Judgment :- 1. Writ Petition is filed praying to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records of the first respondent in Pro.No.1122/Tho.U./2002 dated 06.08.2003; and of the 2nd respondent in Pro.No.5585/FA/2000 dated 21.08.2001, quash the said orders and issue consequential directions to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits such as back-pay, continuity of service, etc. 2. Heard Mr.M.Ravi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner; Mr.S.V.Durai Solaimalai, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent and Mr.R.Madanagopal, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent. 3. The writ petitioner in this case was appointed as mazdoor in the second respondent Milk Producers Co-operative Union in the year 1974 and thereafter promoted as Senior Factory Assistant. While discharging his duty he was caught red-handed for removing 63 bags of = litre milk packet belonging to the Union without appropriate authorisation and consequently he was suspended. A memo has been issued initiating disciplinary proceedings. Enquiry was conducted as per procedure and a punishment of dismissal from service was imposed by the second respondent. Challenging the same the writ petition has been filed. 4. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition it has been stated that an appeal has been filed with a delay and since there was no interim order was passed, petitioner has filed the writ petition. Para 9 of the affidavit reads as follows:- "9. I have submitted an Appeal dated 25.1.2002 against the above order of punishment to the first respondent with a request to condone the delay in filing the Appeal and to stay the order of punishment till the disposal of the Appeal. No order has been passed on the Appeal and no interim order has been received." 5. The appeal came to be disposed of by the first respondent on 6.8.2003. Thereafter, the petitioner filed M.P.No.43428 of 2003 to amend the prayer in the writ petition, thereby challenging the order of the first respondent appellate authority. That application was allowed. No specific application raising additional grounds challenging the order of the first respondent appellate authority has been filed. 6. At the time of final hearing, it is found that most of the grounds raised in the writ petition are relating to factual aspects of the delinquency alleged against the petitioner. The petitioner having preferred an appeal, should have withdrawn this writ petition then. 6. At the time of final hearing, it is found that most of the grounds raised in the writ petition are relating to factual aspects of the delinquency alleged against the petitioner. The petitioner having preferred an appeal, should have withdrawn this writ petition then. Petitioner ought not to have pursued two parallel proceedings. On the contrary, when the appeal was dismissed, he has chosen only to amend the prayer in the writ petition without raising any legal plea by way of additional grounds, challenging the order of the first respondent. The grounds raised in the writ petition is only against the order of the disciplinary authority. 7. In any event, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, the writ petition itself is not maintainable in view of the Larger Bench decision of this Court in K.Marappan - vs. - Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Namakkal reported in (2006)4 MLJ 641 = 2006(4) CTC 689 =2006-4 L.W.495. Para 21 of the larger Bench decision of this Court reads as follows:- "21. From the above discussion, the following propositions emerge:- (i) If a particular co-operative society can be characterised as a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution (applying the tests evolved by the Supreme Court in that behalf), it would also be an authority within the meaning and for the purpose of Article 226 of the Constitution. In such a situation, an order passed by a society in violation of the bye-laws can be corrected by way of writ petition. (ii) Applying the tests in Ajay Hasia it is held that the respondent society carrying on banking business cannot be termed as an instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. (iii) Even if a society cannot be characterised as a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, even so a writ would lie against it to enforce a statutory public duty cast upon the society. In such a case, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the society is being treated as a person or an authority within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution and what is material is the nature of the statutory duty placed upon it and the Court will enforce such statutory public duty. In such a case, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the society is being treated as a person or an authority within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution and what is material is the nature of the statutory duty placed upon it and the Court will enforce such statutory public duty. Although it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity. (iv) A society, which is not a State would not normally be amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, but in certain circumstances, a writ may issue to such private bodies or persons as there may be statutory provisions which need to be complied with by all concerned including societies. If they violate such statutory provisions a writ would be issued for compliance of those provisions. (v) Where a Special Officer is appointed in respect of a co-operative society which cannot be characterised as a State a writ would lie when the case falls under Clauses (iii) and (iv) above. (vi) The bye-laws made by a co-operative society registered under the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983 do not have the force of law. Hence, where a society cannot be characterised as a State, the service conditions of its employees governed by its bye-laws cannot be enforced through a writ petition. (vii) In the absence of special circumstances, the Court will not ordinarily exercise power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when the Act provides for an alternative remedy. (viii) The decision in M.Thanikkachalam v. Madhuranthagam Agricultural Co-operative Society, 2000 (4) CTC 556 is no longer good law, in view of the decision of the seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas case and the other decisions referred to here before. The reference is answered accordingly. Registry is directed to place the paper before the appropriate bench for its disposal." 8. The respondent union is a cooperative society and the issue raised in the writ petition relates to disciplinary action against an individual. It cannot be challenged by way of writ petition in view of the Larger Bench decision. The reference is answered accordingly. Registry is directed to place the paper before the appropriate bench for its disposal." 8. The respondent union is a cooperative society and the issue raised in the writ petition relates to disciplinary action against an individual. It cannot be challenged by way of writ petition in view of the Larger Bench decision. If the petitioner is aggrieved by the order passed by the second respondent or that of the order in appeal passed by the first respondent, his remedy will be before appropriate higher authority or forum concerned. 9. In this regard, the learned counsel for the second respondent produced a copy of the order passed in W.P.Nos.1454 and 7579 of 2000 and 20978 of 2001 dated 13.8.2010 where the writ petitions filed by the similarly placed employees were dismissed as withdrawn giving them liberty to work out their remedy before the competent authority under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act in respect of the proceedings initiated by Tamil Nadu Co-operative Milk Producers Federation which is also a cooperative society and stated that petitioner can work out his remedy in the manner known to law. 10. In this case, the petitioner is a dismissed employee of the cooperative society. Hence, he should pursue his remedy before the appropriate authority as may be advised and the writ petition filed challenging the order of the first respondent is not maintainable in view of the Larger Bench decision of this Court referred to above. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner pleaded that the writ petition has been admitted in the year 2002 and therefore, should not be dismissed on the question of alternative remedy relying upon on the Division Bench decision of this court in Ramachandra Rexins Private Ltd., Bangalore vs. Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, Chennai and another reported in (2009)4 MLJ 417 . 12. The decision in Ramachandra Rexins case will not apply to the facts of the present case as in that case a plea of violation of principles of natural justice was raised in a proceedings before the Tribunal. The Division Bench also noted that an appeal against such order would lie before the High Court and, therefore, on a plea of violation of principles of natural justice, the writ petition was admitted and therefore, there was no need to dismiss the writ petition on the plea of alternative remedy. The Division Bench also noted that an appeal against such order would lie before the High Court and, therefore, on a plea of violation of principles of natural justice, the writ petition was admitted and therefore, there was no need to dismiss the writ petition on the plea of alternative remedy. 13. The facts in the present case is different from the above stated case. Most of the plea raised are on the factual aspects of the delinquency charged which have been found against the petitioner and confirmed in appeal. There is no statutory violation alleged. In view of the Larger Bench decision, where it is clearly held that the writ petition filed against the society will not maintainable, this writ petition has to fail. The petitioner in this case has not raised any plea with regard to violation of principles of natural justice. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed for the above said reasons. No costs.