JUDGMENT S.C. Das, J. 1. This second appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, was admitted for hearing by order, dated 18.08.2000, passed by this Court on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether on the face of Ext. 9 which was admitted in evidence without any objection, containing recital of gift of landed property and delivery of possession of the donor to the donee, the decision of the learned Courts below that the gift was not proved or gift was not valid is sustainable. 2. Whether the findings of the learned Courts below that the Deed of gift (Ext. 9) is void and in-operative for want of acceptance by the donee or for non delivery of possession, is perverse. Heard learned senior counsel, Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, assisted by learned counsel, Mr. S. Datta for the appellants and learned senior counsel, Mr. Sankar Deb, assisted by Mr. S. Datta for the respdt. No. 1. 2. Respdt. Nos. 2 and 3 have chosen to remain absent. 3. Ulfater Rahman, the predecessor of present appellants (hereinafter mentioned as Plaintiff), instituted Title Suit No. 22/ 1988 in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), South Tripura, Udaipur, against the defendant respondents (hereinafter mentioned as defendants) praying for a decree for declaration of title of the plaintiff over the land described in Schedule A(1) of the plaint, for recovery of possession of the land of Schedule 'B' evicting defendant No. 1 therefrom, for confirmation of possession of the plaintiff over the land of Schedule C of the plaint and for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant No. 1 from entering into 'C' schedule land and for declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to get compensation of the acquired land described in 'D' Schedule of the plaint and also for mesne profit in respect of the 'B' Schedule land etc. Defendant No. 1 contested the suit by filing written statement. Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 refrain from contesting the suit. The trial Court considering the pleadings of the parties formulated six issues and in due course, on conclusion of trial, considering the pleadings and evidence on record, decided the issues against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. Defendant No. 1 contested the suit by filing written statement. Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 refrain from contesting the suit. The trial Court considering the pleadings of the parties formulated six issues and in due course, on conclusion of trial, considering the pleadings and evidence on record, decided the issues against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff preferred Title appeal No. 16/1996 in the Court of District Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur and the learned Additional District Judge by judgment and decree, dated 25.04.2000, dismissed the appeal and hence the present second appeal is filed by the plaintiff challenging the judgment and decree of dismissal passed by the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court. 4. Land described in Schedule 'A' originally belonged to one Omar Ali Khadim, recorded in Jote No. 581 of Mouja Khilpara, measuring an area of 66 acre, which is the subject matter of the suit. It is not disputed that Omar Ali Khadim sold the entire land of Jote No. 581 to Alefa Bibi by Sale Deed No. 689, dated 02.12.1352. TE (Exbt. 1). Case of the plaintiff is that Alefa Bibi along with her husband Abdul Azim gifted the land of Jote No. 581 along with other lands to their daughter Indrabanu Bibi by an unregistered gift deed, dated 25.04.1353 TE. (Exbt. 9), and thereafter, Indrabanu along with Jahura Bibi sold out the land of Jote No. 581 to the plaintiff along with other lands by a sale-deed No. 3622 dated 21.09.1963 A.D. (Exbt. 10). Defendant No. 1 disputed the gift made by Alefa to Indrabanu of the land of Jote No. 581 and that is the bone of contention between the parties. The trial Court and the First Appellate Court both concurrently held that the plaintiff failed to prove the alleged gift by Alefa to Indrabanu and that there is no evidence that Indrabanu accepted the gift or that she got possession of the alleged gifted land. 5. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhow-mik, has submitted that recitals of Exbt. 9 clearly speak of handing over of possession by the donor to the donee and the original gift deed was in possession of donee, Indrabanu and after sale of land, Indrabanu handed over the gift deed to the plaintiff which proves physical acceptance of gift and handing over of possession of the gifted land. 9 clearly speak of handing over of possession by the donor to the donee and the original gift deed was in possession of donee, Indrabanu and after sale of land, Indrabanu handed over the gift deed to the plaintiff which proves physical acceptance of gift and handing over of possession of the gifted land. Further, after purchase plaintiff recorded his name in the ROR and the Khatian Exbt. 3 was created in the name of plaintiff, of the purchased land, and presumption of correctness of Khatian regarding possession