention of person under the National Security Act, 1980. Relevant portion of which is quoted herein :- No. 22/Spl-Cell/2011(97)/4645 Imphal, the 22nd Aug. 2011 To The District Magistrate, Imphal West District, Manipur. Subject: Detention of person under the National Security Act, 1980. Sir, I am to forward herewith the History Sheet along with the relevant documents in respect of Shri Thiyam Imocha Singh @ Imphal City (52)s/o (L) Th. Chaoba Singh of Pallen Wajang village, P.S. Kakching, District-Thoubal, Manipur a hard core member of banned organization namely, Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK in short) in favour of perusal and issue of detention order under the National Security Act, 1980. It may be evident from the activities of the subject enumerated in the enclosed History Sheet that the said person has been acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State and it is not possible to prevent his activities by the application of ordinary laws. He may therefore, be detained under the Provision of the National Security Act, 1980. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Sr. Superintendent of Police, Imphal West District, Manipur. No. 22/Spl-Cell/2011(97)Imphal, the 22nd August, 2011 Copy to:- 1. The Inspector General of Police (Int), Manipur, Imphal. 2. The Inspector General Police(Zone-I), Manipur Imphal. 3. The Dy. Inspector General of Police (Range-I), Manipur, Imphal. 4. The Addl. Supdt. Of Police (P) Manipur, Imphal. For favour of kind information with a similar copy of each of the History sheet. Sr. Superintendent of Police, Imphal West District: Manipur. 24. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Lawrence Joachim Joseph D'Souza Vs. State of Bombay: AIR 1956 SC 531 had considered and discussed the enabling provisions of the detaining authority, i.e. clause (6) of Article 22 of the Constitution and held that it is the authority to take decision whether disclosure of the fact would be against the public interest in case non disclosure of the said fact will not cause prejudice to the detenu in filing effective representation and also that the detenu had been furnished adequate particulars of the grounds of detention to enable proper representation being made. 25. In Golam's case (supra) an additional material which is given in the history sheet and the contents of the FIR which evidently weighed to the detaining authority in making the order of detention, was not communicated to the detenu. 25. In Golam's case (supra) an additional material which is given in the history sheet and the contents of the FIR which evidently weighed to the detaining authority in making the order of detention, was not communicated to the detenu. On this score the Apex Court (4 Judges) held that the detention order is vitiated because of infringement of the rights of the detenu guaranteed under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Para 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the SCC in Golam's case (supra) read as follows : 3. In counter-affidavit filed by the District Magistrate, it is averred that he was "satisfied from the materials on record as stated in the grounds of detention", and the "acts committed by the detenue (as disclosed in the grounds furnished to the detenue)" about the necessity of making the detention order. It is nowhere said in the counter that anything more than the bald information given (vide Annexure A, to the counter) was communicated to the detenue. Therefore, neither the contents of the F.I.R. nor the vital particulars of the incident of theft on which the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate was based, were communicated to the detenue. The material served on the detenue is conspicuous by the non-mention of many facts of the incident, such as, the quantity of wheat stolen, the implements or weapons, if any, with the thieves, the show of force, if any, accompanying the theft, the magnitude and duration of the dislocation caused to the supplies and services etc. etc. 5. Shri Raghunath Singh, Advocate, appearing as amicus curiae for the petitioner contends that under the law the detaining authority was bound to communicate to the detenue, all material facts integral to the grounds of detention which weighed with the detaining authority in ordering the detention, and his failure to do so, has left the ground communicated deficient and vague, and, in consequence, deprived the detenue of his right of making an effective representation. For this reason, it is urged, the detention is illegal. 6. For this reason, it is urged, the detention is illegal. 