ORDER 1. Heard Mr. Binod Kumar Singh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants. Mr. Jitendra Kishore Verma, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.1 and Mr. Harish Kumar, the learned counsel for the substituted heirs of the deceased respondent no.11 are also present. 2. The defendants are appellants in this appeal against the judgment and decree of affirmance. 3. After filtering the unnecessary details, the facts, necessary to be frescoed, are that the suit property originally belonged to Ahshan Ahmad and Bibi Amna and they executed a mortgage deed on 04.04.1951 in favour of the defendant no. 1 Ramawati Devi(since deceased, through L.R.) for the suit property and put the mortgagee in possession of the mortgaged property. One Farhat Hussain had filed Money Suit No. 167/56 agaisnt Ahsan Ahmad and after obtaining a decree against him filed Execution Case No. 381/544 of 1958 wherein the suit property was auction sold and purchased by the decree holder Farhat Hussain who was delivered symbolic possession over the auction sold property by the executing court on 20.08.1962. The plaintiff purchased the suit property from the heirs of Farhat Hussain by registered sale deed dated 28.08.1978 for consideration and thereafter the plaintiff has filed the suit for redemption of the mortgage. 4. The defendant no. 1 filed her written statement in the suit and did not deny the fact of the mortgage but asserted that Farhat Hussain did not return the mortgage money within time to this defendant and as such she had acquired title by adverse possession. It was the specific case of the defendant that the symbolic possession of Farhat Hussain in execution of the money decree after auction sale of the mortgaged property, must be deemed to be actual possession and the suit having not been filed within twelve years of the date of such delivery of possession, was barred by limitation. The title of the vendors of the plaintiff over the suit property as heirs of Farhat Hussain was also denied with further denial of the oral gift by Bibi Amna of her interest in the suit property to Ahshan Ahmad. 5. Both the courts below after appreciating the evidence on record, disbelieved the case of the defendant no.1 and decreed the suit granting the relief for redemption of the mortgage, as prayed. 6. Mr. 5. Both the courts below after appreciating the evidence on record, disbelieved the case of the defendant no.1 and decreed the suit granting the relief for redemption of the mortgage, as prayed. 6. Mr. Singh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has firstly submitted that the defendants were wrongly deprived of their opportunity to contest the suit by leading evidence and their prayer to recall the date fixed for judgment permitting them to adduce evidence had been wrongly rejected. It has been further submitted that in C.R. No. 163/2000, this Court, while dismissing the revision application against the order rejecting the prayer as aforesaid, has granted the liberty to challenge the said order in appeal, if judgment is rendered against them. It has been next submitted on behalf of the appellants that both the courts below have ignored the settled principles of law and have wrongly decided the issue of adverse possession against the contesting defendants. Reiterating the submissions as made before the courts below, it has been contended that the symbolical possession of Farhat Hussain under execution of the money decree after auction sale of suit property would be deemed to be actual possession and as he never came in actual possession which always remained with the contesting defendants from 20.08.1962 (the date of symbolical possession), the suit having not been filed within twelve years was barred by limitation. It has further been contended that the relationship of mortgager and mortgagee between the auction purchaser and the contesting defendants never existed as Farhat Hussain got independent title over the suit property after auction sale and therefore, the plaintiff on the basis of her purchase did not get the right of redemption. The submission on behalf of the appellant is that, the possession of the mortgagee became that of a trespasser as against the Farhat Hussain who became absolute title holder over the suit property and after the expiry of twelve years of limitation his right over the auction purchase property got extinguished and thus his heirs on the basis of purchase from his heirs the plaintiff did not acquire title over the suit property or right of redemption. It has also been pointed out that another mortgager Bibi Amna has not been made party either in the money suit or in the execution and therefore, her interest in the suit property could not be affected by the auction purchase of the suit property by Farhat Hussain. It has also been further submitted that the vendors of plaintiff are not the heirs of Farhat Hussain and a dispute in this regard is still to be decided in T.S.No. 219/78 which is pending. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants has further pressed the I.A.No. 2659/12 filed on behalf of the appellants under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. by which some documents have been sought to be brought on record by way of additional evidence. Learned counsel has pointed out that these documents will show that no Hajri was filed on behalf of the contesting defendants in the suit during the period of illness i.e. 12.09.99 to 07.12.1999 but the prayer for recall of the date of judgment and permitting the defendants to adduce evidence has been wrongly rejected mainly on the ground that a Hajri has been filed on behalf of the defendants during the period of illness belying the correctness of story of illness. 8. After perusing the judgment of the courts below, it is manifest that the appellate court below has mentioned the different dates through which the hearing of the suit had proceeded. It appears that the plaintiff started examining her witnesses from 08.06.1999 which continued up-til 09.09.1999 on which date the plaintiff?s evidence was closed. Thereafter several adjournments were granted to the defendants for adducing evidence and finally on 06.10.1999 the evidence of defendants was closed and the suit was posted for argument on 22.11.99. After hearing the argument for the plaintiff, the suit was posted for judgment on 10.12.1999. However, on 09.12.1999 the petition was filed on behalf of the contesting defendants to recall the date fixed for judgment and permitting them to adduce evidence which was rejected and against the said order of rejection, the C.R.No. 163/2000 was filed before this Court but was also dismissed with liberty to the appellants to challenge the order in appeal, if the judgment was rendered against them. 9. 