of the plaintiff has not been drawn by the Courts below and that the gift deed though not challenged has not been accepted by the Courts below and so the plaintiff is entitled to get decree in his favour. In support of his contention learned senior counsel relied on the case laws reported in: (i) AIR 1986 Ker 110 , Vannathi Valap-pil Janaki and Ors. v. Puthiya Purayil Paru and Ors.; (ii) AIR 1984 Gau 41 , Md. Hesabuddin and Ors. v. Md. Hesaruddin and Ors.; (iii) 1995 3 GLR 96, Bina Rani Dey and Ors. v. Tarakhnath and Ors.; (iv) AIR 1998 Ker 134 , Chavittumparakkal Thamasikkum Dappayil Akkutty's daughter Pathumma v. Pokku and Ors.; (v) AIR 1979 NOC 169 (Gau), Narendra Chandra Deb and Ors. v. Kamini Mohan Deb; (vi) (2003) 4 SCC 161 , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors.; (vii) (2006) 1 SCC 168 , Ramlal and another v. Phngua and Ors. Per contra, learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb, has submitted that the deed of gift is a fake document, since, there is no evidence to support it. No oral evidence is adduced to prove the contents of the deed of gift. No endorsement of donee, Indrabanu, is in the alleged deed of gift to show that Indrabanu accepted the gift. No. ROR prepared in her name. Rent receipt (Exbt. 2), placed on record by the plaintiff, shows that it was paid by DW. 2 and DW. 2 narrated totally contrary to the plaintiff's case and rather proved that it was paid in the name of the original Jotdar by the heirs of Alefa Bibi and Abdul Azim. Further, the purchase deed of the plaintiff speaks that the vendors, Indrabanu and Jahura Bibi stated that they got the land by inheritance and sold to the plaintiff. 2 narrated totally contrary to the plaintiff's case and rather proved that it was paid in the name of the original Jotdar by the heirs of Alefa Bibi and Abdul Azim. Further, the purchase deed of the plaintiff speaks that the vendors, Indrabanu and Jahura Bibi stated that they got the land by inheritance and sold to the plaintiff. The finding of facts of the Courts below is based on the evidence on record and does not deserve interference. In support of his contention learned senior counsel relied on the following decisions: (i) AIR 1969 SC 78 , Dhulabai etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another; (ii) (1996) 7 SCC 218 , Laxmi Chand and Ors v. Gram Panchayat, Kararia and Ors.; (iii) (2006) 8 SCC 336 , Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority v. K.S. Narayan; (iv) AIR 2012 SCW 1177, State of Punjab v. Amarjit Singh; (v) : (2012) 3 SCC 619 , Manohar Joshi v. State of Maharashtra and others; (vi) (2006) 5 SCC 545 , Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Sheshammal; (vii) (2007) 5 SCC 669 , P. Chandrasekharan and Ors. v. S. Kanakaranjan and Ors.; (viii) (2011) 7 SCC 289 , Chandra Impex Private Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi. 6. Alefa Bibi got 'A' schedule land by purchase from Omar Ali Khadim (Exbt. 1). The said Alefa Bibi and her husband-Abdul Azim alleged to have executed Exbt. 9, the impugned gift deed, in favour of Indrabanu. The plaintiff alleged to have purchase the land from Indrabanu and Jahura both are lineal descendants of Abdul Azim and Alefa Bibi. For fair appreciation and ready reference let us note here the genealogy of Abdul Azim and Alefa Bibi, as available on record. Rupjahan D/o. Eraj, married Abez, S/o. Jalal. Ulfater Rahman (plaintiff) married Jahura daughter of Jalal. Rupjahan and Jahura are cousins. Eraj died leaving behind Rupjahan (daughter) and Nurjahan (Widow). On the death of Nurjahan the entire share of Eraj was evolved on Rupjahan and as a result, substantial portion of property left by Abdul Azim and Alefa evolved on Rupjahan. Husband of Indrabanu died during life time of her parents and she did not marry again and her cousin Tayabuddin used to look after her. She inherited her share to the property left by her parents. Husband of Indrabanu died during life time of her parents and she did not marry again and her cousin Tayabuddin used to look after her. She inherited her share to the property left by her parents. Abdul Azim and Alefa Bibi had 6 Kanti 18 ganda 1 kara 1 kanta and 10 dhurs of land at Mouja Khilpara and 6 Kani 4 gandas and odds of land at Mouja Fotamati. After the death of Abdul Azim and Alefa the property left by them inherited by their aforesaid heirs. The trial Court held that there is, no evidence to show that Indrabanu accepted the gift and that possession of gifted land was taken over by Indrabanu pursuant to the gift deed marked as Exbt. 9. No Khatian was prepared in the name of Indrabanu and in the sale-deed (Exbt. 10) Indrabanu made no such recital that she got the land by dint of gift deed executed by her patents rather she stated that it was inherited land of her and Jahura which was sold to the plaintiff. The trial Court, therefore, held that the plaintiff failed to prove that Indrabanu got the suit land by dint of the deed of gift and accordingly dismissed the suit. 7. The First Appellate Court, as I find, formulated three points for decision and very nicely and cogently considered the factual and legal aspects and the finding arrived at is based on sound appreciation of the evidence on record of. The conclusion arrived at by the First Appellate Court on all the points argued by learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik, has already been cogently answered and I find no scope at all to interfere in the finding of facts arrived by the trial Court and the First Appellate Court. 8. Section 149 of Mullas' principles of Mahomedan Law prescribes 3 (three) essentials of a gift which reads thus: 149. The three essentials of a gift.-- It is essential to the validity of a gift that there should be: (1) a declaration of gift by the donor, (2) an acceptance of the gift, express or implied, by or on behalf of the donee, and (3) delivery of possession of the subject of the gift by the donor to the done as mentioned in Section 150. If these conditions are complied with, the gift is complete (k). Section 150 prescribes delivery of possession which reads thus: 150. If these conditions are complied with, the gift is complete (k). Section 150 prescribes delivery of possession which reads thus: 150. Delivery of possession.-- (1) It is essential to the validity of a gift that there should be a delivery of such possession as the subject of the gift is susceptible of (1). As observed by the Judicial Committee, 'the taking of possession of the subject-matter of the gift by the donee, either actually or constructively/is necessary to complete a gift (n). See Sections 145, 146, 152, 154. (2) Registration.-- Registration of a deed of gift does not cure the want of delivery of possession. (3) If it is proved by oral evidence that a gift was completed as required by law [secs. 149 and 150], it is immaterial that the donor had also executed a deed of gift, but the deed has not been registered as required by the Registration Act, Section 17(a)(0). (4) A declaration in a deed of gift that possession has been given binds the heirs of the donor (p). But such a declaration is not conclusive and a recital in a deed of gift that possession has been give to a minor nephew (without the intervention of a father or guardian -- Section 156) was on the facts held to be insufficient to support a gift as against the heirs of the donor (q). 9. Burden lies on the plaintiff to prove strictly, the three ingredients, as enunciated under Mahomedan Law. Placing Exbt. 9 on record, the plaintiff brought the fact that gift deed was executed by Alefa Bibi and Abdul Azim but no evidence is on record to show that the gift was accepted by the donee or that there was delivery of possession of the subject of gift by the donor to the donee. Mere presentation of a document does not necessarily prove the contents of the document unless it is categorically accepted by the adverse party. Exbt. 9 does not reflect any endorsement by Indrabanu that she accepted the gift when it was executed by her parents. No record of right was prepared in her name. The averments made in the plaint shows that DW.2 used to take care of Indrabanu and the plaintiff relied on Exbt. 2, the rent receipt, which shows that the rent was paid by DW.2 in the name of original Jotdar Omar Ali Khadim. No record of right was prepared in her name. The averments made in the plaint shows that DW.2 used to take care of Indrabanu and the plaintiff relied on Exbt. 2, the rent receipt, which shows that the rent was paid by DW.2 in the name of original Jotdar Omar Ali Khadim. DW.2 did not support about any gift in favour of Indrabanu rather stated contrary to what plaintiff has stated. Exbt. 10 contains recitals that Indrabanu and Jahura got the land by inheritance and they sold it to the plaintiff. The plaintiff got ROR in his favour but the trial Court and the first appellate Court, considering the oral evidence and the fact that there is no evidence of acceptance of gift, refused to draw a presumption of correctness of Khatian in respect of possession. of the plaintiff in the suit land. No oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff to show as to when he entered in possession and how he was dispossessed from the 'B' schedule land. The concurrent findings of the trial Court and First Appellate Court does not deserve interference in the second appeal on this score. 10. Exbt. 9 is an unregistered deed of gift. Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act prescribes that an instrument of gift of immoveable property shall be registered. Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act prescribes the provision how a transfer by gift is effected which reads thus: 123. Transfer how effected.-- For the purpose of making a gift of immoveable property, the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses. For the purpose of making a gift of moveable property, the transfer may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery. Such delivery may be made in the same way as goods sold may be delivered. Section 129 prescribes provision regarding saving of donations mortis causa and Mahomedan Law which reads thus: 129. Saving of donations mortis Causa and Mahomedan Law -- Nothing in this Chapter relates to gifts of moveable property made in contemplation of death or shall be deemed to affect any rule of Mahomedan Law. Essentially, according to law applicable generally, a gift is to be effected only by a registered instrument. Saving of donations mortis Causa and Mahomedan Law -- Nothing in this Chapter relates to gifts of moveable property made in contemplation of death or shall be deemed to affect any rule of Mahomedan Law. Essentially, according to law applicable generally, a gift is to be effected only by a registered instrument. According to the Mahomedan law, there can be a valid gift, if three essentials of the gift are satisfied. It is not necessary that there should be a deed of gift in order to make it a valid gift. In view of the provisions of Section 129 of T.P. Act, it cannot be held that gifts amongst Muslims also should satisfy the provisions of Chapter VII of the Act. Proof of delivery of possession under the Mahomedan gift is so important that even registration of a gift deed does not cure the want of delivery of possession. While the impugned gift was by written memoranda it would have been registered. No evidence is on record as to why it was left unregistered though written. There is no evidence of delivery of possession by the alleged donor to the donee which is most essential to prove the gift. Under such facts and circumstances, findings of Courts below cannot be disturbed by this Court in second appeal. 11. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb, has submitted that the substantial question of law formulated in this appeal can in no way be termed as a substantial question of law and that at best those may be a substantial question of fact and therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. On the other hand, learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik argued that a document of title which has been accepted in evidence, but has not been considered by the Courts below, according to law, as prescribed under the Mahomedan Law and therefore, it constitutes a substantial question of law for decision by the High Court. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel of both sides and perused the relevant case laws referred by both sides on this point. In the case of Gurdev Kaur & Ors. v. Kaki and Ors., reported in 2006 AIR SCW 2404 : (2007) 1 SCC 619 the Apex Court held thus: Even prior to amendment, the consistent position has been that the Courts should not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts. In the case of Gurdev Kaur & Ors. v. Kaki and Ors., reported in 2006 AIR SCW 2404 : (2007) 1 SCC 619 the Apex Court held thus: Even prior to amendment, the consistent position has been that the Courts should not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts. Now, after 1976 Amendment, the scope of Section 100 has been drastically curtailed and narrowed down. The High Courts would have jurisdiction of interfering under Section 100 CPC only in a case where substantial questions of law are involved and those questions have been clearly formulated in the memorandum of appeal. At the time of admission of the second appeal, it is the bounden duty and obligation of the High Court to formulate substantial questions of law and then only the High Court is permitted to proceed with the case to decide those questions of law, The language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as "substantial question of law" which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that Legislature never wanted second appeal to become "third trial on facts" or "one more dice in the gamble". The effect of the amendment mainly, according to the amended section, was: (i) The High Court would be justified in admitting the second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved; (ii) The substantial question of law to precisely state such question; (iii) A duty has been cast on the High Court to formulate substantial question of law before hearing the appeal; (iv) Another part of the Section is that the appeal shall be heard only on that question. The Court further held thus: In judicial hierarchy finality is absolutely important because that gives certainty to the law. Even in the interest of litigants themselves it may not be unreasonable to draw a line in respect of the two different categories of litigation where procedure will say at a certain stage that questions of fact have been decided by the lower Courts and the matter should be allowed to rest where it lies without any further appeal. This may be somewhat harsh to an individual litigant; but, in the larger interest of the administration of justice, this view seems to us to be juristically sound and pragmatically wise. This may be somewhat harsh to an individual litigant; but, in the larger interest of the administration of justice, this view seems to us to be juristically sound and pragmatically wise. In the case of Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead), reported in (2001) 4 SCC 262 : AIR 2001 SC 1273 the Apex Court held thus: Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact even if erroneous will generality not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stands vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to