Judgment : The petitioner sought for quashment of C.C.No.399 of 2009 on the file of the XVIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. The petitioner is the 2nd accused in the case. 2. An allegation is made by the 2nd respondent that two cheques were issued in discharge of the amounts due to the 2nd respondent and that when both the cheques were presented for collection, they bounced with an endorsement “funds insufficient”. Considering that the Andhra Pradesh Women’s Cooperative Finance Corporation Private Limited (the Corporation, for short), Hyderabad and the then Managing Director of the said Corporation were responsible for the bouncing of the cheques, a private complaint was lodged under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (the Act, for short). The learned Judge took the case on file. At that stage, the petitioner came forward with the present petition. 3. The admitted facts are that by the date of issuance of the cheque on 05-11-2007, the petitioner was not the Managing Director and that she is not the present Managing Director of the 1st accused-Corporation. Smt. V.Dyumani, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, however, contended that at the relevant time, the petitioner was the Managing Director of the Corporation and that in her capacity as the then Managing Director of the Corporation, she is answerable to the claim under Section 138 of the Act. 4. Section 141 of the Act envisages that if a Company commits an offence, every person who was in charge of and was responsible to the affairs of the Company at the time of the commission of the offence shall be guilty of the offence under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act. 5. The offence under Section 138 of the Act, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent occurs not when the cheque is issued and not when the cheque is presented but when the cheque stands bounced. In the present case, admittedly, the cheque stood bounced when the petitioner was the Managing Director of the Corporation. 6. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent placed reliance upon the decisions to show that a Managing Director would be answerable for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In the leading case in S.M.S. PHARMACEUTICALS LTD. In the present case, admittedly, the cheque stood bounced when the petitioner was the Managing Director of the Corporation. 6. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent placed reliance upon the decisions to show that a Managing Director would be answerable for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In the leading case in S.M.S. PHARMACEUTICALS LTD. v. NEETA BHALLA (2005) 8 SCC 89 ), the Supreme Court raised three questions which are: “(a) Whether for purposes of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, it is sufficient if the substance of the allegation read as a whole fulfil the requirements of the said section and it is not necessary to specifically state in the complaint that the person accused was in charge of, or responsible for, the conduct of the business of the company. (b) Whether a director of a company would be deemed to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for conduct of the business of the company and, therefore, deemed to be guilty of the offence unless he proves to the contrary. (c) Even if it is held that specific averments are necessary, whether in the absence of such averments the signatory of the cheque and or the managing directors or joint managing director who admittedly would be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for conduct of its business could be proceeded against.” The Supreme Court answered the questions as follows: “19. In view of the above discussion, our answers to the questions posed in the reference are as under: (a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied. (b) The answer to the question posed in sub-para (b) has to be in the negative. Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The requirement of Section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a director in such cases. (c) The answer to Question (c) has to be in the affirmative. The question notes that the managing director or joint managing director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as managing director or joint managing director, these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, they get covered under Section 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141.” 7. The Supreme Court held that indeed, merely being a Director of the Company would not make a person liable under Section 141 of the Act and that the person should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct and business of the Company at the relevant time to become liable for prosecution under Section 138 of the Act. NATIONAL SMALL INDUSTRIES CORPN. LTD. v. HARMEET SINGH PAINTAL (2010) 3 SCC 330 ) placed reliance upon S.M.S. PHARMACEUTICALS LTD.’s case (1 supra) and reiterated the view expressed in S.M.S. PHARMACEUTICALS LTD.’s case (1 supra). It is the contention of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that the petitioner, who was the Managing Director, therefore, is squarely liable to answer the claim of the 2nd respondent for the offence under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Act. 8. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that the petitioner, who was the Managing Director, therefore, is squarely liable to answer the claim of the 2nd respondent for the offence under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Act. 8. She further contended that whether the petitioner is liable or not can ultimately be decided at the time of the trial and not in a petition under Section 138 of the Act. Sri T.Nageswara Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, pointed out that the earlier Managing Director of accused No.1-Corporation, who issued the cheques, committed grave financial irregularities. He referred to Memo No.12/SC.D/A2/2009, dated 30-01-2009, whereunder criminal legal action was initiated against the then Managing Director, who issued the cheques, by entrusting the case to CID for investigation and enquiry. Needless to add that the 2nd respondent is not bound by any mistakes committed by the cheque issuing authority as on the date of the issuance of the cheques. What counts, however, under Section 138 of the Act is the date of bouncing of the cheques. Again, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is any amount of doubt and perhaps connivance between the cheque issuing authority and the 2nd respondent from the fact that while the cheques were issued on 05-11-2007, they were presented as late as on 06-5-2008. I am afraid that this is not a question which can be gone into in this petition. 9. In P.SudhavenkataLakshmi Vs. Sree Chakra Cotton Company, Rep. by its sole Proprietor, Puvvad (2002 (3) A.P.HIGH COURT LAWS 86), this Court had occasion to go into the question of the liability of a Managing Director in issuing the cheque. The Court held thus: “(8) Proviso to Sub Section 141 of the Act itself lays down that a person prosecuted in the capacity as person in charge of the affairs of a company can prove that the offence was committed without his consent or knowledge and hence is not liable for punishment. So, petitioner can adduce evidence during trial that she is not a Director of the Company or that the offence was committed without her knowledge and is entitled to the benefit of Proviso to Sec.141 (1) of the Act. Recently the Supreme Court in M.M.T.C. Ltd. Vs. So, petitioner can adduce evidence during trial that she is not a Director of the Company or that the offence was committed without her knowledge and is entitled to the benefit of Proviso to Sec.141 (1) of the Act. Recently the Supreme Court in M.M.T.C. Ltd. Vs. Medchel Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. (2001) 4 CTC 749 held that a complaint cannot be quashed merely on the basis of averments in the petition filed in the High Court in respect of the matters which have to be proved by the accused during the course of trial. The question as to whether the petitioner is or is not a Director of the Company is a question of fact. Since the petitioner has not produced any document to show that she is not a Director of the Company, merely on the basis of the averments and assertions in the petition that she is not a Director in the Company, the complaint against her cannot be quashed.” 10. In PareshP. Rajda v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.( AIR 2008 SC 2357 ), there were clear and categorical allegations against the accused that the accused were officers of the Company and were responsible for the affairs of the Company at the time of the commission of the offence. The Supreme Court considered that it was an inappropriate case to quash the proceedings against the accused and that the trial may ultimately decide the liability of such an officer of the Company. In N. Rangachari v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited( AIR 2007 SC 1682 (1), there were allegations against the Directors of a Company. The Supreme Court held that whether such Directors were in charge of the affairs of the Company at the relevant time is a question of fact and can be gone into at the time of the trial and not in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In effect, the Supreme Court considered that so long as it is found that the Director or the Managing Director issued the cheque in question, it would be inappropriate to quash the case at the threshold and that it would be appropriate to allow the trial to go on for the accused to prove his/her innocence. 11. In the present case, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that she has nothing to do with the issuance of the cheque. 11. In the present case, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that she has nothing to do with the issuance of the cheque. Be that as it may, at the time of the presentation of the cheque, she was the Managing Director of accused No.1-Corporation. The petitioner consequently is prima facie answerable to the claim. At this stage, it is not permissible for the petitioner to seek for the quashment of the case. Indeed, it is for the trial Court to consider the defences of the petitioner and decide the case ultimately. This petition, therefore, is found to be devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed. It is made clear that the trial Court shall not be influenced by any observations that are made in this case.