9. It appears from the judgment of the appellate court below that the contesting defendants, who were appellants, had not challenged the judgment and decree passed in the suit due to illegality of the order refusing to recall the date fixed for judgment and permitting them to adduce evidence, and had not raised the same as a ground in the memo of appeal. From the facts as mentioned in the appellate court judgment it is clear that no prayer was made by the appellants in their petition dated 09.12.1999 for recall of the order dated 06.10.1999 by which the evidence of the defendant was closed and the only prayer was made to recall the date of judgment and permit them to adduce evidence. The said petition was rejected on the ground inter alia that the suit had already been fixed for judgment and at that stage nothing was left for further hearing. It has not been disputed by the learned counsel that 10.12.1999 was fixed as a date for judgment of the suit. The principle of law in this regard has been clearly illumined by the Apex Court in Arjun Singh Vs. Mahendra Kumar( AIR 1964 SC 993 ) wherein it has been laid down as follows:- “Where the hearing is completed, the parties have no further rights or privilege in the matter and it is only for the convenience of the Court that O. XX R. I permits judgment to be delivered after an interval after the hearing is completed. It would, therefore, follow that after the stage contemplated by O.IX R. VII is passed the next stage is only the passing of a decree which on the terms of O. IX R.VI the Court is competent to pass……………….. …..There is thus no hiatus between the two stages of reservation of judgment and pronouncing the judgment so as to make it necessary for the Court to afford the remedy of getting orders passed on the lines of O. IX R. VII” 10. In view of the aforesaid principle as laid down by the Apex Court, there is no escape from the conclusion that the petition filed by the defendants to recall the date of judgment and permit them to adduce evidence was not maintainable. In view of the aforesaid principle as laid down by the Apex Court, there is no escape from the conclusion that the petition filed by the defendants to recall the date of judgment and permit them to adduce evidence was not maintainable. As a matter of fact no prayer was made by the defendants to recall the order dated 06.10.1999 by which the evidence of the defendants was closed. Even otherwise also the defendants-appellants had not challenged the order dated 19.01.2000 dismissing the petition dated 09.12.1999 and did not choose to put it up as a ground in the memo of appeal assailing the judgment and decree passed by the appellate court below on that ground. The appellants, therefore, did not avail the opportunity granted to them by this Court giving them the liberty to assail the decree on this score also. The appellate court below has rightly considered this aspect also besides considering the merits of the facts asserted in their petition dated 09.12.1999 by the defendants. 11. After elaborately considering the explanation furnished by the defendants-appellants, the appellate court below did not believe the story as putforth by them and expressly rejected the said plea by a well reasoned finding that the appellants deliberately left the pairvi of the case. 12. In this second appeal also, after the conclusion of the submissions of the parties on 05.04.2012 when the appeal was posted for orders, I.A.No.2659/12 has been filed on 10.04.2012 bringing on record some documentary evidence to establish that no Hajri was filed on behalf of the defendants-appellants during the period of illness of the appellant no.1 asserting that he was the pairvikar of the other defendants as well. No such submission appears to have been made before both the Courts below and no reason has been assigned as to why these documents were not produced in the appellate court below itself and these facts were not brought to the notice of that court. The scope in second appeal for adducing additional evidence and appreciation of the same is very limited. The Apex Court in the case of Balai Chandra Hajra Vs. The scope in second appeal for adducing additional evidence and appreciation of the same is very limited. The Apex Court in the case of Balai Chandra Hajra Vs. Shewdhari Jadav( AIR 1978 SC 1062 ) has considered the scope of Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C.in a second appeal and it has been laid down that the function envisaged by the code of the court hearing second appeal under Section 100 does not include appreciation of evidence and recording the finding of fact and even Section 103 also confines the power to determine a question of fact and limits the same to the evidence on record. Further, the documents sought to be adduced as additional evidence are the photocopies of the requisition forms for the certified copy which only show that the documents (Hajri) were not on the record. These documents also reveal that the appellants had not asked for the certified copy of the order sheet of the title suit of the relevant dates which could have established that no Hajris were filed on behalf of the defendant no.1 on those dates. In the impugned judgment, the appellate court has specifically mentioned the dates, on the basis of the order sheet of the suit, on which the Hajris had been filed on behalf of the defendant no.1. It was squarely upon the appellants to establish that the fact of Hajri, as mentioned in the different orders in the suit, was an error of record. 