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2012 DIGILAW 662 (GAU)

Soumitra Ghosh v. State of Tripura

2012-06-02

SUBHASIS TALAPATRA

body2012
JUDGMENT Subhasis Talapatra, J. 1. This matter has been remitted by the order dated 12.03.2007 by the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 351 of 2007, arising out of SLP (CRL) No. 6311 of 2006. The relevant part of the said order is extracted hereunder:- Leave granted. Appellants herein had filed a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Gauhati, Agartala Bench questioning an order dated 14.6.2006 taking cognizance of an offence under Section 498(A)/500/506 of the I.P.C. on various grounds. The territorial jurisdiction of the Court concerned was also one of the issues raised before the High Court. The High Court, however, without going into the merit of the matter and without assigning any reason whatsoever has dismissed the said petition summarily. In view of the fact that no reason has been assigned in support of the impugned judgment, in our opinion, the same should be set aside and the matter be remitted to the High Court for consideration of the matter on merit. Essential facts as required for consideration of this petition as filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated 14.06.2006 as passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Belonia, South Tripura, in G.R. Case No. 169/2005, taking cognizance of offence against the petitioners under Sections 498A/500/506 of IPC on appreciation of the charge sheet dated 08.06.2006, filed by the Investigating Officer of Belonia Police Station and also for quashing the complaint dated 11.07.2005, filed by the respondent No. 2 in the court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Belonia, South Tripura, which was treated as the First Information Report in Belonia P.S. Case No. 80/2005, dated 22.08.2005, may briefly be noted. 2. The respondent No. 2 lodged a written complaint in the court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Belonia, South Tripura, on 11.07.2005 alleging against the petitioners, inter alia, that on 24.07.2002, corresponding to 7th Shravana 1409 B.S., the respondent No. 2 was married to the petitioner No. 1 according to the Hindu rites and customs at Mahadev Bari at Fire Brigade Chowmuhani, Agartala, West Tripura. The petitioner No. 1 is the husband of the respondent No. 2 whereas the petitioner No. 2 is the mother-in-law, the petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 are her aunts-in-laws. The petitioner No. 1 is the husband of the respondent No. 2 whereas the petitioner No. 2 is the mother-in-law, the petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 are her aunts-in-laws. On the following day of the marriage i.e. on 25.07.2012, the respondent No. 2 went to the house of the petitioner No. 4 at Santipara, Agartala, where post marital ceremony was performed on 27.07.2002. From that day, the petitioners put her into mental and physical torture. They also tried to disrupt the post marital ceremony in various ways but for the vehement protest from the respondent No. 2, the petitioners failed to succeed. The reason behind such ill-behaviour was to extract more dowry from her father. 3. On 31.07.2002, the respondent No. 2 went to the permanent house of the petitioner No. 1 at Jirania under the Sadar Sub-Division, West Tripura along with the petitioner No. 2 and from that day she observed the real nature of the petitioner Rs. Every night the petitioner No. 1 used to return home in a drunken condition and torture the respondent No. 2 physically. He used to rebuke the respondent No. 2 with filthy language and threatened her of murder on her failure to bring more dowry. She was not allowed to go out and visit the house of her uncle-in-law. In spite of all these she had been residing at her maternal home. The petitioner No. 1 did not cohabit with her even after 20 days from the date of her marriage. When she used to be mentally and physically tortured, the petitioner Nos. 1,3 and 4 took the respondent No. 2 to a Doctor at Agartala for reasons best known to the petitioner Rs. The respondent No. 2 later on came to know that the said doctor was a Psychiatrist and he prescribed some medicines and on intake of those medicines she became senseless. On the next day when the respondent No. 2 went to her marital home, she was forced to consume those medicines by the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 and she became senseless once again. When her physical condition had deteriorated, at the instance of the petitioner No. 4, who was serving as a Senior Nurse under the Govt. of Tripura, the father of the respondent No. 2 was instructed on 20.08.2002 to take her back from the matrimonial home. 1 and 2 and she became senseless once again. When her physical condition had deteriorated, at the instance of the petitioner No. 4, who was serving as a Senior Nurse under the Govt. of Tripura, the father of the respondent No. 2 was instructed on 20.08.2002 to take her back from the matrimonial home. On the next day, her elder brother went to her matrimonial home, where he was humiliated by the petitioner Rs. Having regained her normal state on residing at her parental house for few days, the respondent No. 2 returned to her matrimonial house again on 12.09.2002 but she did not find any comfort there. Her mother-in-law, the petitioner No. 2 addressed her as 'witch' and used to keep her away from her husband. When the petitioner No. 1 used to return from his work, her mother-in-law instructed him to sleep at night in his uncle's house and used to tell her that "You are witch and you will have to pass your days in this way till death. After killing you I shall give my son marriage further. 