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2012 DIGILAW 674 (BOM)

State of Maharashtra v. Ramkrushna s/o. Punjabi Bobde

2012-03-27

A.P.BHANGALE

body2012
Judgment The instant appeal is filed by the appellant challenging the judgment and order of conviction dated 24/01/2002 passed by the learned Special Judge, Yavatmal in Special Case No.1 of 1995, whereby the respondent/accused was acquitted of an offence punishable under section 7 read with Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') 2. Facts briefly stated are:- The respondent/accused was serving as a Talathi at village Mankopra, Taluka Darwah, District Yavatmal. Dayaram Pundlik Padhen (PW-1), who was serving as a Clerk in the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Yavatmal, approached the Anticorruption Bureau, Yavatmal (ACB) on 5/10/1993 and gave oral report recorded by Shri.Deshpande (PW-4) (See Ex 17). According to the complaint made, the complainant had purchased agricultural land S.No.58/1 Block No.206 admeasuring 3 Acres at Mauje Mankopra, from one Pradeep Dashrathsingh Thakur. On 27/08/1993, an application was given to Talathi namely Shri.Bobde for taking mutation entry, who assured that the work will be done at Lohi camp and the applicant shall attend when he receives the notice. Complainant waited for notice till 15/09/1993. On that day, he went to Mankopra, but Talathi Bobde was not present. Complainant met Revenue Inspector Gajbhiye and Naib-Tahsildar Godane. Said Gajbhiye told the complainant to prefer application and further told that he will inform Patwari and then notice will be issued. Complainant did not receive notice. Hence, the complainant, on 24/09/1993, approached Talathi again for his work. Talathi Bobde issued notice under Section 150(2) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and asked the complainant to come to the camp. It is alleged that Talathi Bobde had asked that the complainant will have to incur expenses later. 3. It is contended on behalf of the Appellant by learned Additional P.P. that the Sanction to launch prosecution ought to have been held legal and proper. According to Learned Additional P. P., the trial Court ought to have observed that the Sanction was granted to prosecute the accused for the alleged offences after subjective satisfaction about the case for prosecuting the accused. On merits, it is submitted by the learned A.P.P. that the evidence of the complainant and panch witness ought to have been appreciated and accepted in the right perspective. 4. On merits, it is submitted by the learned A.P.P. that the evidence of the complainant and panch witness ought to have been appreciated and accepted in the right perspective. 4. It is the contention of the learned Advocate for the respondent/accused that notices to the persons interested were issued and the mutation entry was already taken on 20/09/1993 (Vide certified copy Ex.45). At that time itself, the duty of the accused to take the mutation entry stood performed, while alleged demand was made on 04/10/1993. It is a settled principle of law that mutation entry made would not confer any legal title. It is not even evidence of title. It indirectly can produce a result at a later stage when records of rights are periodically checked and corrected. Records of rights when duly corrected later, on the basis of the earlier mutations, then the entries in the revenue records start carrying a presumption of truth, though rebuttable. All the same, it cannot be said that the mutation itself had the legal effect of transferring ownership rights. These entries at best indicate present occupation but have no legal value of title; since no valuable thing nor any pecuniary advantage can be given or conferred upon other. 5. To attract penal liability, it is required that the intention of the accused must be to cause or he must be knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause loss or injury to the public or to any person. In all such type of cases of bribery, two aspects are important. Firstly, there must be a demand and secondly, there must be acceptance in the sense that the accused has obtained the illegal gratification. Mere demand by itself is not sufficient to establish the offence. Therefore, the other aspect, namely, acceptance is very important and when the accused has come forward with a plea that the currency notes were put in the drawer without his knowledge, then there must be a clinching evidence to show that it was with the tacit approval of the accused that the money had been put in the drawer as an illegal gratification. In the case of C.M. Girish Babu vs. CBI, Cochin, High Court of Kerala, (2009) 3 SCC 779 , in the facts of that case, the Court took the view that mere recovery of money from the accused by itself is not enough in absence of substantive evidence for demand and acceptance. The Court held that there was no voluntary acceptance of the money knowing it to be a bribe and giving advantage to the accused of the evidence on record. The Court in paras 18 and 20 of the judgment held as under : "18. In Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn) ( 1979 (4) SCC 725 ) this Court