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2012 DIGILAW 674 (GAU)

Bijay Kumar Choudhury v. Union of India

2012-06-05

T.NANDAKUMAR SINGH

body2012
JUDGMENT T. Nandakumar Singh, J. 1. Heard Mr. Th. Babloo, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. C. Komol, learned CGSC appearing for all the respondents. By this writ petition, the petitioner, who was serving as Constable, is assailing the impugned order dated 02.10.1996 dismissing the writ petitioner from service basing on the enquiry report of the departmental enquiry dated 25.5.1996, on the score that the criminal proceeding, for the same set of facts and evidences the departmental enquiry was initiated and proceeded, had been ended in acquitting the writ petitioner vide judgment and order of the learned Special Judge, NDPS Manipur dated 25.2.2011 passed in Special Trial Case No. 2 of 2010. Factual Background 2. The petitioner was enrolled as Constable in the Central Reserved Police Force (CRPF for short) on 23.12.1996 and his Constable number is 860721653. After joining as constable in the CRPF, the petitioner had been posted at different places and his last posting was at E/61 Bn. CRPF, Mantripukhri, Imphal and detailed at the Civil Secretariat, Manipur Imphal. On 19.12.94 the petitioner was on 10 days' leave w.e.f. 19.12.94 to 31.4.1994 and went to his native place, i.e. at Bihar for treatment of his ailing mother in a Civil Bus having Registration No. MN-01/0561 with a prior permission of the Commanding Officer of his post. The said civil Bus in which the petitioner was going, was not a part of convoy of the CRPF personnel to Dimapur from Imphal. On that date, i.e. on 19.12.1994 when the Bus reached Mao Gate Manipur, the civil passengers of the Bus in which the petitioner was going, were bodily searched and also the contents of the luggage were also checked by the police personnel of Mao Police Station. 3. It is stated that some quantity of contraband Ganja was said to have been seized from the luggage of the petitioner which was kept on the roof of the Bus; and for that alleged seizure of the contraband Ganja, a regular criminal case being FIR Case No. 24(12)94-Mao P.S. u/s 20(b)(i) of NDPS Act was registered against the petitioner and he was arrested by the personnel of Mao Police station. 4. On 3.1.1995 police personnel of Mao P.S. through a wireless message informed the Commandant, E/61 Bn. 4. On 3.1.1995 police personnel of Mao P.S. through a wireless message informed the Commandant, E/61 Bn. CRPF that the petitioner had been arrested by the Police personnel in connection with the said FIR case, i.e. FIR Case No. 24(12)94-Mao P.S. u/s 20(b)(i) of NDPS Act. On receipt of the said wireless message, i.e. signal No. SPT/54/94 (Drug) dated 3.1.1995 the petitioner was placed under suspension by the Commandant vide his office order dated 5.1.1995. After the petitioner had been placed under suspension, a departmental enquiry had been initiated vide Memorandum dated 7.2.1996 for the "Article of Charges". The Article of charge read as follows: Article-I That No. 860721653 Constable Vijay Kumar Chaudhury of E Coy 61 Bn., CRPF while functioning as CT (GD) on 19.12.94 committed an act of 'MISCONDUCT' in his capacity as a member of the force, under section 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 in that while proceeding on 10 days Casual Leave on 19.12.94 by a Civil Bus was arrested by Mao Police (Manipur) along with 8 Kg and 600 gms of 'contraband Ganja' which he had hidden in his bedding. Sd/- (M.S. Rawat) Commandant (GS) 61 BN., CRPF, Imphal 5. The statement of imputation of misconduct read as follows: Statement Of Imputation Of Misconduct In Support Of The Article Of Charge Framed Against No. 860721653 Ct Vijay Kumar Chaudhury Of E Coy 61 Bn Crpf: Article-I No. 860721653 Ct Vijay Kumar Chaudhury of E/61 Bn. CRPF was sanctioned 10 days C/L w.e.f. 19.12.94 to 29.12.94, with permission to avail on 25.12.94 being Sunday and joining period for two days w.e.f. 30.12.94 to 31.12.94. On 19.12.94 on his personal request on the grounds of mothers treatment allowed to proceed on 10 days Casual Leave by a civil bus by officer Commanding E/61 Bn., CRPF. While performing journey by bus Regn. No. MN-01-0561 from Imphal to Dimapur, he carried 8 Kg and 600 gms of contraband Ganja (Moriojawa) which was kept hidden in his bedding and was seized by Civil Police at Mao Gate (Manipur) during routine checking on 19.12.94. He was taken into custody by Mao Police and a case under FIR No. 24(12)94 Mao P.S. u/s 20(b)(i) ND & PS Act was registered against No. 860721653 Ct Vijay Kumar Chaudhury of E/61 Bn. CRPF at Mao Police Station for further investigation. He was taken into custody by Mao Police and a case under FIR No. 24(12)94 Mao P.S. u/s 20(b)(i) ND & PS Act was registered against No. 860721653 Ct Vijay Kumar Chaudhury of E/61 Bn. CRPF at Mao Police Station for further investigation. He was remanded to the police