4. In October, 2002, the father of the respondent No. 2 visited her marital home with one Sukumar Ghosh and invited her mother-in-law to visit their house during Durga Puja but the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 rebuked her father in filthy language and told that her father was at liberty to take back the respondent No. 2 and not to send her in the marital home once again. Hearing all these, the respondent No. 2 went to her parental house with her father. After few days the respondent No. 2 again returned to her marital house at Jirania with her elder brother. The moment she entered her marital home, her husband attempted to attack her, but she being a religious Hindu woman in spite of severe pain maintained her principle not to leave the marital home. At that time, a conspiracy was hatched to kill the respondent No. 2 by administering drugs. On 20.01.2003, her husband told her to go to his friend's house for keeping an invitation. The respondent No. 2 in simple mind started with her husband for an unknown place with an Auto-rickshaw. After some time, she observed that her husband entered into the G.B. Hospital at Agartala along with the respondent No. 2, where her aunt-in-law, the petitioner No. 4 was present. The respondent No. 2 in simple mind started with her husband for an unknown place with an Auto-rickshaw. After some time, she observed that her husband entered into the G.B. Hospital at Agartala along with the respondent No. 2, where her aunt-in-law, the petitioner No. 4 was present. The petitioner No. 4 obtained a ticket from the OPD and removed all ornaments from the body of the respondent No. 2 and put her in the lunatic asylum. Out of fear, the respondent No. 2 started crying when some doctors and nurses rebuked the petitioner Nos. 1 and 4. At that time, the doctor told the petitioners that for keeping any mentally ill person into a lunatic asylum, order of the Magistrate is required and asked them whether there was any recommendation of the Medical Board. Finding no other alternative, the petitioners took her back to the marital home where she was kept in confinement. A cousin brother of her husband contacted with the parents of the respondent No. 2 beyond the knowledge of the petitioner Rs. On the next day, the elder brother of the respondent No. 2 took her back to her parental home and since then she did not return to her marital home. 5. After few days, the respondent No. 2 received a notice containing a petition under Section 12(1)(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, filed by her husband, alleging that the respondent No. 2 was mentally ill. The respondent No. 2 then moved an application for transfer of the case to the court of the learned Addl. District Judge, Belonia, South Tripura and the same having been allowed, the hearing of the case started at Belonia, South Tripura. 6. During pendency of the said case, on 18.12.2004, while the respondent No. 2 was sitting in the court as witness, her husband along with one of his friends threatened her that she must give evidence in his favour. At that time, one Dibakar Chakraborty, Advocate's Clerk whisked the respondent No. 2 away. 7. The said suit for nullity of marriage was dismissed by the judgment and order dated 31.01.2005. After the judgment was pronounced, on 07.03.2005, the respondent No. 2 went to Baramura, West Tripura, to live with her husband, but her husband behaved with the respondent No. 2 roughly and threatened to kill her. 7. The said suit for nullity of marriage was dismissed by the judgment and order dated 31.01.2005. After the judgment was pronounced, on 07.03.2005, the respondent No. 2 went to Baramura, West Tripura, to live with her husband, but her husband behaved with the respondent No. 2 roughly and threatened to kill her. Finding the situation dingy, the respondent No. 2 took shelter in the house of one Smti Dali Ghosh and on the next day she returned to her parents' house. At that time, her elder brother was with her. Since then, her husband has been continuously threatening her over phone and directed her to leave him by accepting money or otherwise to be ready to face dire consequences. Whenever her husband made correspondence with her, he addressed her as 'Miss'. In this way her husband tortured her mentally since marriage. 8. The learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Belonia, South Tripura, on receipt of the complaint, forwarded the same to the Belonia Police Station for investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr. P.C., without reflecting on the materials and accordingly a police case was registered against the petitioner Rs. After investigation, the charge sheet was filed in the court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Belonia, South Tripura and the G.R. Case No. 169/2005, under Sections 498A/500/506 of IPC was registered and cognizance of those offences were taken by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate by the order dated 14.06.2006. On 02.08.2006 and 14.08.2006, the petitioners were enlarged on bail in connection with that case. 9. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 14.06.2006 (Annexure-2 to this petition), this petition has been filed by the petitioners for quashing the said order dated 14.06.2006 and the complaint dated 11.07.2005 as filed by the respondent No. 2 in the court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Belonia, South Tripura, which was later on treated as the First Information Report by the Belonia Police Station. 10. It is pertinent to point out that even though after investigation the charge sheet was filed on 08.06.2006, the said charge sheet has not been challenged in this petition by the petitioner Rs. 10. It is pertinent to point out that even though after investigation the charge sheet was filed on 08.06.2006, the said charge sheet has not been challenged in this petition by the petitioner Rs. The two fundamental grounds that have been resorted to by the petitioners, are as follows:- (1) On consideration of the admitted place of occurrence of alleged cruelty and intimidation, the Belonia police as well as the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate has no jurisdiction to investigate and to try in view of Section 177 of Cr. P.C., which stipulates that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. (2) The complaint is stuffed with improbable stories and unspecific allegations. Even in the statement of the respondent No. 2 as recorded by the Investigating Officer under Section 161 Cr. P.C. there is no definite and specific allegations of cruelty, even no allegation of intimidation has found place therein. 