Judgment : These two appeals are directed against the award dt. 16-3-2003 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-IV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad in OP No.1908/2002. The United India Insurance Company Ltd. is the appellant in CMA No706/2004 and the claimants are the appellants in CMA No.4748/2003. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, both these appeals are disposed of by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are refereed to as they are arrayed in OP No.1908/2002. The case of the claimants is that on 18-7-2002 at 7-45 PM while K. Ramulu, (hereinafter referred to as the “the deceased”) was crossing the road at Chaderghat cross road, one auto bearing No. AP 11 V 1600 coming from Nimboliadda towards Koti driven in a rash and negligent manner dashed against the deceased, due to which, the deceased sustained serious injuries and fell down. He was shifted to Apollo Hospital where he succumbed to the injuries on 23-7-2002. The appellants in CMA No.4748/2003 are the wife and the children of the deceased. They claimed an amount of Rs. 6 lakhs as compensation under various heads against respondents 1 and 2 who are the owner of the vehicle and insurer of the auto bearing No. AP 11 V 1600 respectively. R-1, who is the owner of the auto remained ex parte before the Tribunal. The Insurance Company filed a counter denying the averments made in the petition. It may be mentioned here that IA No.1108/2003 filed by the Insurance Company was allowed and they are permitted to take all the defences that are available to R-1 Basing on the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the deceased K. Ramulu died in a motor accident that took place on 18-7-2002 due to rash and negligent driving of Auto No. AP 11 V 1600? 2. Whether the petitioners are entitled for compensation, if so to what amount and from whom? 3. To what relief? On behalf of the claimants, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and got marked Exs.A-1 to A 9. On behalf of the respondents, no witness was examined but Ex.B-1 was marked on behalf of the Insurance Company. To prove the incident, the claimants examined P.W.2, who is a Police Constable, as an eye-witness to the incident. 3. To what relief? On behalf of the claimants, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and got marked Exs.A-1 to A 9. On behalf of the respondents, no witness was examined but Ex.B-1 was marked on behalf of the Insurance Company. To prove the incident, the claimants examined P.W.2, who is a Police Constable, as an eye-witness to the incident. He deposed that he was on duty at the time of accident. According to him, one person aged about 56 years while crossing the road an auto bearing No. AP 11 V 1600 came from Nimboliadda towards Koti driven in a rash and negligence manner and dashed against him. Due to which, he received injuries and fell down unconscious. According to P.W.2 he brought the said injured to Afzulgunj police station and gave a report to the police against the auto driver. Then the police shifted the injured to Osmania Hospital for treatment. Basing on his report, law was set into motion. Though P.W.2 was cross-examined, nothing useful is elicited to show that he could not have witnessed the incident. It has been elicited from him that he witnessed the incident from a distance of 20 to 25 feet, he denied the suggestion that the auto was moving slowly and in view of traffic on the road, he could not have driven the auto in a rash and negligent manner. He denied the suggestion that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the auto. P.W.1, who is the wife of the deceased, is not an eye-witness to the incident. Exs.A-1 to A-9 are marked through her. Ex.A-1 is the First Information Report, Ex.A-1 is the charge sheet, Ex.A-3 is the inquest panchanama and Ex.A-4 is the post mortem examination report. P.W.2, who is an eye witness to the incident speaks about the said incident and also taking the deceased to the police station and from there to the hospital. Therefore, the claimants have established beyond doubt with regard to the incident which took place on 18-7-2002 and the deceased receiving injuries in the said incident. After considering the evidence adduced by the parties, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 4,44,592/-with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realization. Therefore, the claimants have established beyond doubt with regard to the incident which took place on 18-7-2002 and the deceased receiving injuries in the said incident. After considering the evidence adduced by the parties, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 4,44,592/-with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realization. Aggrieved by the award passed by the Tribunal, the present appeals are filed by the Insurance company as well as the claimants respectively. The main contention advanced by the learned counsel for the claimants is that the tribunal erred in taking into consideration an amount of Rs.6041-00 as salary of the deceased. It may be mentioned here that the deceased was working as an AC mechanic in A.