J. P. Singh, J.:- Saddled by the Jammu and Kash­mir State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Jammu, here­after the State Commission with liabil­ity to pay Rs. 12,95,650/- along with interest at the rate of 8% per annum to M/s. Pal Construction Company-re­spondent No. 1 for deficiency in service of Sonalika Mustang Heavy Duty Back Hoe Loader, purchased by respondent No. 1 from it through Jammu Motors Private Limited-respondent No. 2, the Appellant-M/s. International Tractor Limited is in appeal against the Com­missions order dated 15.12.2010. 2. The State Commission was moved by respondent No. 1 with its Complaint against the appellant and its Agent al­leging surfacing of manufacturing de­fects in Sonalika Mustang Heavy Duty Back Hoe Loader, referred in the Com­plaint, as JCB Machine, within two and half months of its purchase, which were not attended to by the appellant, despite its Agents noticing defects in the ma­chinery supplied by the appellant to respondent No. 1 and claiming refund of Rs. 12,95,650/-, the cost of the Ma­chinery along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum, besides compensa­tion of Rs. 2.00 lac, for, the machinery was rendered incapable of use. 3. The appellant contested the re­spondents Complaint alleging mis-use of Machinery and non-following of the instructions contained in the Manual for use of Machinery, by respondent No. 1, besides raising the issue that hav­ing purchased the Machinery for com­mercial purposes, the Commission would have no jurisdictional compe­tence to determine respondent No. Is Complaint, who was not a consumer under the Jammu and Kashmir Con­sumer Protection Act. 4. The appellant, however, did not lead any evidence in support of the case set up by it in response to the respon­dents Complaint. Therefore, relying on the evidence produced by respondent No. 1, the State Commission directed the appellant to pay respondent No. 1 the amount claimed by it as cost of the Machinery along with interest @ 8% per annum. 5. Therefore, relying on the evidence produced by respondent No. 1, the State Commission directed the appellant to pay respondent No. 1 the amount claimed by it as cost of the Machinery along with interest @ 8% per annum. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that respondent No. 1, being a commercial concern and having purchased the Machine for com­mercial purposes, was not Consumer as defined in Section 2 (d) of the Jammu and Kashmir Consumer Pro­tection Act, 1986, as explained in the Explanation appended thereto and the Machine having been purchased by it for commercial purposes, respondent No. Is Complaint before the Commis­sion was not maintainable and the order made by the State Commission was, therefore, without jurisdiction, in that, the State Commission could ad­dress the Complaint of only those Con­sumers, who fall within the expression Consumer as defined in the Act. Re­sponding to the submissions made by the appellants learned counsel and referring to the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Laxmi Engi­neering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial In­stitute, reported as (1995)3 Supreme Court Cases 583 and Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. and Anr. V. Ashok Iron Works Pvt. Ltd., reported as AIR 2009 SC 1905 , the learned coun­sel appearing for respondent No. 1 sub­mitted that the issue raised by the ap­pellant being no longer res integra and concluded by the judgments referred to hereinabove, the appellants Appeal was without substance. 6. We have considered the submis­sions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the records of the State Commission and the order made by it. 7. We find sufficient force in the sub­missions of the respondents learned counsel that the issues raised by the appellant, may not survive for consid­eration in the Appeal in view of the legal position settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the judgments re­ferred to hereinabove. 8. The facts as pleaded and proved by respondent No. 1 amply demonstrate that the Machine in question was pur­chased by the respondent for doing its business to earn for it. There being no evidence by the appellant to disprove the above fact pleaded and proved by the respondent, respondent No. Is case is thus clearly covered by one of the il­lustrations appearing in the case of Laxmi Engineering Works (Supra), where it was indicated as follows: "11. There being no evidence by the appellant to disprove the above fact pleaded and proved by the respondent, respondent No. Is case is thus clearly covered by one of the il­lustrations appearing in the case of Laxmi Engineering Works (Supra), where it was indicated as follows: "11. .Let us elaborate: a person who buys a typewriter or a car and uses them for his personal use is certainly a consumer but a person who buys a typewriter or a car for typing others work for consideration or for plying the car as a taxi can be said to be using the typewriter/car for a commer­cial purpose. The explanation how­ever clarifies that in certain situa­tions, purchase of goods for commer­cial purpose would not yet take the purchaser out of the definition of ex­pression consumer. If the commercial use is by the purchaser himself for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self employment, such purchaser of goods is yet a consumer. In the illustration given above, if the purchaser himself works on type­writer or plies the car as a taxi him­self, he does not cease to be a con­sumer. In other words, if the buyer of goods uses them himself, i.e., by self-employment, for earning his liveli­hood, it would not be treated as a com­mercial purpose and he does not cease to be a consumer for the pur­pose of the Act. The explanation re­duces the question, but is a commer­cial purpose, to a question of fact to be decided in the facts of each case". 