Judgment B.S. Verma, J. 1. Learned counsel for the parties have submitted that since the facts are not disputed in the writ petition, therefore, the writ petition may be decided finally at the admission stage. 2. In the present writ petition the petitioner has challenged the judgment and order dated 3-8-2012 passed by Addl. District Judge Almora in Arbitration Misc. Appeal No. 14 of 2009 filed U/S 37(1b) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and the judgment and order dated 12-6-2009, passed by Civil Judge Almora in Misc. Case No. 8 of 1999. 3. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that a reference was made to the Sole Arbitrator by the Engineer in Chief, Army Headquarter New Delhi vide letter No. 13600/CC/717/E8 dated 4-3-1998 in terms of condition No. 70 of IAFW 2249 forming part of the contract between the parties. Thereafter the Arbitrator having heard both the parties gave an award on 7-12-1998. The Arbitrator had rejected the claim of the petitioner. The petitioner filed objections U/S 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (hereinafter referred as ‘the Act’) before the Civil Judge (S.D.), Almora. The objections were dismissed by the Civil Judge (S.D.) vide order dated 12-6-2009. Aggrieved further the petitioner preferred appeal before the District Judge, Almora U/S 37(1)(b) of the Act. The appeal too was dismissed by the Addl. District Judge and Sessions Judge, Almora vide impugned judgment and order dated 3-8-2012. Hence this writ petition. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5. This fact is not disputed that the award was passed by the Arbitrator on 7-12-1998 after the enforcement of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This fact is also not disputed that the reference to the Arbitrator was made after coming into force of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 5. This fact is not disputed that the award was passed by the Arbitrator on 7-12-1998 after the enforcement of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This fact is also not disputed that the reference to the Arbitrator was made after coming into force of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore, the objections U/S 34 of the Act ought to have been filed before the ‘court’ defined in Section 2(e) of the Act, which reads as under:- “(e) “Court” means the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes.” 6. Section 3(17) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines the term “District Judge” as ‘the Judge of a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction’. 7. Thus, it is quite obvious that ‘court’ means principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district, i.e. the court of District Judge and not the Civil Judge (S.D.). 8. I am fortified in my view by the judgment of Allahabad High Court in the case of M/s I.T.I. Ltd. Allahabad v. District Judge, Allahabad, reported in A.I.R. 314 (Allahabad), wherein it has been held in para-7 as under:- ‘A conjoint reading of Sections 2(3) and 42 of the Act, leaves no manner of doubt that the parliament intended to make only one Court- the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or, as the case may be, the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction, whichever Court is approached earlier, as the venue for all matters connected with an arbitration agreement; and award; and all arbitral proceedings. Secs. Secs. 2(e) and 42 paraphrased in simple language, would mean that any application with respect to an arbitration agreement’ will have to be filed in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district, or, as the case may be, in the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit and that court alone to which the application is filed shall have the jurisdiction over the entire arbitral proceedings to the exclusion of any other court, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of arbitration. 9. In para-12 of the judgment it has been held that – ‘the court of Additional District Judge is shorn of jurisdiction to entertain an application U/S 34 of the Act and the District Judge, cannot, by invoking the provisions contained in Sec. 8(2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts, Act, 1887, transfer the application for its disposal to the Court of an Additional District Judge. An application for setting aside an award U/S 34 of the Act is as much an application ‘with respect to an arbitration agreement’ as it is for ‘setting aside the arbitral award’ and it is a matter of statutory compulsion that such application is made to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district ‘or the High Court in exercising of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit and it is again a matter of statutory mandate that the court to which the application is made alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out that agreement, and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in the court and in no other court except the appellate court being in seisin over the matter.’ 10. It appears that the petitioner was given wrong advice to file objection before the Civil Judge (S.D.) since under the old Act of 1940 the objections were to be filed before Civil Judge (S.D.) as mentioned in Section 2(c) of old Act, which reads as under:- “(c) “Court” means a Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under Section 21, included a Small Cause Court.” 11. The learned Civil Judge was having jurisdiction to decide the objection U/S 30/33 of old Act, i.e. 1940 Act. Further, if the original jurisdiction lies with the District Judge, obviously the jurisdiction of appeal lies with the High Court. But the learned Civil Judge (S.D.) has committed a manifest error of law by deciding the objection U/S 34 of the Act. and the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge also did not consider this aspect of the matter and proceeded further and decided the appeal without having jurisdiction. Therefore both the orders passed by learned Civil Judge (S.D.) and the learned Addl. District Judge, are without jurisdiction and are liable to be quashed. 12. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders passed by Civil Judge(S.D.) as well as by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, are hereby quashed.