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Falaknuma Depot at the time accident, and he was aged about 56 years. He further contends that the tribunal excluded the salary particulars like GPF,CCS etc., while calculating the income of the deceased. His further contention is that the multiplier ‘8’ which has been adopted by the tribunal is incorrect and according to him, multiplier ‘9’ should have been adopted in view of the judgment of the Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation ((2009) 6 SCC 121). On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/insurance company submits that salary certificate which has been marked as Ex.A-6 is not proved by legal evidence. According to him, the said certificate is not marked through the person who has issued the same and no person who is acquainted with the salary of the deceased is examined. As such, according to him, no reliance can be placed on the said document as the same is not proved to be the document issued by the authorities. In support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of this court in UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO., LTD., V. MOHD. KHAJ RASOOL SAYYED ( 2003 (5) ALD 162 ). He further contends that mere marking of documents does not amount to proof of the said document. His further contention is that the claimants 4 and 5 who arrayed as dependents of the deceased cannot be treated as dependents since they are majors. Perused the material placed on record and heard both sides. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent/insurance company that Ex.A-6 salary certificate is not proved is unsustainable. His further contention is that the claimants 4 and 5 who arrayed as dependents of the deceased cannot be treated as dependents since they are majors. Perused the material placed on record and heard both sides. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent/insurance company that Ex.A-6 salary certificate is not proved is unsustainable. A reading of the evidence of P.W.1 would go to show that Ex.A-6 was marked through P.W.1. No objection was raised at the time of marking of the said document. Even in the cross-examination of P.W.1, except putting a suggestion that the deceased was not earning more than Rs.6000/-per month, nothing is elicited to discredit Ex.A-6. The said suggestion to P.W.1 was also denied. If really, the said document is fabricated or brought into existence for the purpose of this case, as alleged, nothing prevented the insurance company from proving the same by leading defence evidence or sending the said document to the concerned authorities to prove the contents of the said certificate. As stated earlier, Ex.A-6 is the salary certificate issued by the Depot Manager, Falaknuma Depot. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the insurance company is not applicable to be present case. It is to be seen that the said judgment relates to marking of medical certificates and medical bills issued by the Doctors and Hospitals in a case of disability. In that view of the matter, learned single Judge held that mere marking of documents by the claimants does not establish authenticity of the said documents and held that the documents produced, cannot be accepted nor can be relied on by the court. They have to be proved according to law. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation intend to provide just and reasonable compensation to the victims of motor vehicle accidents to the extent possible. The provisions have to be construed liberally in favour of the claimants. The proceedings before the tribunal are summary in nature and strict rules of evidence and pleadings are not necessary. When such is the position, the objection raised by the counsel for the insurance company that marking of Ex.A-6 is incorrect and not according to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act is unsustainable. The proceedings before the tribunal are summary in nature and strict rules of evidence and pleadings are not necessary. When such is the position, the objection raised by the counsel for the insurance company that marking of Ex.A-6 is incorrect and not according to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act is unsustainable. It may be noted here that the insurance company did not lead any evidence either documentary or oral to exonerate themselves from the liability of paying compensation as per the salary particulars mentioned in Ex.A-6. No attempt is made even by suggesting to P.W.1 that the contents of the said document are incorrect or false. In that view of the matter and in view of the fact that the proceedings before the tribunal are summary in nature, this court holds that the contents of Ex.A-6-salary certificate can be looked into. Pending CMA No.4748/2003, the claimants filed CMA MP No.572/2011 seeking permission of the court to amend the prayer in OP No.1908/2002 claiming compensation to an extent of Rs.8,70,348/-in the place of Rs.6,00,000/-. The reasons mentioned for filing the said application appears to be that if the court comes to the conclusion that the multiplier ‘9’ is to be applied and if 1/4th of the amount is deducted towards personal expenses, there is likelihood of claimants getting more compensation than what they have claimed earlier. Learned counsel for the respondent-insurance company objected for the same on the ground that the claimants have approached this court at a belated stage and they were very well aware of the contents of the salary certificate even at the time of filing of OP. He prays that no indulgence should be shown in altering the prayer in OP. In so far as amendment of prayer in OP is concerned, it may be noted here that the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation and as held by the Supreme Court the award need not be restricted to the claimed amount. If the evidence on record justifies passing of such award, the claim cannot be rejected on the ground that claimant has restricted the claim. If the evidence on record justifies passing of such award, the claim cannot be rejected on the ground that claimant has restricted the claim. The Supreme Court in