11. On the other hand, Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2, the complainant, referring to the complaint, submitted that in the complaint there are plethora of allegations of physical intimidation in the complaint and one of which occurred on 18.12.2004 and as such it cannot be stated that the learned court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Belonia, South Tripura, or the Belonia Police Station has no jurisdiction to try or investigate the case. 12. Mr. S. Sarkar, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has referred to a celebrated decision of the Apex Court as rendered in Sujata Mukherjee vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, as reported in (1997) 5 SCC 30 , where the Apex Court held that the place where the subsequent threat was given shall have the jurisdiction for entertaining the complaint. It was held:- 7. We have taken into consideration the complaint filed by the appellant and it appears to us that the complaint reveals a continuing offence of mal treatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant in the hands of all the accused-respondents and in such continuing offence, on some occasions all the respondents had taken part and on other occasion, one of the respondents had taken part. Therefore, Clause (c) of Section 178 of the Cr PC is clearly attracted. Mr. Therefore, Clause (c) of Section 178 of the Cr PC is clearly attracted. Mr. Sarkar, however, did not refer to the backdrop of the case which can be availed of in para-1 of the said report. Profitably, para-1 of Sujata Mukherjee (supra) is extracted hereunder:- 1. These two appeals are directed against the order dated 31.8.89 passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court disposing of Criminal Revision No. 481 of 1989 and Criminal Revision No. 463 of 1989. Criminal Revision No. 481 of 1989 was preferred by all the five respondents against refusal by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur to transfer the case from Raipur to Raigarh. Criminal Revision No. 463 of 1989 was preferred by four of the respondents challenging the assumption of jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur in the complaint made by the appellant for offences under Section 498A and 506B and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondents are the husband, parents-in-law and two sisters-in-law of the appellant Sujata Mukherjee. The gist of the allegation of the appellant, Sujata Mukherjee is that on account of dowry demands, she had been maltreated and humiliated not only in the house of the in-laws at Raigarh but as a consequence of such events, the husband of the appellant had also come to the house of her parents at Raipur and had also assaulted her. 13. After Sujata Mukherjee(supra), the Apex Court in Y. Abraham Ajith & other vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai & another, as reported in (2004)8 SCC 100 , distinguished the situations applicable vis-a-vis Section 177 and 178 of Cr. P.C. for purpose of inquiry and trial as follows : 8. Sections 177 to 186 deal with venue and place of trial. Section 177 reiterates the well-established common law rule referred to in Halsbury's Laws of England (Vol. 9, para 83) that the proper and ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occur and which alleged to constitute the crime. There are several exceptions to this general rule and some of them are, so far as the present case is concerned, indicated in Section 178 of the Code which read as follows: 178. Place of inquiry or trial:- (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed. There are several exceptions to this general rule and some of them are, so far as the present case is concerned, indicated in Section 178 of the Code which read as follows: 178. Place of inquiry or trial:- (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed. (b) Where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another. (c) Where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one. (d) Where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. 9. "All crime is local, the jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed", as observed by Blackstone. A significant word used in Section 177 of the Code is "ordinarily". Use of the word indicates that the provision is a general one and must be read subject to the special provisions contained in the Code. As observed by the Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of W.B., L.N. Mukherjee v. State of Madras, Banwarilal Jhunjhunwalla v. Union of India and Mohan Baitha v. State of Bihar, exception implied by the word "ordinarily" need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by Taw on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court. No such exception is applicable to the case at hand. 10. As observed by this Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi (1972)2 SCC 890 , a continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all, that it is one of those offences which arises out of the failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, liability continues till compliance, that on every occasion such disobedience or non-compliance occurs or recurs, there is the offence committed. 11. A similar plea relating to continuance of the offence was examined by this Court in Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee (1997)5 SCC 30 . There the allegations related to commission of alleged offences punishable under Section 498A, 506 and 323 IPC. 11. A similar plea relating to continuance of the offence was examined by this Court in Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee (1997)5 SCC 30 . There the allegations related to commission of alleged offences punishable under Section 498A, 506 and 323 IPC. On the factual background, it was noted that though the dowry demands were made earlier the husband of the complainant went to the place where complainant was residing and had assaulted her. This Court held in that factual background that Clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the present case the factual position is different and the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15.4.1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence much less at Chennai. That being so, the logic of Section 178(c) of the Code relating to continuance of the offences cannot be applied. 