13. It is not the case of the appellants that it had been specifically pointed out by them before the appellate court below that no Hajris were filed on the dates in question and there was error of record in the orders of the suit where this fact had been mentioned otherwise. From the perusal of the documents sought to be adduced as additional evidence, it further appears that these documents are available with the appellants from February and March, 2010 but the prayer for adducing them as additional evidence in this appeal has been made only on 10.04.2012 and that too after this second appeal has been posted “for orders” 14. From the perusal of the documents sought to be adduced as additional evidence, it further appears that these documents are available with the appellants from February and March, 2010 but the prayer for adducing them as additional evidence in this appeal has been made only on 10.04.2012 and that too after this second appeal has been posted “for orders” 14. In view of the aforesaid discussion and particularly in absence of explanation for not obtaining these documents and producing them in the appellate court below and failure to raise the issue of absence of the Hajris on behalf of the defendant no.1 on the dates in question, in the appeal itself, the prayer of the appellants to take these documents in evidence, and thereafter appreciate the findings of fact recorded by the appellate court below, cannot be allowed. The interlocutory application (I.A.No. 2659/12) is, accordingly, rejected. 15. There is no dispute that the suit property was mortgaged for 9 years on 04.04.1951 by the admitted owners Ahshan Ahmad and Bibi Amna with the original defendant no.1. However, the mortgaged property was auction sold in the year 1962 in execution of a money decree against the mortgager Ahshan Ahmad and was purchased in the auction sale by the decree holder Farhat Hussain. Since the mortgagee (original defendant no.1) was in possession of the property, the symbolic possession was delivered to the decree holder on 20.08.1962. The original plaintiff purchased the suit property through registered sale deed with equity of redemption from the heirs of the auction purchaser and filed the present suit for redemption of the mortgage on payment of mortgage money claiming to have stepped into the shoes of the auction purchaser. The law in this regard is well settled that an auction purchaser of whole or part of equity of redemption has a right to redeem the mortgage. The provision of Section 59 (A) of the T.P.Act also includes within the term „mortgager? all persons who derive title from mortgager. The Apex Court in the case of Samarendra Vs. The law in this regard is well settled that an auction purchaser of whole or part of equity of redemption has a right to redeem the mortgage. The provision of Section 59 (A) of the T.P.Act also includes within the term „mortgager? all persons who derive title from mortgager. The Apex Court in the case of Samarendra Vs. Krishna Kumar ( AIR 1967 SC 1440 ) has also laid down as follows: “Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that besides the mortgager, any person other than the mortgagee who has any interest in or charge upon the property mortgaged or upon the right to redeem the same may redeem or institute a suit for redemption of such mortgaged property. An execution purchaser therefore of the whole or part of the equity of redemption has the right to redeem the mortgaged property” 16. The submission on behalf of the appellant that Farhat Hussain having acquired absolute title over the suit property by auction purchase and after obtaining symbolical delivery of possession was bound to institute the suit for recovery of possession within 12 years against the mortgagee defendant no.1 who was in actual possession of the property, is misconceived. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants are clearly distinguishable on facts inasmuch as in none of the decisions it has been laid down that the purchase of a property in auction sale with equity of redemption will shorten the period of redemption of the mortgage. The suit property was clearly clogged with mortgage and the original defendant no.1 was in possession as mortgagee, and even by auction sale and purchase in execution of a money decree the status of the mortgagee defendant would not be affected and would not be transformed into a trespasser from a mortgagee. In view of the stipulation in the mortgage deed, the right of redemption accrued on 04.04.1960 and continued up-til 04.04.1990(in view of Article 61 of the Limitation Act) and the present suit having been filed in 1981 was clearly within the limitation. In view of the stipulation in the mortgage deed, the right of redemption accrued on 04.04.1960 and continued up-til 04.04.1990(in view of Article 61 of the Limitation Act) and the present suit having been filed in 1981 was clearly within the limitation. By mere auction sale of the mortgaged property in execution of a money decree against the mortgagor in the year 1962, the rights and liabilities between the mortgager and mortgagee inter se will not be extinguished and the possession of the mortgagee cannot become ipso facto adverse to the mortgager or the auction purchaser so as to shorten the period of limitation to 12 years. It is well settled that once a mortgage is always a mortgage and mere assertion of adverse title by the mortgagee cannot affect the subsisting equity of redemption of the mortgager or his successor in interest and shorten the period of limitation prescribed for a suit for redemption. The Apex Court in the decision of Leela Chand Vs. Mallapa ( AIR 1960 SC 85 ) has also laid down that the possession of a mortgagee is under a lawful origin and mere assertion of adverse title will have no affect on the rights of the equity of redemption of the mortgager. Even in view of Section 91 of T.P.Act, a person (other than a mortgagee) having any interest in or charge upon the mortgage property or upon the right to redeem the same, can redeem the mortgage. The Privy Council also in the decision reported in AIR 1921 PC 125 has observed that even the smallest interest in the mortgaged properties is sufficient to entitle a person to file a suit for redemption. 17. Both the courts below on consideration of evidence have also come to the finding that the vendors of the plaintiff are the heirs of Farhat Hussain (auction purchaser) and there is no dispute with regard to the suit property in the pending T.S.No. 219/78 for partition among his heirs. I do not find any perversity in the findings of the courts below. 18. The findings of both the courts below on the issues arising between the parties are on the basis of appreciation of evidence and in accordance with the principles of law, and there is no perversity in the same. 19. There is no substantial question of law arising for consideration in this appeal, which is, accordingly, dismissed.