6. Shri S.C. Majumdar, learned Counsel for the State, however, contends that this Court cannot test and review the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority by objective standards: nor can the Court go into the question whether the solitary ground of detention was sufficient to make the impugned order, the matter being one exclusively within the province of the authority. It is further maintained that the law requires only the "grounds" of detention, as distinguished from the 'particulars of the evidence,' to be communicated to the detenue, and that this requirement has been amply complied with in the instant case. 7. We think that the contention of the learned amicus curiae for the petitioner must prevail. No doubt, clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution and Section 8 of the Act do not, in terms, speak of 'particulars' or 'facts,' but only of 'grounds' to be communicated to the detenue. But this requirement is to be read in conjunction with the subservient to the primary mandate: "and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order", in the aforesaid clause (5). Thus construed, it is clear that in the context, 'grounds' does not merely mean a recital or reproduction of a ground of satisfaction of the authority in the language of Section 3 of the Act: nor is its connotation restricted to a bare statement of conclusions of fact. It means something more. That 'something' is the factual constituent of the 'ground' on which the subjective satisfaction of the authority is based. All the basic facts and material particulars, therefore, which have influenced the detaining authority in making the order of detention, will be covered by "grounds" within the contemplation of Article 22(5) and Section 8, and are required to be communicated to the detenue unless their disclosure is considered by the authority to be against public interest. The question whether this requirement is complied with or not is justifiable, indeed it is the duty of this Court as sentinel of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, to see that the liberty of none is taken away except in accordance with procedure prescribed by law. 8. The question whether this requirement is complied with or not is justifiable, indeed it is the duty of this Court as sentinel of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, to see that the liberty of none is taken away except in accordance with procedure prescribed by law. 8. In the case before us, we have perused the history-sheet (bio-data) of the petitioner which was submitted by the Superintendent of Police while moving the District Magistrate for detention of the petitioner. In this history-sheet it is inter alia stated that the petitioner started mixing with his associates and committing crime in the Canning R/S railway campus and specialized in wagon-breaking and pilfering of foodgrains. It is further mentioned in this history-sheet that while committing the theft of wheat from the wagons on September 10, 1972 the petitioner and his associates were carrying breaking implements, and when the railway staff warned the miscreants, the latter threatened the former with dire consequences. 26. The Apex Court in Bablu Das case (supra) held that non communication of all the materials including the history sheet of the detenu containing a serious and injurious circumstance about his criminal antecedents to the detenu, shall vitiate his rights guaranteed under Art. 22(5) of Constitution of India. Para 2 of the SCC in Bablu's case (supra) read as follows : 2. We have seen from the said bio-data that, apart from the single incident of crime which was communicated as a ground to the detenu, there is also a series of other injurious circumstances of the immediate past about the criminal antecedents of the detenu which were not communicated. Indeed, this chain of facts explain why in the counter affidavit it has been started that : The petitioner is notorious wagon-breaker and railway criminal and was indulging in committing thefts from goods train. For one thing, a 'notorious' wagon-breaker implies a course of conduct and not a single instance. For another, the factors which make up the notoriety and which are recited in the history sheet presented to the District Magistrate certainly must have induced him into the subjective satisfaction resulting in the detention. They were not communicated. The consequence is that the order is in violation of the constitutional provision in Article 22(5) and is bad. For this reason, the rule is made absolute and the petitioner is directed to be released forthwith. 27. They were not communicated. The consequence is that the order is in violation of the constitutional provision in Article 22(5) and is bad. For this reason, the rule is made absolute and the petitioner is directed to be released forthwith. 27. The Apex Court in M. Ahamedkutty's case (supra) held that all the documents relied upon and considered by the detaining authority shall be furnished to the detenu irrespective of the detenu already knew about their contents or not. Para 20 of the SCC in M. Ahamed Kutty's case read as follows :- 20. It is immaterial whether the detenu already knew about their contents or not. In Mehrunissa v. State of Maharastra : (1981) 2 SCC 709 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 592 it was held that the fact that the detenu was aware of the contents of the documents not furnished was immaterial and non-furnishing of the copy of the seizure list was held to be fatal. To appreciate this point one has to bear in mind that the detenu is in jail and has no access to his own documents. In Mohd. Zakir v. Delhi Administration: (1982)3 SCC 216 :1982 SCC (Cri) 695 it was reiterated that it being a constitutional imperative for the detaining authority to give the documents relied on and referred to in the order of detention pari passu the grounds of detention, those should be furnished at the earliest so that the detenu could make an effective representation immediately instead of waiting for the documents to be supplied with. The question of demanding the documents was wholly irrelevant and the infirmity in that regard was violative of constitutional safeguards enshrined in Article 22(5). 