12. The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the Code it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused. 13. While in civil cases, normally the expression "cause of action" is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression "cause of action" is therefore not a stranger to criminal cases. 14. It is settled law that cause of action consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right to claim relief against the opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. 15. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. 15. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the proceeding including not only the alleged infraction, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in "cause of action". 16. The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts. 17. The expression "cause of action" is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. (Black's Law Dictionary a "cause of action" is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In "Words and Phrases" (4th Edition) the meaning attributed to the phrase "cause of action" in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf. 18. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edition) it has been stated as follows: Cause of action" has been defined as meaning, simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. 18. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edition) it has been stated as follows: Cause of action" has been defined as meaning, simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. "Cause of action" has also been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action. 14. In a decision rendered by the Jharkhand High Court in Ranvijay Prasad Deo vs. State of Jharkhand & another, as reported in 2007 CRI. L.J. 3553, it has been observed:- 8. In the case of Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, reported in (1997)5 SCC 30 : AIR 1997 SC 2465 , Para 8, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case similar to the facts of the present case. In that case also, the gist of allegations of the complainant Sujata Mukherjee was that on account of dowry demand, she was maltreated not only at the in-laws house at Raigarh but as a consequence of such event, her husband had come also at house of her parent at Raipur and had assaulted her there. In such facts, the Supreme Court held that the complaint revealed a continuing offence of maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the complainant in the hands of the accused persons and in such continuing offence, on some occasions, all the accused persons had taken part and on other occasion, one of the accused had taken part. Therefore, Clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was attracted which reads as under: 178. Place of inquiry or trial:- (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed. (b) Where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another. (c) Where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one. Place of inquiry or trial:- (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed. (b) Where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another. (c) Where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one. (d) Where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. 9. In the present case, as already noticed, the allegations in the complaint as well as in the evidence adduced before charge on behalf of the complainant, clearly speak that on 11th April, 2004, the accused Nos. 1 and 3 i.e. the husband and the mother-in-law of the complainant came to Dhanbad i.e. the parent's place of the complainant where she was residing and threatened the complainant and four family members to destroy and to kill them and therefore, relying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sujata Mukherjee (Supra) hold that in the present case also, the offence was continuing and therefore, the Court at Dhanbad is competent and has jurisdiction to try the case. The case of Y. Abraham Ajith and O Rs. (Supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case since the facts are quite different in the case in hand. 15. In a decision rendered in Bina Dey & other vs. Pratibha Dey (Baidya), as reported in 2003(3) GLT 659, this High Court held that the offence under Section 498A is a continuing offence. It was held:- 4. Being unable to bear the alleged cruelty or 'torture, the wife has to go back to her parents place for shelter and in case, she is asked to prosecute her case under Section 498A, IPC, at her matrimonial place, in our opinion, it will amount to deprivation of right to prosecute the case as a deserted lady will not be able to prosecute the same properly. The learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the case of Satvinder Kaur v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another, reported in (1999) 8 SCC 728 . Although the facts of the above case are identical, the matter relates to investigation only and the Apex Court refused to interfere with investigation. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the case of Satvinder Kaur v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another, reported in (1999) 8 SCC 728 . Although the facts of the above case are identical, the matter relates to investigation only and the Apex Court refused to interfere with investigation. 