NAGAPPA V. GURUDAYALA SINGH AND OTHERS ( 2003 (1) ALD 1 (SC))held as follows: “Hence, as stated earlier, it is for the Tribunal to determine just compensation from the evidence which is brought on record despite the fact that claimant has not precisely stated the amount of damages of compensation which he is entitled to. If evidence on record justifies passing of such award the claim cannot be rejected solely on the ground that claimant has restricted this claim. From 63 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rates, 1989, which is for filing an application for compensation, does not provide that claimant should specify his claim amount. It inter alia provides that he should mention his monthly income as well as the nature of injury sustained and medical certificate.” (para 13) The Supreme Court further held that in appropriate cases, depending upon the facts and the evidences which has been brought on record and in the interest of justice, Court may permit amendment of claim petition so as to award enhanced compensation. Further, for amendment of the pleadings, it is settled law that unless it causes injustice to other side or it is not necessary for the purpose of determining real issue between the parties, Court would grant amendment. Further, it is also stated in the said judgment that under the M.V. Act, there is no time limit prescribed for claiming compensation. As such, the question of enhanced claim being barred by limitation does not arise. In view of the above, the application ie., CMAMP No.572/2011 made by the claimants for amendment of prayer in OP is allowed. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the claimants that Ex.A-6-salary certificate is issued by the Depot Manager dt. 10-7-2003 and the emoluments shown as Basic pay-Rs.7945-00; DA-Rs.302-00; HRA-Rs.1589-00; CCA-Rs.240-00; Eq.allowance-Rs.15-00 and Washing Allowance-Rs.30/-. Thus, the total salary of the deceased is shown as Rs.10,121/-. Standard deductions are shown as Provident Fund-Rs.990-00; CCS-Rs.2780/-; SDT (F)-Rs.60-00; SRBS-Rs.70-00; Festival Advance Rs.100-00 and Profession Tax Rs.80-00. The total standard deductions are shown as Rs.4080-00. The tribunal after deducting the standard deductions to a tune of Rs.4080/-from the salary of the deceased ie., Rs. Thus, the total salary of the deceased is shown as Rs.10,121/-. Standard deductions are shown as Provident Fund-Rs.990-00; CCS-Rs.2780/-; SDT (F)-Rs.60-00; SRBS-Rs.70-00; Festival Advance Rs.100-00 and Profession Tax Rs.80-00. The total standard deductions are shown as Rs.4080-00. The tribunal after deducting the standard deductions to a tune of Rs.4080/-from the salary of the deceased ie., Rs. 10,121-00, came to the conclusion that the monthly income of the deceased was only Rs.6041/-. Learned counsel for the respondent-insurance company submits that the calculation made by the tribunal is correct and warrants no interference. The Supreme Court in SUNIL SHARMA AND OTHERS V. BACHITAR SINGH AND OTHERS (2011 (4) ALD 109 (SC))after referring to its earlier judgment in NATIONAL INSURANCE CO.LTD., V. INDIRA SRIVASTAVA (2008) 2 SCC 763 )held as follows: “6.In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Indira Srivastava (4 supra) S.B. Sinha, J. has observed that: “9. The term ‘income’ has different connotations for different purposes. A court of law, having regard to the change in societal conditions must consider the question not only having regard to pay-packet the employee carries home at the end of the month but also other perks which are beneficial to the members of the entire family. Loss caused to the family on a death of a near and dear one can hardly be compensated on monetary terms.” 7. His Lordship also stated that if some facilities were being provided whereby the entire family stood to benefit, the same must be held to be relevant for the purpose of computation of total income on the basis of which the amount of compensation payable for the death of the kith and kin of the applicants was required to be determined. This Court held that: “12. … superannuation benefits, contributions towards gratuity, insurance of medical policy for self and family and education scholarship were beneficial to the members of the family.” 8. This Court clarified that by opining that: “ ‘just compensation’ must be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The basis for considering the entire pay-packet is what the dependants have lost [in view of] death of the deceased. It is in the nature of compensation for future loss towards the family income.” and that: “19. This Court clarified that by opining that: “ ‘just compensation’ must be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The basis for considering the entire pay-packet is what the dependants have lost [in view of] death of the deceased. It is in the nature of compensation for future loss towards the family income.” and that: “19. The amounts, therefore, which were required to be paid to the deceased by his employer by way of perks, should be included for computation of his monthly income as that would have been added to his monthly income by way of contribution to the family as contradistinguished to the ones which were for his benefit. We may, however, hasten to add that from the said amount of income, the statutory amount of tax payable thereupon must be deducted.” In SHYAMWATI SHARMA V. KARAM SINGH ( (2010) 12 SCC 378 )the Supreme Court held that while ascertaining the income of the deceased, any deductions shown in the salary certificate as deductions towards GPF, life insurance premium, repayment of loans etc., should not be excluded from the income. The deductions