JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsels for the parties. 2. The defendant-petitioner Raj Kumar Nalwaya, has filed the present revision petition before this Court being aggrieved by the order dated 17.2.2009 of the learned trial Court rejecting his application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. in a suit for injunction filed by the respondent-plaintiff. Atam Singh Kalara seeking cancellation of permission for raising construction granted by the defendant No. 2-Municipal Council, Udaipur on 5.2.2008 in favour of defendant No. 1-Raj Kumar Nalwaya and also permanent injunction against him not to raise construction on his plot of land. 3. The application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. was filed by defendant-petitioner, inter alia, on the ground that the suit was instituted by the plaintiff without giving any prior notice to the Municipal Council, Udaipur and, therefore, the suit was barred in view of Section 271 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as 'Act of 1959'), which stipulates that no suit shall be instituted against a Board or its officials until the expiration of two months next after the notice thereof in writing has been served on the Board. Sub-section (3) of Section 271 of the said Act provides that such suit shall not be barred, if the only relief claimed is an injunction,. of which object would be defeated by giving of such notice. 4. Learned trial Court has rejected the defendant's application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. on the ground that since the relief No. 1 in the plaint was withdrawn by the plaintiff under Order 23 Rule 1 C.P.C. on 17.2.2009, therefore, the requirement of Section 271(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act of 1959 of giving a prior notice to the Municipal Council, Udaipur, no longer could hit the maintainability of the suit and, therefore the defendant's application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. deserves to be rejected. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. Arun Bhansali learned counsel appearing for the defendant-petitioner submitted that even though the relief No. 1 from the plaint was withdrawn by the plaintiff, however, the relief No. 4 claimed in the plaint, which was never withdrawn by the plaintiff in substance, amounted to same as relief No. 1 and by relief No. 4 in the plaint, the plaintiff had claimed that permission of construction granted in favour of defendant No. 1 on 5.2.2008 may be directed to be cancelled and construction, if any raised, may be demolished by the Municipal Council. Udaipur and in view of said relief claimed in the suit the requirement of serving an advance notice under Section 271(1) of the Act of 1959, cannot be said to have obliterated and in view of clear mandate of sub-section (1) that no such suit can be instituted without such prior notice the present suit deserved to be dismissed at the threshold. He further submitted that sub-section (3) carving out an exception to sub-section (1) of Section 271 of the Act, did not clearly apply in the present case as no such emergent cause was shown in the plaint requiring dispensing with of such notice on the part of the plaintiff to the Municipal Council. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Suresh Shrimali, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent relied upon Allahabad High Court decision in the case or Gaja & Ors. v. Dasa Koeri and Ors. reported in AIR 1964 Allahabad 471 and Allahabad High Court decision in the case of Ishtiyaq Husain Abbas Husain v. Zafrul Islam Afzal Husain & Ors. reported in AIR 1969 Allahabad 161 and submitted that objections in regard to notice under Section 271(1) of the Act of 1959 could be raised only by the Municipal Council and not by the private defendant, Raj Kumar Nalwaya, the present petitioner and therefore, the suit cannot be dismissed on this ground as not maintainable. He further submitted that the learned trial Court was justified in rejecting application of the defendant-petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. and consequently, the present revision petition filed by the defendant-petitioner deserves to be dismissed. 7. In rejoinder, Mr. He further submitted that the learned trial Court was justified in rejecting application of the defendant-petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. and consequently, the present revision petition filed by the defendant-petitioner deserves to be dismissed. 7. In rejoinder, Mr. Arun Bhansali, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the suit itself is barred, therefore, locus of the private defendant in whose favour permission for raising construction was granted by the Municipal Council, his locus cannot be questioned; and secondly, the Municipal Council itself has raised this objection in its written statement filed before the learned trial Court in the present suit. Therefore also, it cannot be said that the Municipal Council, has waived such a prior notice under Section 271(1) of the Act of 1959. 8. I have heard learned counsels for the parties at length and perused the provisions and judgments cited at bar. 9. Section 271 of the Act of 1959 is a bar against institution of suits against the Municipal Board and its officials unless a prior notice of two months is served upon in and the concerned officials, and sub-section (2) provides a period of six months notice in case the suit is for the purpose of recovery of immovable property or for a declaration and title thereto. The purpose of providing such a bar is clearly to put the defendant-Municipal Board of Council to notice about the impending suit/s against it, so that such litigation against the public bodies can be avoided and if the grievances raised in the notice is found to be genuine by the respondent-Municipal Council or its authorities such a relief could be granted to the plaintiff-appellant without requiring him/her to approach the Court of Law. 10. At the same time the purpose is also to avoid public bodies being dragged into litigation without advance notice. Such purpose can also be seen in the provision of Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 10. At the same time the purpose is also to avoid public bodies being dragged into litigation without advance notice. Such purpose can also be seen in the provision of Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The special enactments/laws as mandated in the Act 1959 also provides for mechanism and forum for redressal of the grievances raised by the citizens and, therefore, litigation in the Court of civil jurisdiction is sought to be prohibited without first adopting the course through alternative forums provided by such special laws and the resort to civil Courts without prior to recourse to such alternative mechanism is prohibited to sub-section (3) of Section 271 of the Act of 1959 dispenses with the requirement of such a prior notice, in case of emergent situation, where giving of such notice would frustrate the very purpose of filing of the suit itself and in such cases, it would not require any advance notice to the Municipal Council. 