5. Considering the provisions of law, we are of the view that the ratio of law laid down by the Allahabad High Court and Rajasthan High Court as quoted above, will be correct question of law. We do not agree with the proposition of law laid down by the Delhi High Court. It is therefore held that in an offence under Section 498A, IPC, the place where the wife is forced to take shelter has the jurisdiction to try the offence under Section 498A, IPC. This decision is in complete contrast to the decision as led by the Apex Court in Y. Abraham Ajith (supra) and as such this court has to prefer the decision of Y. Abraham Ajith (supra) to the decision of this case as rendered in Bina Dey(supra). 16. Another aspect of the matter which has surfaced in this case is that the challenge is made against the order dated 14.06.2006 as passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Belonia, South Tripura, in G.R. Case No. 169/2005, whereby he has taken cognizance of the offence under Section 498A/500/506 of IPC. There are two aspects in the said order dated 14.06.2006 - (i) Even if the court has got no jurisdiction to try the case, whether that court has power to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the charge sheet filed by the police on completion of investigation? (ii) Whether on the basis of a police report, cognizance of offence under Section 500 can be taken by a criminal court? 17. The Apex Court in Satvinder Kaur vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) & another, as reported in (1999) 8 SCC 728 , has appreciated the legal position relating to investigation, inquiry and investigation in the following manner:- 9. This would be clear from the following discussion. Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the Police Officer to investigate any cognizable offence. It reads as under: 156. This would be clear from the following discussion. Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the Police Officer to investigate any cognizable offence. It reads as under: 156. Police Officer's power to investigate cognizable case:- (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned. 10. It is true that territorial jurisdiction also is prescribed under Sub-section (1) to the extent that the Officer can investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such police station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. However, Sub-section (2) makes the position clear by providing that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered to investigate. After investigation is completed, the result of such investigation is required to be submitted as provided under Sections 168, 169 and 170. Section 170 specifically provides that if, upon an investigation, it appears to the Officer in charge of the police station that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall, forward the accused under custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or commit for trial. Further, if the Investigating Officer arrives at the conclusion that the crime was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station, then F.I.R. can be forwarded to the police station having jurisdiction over the area in which crime is committed. But this would not mean that in a case which requires investigation, the police officer can refuse to record the FIR and/or investigate it. 11. But this would not mean that in a case which requires investigation, the police officer can refuse to record the FIR and/or investigate it. 11. Chapter XIII of the Code provides for "Jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts in inquiries and trials". It is to be stated that under the said Chapter there are various provisions which empower the Court for inquiry or trial of a criminal case and that there is no absolute prohibition that the offence committed beyond the local territorial jurisdiction cannot be investigated, inquired or tried. This would be clear by referring to Sections 177 to 188. For our purpose, it would be suffice to refer only to Sections 177 and 178 which are as under: 177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial - Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. 178. Place of inquiry or trial. - (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) Where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another. (c) Where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one. (d) Where it consists of several acts done in different local areas. It may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. 12. A reading of the aforesaid sections would make it clear that Section 177 provides for 'ordinary' place of inquiry or trial. Section 178 inter alia provides for place of inquiry or trial when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed or where the offence was committed partly in one local area and partly in other and where it consisted of several acts done in different local areas, it could be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Hence, at the stage of investigation, it cannot be held that S.H.O. does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the crime. 13. Hence, at the stage of investigation, it cannot be held that S.H.O. does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the crime. 13. This Court in the State of W.B. v. S.N. Basak, dealt with a similar contention wherein the High Court had held that the statutory powers of investigation given to the police under Chapter XIV were not available in respect of an offence triable under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949 and hence the investigation was without jurisdiction. Reversing the said finding, it was held thus: The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Cr. P.C. Section 154 which is in that Chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and Section 156 with investigation into such offences and under these sections the police has statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under Section 439 or under the inherent power of the Court under Section 561A of Criminal Procedure Code. As to the powers of the Judiciary in regard to statutory right of the police to investigate, the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (IA at p.212) observed as follows:- The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Section 561A has given increased powers to the Court which it did not posses before that Section was enacted. In such a case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Section 561A has given increased powers to the Court which it did not posses before that Section was enacted. But this is not so, the section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the Court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent powers had survived the passing of that Act. With this interpretation, which has been put on the statutory duties and powers of the police and of the powers of the Court, we are in accord. The High Court was in error therefore in interfering with the powers of the police in investigating into the offence which was alleged in the information sent to the Officer-in-charge of the police station. 