28. The Apex Court in Powanammal's case (supra) held that there is a distinction between the document which has been relied upon by the detaining authority in the grounds of detention and the document which finds mere reference in the grounds of detention. Where non supply of a document relied upon in the grounds of detention has been held to be fatal to continued detention, detenu need not show that any prejudice is caused to him. Where non supply of a document relied upon in the grounds of detention has been held to be fatal to continued detention, detenu need not show that any prejudice is caused to him. In the present case, the history sheet and other materials forwarded by the sponsoring authority, i.e. the Senior Superintendent of Police, Imphal West under his letter dated 22.8.2011 had been relied upon by the detaining authority as stated in his affidavit in-opposition filed in the present writ petition; but admittedly the history sheet and other which had been relied upon by the detaining authority had not been furnished to the petitioner-detenu. Para 9 of the SCC in Powanammal's case (supra) read as follows : 9. However, this Court has maintained a distinction between a document which has been relied upon by the detaining authority in the grounds of detention and a document which finds a mere reference in the grounds of detention. Whereas the non-supply of a copy of the document relied upon in the grounds of detention has been held to be fatal to continued detention, the detenu need not show that any prejudice is caused to him. This is because the non-supply of such a document would amount to denial of the right of being communicated the grounds and of being afforded the opportunity of making an effective representation against the order. But it would not be so where the document merely finds a reference in the order of detention or among the grounds thereof. In such a case, the detenu's complaint of non-supply of document has to be supported by prejudice caused to him in making an effective representation. What applies to a document would equally apply to furnishing a translated copy of the document in the language known to and understood by the detenu, should the document be in a different language. 29. The Apex Court in Adishwar Jain's case (supra) in a clear term held that the statement of the detenu having been relied upon by the detaining authority in one part of the order of detention, it cannot be later on stated by the said authority that he was not relying upon the same; therefore, same need not be supplied to the detenu. Para 27, 28, 29 and 32 of SCC in the Adishwar Jain's case (supra) read as follows :- 27. We have been taken through the order of detention. Para 27, 28, 29 and 32 of SCC in the Adishwar Jain's case (supra) read as follows :- 27. We have been taken through the order of detention. The statements of the appellant and the said Prabhjot Singh were recorded therein in extensor. Recording of such statement must have been made from the Xeroxed copies of such documents which were available with the detaining authority. The self-inculpatory statements of the appellant as also Prabhjit Singh purported to have been made in terms of Section 108 of the Customs Act were required to be considered before the order of detention could be passed. The same was not done. The original of such documents might not have been available with the detaining authority but admittedly the Xeroxed copies were. It has not been denied or disputed that even the Xeroxed copies of the said documents had not been supplied to the detenu. It may be true that the appellant in his representation dated 14.6.2005 requested for showing him the original documents referred to or mentioned in the grounds of detention but then at least the Xeroxed copies thereof should have been made available to him. 28. Learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that due to non-supply of documents which were not vital or have merely been referred to as incidental, the order of detention may not become vitiated as has been held by this Court in Kamarunnisa v. Union of India; (1991)1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC (Cril) 88. The said decision was rendered in a different fact situation. In the said decision, this Court stated the law, thus: (SCC pp. 142-43, para 14) If merely an incidental reference is made to some part of the investigation concerning a co-accused in the grounds of detention which has no relevance to the case set up against the detenus it is difficult to understand how the