11. Admittedly, such is not the case here. The plaintiff-respondent had asked for cancellation of permission to raise construction granted in favour of defendant-Raj Kumar Nalwaya. The Municipal Council was also arrayed as a defendant and relief in the nature of cancellation of said permission and demolition of unauthorized construction, if any, by the private defendant was also claimed in the suit. When an objection was raised by the defendant-Municipal Council in the written statement, it appears that the plaintiff chose to withdraw apparently the relief No. (1) against the Municipal Council by withdrawing the relief No. 1, which was permitted by the learned trial Court. However, the relief No. 4 of the same nature contained in the plaint was not withdrawn and that prayer No. 4 in the suit/plaint still requires the defendant-Municipal Council to cancel the permission for construction dated 5.2.2008 and to demolish unauthorized construction, if any, and not regularise the same. Had the plaintiff really wanted to not to sue the Municipal Council, Udaipur at all, the relief No. 4 also could have been withdrawn and the Municipal Council would have been deleted from the array of defendants. However, it was not so done. Had the plaintiff really wanted to not to sue the Municipal Council, Udaipur at all, the relief No. 4 also could have been withdrawn and the Municipal Council would have been deleted from the array of defendants. However, it was not so done. The intelligent drafting of plaint by incorporating similar relief in prayer No. 1 and prayer No. 4 of the suit and thereafter withdrawal of one of the prayer possibly misled the learned trial Court to believe that no relief is claimed against the Municipal Council, Udaipur; and therefore, the question of complying with the mandatory requirement of a prior notice under Section 271 of the Act of 1959 cannot be stand in the way of the maintainability of the suit itself. The learned trial Court, therefore, apparently fell into error in rejecting the application of the defendant-petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C., which sought dismissal of the suit on the ground of bar of law created by Section 2.71 of the Act of 1959. 12. Coming to the question of locus of the private defendant, the present petitioner, Raj Kumar Nalwaya to raise the said plea in his application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C., this Court is of the opinion that there is no bar against the private defendant in whose favour the construction permission was granted by the Municipal Council to raise an objection in consonance with the objections raised by the Municipal Council with regard to maintainability of the suit on the anvil of Section 271(1) of the Act of 1959. Section 271 of the Act clearly bars institution of suit itself against a Municipal Board and its officials before the expiry of two months or six months respectively, depending upon the nature of the suit to be instituted. The purpose of such prior mandatory notice as stated above is to put the public bodies on guard and avoid possible litigation in the Court of law. The exception carved out in sub-section (3) in cases of emergency is also there but nothing of that emergent nature is pointed out in the plaint in the present case. The purpose of Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. is to avoid trial of frivolous civil suits. The exception carved out in sub-section (3) in cases of emergency is also there but nothing of that emergent nature is pointed out in the plaint in the present case. The purpose of Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. is to avoid trial of frivolous civil suits. Therefore, if the suit is barred by law, Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. not only permits but mandates that such civil suit need not be tried and judicial time taken for recording of evidence, framing of issues, hearing arguments, giving judgment is dispensed with at the threshold and that is why if the. plaint does not disclose any cause of action or the plaintiff has not paid the adequate Court fees or the suit is barred by law, these are grounds sufficient to enable the trial Court to dismiss such frivolous suits at the threshold. 13. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent of Allahabad High Court apparently do not apply to the facts of the present case. In Gaja & Ors. (supra), the learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court held that waiver of a notice under Section 80 of C.P.C. can be inferred even from the non-appearance and absence of the written statement. 14. In the case of Ishtiyaq Husain Abbas Husain (supra), learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court held that in a suit for declaration of title and possession. State Government was impleaded as proforma-defendant being tenant of the suit property and it did not put in appearance in the suit and, therefore, the State Government by non-appearance must be deemed to have waived such a plea. 15. So far as the present case is concerned, these are not the facts available in the present case, where the Municipal Council, Udaipur has not only put in appearance in the suit but has also raised specific objection with regard to maintainability of the suit itself in the absence of prior and mandatory notice to the Municipal Council as required under Section 271 of the Act of 1959. The similar objection raised by the private respondent is not an independent or contradictory objection, which could be raised by the Municipal Council but it is in consonance with the same. The similar objection raised by the private respondent is not an independent or contradictory objection, which could be raised by the Municipal Council but it is in consonance with the same. Therefore, in these circumstances, the locus of the private defendant to raise such an objection in consonance with the objection, which has been raised by the Municipal Council also, cannot be questioned by the plaintiff-respondent. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, therefore, is liable to be rejected and same is accordingly rejected. 16. Consequently, the present revision petition deserves to be allowed and same is accordingly allowed and setting aside the order of trial Court dated 17.2.2009, the application filed by the defendant-petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. stands allowed and in consequence there of the Civil Suit No. 146/2008 Atam Singh Kalara v. Raj Kumar Nalwaya & Anr. ) in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Udaipur City-North, Udaipur shall stand dismissed.No order as to costs.Revision allowed. *******