14. Further, the legal position is well settled that if an offence is disclosed the Court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. If the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence, the Court does not normally stop the investigation, for, to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. It is also settled by a long course of decision of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se; it has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. 18. The proposition in respect of cognizance was further dealt by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Ramakrishna Reddy & other vs. K. Padmavathi & another, as reported in 2001 CRI. L.J. 3424, where after elaboration, the said High Court held that the jurisdiction aspect becomes relevant only when the question of enquiry or trial arises. 18. The proposition in respect of cognizance was further dealt by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Ramakrishna Reddy & other vs. K. Padmavathi & another, as reported in 2001 CRI. L.J. 3424, where after elaboration, the said High Court held that the jurisdiction aspect becomes relevant only when the question of enquiry or trial arises. It is therefore a fallacious thinking that only a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case has the power to take cognizance of the offence. If he is a Magistrate of the First Class his power to take cognizance of the offence is not impaired by territorial restrictions. After taking cognizance he may have to decide as to the Court which has jurisdiction to inquire into or try the offence and that situation would reach only during the post cognizance stage and not earlier. This law was initially found recognition in Trisuns Chemical Industry vs. Rajesh Agarwal, as reported in 1999 CRI. L.J. 4325. Paragraph Nos. 8 and 9 of K. Ramakrishna Reddy (supra) is profitably reproduced: 8. From the facts narrated hereinabove it is clear that the parties are at issue only on the question of territorial jurisdiction of the respective Courts. There is no dispute regarding the power of the Magistrate; under the Code, to take cognizance of the offences. Dealing with similar fact situation the Supreme Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry vs. Rajesh Agarwal, (1999)2 Andh LT (Cri) 405: (1999 Cri LJ 4325) held thus (Paras 9, 10, 11 and 12) 11. It is an erroneous view that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence must necessarily have territorial jurisdiction to try the case as well. Chapter XIII of the Code relates to jurisdiction of the criminal Courts in enquiries and trials. That chapter contains provisions regarding the place where the enquiry and trial are to take place. Section 177 says that 'Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. But Section 179 says that when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the place of enquiry and trial can as well be in a Court 'within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. But Section 179 says that when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the place of enquiry and trial can as well be in a Court 'within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. It cannot be overlooked that the said provisions do not trammel the powers of any Court to take cognizance of the offence. Power of the Court to take cognizance of the offence is laid in Section 190 of the Code. Sub-sections (1) and (2) read thus:- (i) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the First Class and any Magistrate of the Second Class specifically empowered in this behalf under Sub-section (2) may take cognizance of any offence- (a) Upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence. (b) Upon a police report of such facts. (c) Upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. (ii) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the Second Class to take cognizance under Sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try. 12. Section 193 imposes a restriction on the Court of Session to take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction. But 'any' Magistrate of the First Class has the power to take cognizance of any offence, no matter that the offence was committed within his jurisdiction or not. 13. The only restriction contained in Section 190 is that the power to take cognizance is 'subject to the provisions of this Chapter'. There are 9 Sections in Chapter XIV most of which contain one or other restriction imposed on the power of a First Class Magistrate in taking cognizance of an offence. But none of them incorporates any curtailment on such powers in relation to territorial barrier. In the corresponding provisions in the old Code of Criminal Procedure (1898) the commencing words were like these. 'Except as hereinafter provided'. Those words are now replaced by 'Subject to the provisions of this Chapter'. But none of them incorporates any curtailment on such powers in relation to territorial barrier. In the corresponding provisions in the old Code of Criminal Procedure (1898) the commencing words were like these. 