took the view that (at SCC p. 727, para 2) mere recovery of tainted money divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused, in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe." 6. A three-Judge Bench in M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P. ( 2001 (1) SCC 691 : SCC (Cri) 258), while dealing with the contention that it is not enough that some currency notes were handed over to the public servant to make it acceptance of gratification and prosecution has a further duty to prove that what was paid amounted to gratification, observed thus : (SCC p. 700, para 24) : "24. ... we think it is not necessary to deal with the matter in detail because in a recent decision rendered by us the said aspect has been dealt with at length. (Vide Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra ( 2000 (8) SCC 571 )).The following statement made by us in the said decision would be the answer to the aforesaid contention raised by the learned counsel: (Madhukar case, SCC p. 577, para 12) `12. The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification. Once the said premise is established the inference to be drawn is that the said gratification was accepted; "as motive or reward" for doing or forbearing to do any official act. The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification. Once the said premise is established the inference to be drawn is that the said gratification was accepted; "as motive or reward" for doing or forbearing to do any official act. So the word "gratification" need not be stretched to mean reward because reward is the outcome of the presumption which the court has to draw on the factual premise that there was payment of gratification. This will again be fortified by looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other like "gratification or any valuable thing"& If acceptance of any valuable thing can help to draw the presumption that it was accepted as motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do an official act, the word"gratification" must be treated in the context to mean any payment for giving satisfaction to the public servant who received it." "13. In fact, the above principle is no way derivative but is a reiteration of the principle enunciated by this Court in Suraj Mal case (supra), where the Court had held that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of prosecution against the accused in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money." 7. The learned trial Judge, it appears, went through the evidence on record in detail to arrive at the findings. There was material admission from Surendrakumar Devidas Jahagirdar (PW3) that it is the duty of the Talathi to take mutation entry in respect of sale or purchase of the agricultural land and issue notice to the parties under section 150(2) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966; while the certification of such entry is the job of the Superior Officer of Talathi. Thus, duty of the Talathi comes to an end when he takes mutation entry on record. The learned trial Judge found that Surendrakumar (PW-3) Sanctioning Officer made an incorrect statement on oath claiming that he had seen the original investigation papers, while it was clear that the copies were received by him. He held that the Sanction granted was not legal and proper. The learned trial Judge found that Surendrakumar (PW-3) Sanctioning Officer made an incorrect statement on oath claiming that he had seen the original investigation papers, while it was clear that the copies were received by him. He held that the Sanction granted was not legal and proper. It can not be disputed that the role of the sanctioning Authority is very important as the sanctioning Authority is expected to apply its judicious mind to the proposal of sanction. Judicial notice can be taken of the routine practice in the Government set up to put up draft Sanction Order before the Officer concerned for his signature. The sanctioning Authority can not start with assumption as to prima facie case as a matter of routine merely by putting its seal of approval on the draft of Sanction Order without going through the record of the case or without assessment of the material collected during the investigation. 8. Bearing in mind the above settled principles in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, it must be concluded that the trial Judge delivered well reasoned Judgment after marshaling the entire evidence. Findings were on the evidence led. I do not find any serious infirmity or perversity in the impugned judgment so as to disturb the findings and order of acquittal. Even otherwise, the High Court does not ordinarily set aside the Judgment of acquittal in case where two views are possible, although the view of the Appellate Court may be more probable. This is so because presumption of innocence is bolstered up further by judgment and order of acquittal. The order of acquittal is not to be disturbed unless there is any compelling or substantial reason. There is no compelling or substantial ground for to set aside the acquittal. The Appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs.