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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 657 (MP)

K. L. Shrivastava v. State of M. P.

2012-07-03

S.C.SHARMA

body2012
ORDER 1. The petitioner before this Court a retired government servant has filed this present petition being aggrieved by order dt. 22.11.1999 passed by the respondents by which a punishment of stoppage of three increments and a recovery of Rs. 555.75/- has been inflicted upon him after conducting a departmental enquiry. The petitioner is also aggrieved by dismissal of his appeal vide order dt. 2.5.2008. 2. The petitioner’s contention is that he was working on the post of Surveyor while in service and on 4.4.1978 he was placed under suspension contemplating a departmental enquiry. The petitioner has further stated that a letter was issued informing him about the departmental enquiry on 6.2.1979 and thereafter he was transferred also from Khandwa to Dhar on 2.7.1979. The petitioner has further stated that he did submit a reply to the charge sheet issued by the Department, however, the Department after considering the reply of the petitioner has finally passed an order on 13.10.1981 cancelling the departmental enquiry pending against the petitioner. Not only this, the Joint Director Agriculture on 31.3.1986 has directed for regularisation of the period spent under suspension and finally an order was passed regularising the period spent under suspension and granting full salary to the petitioner on 28.4.1986. The petitioner’s contention is that the respondents in the year 1995 meaning thereby after about 15 years of closing the departmental enquiry, again issued notice to the petitioner for continuing with the departmental enquiry and the departmental enquiry was concluded later on. The petitioner has further stated that in the departmental enquiry a punishment of stoppage of three increments and a recovery of Rs. 555.75/- has been inflicted upon him. The petitioner has raised various grounds before this Court. 3. His first contention is that the departmental enquiry was concluded and closed in the year 1981 and could not have been conducted again afresh in respect of same charges in the manner and method it has been done by the respondents and, therefore, the impugned orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as by the Appellate Authority deserves to be set-aside. The petitioner’s second ground is that the delay in re-initiating the departmental enquiry is a fatal delay as the respondents after 15 years from the date of closing the departmental enquiry have re-initiated the departmental enquiry on same set of charges and, therefore, the impugned orders are bad in law and liable to be quashed. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment delivered by the apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh 1990 JLJ 319 = AIR 1990 SC 1308 and also upon a judgment delivered in the case of N.K.Soloman v. Food Corporation of India and another, reported in 1997 (2) JLJ 28 . His contention is that the delay in the departmental enquiry which has taken place is a fatal delay and the order of punishment as well as the order passed by the Appellate Authority deserves to be set-aside. 5. A reply has been filed in the matter and the State has admitted the initiation of the departmental enquiry in the year 1979. The State Government has also admitted the closure of the departmental enquiry in the year 1981. However, it has been clarified by the State Government that in the departmental enquiry, Officers of various ranks were involved and, therefore, as the enquiry was not being conducted by a competent Disciplinary Authority, the order initiating the departmental enquiry was withdrawn and thereafter a fresh order was issued for initiating the departmental enquiry by appointing a competent Disciplinary Authority in the year 1995 meaning thereby the respondents have admitted in the return that the departmental enquiry which was closed in the year 1981 was revived in the year 1995. Respondents have not given any explanation in respect of the delay which has taken place in the matter. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 7. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the departmental enquiry which was initiated against the petitioner in the year 1978 was dropped in the year 1981. To be more specific by an order dt. 13.10.1981 (Annxure P/5). The departmental enquiry was revived as stated by the respondents on 1.7.1988. 7. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the departmental enquiry which was initiated against the petitioner in the year 1978 was dropped in the year 1981. To be more specific by an order dt. 13.10.1981 (Annxure P/5). The departmental enquiry was revived as stated by the respondents on 1.7.1988. However, the fact remains that the petitioner was directed to appear for the first time on 1.7.1995 (Annexure P/11) which has not been denied by the respondents, meaning thereby that the Department took no steps for re-initiating the departmental enquiry till 1995 and the departmental enquiry which was initially initiated in the year 1978 was re-initiated by the respondents in the year 1995 by calling the petitioner before the Enqiury Officer and the respondents after holding the departmental enquiry have passed the impugned orders dt.22.11.1999 and dt.2.5.2008. The Apex Court in the case of Bani Singh in paragraph 4 has held as under:- 4. The appeal against the order dt.16.12.1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned Counsel. The irregularities which were the subject-matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-1977. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April, 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal’s orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal. 8. In the present case also the respondent/State has not provided any satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in concluding the departmental enquiry against the petitioner. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal’s orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal. 8. In the present case also the respondent/State has not provided any satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in concluding the departmental enquiry against the petitioner. The departmental enquiry which was initiated in the year 1978 and which was closed in the year 1981 has been concluded in the year 1999. Not only this, once the matter was closed by the respondents there appears to be no justification in re-initiating the departmental enquiry on similar set of charges. 9. Resultantly, as the petitioner is a retired government servant, keeping in view the totality of the circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion, that the order of punishment dt. 22.11.1999 and the order passed by the Appellate Authority deserves to be set-aside and are, accordingly, set-aside. The petitioner shall be entitled for all consequential benefits including the refund of the amount and the amount which was not paid to the petitioner by virtue of the order of punishment. The petitioner shall also be entitled for revised salary as well as arrears of salary and pension. The respondents are directed to grant the benefits to the petitioner as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 10. The writ petition stands allowed. No order as to costs.