detenus could contend that there were denied the right to make an effective representation. It is not sufficient to say that the detenus were not supplied the copies of the documents in time on demand but it must further be shown that the non-supply has impaired the detenu's right to make an effective and purposeful representation. It is not sufficient to say that the detenus were not supplied the copies of the documents in time on demand but it must further be shown that the non-supply has impaired the detenu's right to make an effective and purposeful representation. Demand of any or every document, however irrelevant it may be for the detenu concerned, merely on the ground that there is a reference thereto in the grounds of detention, cannot vitiate an otherwise legal detention other. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in this behalf but what is essential is that the detenu must show that the failure to supply the documents before the meeting of the Advisory Board had impaired or prejudiced his right, however slight or insignificant it may be. In the present case, except stating that the documents were not supplied before the meeting of the Advisory Board, there is no pleading that it had resulted in the impairment of his right nor could counsel for the petitioners point out any such prejudice. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken by the Bombay High Court in this behalf is unassailable. 29. What is, therefore, relevant was as to whether the documents were material. If the documents were material so as to enable the detenu to make an effective representation which is his constitutional as also statutory right, non-supply thereof would vitiate the order of detention. 32. The detaining authority moreover while relying on the said documents in one part of the order of detention could not have stated in another part that he was not relying thereupon. They very fact that he had referred to the said statements in extenso is itself a pointer to the fact that he had relied upon the said documents. Even in the earlier part of the impugned order of detention i.e. detaining authority appears to have drawn its own conclusions. 30. The ratio laid down in Ahamedkutty's case (supra) had been reiterated in Ranu Bhanadari's case (supra) that the document relied upon by the detaining authority should be furnished to the detenu irrespective of the detenu had the knowledge thereof. Para 25 to 29 and 31 of SCC in the Ranu Bhandari's case (supra) read as follows : 25. 30. The ratio laid down in Ahamedkutty's case (supra) had been reiterated in Ranu Bhanadari's case (supra) that the document relied upon by the detaining authority should be furnished to the detenu irrespective of the detenu had the knowledge thereof. Para 25 to 29 and 31 of SCC in the Ranu Bhandari's case (supra) read as follows : 25. Keeping in mind the fact that of all human rights the right to personal liberty and individual freedom is probably the most cherished, we can now proceed to examine the contention advanced on behalf of the parties in the facts and circumstances of this case. But before we proceed to do so, it would be apposite to reproduce herein below a verse from a song which was introduced in the cinematographic version of Joy Adamson's memorable classic Born Free which in a few simple words encapsulates the essence of personal liberty and individual freedom and runs as follows : Born free, as free as the wind blows, As free as the grass grows. Born free to follow your heart. Born free and beauty surrounds you. The world still astounds you. Each time you look at a star. Stay free, with no walls to hide you. You're as free as the roving tide. So there's no need to hide. Born free and life is worth living. It's only worth living, if you're born free. The aforesaid words aptly describe the concept of personal liberty and individual freedom which may, however, be curtailed by preventive detention laws, which could be used to consign an individual to the confines of jail without any trial, on the basis of the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority on the basis of material placed before him. The courts which are empowered to issue prerogative writs have, therefore, to be extremely cautious in examining the manner in which a detention order is passed in respect of an individual so that his right to personal liberty and individual freedom is not arbitrarily taken away from him even temporarily without following the procedure prescribed by law. 26. The courts which are empowered to issue prerogative writs have, therefore, to be extremely cautious in examining the manner in which a detention order is passed in respect of an individual so that his right to personal liberty and individual freedom is not arbitrarily taken away from him even temporarily without following the procedure prescribed by law. 26. We have indicated hereinbefore that the consistent view expressed by this Court in matters relating to preventive detention is that while issuing an order of detention, the detaining authority must be provided with all the materials available against the individual concerned, both against him and in his favour, to enable it to reach a just conclusion that the detention of such individual is necessary in the interest of the State and the general public. 