ORDER Heard Shri Ramesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel, who was assisted by Shri Sanjay Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of opposite party no.1/State of Bihar and Shri Anant Kumar Bhaskar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the informant/opposite party no.2. 2. The sole petitioner, who is husband of the informant, has approached this Court, while invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of order dated 11.1.2011 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barh in Bakhtiarpur P.S. Case No.162 of 2006, whereby the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of offence under Sections 498(A), 323, 354 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing of entire prosecution in the said case. 3. Shri Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, while assailing the order of cognizance as well as assailing entire prosecution, has firstly argued that the learned Magistrate was not having territorial jurisdiction to try the case and order of cognizance is without jurisdiction. He submits that in the F.I.R. itself, there was disclosure by the informant that marriage in between the petitioner and the informant was solemnized at Deoghar, which is out of State of Bihar and subsequently, after marriage, the informant with petitioner was residing at Asansol and all the allegations of atrocity indicates that same was done in Asansol and as such the case was to be initiated within the jurisdiction of Asansol not in a court at Barh. 4. In support of his argument that on lack of territorial jurisdiction, a court can not proceed he has relied on AIR 2004 Supreme Court 4286 (Y. Abraham Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai). He has referred to paragraphs 11 and 19 of the said judgment. He has also relied on AIR 2008 Supreme Court 2666 (Bhura Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan). In the said case, he has referred to paragraph-4. He further submits that allegation made in the F.I.R. appears to be not believable and improbable and on this ground also, the entire proceeding is liable to be set aside. He further submits that misuse of provision under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code has been noticed by apex court, time without number, and it has been deprecated, particularly in 2010 Criminal Law Journal (SC) 4303 (Preeti Gupta Vs. He further submits that misuse of provision under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code has been noticed by apex court, time without number, and it has been deprecated, particularly in 2010 Criminal Law Journal (SC) 4303 (Preeti Gupta Vs. State of Jharkhand, relying on AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1489 (State of Karnataka Vs. L. Munsi Swami). He submits that the prosecution in the present case is liable to be set aside, since there is no corroborative material collected during the investigation of the case. Of course, in the F.I.R., it was alleged that part of the cause of action arose within territorial jurisdiction of Barh Court, but said fact was not corroborated during investigation, which is evident from the statement of father recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He has referred to Annexure-2 to the supplementary affidavit, which is a photo copy of paragraph-6 of purported case diary. Lastly it was argued that if there is bleak chance of conviction, then in that event, criminal proceeding should be set aside even at initial stage of a case. On this point, he has heavily relied on AIR 1988 Supreme Court 709 (Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia and another vs. Sambhajirao Chadrojirao Angre and others). On the question of improbability of the allegation, he has relied on AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604 (State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others) particularly, paragraph 108(5) and 108(7) of the said judgment. He submits that after going through the allegations made in the said F.I.R., it can be inferred that the offence was not probable and on this ground also, the entire proceeding is liable to be set aside. 5. At the time of hearing, he admits that after cognizance the case has not proceeded. 6. Shri Bhaskar, learned counsel for opposite party no.2, while opposing the prayer of the petitioner, submits that allegation made in the F.I.R. itself indicates that prima facie case is made out. He further submits that the allegation made by the informant was thoroughly investigated by the police and after investigation, police submitted charge sheet. Thereafter, the learned Magistrate, on the basis of materials available in the case diary as well as charge sheet, has passed the impugned order of cognizance which requires no interference. He further submits that the allegation made by the informant was thoroughly investigated by the police and after investigation, police submitted charge sheet. Thereafter, the learned Magistrate, on the basis of materials available in the case diary as well as charge sheet, has passed the impugned order of cognizance which requires no interference. He submits that while the petitioner, after the order of cognizance, had approached this Court for grant of bail a Bench of this Court, by its order dated 19.4.2011 passed in Cr. Misc. No.11061 of 2011 has granted privilege of bail to the petitioner on submission made by both the parties that steps shall be taken for settling the dispute between the parties. He submits that this Court, while granting bail, had directed the court below for fixing a date for reconciliation and for taking all possible steps to patch up the dispute of the parties. This Court further granted liberty to the learned court below that if he fails in his attempt on account of “rigid approach of the petitioner”, he may cancel the bail bonds of the petitioner, but if the informant creates hurdle in reconciliation proceeding in that event, the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barh shall drop the reconciliation proceeding and shall proceed with the case without cancelling the bail bonds of the petitioner. On aforesaid ground, he has prayed for rejecting the present petition. 7. At the very outset before dealing with any point, it would be appropriate to refer provision contained in Section 460 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which prescribes that on certain irregularity criminal proceeding may not be vitiated. One of the provision under Section 460(e) indicates that order of cognizance even on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction can be treated as only irregularity and on this ground order of cognizance may not be set aside. For just decision, it would be appropriate to quote Section 460 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is as follows : “460. For just decision, it would be appropriate to quote Section 460 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is as follows : “460. Irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings.–If any Magistrate not empowered by law to do any of the following things, namely:- (a) to issue a search-warrant under section 94; (b) to order, under section 155, the police to investigate an offence; (c) to hold an inquest under section 176; (d) to issue process under section 187, for the apprehension of a person within his local jurisdiction who has committed an offence outside the limits of such jurisdiction; (e) to take cognizance of an offence under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 190; (f) to make over a case under sub-section (2) of section 192; (g) to tender a pardon under section 306; (h) to recall a case and try it himself under section 410; or (i) to sell property under section 458 or section 459, erroneously in good faith does that thing, his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered.” 8. Meaning thereby that order of cognizance on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction cannot be assailed. It is true that on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, a trial may not proceed in view of Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. In the present case in the F.I.R., there is specific assertion that some of the occurrence had taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of Barh Court. Under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, if in a case, cause of action arose at difference places, the parties, would be entitled to approach either of the court. In the present case in the F.I.R., there is specific assertion that the informant was abused and mentally tortured in her village Salimpur, which is within Bakhtiarpur and within the territorial jurisdiction of Barh. While referring this assertion, it would also be appropriate to deal with the averment made by learned counsel for the petitioner that such allegation was not corroborated. During investigation, the father of the informant, in his statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has not corroborated such statement. 10. The court is of the opinion that at the stage of cognizance or even at the charge stage only requirement is to see prima facie case. During investigation, the father of the informant, in his statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has not corroborated such statement. 10. The court is of the opinion that at the stage of cognizance or even at the charge stage only requirement is to see prima facie case. If there is material to show prima facie that part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Barh Court, then in that event, it would not be appropriate for this Court to interfere with the order of cognizance. In Y. Abraham Ajith’s case (supra) as well as Bhura Ram’s case (supra), entire cause of action arose beyond the jurisdiction of a court where order of cognizance was passed. This is not fact in the present case. It is evident that part of cause of action arose before the Barh Court and as such the petitioner may not get any help from the aforesaid judgments. So far as Preeti Gupta’s case (supra) is concerned, every case is to be examined on the basis of its own fact. In the present case, the fact emerged from the F.I.R. indicates that petitioner may not get any help from law laid down by Preeti Gupta’s case (supra). Simiarly, Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) does not help the petitioner. Of course, in paragraph-108 in Bhajan Lal’s case, the apex court has indicated certain criteria for interference in a criminal proceeding at initial stage, but in paragraph-109 of the said judgment, the apex court has categorically held that such power should be exercised sparingly. It would be appropriate to quote paragraph-109 of Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) : “109. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice”. 11. At the initial stage of a criminal proceeding, time without number, it has been held that only requirement is to see a prima facie case. 11. At the initial stage of a criminal proceeding, time without number, it has been held that only requirement is to see a prima facie case. The word ‘prima facie’ has elaborately been discussed in 1996(3) Criminal Law Journal 2448 (State of Maharashtra etc. Vs. Som Nath Thapa etc.). For just decision, it would be appropriate to quote paragraph-30 of the judgment, which is as follows : “30. In Antulay’s case, ( AIR 1986 SC 2045 ), Bhagwati, C.J., opined, after noting the difference in the language of the three pairs of section, that despite the difference there is no scope for doubt that at the stage at which the Court is required to consider the question of framing of charge, the test of “prima facie” case has to be applied. According to Shri Jethmalani, a prima facie case can be said to have been made out when the evidence, unless rebutted, would make the accused liable to conviction. In our view, better and clearer statement of law would be that if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence, a Court can justifiably say that a prima facie case against him exists, and so, frame charge against him for committing that offence.” 12. After going through the facts and circumstances and law laid down by the Apex Court, the court is of the opinion that the present case is not a case, which can be put in the category in rarest of rare case. From the F.I.R. itself, it is evident that prima facie case is disclosed. The allegation made in the F.I.R. was thoroughly investigated and thereafter, police submitted charge sheet. The learned Magistrate, on the basis of material on record i.e. charge sheet and case diary, has passed the order of cognizance, which requires no interference. This Court is reminded by an observation of the apex court recorded in 1995(3) Criminal Law Journal 2935 (Ganesh Narayan Hegde Vs. S. Bangarappa and others). Paragraph-18 of the said judgment is quoted herein below : “18. It is common knowledge that currently in our country criminal Courts excel in slow-motion. The procedure is dilatory, the dockets are heavy, even the service of process is delayed and, still more exasperating, there are appeals upon appeals and revisions and supervisory jurisdictions, baffling and baulking speedy termination of prosecutions....”. It is common knowledge that currently in our country criminal Courts excel in slow-motion. The procedure is dilatory, the dockets are heavy, even the service of process is delayed and, still more exasperating, there are appeals upon appeals and revisions and supervisory jurisdictions, baffling and baulking speedy termination of prosecutions....”. The slow-motion becomes much slow-motion when politically powerful or rich and influential persons figure as accused. F.I.Rs. are quashed. Charges are quashed. Interlocutory orders are interfered with. At every step, there will be revisions and applications for quashing and writ petitions. In short, no progress is ever allowed to be made. And if ever the case reaches the stage of trial after all these interruptions, the time would have taken its own toll: the witnesses are won over; evidence disappears; the prosecution loses interest-the result is an all too familiar one. We are sad to say that repeated admonitions of this Court have not deterred superior Courts from interfering at initial or interlocutory stages of criminal cases. Such interference should be only in exceptional cases where the interests of justice demand it; it cannot be a matter of course.” 13. After going through the aforesaid observation, it is evident that the apex court has deprecated interference by the superior courts at initial or interlocutory stage of a criminal case. The apex court has also used the word ‘admonition’ against the superior courts in such situation. 14. In that view of the matter, I do not find any material to interfere either with the order of cognizance or proceeding in Bakhtiarpur P.S. Case No.162 of 2006. 15. Accordingly, the petition stands dismissed. 16. Since in the case, F.I.R. was lodged long back in the year 2006 and at belated stage, order of cognizance was passed in the year 2011, it would be appropriate to direct the court below to proceed with the case expeditiously so that the case may come to its logical end without any further delay. With aforesaid observation and direction, the petition stands dismissed. ?