JUDGMENT [Hon’ble B.S. Verma, J. (Oral)] (Delay Condonation Application No.1464 of 2010) Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The appellant-applicant has filed delay condonation application to condone the delay in filing the appeal. 3. This appeal has been filed with a delay of 46 days. 4. In support of the delay condonation application, an affidavit duly sworn in by Sri G.S.Rai, Assistant Garrison Engineer (1), Lansdowne, Pauri Garhwal. 5. Against the delay condonation application, an objection has been filed on behalf of the respondent, which is supported by an affidavit. 6. In the affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application, the reasons shown are that the copy of the judgment and order dated 27-10-2009 was supplied by the Department through their counsel on 10-11-2009 and the same was received on 11-11-2009. Immediately thereafter, the judgment was forwarded to the Headquarters, i.e. CWE (Hills), Dehradun for necessary action. Thereafter the department, after obtaining necessary permission, approached the Assistant Solicitor General in the second week of December, 2009. The Assistant Solicitor General appears to have given his opinion subsequently to challenge the impugned order by filing an appeal. Thereafter, the appeal could be prepared by the counsel for the appellant after winter vacations and ultimately, the appeal was filed before this Court on 11-3-2010. The applicant-appellant has therefore prayed that the delay in filing the appeal is neither deliberate nor intentional and the same may be condoned. 7. In the affidavit filed in support of the objection, the averments made in the appellant’s affidavit have been denied and it has been stated that the delay is deliberate and no specific dates have been mentioned. 8. Considering the fact that since the appellant is a Department of the Central Government and the file must have run table to table for completing the necessary formalities and necessary permission had to be obtained to challenge the order, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case as well as in the interest of justice, the delay in filing the appeal is condoned. The delay condonation application to condone the delay in filing the appeal is allowed. 9. Also heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties on admission of appeal. 10. The delay condonation application to condone the delay in filing the appeal is allowed. 9. Also heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties on admission of appeal. 10. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short the Act) was moved by the petitioner before the District Judge, Dehradun for setting aside the award published by the Sole Arbitrator in Case No. CEB/DDN/14 of 1993/94. The petition was registered as Arbitration Misc. Case No. 170 of 2005. The main controversy before the District Judge was whether the petition/objection under Section 34 of the Act is barred by time and whether the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are applicable to the Act or not. 11. The learned District Judge after considering the provisions of Section 14 of Limitation Act and after giving benefit of Section 14 thereof, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Goa Vs. Western Builders [(2006) 6 SCC, 239] declined to entertain the objection in view of the Apex Court verdict in the case of Union of India Vs. Popular Construction Company [AIR 2001, Supreme Court, 4010], wherein it has been held that the objection cannot be entertained in any case after the expiry of limitation as has been given under proviso of sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act. 12. In the case at hand, according to the appellant, the award was published on 30-11-2004 and copy of the same was received by the Union of India on 3-12-2004. The Union of India being aggrieved by the said award, preferred a Writ Petition bearing No. 283 of 2005 and challenged the award before this Court on 2-4-2005 under bona fide belief that since the Arbitrator has been appointed by this Court, the award could only be assailed in the High Court itself by filing writ petition. However, the said writ petition was dismissed in limine by this Court vide order dated 4-4-2005 being not maintainable on the ground that the award ought to have been challenged by way of filing objection under Section 34 of the Act in the Court of the District Judge, Dehradun. 13. However, the said writ petition was dismissed in limine by this Court vide order dated 4-4-2005 being not maintainable on the ground that the award ought to have been challenged by way of filing objection under Section 34 of the Act in the Court of the District Judge, Dehradun. 13. After the dismissal of the writ petition, the objection under Section 34 of the Act was filed before the District Judge along with an application for condonation of delay on 16-5-2005 and the case was registered as Arbitration Case No. 170 of 2005, referred to above. The learned District Judge ultimately dismissed the application for condonation of delay as well as the application for setting aside the award vide order dated 6-8-2005 being barred by time. Aggrieved by the said order, the Union of India preferred First Appeal No. 67 of 2005 before this Court, which too was dismissed by order dated 17-8-2005. Aggrieved further, the Union of India preferred Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court and after getting the leave granted, the Apex Court decided the Civil Appeal No. 4516 of 2006 by order dated 17-10-2006 thereby allowed the appeal, set aside the orders passed by this Court and the District Judge, Dehradun and remitted the matter to the District Judge with a direction to examine the matter on its merits in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Western Builders (supra). 