dealt with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-a-vis the Concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication--what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In the case of Hero Vinoth (supra) the Apex Court in Para 16 held has held thus: 16. It is now well settled that an inference of fact from a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms or a term of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of a principle of law, is a question of law. Therefore, when there is a misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law while interpreting a document, it is open to interference under Section 100, CPC. If a document creating an easement by grant is construed as an 'easement of necessity' thereby materially affecting the decision in the case, certainly it gives rise to a substantial question of law. 12. If a document creating an easement by grant is construed as an 'easement of necessity' thereby materially affecting the decision in the case, certainly it gives rise to a substantial question of law. 12. In the present appeal, substantial question of law has been formulated regarding the admissibility of Exbt. 9 based on which the plaintiff claimed relief of his right, title and interest over the suit land. Considering the law laid down by the Apex Court and considering the issues involved in the case at hand, I think the substantial Question of law in this appeal has rightly been formulated for a decision by this Court. 13. I have meticulously gone through the case laws referred by learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik. The factual matrix of Vannathi Valappil Janaki (supra) has no bearing in the facts of the case in hand and I find nothing to apply the ratio of that decision. In the case of Md. Hesabuddin (supra) this Court laid down the principles based on which a Mahomedan gift is supposed to stand. For appreciation Para 5, 6 and 7 are therefore reproduced as under: 5. Learned counsel Mr. Ali appearing for the appellants referred to the provisions with regard to gift of immovable property Linder the Mahomedan Law and submitted that if the instrument of gift be the sole basis effecting the gift it must be registered. In the present case, according to him, the gift was made through Ext. A(2) document. He further submitted that it does not merely recite the fact of a prior gift in which case no registration would have been required. But when the document itself becomes the basis of the right, title and interest to be created in favour of the done, it is compulsorily registrable under the provisions of Section 17 of the Registration Act. But it should be pointed out that such an instrument must be a formal instrument of gift creating the gift itself. In the instant case, the alleged paper has been written in an ordinary sheet of paper and not in a stamped paper and as such it cannot be said that it is a formal instrument of gift. But it should be pointed out that such an instrument must be a formal instrument of gift creating the gift itself. In the instant case, the alleged paper has been written in an ordinary sheet of paper and not in a stamped paper and as such it cannot be said that it is a formal instrument of gift. It is the admitted position of the law of Mahomedan gift that three essentials are required to make a gift valid which are: (1) declaration of the gift by the donor (Ejab), (2) acceptance of the gift by the done (Qabul) and (3) delivery of possession (Qabul). It is therefore found that the manifestation of the wish of the donor to make the gift the acceptance of the done either impliedly or expressly and the taking possession of the subject-matter of the gift by the done either actually or constructively are the essential requisites to make a gift valid under the Mahomedan law. It may be noted that no written document is required in such a case. It is also to be noted that where there is no real intention to make a gift, the gift fails. There may be sham, colourable or benami transactions. These things should be distinguished from a real gift so far as the Mahomedan Law is concerned. 6. Section 123 of the T.P. Act mandates that the gift of immovable property must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by the least two witnesses. Section 129 of the T.P. Act however excludes the rule of Mahomedan Law from the purview of Chapter 7, T.P. Act, which includes Section 123 of the T.P. Act. 7. But it cannot be taken as sine qua non in all cases that wherever there is a writing about a Mahomedan gift of immovable property, there must be registration thereof. The facts and circumstances of each case have to be taken into consideration before finding whether the writing requires registration or not. The essential requirements, as said before, to make a Mahomedan gift valid the declaration by the donor/acceptance by the donee and delivery of possession to the donee. It was held in Jubeda Khatoon v. Moksed AH, AIR 1973 Gau 105 (at P.106) 'Under the Mahomedan Law three things are necessary for creation of a gift. The essential requirements, as said before, to make a Mahomedan gift