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2012 DIGILAW 67 (ALL)

SHYAMLEELA DEVELOPMENT PVT. LTD. v. ANIL KUMAR SINGH

2012-01-07

PRAKASH KRISHNA

body2012
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J.—These two revisions were heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment as was jointly agreed by the learned counsel for the parties. They are directed against two separate orders both dated 8th of September, 2011 passed by the Court below rejecting the application Nos. 38C and allowing 46Ka, preferred by the applicant defendant herein. 2. The original suit No. 1740 of 2008 has been instituted by Anil Kumar against Smt. Shanti Devi and others for mandatory injunction claiming the following reliefs : (a) Decree for mandatory injunction be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 directing the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to execute the deed of sale in favour of plaintiff within the time allowed by the learned Court. (b) Cost of the suit be also awarded to the plaintiff and against the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. (c) Any other relief which the learned court may deem fit and proper be granted in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in the circumstances of the case. 3. Initially, the said suit was filed against three defendants and the defendant No. 4 who has filed the present revision was impleaded subsequently by the plaintiff on the allegation that he has purchased the property in dispute during the pendency of the suit. 4. The aforestated suit has been filed on the allegations that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are owners of several properties as detailed in the plaint. They expressed their desire to sell two properties to the plaintiff. Therefore, two sets of agreements for sale of properties enumerated in each agreement were entered into. It was agreed upon that the sale-deed would be executed within a period of one year thereof. The sale agreements are dated 15th of June, 2005. The suit giving rise to these revisions was instituted in the month of September, 2008. 5. Therefore, two sets of agreements for sale of properties enumerated in each agreement were entered into. It was agreed upon that the sale-deed would be executed within a period of one year thereof. The sale agreements are dated 15th of June, 2005. The suit giving rise to these revisions was instituted in the month of September, 2008. 5. When the present applicant was impleaded as defendant No. 4, objection with regard to the maintainability of the suit for prohibitory injunction was raised, by filing an application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. Then, the plaintiff filed an application for amendment of the plaint for incorporating the plea for specific performance of contract to sell which was opposed by the present applicant on the ground that the said relief cannot be granted as it is barred by time by now. 6. The trial Court by the two orders allowed the amendment application permitting the plaintiff to add the relief for specific performance of contract to sell and consequently, it dismissed the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. Hence, these two revisions. 7. Sri P.K. Jain, learned counsel for the applicant, submits that a bare perusal of the amendment application would show that the plaintiff claimed drastic amendments in the plaint. He has sought for amendment almost in each and every paragraph of the plaint. Through the amendments the words ‘suit for mandatory injunction’ have been sought to be deleted. The valuation clause of the suit as also the court fees clause have been sought to be amended. Elaborating the argument, it was submitted that by paragraph 14 of the amendment application the plaintiff has sought that the words ‘mandatory injunction’ in the relief clause be deleted and be substituted by the words ‘specific performance of contract to sell’. The submission is that on the plaint allegations, no relief for specific performance of contract to sell can now be granted as on the date of the amendment application, the suit for the said relief is barred by time. 8. In reply, the learned counsel for the plaintiff supports the impugned orders. 9. Considered the respective submissions of the counsel for the parties and perused the record. Certain facts which are not in dispute may be noted. 10. The alleged agreement is dated 15th of June, 2005. The suit for mandatory injunction was filed on 9th of September, 2008. 8. In reply, the learned counsel for the plaintiff supports the impugned orders. 9. Considered the respective submissions of the counsel for the parties and perused the record. Certain facts which are not in dispute may be noted. 10. The alleged agreement is dated 15th of June, 2005. The suit for mandatory injunction was filed on 9th of September, 2008. The application for amendment was filed on 28th of July, 2011. Period of one year was fixed under the said agreement for the execution of the sale deed. In this regard, it is useful to notice paragraphs 10 and 11 of the plaint reproduced below as it originally stood : 10. That the agreements for sale were executed on 15.6.2005. One year time was allowed for execution of deeds of sale, which expired on 14.6.2006 and thereafter 3 years prescribed in the Limitation Act which will expire on 14.6.2009. Thus the suit is within limitation. 11. That the cause of action for the suit firstly arose on 15.6.2005 on the date of execution, thereafter 11.6.2006 and lastly on 1.8.2008, when the defendant No. 1 and 2 refused to execute the deed of sale, further on 20.10.2010 when the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 executed the sale deed in favour of defendant No. 4 within the jurisdiction of the learned court and the learned court has the jurisdiction to try the suit. 11. The agreements to sell were executed on 15th of June, 2005. From that date at the most the plaintiff could have one year + three years i.e. four years period of limitation for a suit for specific performance of contract to sell, which expired on 14th of June, 2009. Therefore, the date on which the amendment application i.e. 28.7.2011 was filed, the relief for specific performance of contract to sell can not be granted. It is barred by time. 12. The Apex Court in the case of T.L. Muddukrishana and another v. Smt.Lalitha Ramchandra Rao, AIR 1997 SC 772 , had occasion to examine the present controversy precisely. Para 8 is relevant to reproduce below : “Under these circumstances, it must be held that for the purpose of limitation, what is material is that the limitation begins to run from the date the parties have stipulated for performance of the contract. Para 8 is relevant to reproduce below : “Under these circumstances, it must be held that for the purpose of limitation, what is material is that the limitation begins to run from the date the parties have stipulated for performance of the contract. The suit required to be filed within three years from the date fixed by the parties under the contract. Since the application for amendment of the plaint came to be filed after the expiry of three years, certainly it changed the cause of action as required to be specified in the plaint. The suit for mandatory injunction is filed and the specific performance was sought for by way of an amendment. The cause of action is required to be stated initially in the plaint but it was not pleaded. It was sought to be amended, along-with an application for specific performance which, as stated earlier, was rejected. Under these circumstances, even by the date of filing of the application, namely, November 5, 1992, the suit was barred by limitation. The high Court, therefore, was right in refusing to permit the amendment of the plaint.” 13. Applying the above principle to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the amendment sought for by the plaintiff to substitute the relief clause by seeking a decree for specific performance of contract to sell in respect of the agreements dated 15th of June, 2005 in the year 2011 is obviously barred by time. This being so, the Court below was not justified in allowing the amendment. Consequently, it also committed illegality in refusing to reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C as it is barred by Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act. 14. In view of the above, the two orders dated 8th of September, 2011 rejecting the application No. 38C and allowing the application No. 46Ka cannot be allowed to stand and are hereby set aside. The Court below has acted illegally with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction in passing the two orders under revision. 15. In the result, both the revisions succeed and are allowed. The application No. 46Ka filed by the plaintiff is rejected and the application No. 38C filed by the defendant applicant stands allowed. The plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C is rejected in view of section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act. 16. 15. In the result, both the revisions succeed and are allowed. The application No. 46Ka filed by the plaintiff is rejected and the application No. 38C filed by the defendant applicant stands allowed. The plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C is rejected in view of section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act. 16. No order as to costs. ——————