9. The appellants next plea that be­ing not a living person and, on the other hand, having the trappings of a Com­pany/Firm, respondent No. 1 was not a consumer and the Complaint before the Commission was, therefore, not main­tainable, too may not need consider­ation as this issue also stands con­cluded by Hon’ble Supreme Court of In­dia in Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited case (supra), where, holding that the expression personas used in the Act, does not exclude the Companies/Firms, their Lordships observed and held as follows: "11. The question that falls for our determination is: is a private limited Company a personas contemplated under Section 2(1) (d). The question that falls for our determination is: is a private limited Company a personas contemplated under Section 2(1) (d). The contention of the learned counsel for the KPTC is that persons specified and enumer­ated in Section 2(1)(m) are the only categories of persons covered by that clause and a company incorporated under the Companies Act is not cov­ered there under. The learned coun­sel would submit that a company is excluded from the definition of per­son since the object of the Act, 1986 is to provide an affordable remedy to individuals or four categories of col­lectivities or associations of individu­als which may constitute legal enti­ties for suing or being sued. Accord­ing to learned counsel, the companies incorporated were never intended to be covered by Act, 1986 as they could always pursue the ordinary remedy provided in law. The learned counsel also submitted that the word includes must be read as means. In this re­gard, the learned counsel placed reli­ance upon two decisions of this Court namely; (1) The South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association and Anr. v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. [ (1976) 4 SCC 601 ] (2) Reserve Bank of India v. peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Ors. [1987)1 SCC 424] AIR 1977 SC, 90 AIR 1987 SC 1023 . 12. Lord Watson in Dilworth v. Com­missioner of Stamps (1899) AC 99 made the following classic statement: The word include is very gener­ally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases oc­curring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be con­strued as comprehending, not only such things as they signify ac­cording to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. But the word include is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the pur­pose of adding to the natural sig­nificance of the words or expres­sions defined. It may be equiva­lent to mean and include, and in that case it may afford an exhaus­tive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, @page-Sc 1908 must invariably be attached to these words or ex­pressions. 13. It may be equiva­lent to mean and include, and in that case it may afford an exhaus­tive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, @page-Sc 1908 must invariably be attached to these words or ex­pressions. 13. Dilworth (supra) a few other de­cisions came up for consideration in Peerless General Finance and Invest­ment Co. ltd. and this Court summa­rized the legal position that inclusive definition by the Legislature is used; (one) to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases so as to take in the ordi­nary, popular and natural sense of the words and also the sense which the statute wishes to attribute to it, (two) to include meaning about which there might be some dispute; (three) to bring under one nomenclature all transactions possessing certain simi­lar features but going under different names. 14. It goes without saying that inter­pretation of a word or expression must depend on the text and the con­text. The resort to the word includes by the Legislature often shows the intention of the Legislature that it wanted to give extensive and enlarged meaning to such expression. Some­times, however, the context may sug­gest that word includes may have been designed to mean means. The setting, context and object of an en­actment may provide sufficient guid­ance for interpretation of word include for the purposes of such enactment. 15. Section 2(1)(m) which enumerates four categories namely, (i) a firm whether registered or not; (ii) a Hindu undivided family; (iii) a co-operative society; and (iv) every other associa­tion of persons whether registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960 (21 of 1960) or not while defining person cannot be held to be re­strictive and confined to these four categories as it is not said in terms that person shall mean one or other of the things which are enumerated, but that it shall include them. 16. The General Clauses Act, 1987 in Section 3(42) defines person: "Person shall include any com­pany or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not". 17. Section 3 of the Act, 1986 upon which reliance is placed by learned counsel for KPTC provides that the provisions of the Act are in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force. 17. Section 3 of the Act, 1986 upon which reliance is placed by learned counsel for KPTC provides that the provisions of the Act are in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force. This provision instead of helping the con­tention of KPTC would rather suggest that the access to the remedy provided to the Act of 1986 is an addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. It does not in any way give any clue to restrict the defi­nition of the person. 18. Section 2(1)(m), is beyond all questions, an interpretation clause, and must have been intended by the Legislature to be taken into account in construing the expression 'person' as it occurs in Section 2(1)(d). While defining 'person' in Section 2(1)(m), the Legislature never intended to ex­clude a juristic person like company. As a matter of fact, the four catego­ries by way of enumeration men­tioned therein is indicative, categories (i), (ii) & (iv) being unincorporate and category (iii) corporate, of its intention to include body corporate as well as body unincorporated". 10. The definition of 'person' in Sec­tion 2(1)(m) is inclusive and not ex­haustive. It does not appear to us to admit of any doubt that company is a person within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) read with Section 2(1)(m) and we hold accordingly. 11. In view of the legal position settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India on both the issues urged by the appellants counsel to question the judg­ment of the State Commission against the appellant, we find no merit in the Appeal additionally because the facts proved by respondent No. 1 before the State Commission demonstrate that Sonalika Mustang Heavy Duty Back Hoe Loader, supplied by the appellant to respondent No. 1 did not work despite appellants attempt to make it func­tional, to the respondents satisfaction and in this view of the matter, the Com­mission was right in directing the ap­pellant to pay the cost of the machin­ery that it had supplied to respondent No. 1, along with interest @8% per an­num. 12. This Appeal is, accordingly, found without merit, hence dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000/-. __________