'Except as hereinafter provided'. Those words are now replaced by 'Subject to the provisions of this Chapter'. Therefore, when there is nothing in Chapter XIV of the Code to impair the power of a Judicial Magistrate of First Class taking cognizance of the offence on the strength of any territorial reason it is impermissible to deprive such a Magistrate of the power to take cognizance of an offence - of course, in certain special enactments special provisions are incorporated for restricting the power of taking cognizance of offences falling under such acts. But such provisions are protected by non obstante clauses. Anyway that is a different matter. 14. The jurisdiction aspect becomes relevant only when the question of enquiry or trial arises. It is therefore a fallacious thinking that only a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case has the power to take cognizance of the offence. If he is a Magistrate of the First Class his power to take cognizance of the offence is not impaired by territorial restrictions. After taking cognizance he may have to decide as to the Court which has jurisdiction to enquiry into or try the offence and that situation would reach only during the post cognizance stage and not earlier. 9. From the afore mentioned legal position it is clear that a Magistrate, after taking cognizance of the offences, can decide the question of territorial jurisdiction. Ultimately, if the Magistrate finds that he has no territorial jurisdiction, he can only return the complaint or the charge sheet, as the case may be, for presenting to a proper Court, which has territorial jurisdiction. From this it follows that the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate of First Class, which has taken cognizance of the offence. 19. The similar view has been taken by the Bombay High Court in Motorola Incorporated vs. Union of India & other, as reported in 2004 CRI. L.J. 1576. It has been held that in Trisun Chemical Industry (supra), wherein it was held that it is erroneous view that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence must necessarily have territorial jurisdiction to try the case as well. L.J. 1576. It has been held that in Trisun Chemical Industry (supra), wherein it was held that it is erroneous view that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence must necessarily have territorial jurisdiction to try the case as well. It was further observed:- The jurisdictional aspect becomes relevant only when the question of enquiry or trial arises. It is, therefore, a fallacious thinking that only a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case has the power to take cognizance of the offence. If he is a magistrate of the First Class his power to take cognizance of the offence is not impaired by territorial restrictions. After taking cognizance he may have to decide as to the court which has jurisdiction to enquire into or try the offence and that situation would reach only during the post-cognizance stage and not earlier. 20. As such, in view of Trisun Chemical Industry(supra), the question of territorial jurisdiction is not collated with the power of taking cognizance of any offence by the Judicial Magistrate otherwise competent to take cognizance on the basis of the police report or otherwise. In view of this, the impugned order dated 14.06.2006 cannot be faulted with. However, the second point that has been taken for consideration is of paramount importance as it strikes at the root of the power for taking cognizance by the Magistrate under Section 500 of IPC for defamation. 21. In Section 199 of Cr. P.C., it has been categorically provided [in sub-section(1)] that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. Provided that where such person is under the age of eighteen years, or is an idiot or a lunatic, or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint, or is woman who, according to the local customs and manners, ought not to be compelled to appear in public, some other person may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his or her behalf. Sub-section (2) of Section 199 of Cr. P.C. is a non-obstante clause. 22. In view of Section 190 of Cr. P.C., cognizance can be taken from three sources viz. (i) Upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence. (ii) Upon a police report of such facts. Sub-section (2) of Section 199 of Cr. P.C. is a non-obstante clause. 22. In view of Section 190 of Cr. P.C., cognizance can be taken from three sources viz. (i) Upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence. (ii) Upon a police report of such facts. (iii) Upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. Whereas Section 190 Cr. P.C. deals with the cognizance of offences by the Magistrate and that has been further explained in sub-section (2) of Section 190 Cr. P.C., where it has been stipulated that "The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try". Ordinarily the Magistrate of the second class are not empowered to take cognizance but other Magistrates meaning "any Magistrate of the first class" and by dint of the power granted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered can take cognizance of the offence. 23. Since Section 199(1) categorically creates a bar from taking cognizance of offence under Section 500 IPC by the impugned order is beyond the jurisdiction of the said Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate and accordingly that part of the cognizance so far it relates to offence under Section 500 IPC is concerned is hereby interfered with and is set aside inasmuch as that cognizance was absolutely without authority of law. 24. Another question is whether Sujata Mukherjee (supra) has any application in the present case or not. For that purpose, it is required to look into the statement appearing in the complaint regarding the offence of intimidation as to whether that has at all taken place or whether the allegation at all constitute any offence of criminal intimidation or not. Only one short paragraph of the complaint deals with such allegation, which, if translated verbatim would appear as follows:- During pendency of the case, on 18.12.2004 when the complainant was sitting alone for giving evidence in the court then the accused No. 1 with one of his friends threatened the complainant stating that the complainant must give evidence in his favour. At that time, one Sri Dibakar Chakraborty, an Advocates Clerk whisked the complainant away. 25. At that time, one Sri Dibakar Chakraborty, an Advocates Clerk whisked the complainant away. 25. The criminal intimidation has been described in Section 503 of IPC as under:- 503. Criminal intimidation-Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation – A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section. Illustration – A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation. 