27. It has also been the consistent view that when a detention order is passed all the material relied upon by the detaining authority in making such an order, must be supplied to the detenu to enable him to make an effective representation against the detention order in compliance with Article 22(5) of the Constitution, irrespective of whether he had knowledge of the same or not. These have been recognized by this Court as the minimum safeguards to ensure that preventive detention laws, which are an evil necessity, do not become instruments of oppression in the hands of the authorities concerned or to avoid criminal proceedings which would entail a proper investigation. 28. In most cases the decisions of this Court have gone in favour of the detenu when even one of the grounds of detention did not satisfy the rigours of proof of its genuineness as a foundational fact in support thereof. 28. In most cases the decisions of this Court have gone in favour of the detenu when even one of the grounds of detention did not satisfy the rigours of proof of its genuineness as a foundational fact in support thereof. The decisions rendered in Ashdevi case (1979) 1 SCC 222 :1979 SCC (Cri)262, Mehrunissa case (1981) 2 SCC 709 :1981 SCC (Cri) 592, Ayya case (1989) 1 SCC (Cri) 153 and Ahamedkutty case (1990)2 SCC 1 : 1991 SCC (cri) 258, all referred to hereinbefore, have relied on the principle that although the State is empowered to issue orders of preventive detention, since the liberty of an individual was in question, such power should be exercised by the detaining authority on consideration of relevant material, both against and in favour of the individual concerned, to arrive at a just conclusion that his detention was necessary in the interest of public and to prevent him from continuing to indulge in activities which are against the public interest and the interest of the State. 29. This brings us to the next question as to whether even such material as had not been considered by the detaining authority while issuing the detention order, is required to be supplied to the detenu to enable him to make an effective representation against his detention. 31. Of course, in Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran case: (2009) 9 SCC 170: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1198 it was also made clear that there is no legal requirement that a copy of every document mentioned in the order has to be supplied to the detenu. What is, therefore, imperative is that copies of such documents which had been relied upon by the detaining authority for reaching the satisfaction that in the interest of the State and its citizens the preventive detention of the detenu is necessary, have to be supplied to him. Furthermore, if in this case, the detenu's representation and writ petition had been placed before the detaining authority, which according to the detenu contained his entire defence to the allegations made against him, the same may have weighed with the detaining authority as to the necessity of issuing the order of detention at all. 31. Apex Court is of the similar view in Thahira Haris's case (supra) that non supplying of relied document to the detenu rendered his continued detention illegal. 6. 31. Apex Court is of the similar view in Thahira Haris's case (supra) that non supplying of relied document to the detenu rendered his continued detention illegal. 6. We propose to deal with the impact of non-supply of relied upon and relevant documents on the detention order. 10. According to the detaining authority, copy of the detention order issued under COFEPOSA is a relied upon document. This document was admittedly not supplied to the detenu. Now it has become imperative to examine the settled law crystallized by a catena of judgments of this Court. Some of the ratios of those judgments are recapitulated as under. 15. In Khudiram Das v. State of W.B. : (1975) 2 SCC 81 :1975 SCC (Cri) 435 the Court observed that Article 22(5) insists that all basic facts and particulars which influenced the detaining autority in arriving at the requisite satisfaction leading to the making of the order of detention must be communicated to the detenu. Para 13 of this case reads as under: (SCC p. 96) 13.......Section 8(1) of the Act, which merely re-enacts the constitutional requirements of Article 22(5), insists that all basic facts and particulars which influenced the detaining authority in arriving at the requisite satisfaction leading to the making of the order of detention must be communicated to the detenu, so that the detenu may have an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention. It is, therefore, not only the right of the Court, but also its duty as well, to examine what are the basic facts and materials which actually and in fact weighed with the detaining authority in reaching the requisite satisfaction. The judicial scrutiny cannot be foreclosed by a mere statement of the detaining authority that it has taken into account only certain basic facts and materials and though other basic facts and materials were before it, it has not allowed them to influence its satisfaction. The Court is entitled to examine the correctness of this statement and determine for itself whether there were any other basic facts or materials, apart from those admitted by it, which could have reasonably influenced the decision of the detaining authority and for that purpose, the Court can certainly require the detaining authority to produce and make available to the Court the entire record of the case which was before it. That is the least the Court can do to ensure observance of the requirements of law by the detaining authority. 