14. After remand of the matter, the learned District Judge heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and perused the Apex Court verdict in the case of Popular Construction Company (supra) and Western Builders (supra). 15. The learned District Judge has extended the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to the applicant-appellant Union of India and excluded the time of proceeding spent bona fidely in the Court having no jurisdiction. The District Judge in paragraph no. 10 of the impugned order has observed as under: “10. 15. The learned District Judge has extended the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to the applicant-appellant Union of India and excluded the time of proceeding spent bona fidely in the Court having no jurisdiction. The District Judge in paragraph no. 10 of the impugned order has observed as under: “10. In the present case it is a fact that a bonafide error was committed by Union of India in challenging the arbitral award before Hon ’ble High Court of Uttarakhand by way of Writ and as bonafidely that arbitral award was challenged by the Union of India before the Hon ’ble High Court of Uttarakhand, therefore, taking into consideration the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act, which also apply to the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 as held by Hon ’ble Apex Court in Western Builder’s case therefore, the period spent in filing the Writ petition before High Court up to the date of its decision will have to be excluded from the time limit prescribed under the Act i.e. 120 days.” 16. In the case at hand, undisputedly, the objection under Section 34 of the Act was filed before the District Judge only on 16-5-2005. According to the appellant, under a bona fide error, the appellant had challenged the arbitral award before this Court by filing a writ petition, therefore, taking into consideration the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which also apply to the provisions of the Act, the time spent in the proceedings of the writ petition was to be excluded. Since the arbitral award was published on 30-11-2004, the District Judge has observed that by calculating the 120 days, the Union of India ought to have challenged the award latest by 30th March 2005 and by excluding the period of three days spent on account of the pendency of the writ petition, the District Judge has held that the objection under Section 34 of the Act could have been filed latest by 5.4.2005. Ultimately, the learned District Judge has held that there is a clear cut delay of one month and eleven days in filing the objection even after extending the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, thereby excluding the period of 3 days when the writ petition was pending in the High Court. 17. Ultimately, the learned District Judge has held that there is a clear cut delay of one month and eleven days in filing the objection even after extending the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, thereby excluding the period of 3 days when the writ petition was pending in the High Court. 17. Learned Assistant Solicitor General of India appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that the learned District Judge fell into error in taking into consideration the period of limitation from the date of publication of arbitral award and submitted that the limitation under sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act will run from the date of receipt of the award. 18. I have pondered over the matter. According to the appellant itself, the arbitral award was received by the Union of India on 3-12-2004. By adding the period of 120 days, the limitation would have expired for filing the objection under Section 34 of the Act on 2-4-2005. Since the writ petition was filed on 2-4-2005, which was dismissed on 4-4-2005, therefore, a period of 3 days was to be extended to the period of limitation. As such, the objection under Section 34 of the Act could have been filed by the appellant latest by 5-4-2005. Even if for the sake of argument, the contention of the learned Assistant Solicitor General is taken for granted that the limitation of 120 days should run from the date of receipt of the award instead of the date of publication of the arbitral award, the limitation stood expired latest by 5-4-2005, while the objection undisputedly filed before the District Judge on 16-5-2005, which is after the expiry of the period of limitation and cannot be held to be within the period of limitation. Therefore, in any view of the matter, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant to say that the objection under Section 34 of the Act has been filed within the period of limitation even from the date of receipt of the award i.e. 30-12-2004, as admitted by the appellant. 19. Therefore, in any view of the matter, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant to say that the objection under Section 34 of the Act has been filed within the period of limitation even from the date of receipt of the award i.e. 30-12-2004, as admitted by the appellant. 19. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material placed before this Court, I am of the considered view that the learned District Judge has rightly held that there is no justification to condone further delay in filing the objection under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in view of the Apex Court judgment in the case of Popular Construction Company (supra), and after giving benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the objection filed by the appellant isalso barred by limitation. I therefore hold that there has been delay of one month and 11 days as held by the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge has rightly dismissed the objection being barred by time. The order passed by the learned District Judge does not call for any interference in this appeal. The appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. 20. The appeal is dismissed summarily.