JUDGMENT 1. The petitioners are accused 1 and 2 in C.C.957 of 2006 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Malappuram. The first respondent herein filed the above complaint against the petitioners who are the Sub inspector of Police and woman constable of Kondotty Police Station alleging offences under Sections 321, 323 and 506 (ii) read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The allegation of the first respondent in Annexure-III complaint is that on 5.9.2004 at about 10 A.M, the first respondent while parking a qualis car bearing No.KL 10L/7139 at the parking space of AJS Bakery, Kondotty, the second petitioner commanded the first respondent to take the vehicle to the police station and accordingly, the vehicle was taken to the police station. Reaching at the police station, the second respondent was wrongfully restrained by the petitioners in furtherance of their common intention and inflicted hurt by beating and hitting with hands on the face and chest; and by kicking at the abdomen and knees. The petitioners had also criminally intimidated the first respondent. Contending that the complaint is bad for want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal procedure and barred under Section 64(3) of Kerala Police Act as it is beyond six months of the alleged occurrence, the petitioners seek an order to quash Annexure-III complaint in exercise of the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this petition was filed. 3. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as the first respondent, besides the learned Government Pleader. Perused the records. Annexure-III would show that the complaint was filed only on 16.4.2005. Since the alleged occurrence was on 5.9.2004, definitely the complaint is barred by limitation because of Section 64(3) of the Kerala Police Act which reads as follows: 64. Perused the records. Annexure-III would show that the complaint was filed only on 16.4.2005. Since the alleged occurrence was on 5.9.2004, definitely the complaint is barred by limitation because of Section 64(3) of the Kerala Police Act which reads as follows: 64. (1) Magistrate or Police Officer not liable for anything done in goodfaith- xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx (3) Suit or prosecution not to be entertained if instituted more than six months after the date of the act complained of- No court shall take cognizance of any suit or complaint, in respect of any offence or wrong alleged to be committed or done by a Magistrate, Police Officer or other person on account of any act done in pursuance of any duty imposed or authority conferred on him by this Act or any other law for the time being in force or any rule, order or direction lawfully made or given thereunder unless the suit or complaint is filed within six months of the date on which the offence or wrong is alleged to have been committed or done. The above provision prescribes a time limit of six months for taking cognizance. I find that the first respondent had not stated any reason for filing the complaint beyond the period prescribed under Section 64(3) quoted above. Therefore, the learned Magistrate wouldn't have taken cognizance on Annexure-III as it is barred by limitation under Section 64(3) of the Police Act. 4. A decision reported in Unnikrishnan v. Alikutty 2000(3) KLT 483 (SC) was brought to the notice. It was a case in which the complainant was brutally assaulted and unlawfully retained for four days. In that case, the trial court, the High Court and the Apex Court declined to interfere with the prosecution on plea of limitation by holding that the detention of the complainant for more than three days was not in the capacity as police officers as a police officer could not detain a person for more than 24 hours. It is for that reason the plea of limitation was not entertained by holding that detention of the complainant for more than three days cannot be termed as one in discharge of official duties. The case on hand has no comparison with the case. Therefore, the ratio of the above decision has no application to the case on hand. It is for that reason the plea of limitation was not entertained by holding that detention of the complainant for more than three days cannot be termed as one in discharge of official duties. The case on hand has no comparison with the case. Therefore, the ratio of the above decision has no application to the case on hand. It is also noticed that the trial court had omitted to note that the complaint was filed beyond the period prescribed under Section 64(3) of the Kerala Police Act. No reason is stated to get over the limitation. The trial court took cognizance as if the complaint was filed within time. In this proceedings also the first respondent could not point out any good reason for not lodging the complaint in time. In the above circumstance, I find that Annexure-III complaint is barred by Section 64(3) of the Kerala Police Act as it was filed beyond six months of occurrence and is liable to be quashed. 5. It is admitted that the first respondent was an accused in Crime No.510 of 2004 for offence under Sections 283, 294(b) IPC and 38 read with 52 of the Kerala Police Act. A copy of the First Information Report is produced as Annexure-I. The very case of the petitioners is that the prosecution was launched against the petitioners to wreak vengeance because of the registration of the above case. Whatever may be, having due regard to the allegations in Annexure-III complaint, it can be safely concluded that the act alleged in the complaint amounting to the offences were committed inside the police station. It cannot be said that it was not committed during the course of discharge of the duties because what is discernible is that the first respondent was summoned to the station in discharge of the official duties and the offences alleged were committed in the guise of discharge of official duties. The offences alleged and the discharge of duties cannot be separated. Even if the offences alleged were committed by the petitioners while purporting to act in the discharge of official duties, previous sanction of the Government is a must before taking cognizance. Therefore, the first respondent ought to have obtained previous sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before launching prosecution. For that reason also I find that Annexure-III is liable to be interfered. Therefore, the first respondent ought to have obtained previous sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before launching prosecution. For that reason also I find that Annexure-III is liable to be interfered. In the result, this petition is allowed and Annexure-III complaint and all consequential proceedings would stand quashed.