16. In Vakil Singh v. State of J & K : (1975) 3 SCC 545 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 109 the Court clarified that grounds meant materials on which the order of detention was primarily based, that is to say, all primary facts though not subsidiary facts or evidential details. 17. In Ganga Ramchand Bharvani v. Govt. of Maharastra : (1980) 4 SCC 624 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 86 the Court in para 16 observed as under: (SCC p. 629) 16.....The mere fact that the grounds of detention served on the detenu are elaborate, does not absolve the detaining authority of its constitutional responsibility to supply all the basic facts and materials relied upon in the grounds to the detenu. In the instant case, the grounds contain only the substance of the statements, while the detenu had asked for copies of the full text of those statements. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the absence of the full texts of these statements which had been referred to and relied upon the 'grounds' of detention, the detenus could not make an effective representation and there is disobedience of the second constitutional imperative pointed out in Khudiram case (1975) 2 SCC 81 :1975 SCC (Cri) 435. There is merit in this submission. 18. In S. Gurdip Singh v. Union of India (1981)1 SCC 419 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 168 this Court, while reiterating the legal position, observed that failure to furnish documents or materials which formed the basis of the detention order along with the grounds of detention and even on demand subsequently made by the detenu would amount to failure to serve the grounds of detention and, therefore, would vitiate the detention order and make it void ab initio. 26. In Ram Baochan Dubey v. State of Maharashtra : (1982) 3 SCC 383 : 1983 SCC (Cri)59(2) this Court reiterated the legal position and observed that mere service of the grounds of detention is not a compliance with the mandatory provisions of Article 22(5) unless the grounds are accompanied with the documents which are referred to or relied on in the grounds of detention. Any lapse would render the detention order void. 31. Any lapse would render the detention order void. 31. In the instant case, admittedly, the relied upon document, the detention order of Anil Kumar was not supplied to the detenu and the detenu was prevented from making effective representation which has violated his constitutional right under clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution. 32. The Supreme Court (2 Judges) in Wasi Uddin Ahmed's case (supra) held that right of the detenu under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution is subject to a provision of Art.22 (6) of the Constitution of India and therefore disclosure of facts which the authority considered against public interest, such authority, therefore, is not bound to disclose intelligent report which includes the history-sheet and it was not necessary for him to supply the history sheet. In the case in hand the detaining authority and the State Government did not even make a whisper in their affidavits that disclosure of the history sheet and the material documents furnished by the sponsoring authority, i.e. Senior Superintendent of Police, Imphal West, Manipur under his letter dated 22.8.2011 will be against public interest and therefore they claim the privilege of the said documents under Art. 22(6) of the Constitution of India. Para 20 of the AIR in Wasi Uddin's case read as follows :- 20. No doubt, the constitutional imperatives of Art.22(5) enjoin the disclosure of all the basic facts and materials which have been taken into account by the detaining authority in making the order of detention, but this right of the detenu is subject to the provisions of Art. 22(6). Article 22(6) of the Constitution provides that nothing in cl.(5) shall require an authority making an order of detention, to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest. Under Art. 22(6), the District Magistrate was, therefore, not bound to disclose the intelligence reports and it was also not necessary for him to supply the history-sheet, if any. In Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1975 SC 550 ) (supra) the Court, in somewhat similar circumstances, held that the non-disclosure of the history-sheet had not the effect of invalidating the order of detention. 