towards income tax/surcharge alone should be considered to arrive at the net income of the deceased. In Raghuvir Singh Matolya & Ors. v. Hari Singh Malviya & Ors., ( (2009) 15 SCC 363 = AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 2222)the Supreme Court held that dearness allowance and house rent allowance should be included for computation of income of the deceased. Therefore, in view of the law laid down in the above referred cases, the deductions made by the tribunal on account of provident fund, CCS, SDT, SRBS, are on an incorrect basis and should have been taken into consideration while calculating the income of the deceased. The above judgments indicate that statutory amount of tax payable thereon only has to be deducted and nothing else. Therefore, in the present case only, the statutory amount of Rs.80/-paid towards professional tax and festival advance of Rs.100/-have to be deducted while calculating the net income of the deceased apart from deductions to be made towards payment of Income Tax. The Supreme Court in SARLA VARMA’s case (1 supra) issued guidelines, considering its earlier judgments, relating to appropriate multiplier and deductions to be made towards personal and living expenses of the deceased and other relevant factors in deciding just and reasonable compensation. The Supreme Court in SARLA VARMA’s case (1 supra) issued guidelines, considering its earlier judgments, relating to appropriate multiplier and deductions to be made towards personal and living expenses of the deceased and other relevant factors in deciding just and reasonable compensation. Applying the principles laid down in the said judgment, this court proceeds to arrive a just and reasonable compensation Learned counsel for the claimants contends that the claimants are also entitled for additional income for future prospects. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/Insurance Company contends that the claimants are not entitled for any additional income for future prospects. He relied upon the judgments of GENERAL MANAGER, KERALA S.R.T.C. V. SUSAMMA THOMAS ( (1994) 2 SCC 176 ) and SARLA DIXIT V. BALWANT YADAV ( (1996) 3 SCC 179 ). According to him, there will be no additional income under the heading future prospects, where the age of the deceased is more than 50 years. P.W.1 in her evidence categorically stated that her husband (deceased) was aged about 56 years at the time of accident. In view of the categorical admission made by P.W.1 that the age of her husband was 56 years at the time of accident, the claimants are not entitled to any additional income for future prospects. Learned counsel for the claimants further submits that the tribunal went wrong in deducting 1/3rd from the income of the deceased towards his personal expenses. Learned counsel for the respondent/insurance company contends that the petitioners 4 and 5 are majors and hence the tribunal was right in deducting 1/3rd towards personal expenses of the deceased. It is to be seen that though petitioners 4 and 5 are majors they are still dependents on the deceased. The petitioners 3 and 4 who are the daughters of the deceased were unmarried and were living with the deceased at the time of accident. In view of the principles laid down in SARLA VARMA (1 supra) and U.P.SRTC V TRILOK CHANDRA ( (1996) 4 SCC 362 )the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased should be 1/4th as there are five dependents and not 1/3rd as held by the tribunal. In view of the principles laid down in SARLA VARMA (1 supra) and U.P.SRTC V TRILOK CHANDRA ( (1996) 4 SCC 362 )the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased should be 1/4th as there are five dependents and not 1/3rd as held by the tribunal. Learned counsel for the claimants submits that as the age of the deceased was 56 years at the time of accident, application of multiplier ‘8’ is incorrect, and in view of the judgment of the SARLA VARMA (1 supra), multiplier to be applied while calculating the compensation to be awarded to the legal heirs of the deceased should be ‘9’. The contention of the learned counsel for the claimants with regard to application of multiplier ‘9’ is correct. The compensation awarded towards loss of consortium, loss of estate, funeral expenses and transport charges needs no interference and the award in respect of those amounts is confirmed. For the purpose of calculating the salary of the deceased, income-tax deduction if any from the salary of the deceased is required to be made. The deduction towards income tax/surcharge, should be considered to arrive at the net income of the deceased. There is no material on record to show whether any deductions are made in the salary of the deceased towards income-tax. In the circumstances of the case, it appropriate that the matter be remanded back to the tribunal to calculate the compensation, which the legal heirs of the deceased are entitled to after deducting the amount payable towards income-tax. Taking into consideration the findings given hereinabove i.e., 1/4th deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased, taking the salary of the deceased without deducting provident Fund, CCSs, and applying multiplier ‘9’ in stead of ‘8’, the tribunal is directed to work out compensation and pass fresh award within a period of three (3) months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. It is made clear that the tribunal should give a notice to both parties to adduce evidence with regard to tax deduction to be made, if any. In view of the above discussion, CMA No.706/2004 stand dismissed and CMA No.4748/2003 is disposed of with the above modification. No order as to costs.