valid the declaration by the donor/acceptance by the donee and delivery of possession to the donee. It was held in Jubeda Khatoon v. Moksed AH, AIR 1973 Gau 105 (at P.106) 'Under the Mahomedan Law three things are necessary for creation of a gift. They are (i) declaration of gift by the donor, (ii) acceptance of the gift express or implied by or on behalf of the donee and (iii) delivery of possession of the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee. The deed of gift is immaterial for creation of gift under the Mahomedan Law. A gift under the Mahomedan Law is not valid if the above mentioned essentials are not fulfilled even if there be a deed of gift or even a registered deed of gift. In other words even if there be a declaration of acceptance of the gift, there will be no valid gift under the Mahomedan Law if there be no valid gift under the Mahomedan Law if there be no delivery of possession, even though there may be registered deed of gift'. 'In that case there was a deed of gift which was not produced during trial. Still it was found in that case that had the defendants produced the deed of gift, at best it would have proved a declaration of the gift by the donor and acceptance thereof by the donee. It was further held that despite this the defendants would have to lead independent oral evidence to prove delivery of possession in order to prove a valid gift. Therefore it was found in that case that deed of gift under the Mahomedan Law does not create a disposition of property. Relying on this it cannot be said that whenever there is a writing with regard to a gift executed by the donor, it must be proved as a basis instrument of gift before deciding the gift to be valid. In the instant case a mere writing in the plain paper as aforesaid containing the declaration of gift cannot tantamount to a formal instrument of gift. Ext. A(2) has in the circumstances of the present case to be taken as a form of declaration of the donor. In the instant case a mere writing in the plain paper as aforesaid containing the declaration of gift cannot tantamount to a formal instrument of gift. Ext. A(2) has in the circumstances of the present case to be taken as a form of declaration of the donor. In every case the intention of the donor the background of the alleged gift and the relation of the donor and the donee as well as the purpose or motive of the gift all have to be taken into consideration. In the present case, it is recited in the said writings that the 3rd defendant has been maintain and looking after the donor where neglecting her. The gift was from a mother to a son and it was based on love and affection for the son in whose favour the gift was made. Therefore, it cannot be held that because a declaration is contained in the paper Ext. A(2) the latter must have been registered in order to render the gift valid. Admittedly, the 3rd defendant has been possessing the land and got his name mutated in the revenue records with respect to the land. It is therefore implied that there was acceptance on behalf of the donee and also that the possession of the property was delivered to the donee by the donor. It should be remembered that unless there was possession on behalf of the 3rd defendant, no mutation would have taken place with regard to the property. It may be repeated that Ext. A(2) has to be taken in the present case as a mere declaration of the donor in presence of the witnesses who are said to have attested the writing. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik, strongly relied on the decision of Kerala High Court in the case of Chavittumparakkal (supra). The fact of that reported case is that husband donated the property to wife and possession of the wife to the gifted property was considered in the circumstances of the donor and donee residing together and that possession was deemed to have been handed over. The ratio of that case cannot be applied in this case. Here the alleged donee was though a daughter, she was residing with her husband and when her husband died during lifetime of her parents, she had been residing independently under the care of her cousin Taybuddin (DW.2). The ratio of that case cannot be applied in this case. Here the alleged donee was though a daughter, she was residing with her husband and when her husband died during lifetime of her parents, she had been residing independently under the care of her cousin Taybuddin (DW.2). So, how and in what manner the possession of the gifted land was handed over to the donee is very relevant which has not been established in the case in hand and therefore, the ratio of that decision cannot be applied in this case. 14. I have meticulously gone through the other case laws referred by learned counsels but in my considered opinion the fact of those cases are clearly distinguishable to that of the facts of the case in hand and therefore, I find no manner of application of the ratio of those reported cases in the facts of this case. 15. The appeal accordingly stands dismissed and in the circumstances with cost. Prepare appellate decree. Send back the LC records along with a copy of this judgment. Appeal dismissed