33. In Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1975 SC 550 ) (supra) the Court, in somewhat similar circumstances, held that the non-disclosure of the history-sheet had not the effect of invalidating the order of detention. 33. This Court in K. Dimajit Singh's case (supra) did not hold that the detaining authority had relied on the history sheet for coming to the subjective satisfaction for detaining the detenu and also what the Court decided in Dimajit Singh's case (supra) was that 8(eight) documents including the extract of the statement of the detenu recorded by the I.O. were furnished to the detenu and those documents do form what is known as Police Report and also no law or authority has been cited by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-detenu to persuade this Court to hold that omission to furnish the history sheet will render the detention illegal. Facts of the Dimajit Singh's case (supra) are diametrically different from that of the present case. Para 8 of the GLT in Dimajit Singh's case (supra) read as follows : 8. On perusing the grounds of detention, there can be no dispute that as many as 8 (eight) documents including the extract of the statement of the detenu recorded by the I.O. were furnished to the detenu. In our opinion, these documents do form what is known as a Police Report. From the impugned order it is evident that these are documents relied upon by the respondent No. 1 in issuing the detention order. No law or authority has been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner to persuade us to hold that the omission to furnish the history sheet to the detenu will render the detention illegal. In this connection, we may reproduce the following paragraphs of the Apex Court in state of Tamil Nadu & Ors. Vs. Abdullah Kadher Batcha & Anr : (2009) 1 SCC 333 (a decision cited by the learned State counsel). 7. The Court has a duty to see whether the non-supply of any document is in any way prejudicial to the case of the detenu. The High Court has not examined as to how the non-supply of the documents called for had any effect on the detenu and/or whether the non-supply was prejudicial to the detenu. 7. The Court has a duty to see whether the non-supply of any document is in any way prejudicial to the case of the detenu. The High Court has not examined as to how the non-supply of the documents called for had any effect on the detenu and/or whether the non-supply was prejudicial to the detenu. Merely because copies of some documents have (sic not) been supplied, they cannot by any stretch of imagination be called as relied upon documents. While examining whether non-supply of a document would prejudice a detenu, the Court has to examine whether the detenu would be deprived of making an effective representation in the absence of a document. Primarily, the copies which form the ground of detention are to be supplied and non-supply thereof would prejudice the detenu. But documents which are merely referred to for the purpose of narration of facts in that sense cannot be termed to be documents without the supply of which the detenu is prejudiced. 34. The Apex Court in Abdullah Khadher Batcha's case (supra) held that primarily the copies which form the bases of the grounds of detention are to be supplied. Non supply thereof would prejudice the detenu but the documents which are merely referred to for the purpose of narration of facts in that sense cannot be termed to be the documents without supply of which detenu is prejudiced. 35. For the foregoing discussions and reasons, we are constrained to hold that the material document, i.e. history sheet relied upon by the detaining authority, as clearly stated in his affidavit, in coming to the subjective satisfaction for detaining the detenu under the impugned detention order dated 24.8.2011 should have been supplied to the detenu and the detaining authority later on cannot say that the said document had not been relied upon while furnishing the copies of the documents which form the bases of the grounds of detention to the detenu. Non furnishing of the history sheet, in the given case, will certainly prejudice the detenu in filing the representation as a result the rights of the petitioner-detenu guaranteed under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India had been infringed and result would be that the continued detention of the petitioner-detenu would be illegal. Non furnishing of the history sheet, in the given case, will certainly prejudice the detenu in filing the representation as a result the rights of the petitioner-detenu guaranteed under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India had been infringed and result would be that the continued detention of the petitioner-detenu would be illegal. Accordingly, the impugned detention order dated 24.8.2011, the approval order dated 01.09.2011 and the confirmation order dated 07.10.2011 are hereby set aside and the petitioner-detenu, namely Thiyam Imocha Singh @ Imphal City, be set at liberty forthwith if he is not required in connection with any other case. Writ petition is allowed. Petition allowed.