26. From a simple reading of the complaint, it would be apparent that the allegation as made in the aforesaid paragraph does not constitute the offence of criminal intimidation and as such the complaint so far it relates to Section 506 of IPC is concerned the same is quashed by invoking the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. Even if the allegations are entirely believed by the court those do not make out any offence under Section 506 IPC. 27. In view of this, it can be now safely stated that Sujata Mukherjee (supra) does not have any application rather this case would be covered by Y. Abraham Ajith (supra). However, this court finds there are sufficient materials in the complaint so far the offence under Section 498A is concerned. As such this court is not inclined to quash the entire complaint as prayed in view of State of Kerala vs. O.C. Kuttan, as reported in (1999)2 SCC 651 , where the Apex Court enunciated the law relating to exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr. As such this court is not inclined to quash the entire complaint as prayed in view of State of Kerala vs. O.C. Kuttan, as reported in (1999)2 SCC 651 , where the Apex Court enunciated the law relating to exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. or under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, as follows:- Having said so, the court gave a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing the criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly with circumspection and that too in me rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. It is too well settled that the first information report is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate into a cognizable offence and, therefore, while exercising the power and deciding whether the investigation itself should be quashed, utmost care should be taken by the Court and at that stage it is not possible for the Court to shift the materials or to weigh the materials and then come to the conclusion one way or the other. In the case of State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma, a three Judge Bench of this Court indicated that the High Court should be loath to interfere at the threshold to thwart the prosecution exercising its inherent power under Section 482 or under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, as the case may be and allow the law to take its own course. The same view was reiterated by yet another three Judges bench of this Court in the case of Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, where this Court sounded a word of caution and stated that such power should be sparingly and cautiously exercised only when the Court is of the opinion that otherwise there will be gross miscarriage of justice. The Court had also observed that social stability and order is required to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. 28. The Court had also observed that social stability and order is required to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. 28. Now, it has to be decided whether for not having the territorial jurisdiction in view of Y. Abraham Ajith (supra), the entire complaint is required to be quashed. In this regard, the Apex Court held that the substantial ends of justice cannot be sacrificed at the altar of technicality rather the courts should exercise this power to secure the ends of justice. 29. In State of M.P. vs. Suresh Kaushal & another, as reported in (2003)11 SCC 126, the Apex Court held:- When the High Court found that the courts at Jabalpur had no jurisdiction (with that finding we don't agree now) the course adopted by the High Court by quashing the entire criminal proceedings is not permissible in law. The High Court should have transferred the case to the court which the High Court found to be vested with jurisdiction. We cannot appreciate the course adopted by the High Court in quashing the whole criminal proceedings against the accused. 30. Similar view was taken in Manish Ratan & other vs. State of M.P. & another, as reported in (2007)1 SCC 262 , where the Supreme Court held:- Interest of justice would be sub-served, while setting aside the order of the High Court, if in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct transfer of the criminal case pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur. We accordingly do so. 31. Similarly, in exercise of power under Section 482 read with Section 407(1) of Cr. P.C., this Court directs that the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Belonia, South Tripura, to transfer the criminal proceeding being G.R. Case No. 169/2005 to the court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala, for trial and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate may also transfer the case to any other court of the competent jurisdiction for trial after receipt of the case records. It is made clear that there would be no necessity of taking fresh cognizance of offence under Section 498A of IPC with this observations and directions, this petition stands partly allowed. It is made clear that there would be no necessity of taking fresh cognizance of offence under Section 498A of IPC with this observations and directions, this petition stands partly allowed. The LCRs be initially send to the court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Belonia, South Tripura for compliance of the direction as contained in this order.