custody for a period of 15 days w.e.f. 20.12.94 to 22.12.94 and remanded to judicial custody for a period of 15 days w.e.f. 22/12/94. Thus No. 860721653 Ct Vijay kumar Chaudhury committed an act of MISCONDUCT u/s 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 for carrying prohibited and contraband goods which is prejudicial to the good order and discipline of the force. Sd/- (M.S. Rawat) Commandant (GS) 61 BN., CRPF, Imphal 6. On perusal of the Article of Charge, it is clear that for that incident, i.e. on 19.12.94, the contraband Ganja alleged to have been seized from the luggage of the petitioner by the Police personnel of Mao P.S., the said departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner. In response to the said Memorandum for initiating departmental enquiry against the petitioner, the petitioner also submitted his show cause statement/statement of defence by categorically denying the said Article of charge against him. 7. It is also alleged that the departmental enquiry against the petitioner was in clear infraction of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as no Presenting Officer was appointed in the said departmental enquiry. It is the further case of the petitioner that in the absence of Presenting Officer in the said departmental enquiry, the Enquiry Officer functions as Prosecutor as well as the Enquiry Officer, i.e. both as Prosecutor and Judge. Therefore, it is the case of the petitioner that the departmental proceeding was proceeded in clear violation of the principles of natural justice and fair procedure. 8. The Enquiry officer of the said departmental enquiry, which was initiated in clear violation of the principles of natural justice, submitted his report on 25.5.1996 that the Article of charge against the petitioner stood proved. 8. The Enquiry officer of the said departmental enquiry, which was initiated in clear violation of the principles of natural justice, submitted his report on 25.5.1996 that the Article of charge against the petitioner stood proved. Basing on the said enquiry report, i.e. dated 25.5.1996, the commanding Officer issued the impugned dismissal order dated 2.10.96 for dismissing the petitioner from service and also treated the period from the date of suspension to the date of dismissal as dies non and further directed to seize all the Medals, if received by the petitioner, during the service period under Section 12(1) of the CRPF Act, 1949. 9. Against the dismissal order dated 2.10.96 the petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate authority, i.e. the D.I.G., CRPF, Ajmer (Raj) and that the appeal was also ended in dismissal vide order of the appellate authority dated 9.4.1997. 10. The I.O. of the said FIR, i.e. FIR No. 24(12)94-Mao P.S. u/s 20(b)(i) of NDPS Act which was registered for the same incident, i.e. for the alleged seizure of the contraband Ganja from the luggage of the petitioner which was kept on the roof of the Bus by the Police personnel of Mao P.S. on 19.12.1994, submitted charge sheet. After submission of the charge sheet, the learned Special Judge, ND & PS Manipur had conducted full length trial and in course of the trial the prosecution had examined prosecution witnesses in order to bring home the charge against the petitioner. 11. The learned Special Judge, ND & P.S. Manipur vide judgment and order dated 25.2.2011 passed in Special Trial Case No. 2/2010 acquitted the petitioner after coming to clear conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove that the petitioner was found in possession of 3 Packets of contraband Ganja on 19.12.94 at about 2.30 p.m. at Mao Gat, Manipur. For easy reference, relevant portions of the judgment and order of the learned Special Judge, ND & P.S. Manipur dated 25.2.2011 passed in Special Trial Case No. 2/2010 are quoted hereunder: 5. The prosecution is to prove the following points. (i) Whether the accused Bijoy Kumar Choudhury was in possession of three packets of articles, suspected to be ganja weighing one packet 3 kgs and other two packets weighing 2 kgs 800 gms each at Mao Gate on 19.12.94 at about 2.20 p.m.? (ii) Whether the said articles are having positive test of ganja? 6. (i) Whether the accused Bijoy Kumar Choudhury was in possession of three packets of articles, suspected to be ganja weighing one packet 3 kgs and other two packets weighing 2 kgs 800 gms each at Mao Gate on 19.12.94 at about 2.20 p.m.? (ii) Whether the said articles are having positive test of ganja? 6. Let us take up the first point whether the accused Bijoy Kumar Choudhury was in possession of 3 packets containing articles suspected to be ganja on 19.12.94 at 2.20 p.m. at Mao Gat. In order to prove the aforesaid facts, the prosecution had examined two witnesses namely Md. Allaudin, PW No. 3, who is the seizure officer and P.S. No. 2. Laisharam Nobo Singh who is the seizure witness. 7. PW No. 3 Md. Allaudin stated that on 19.12.94 at about 2 p.m., while he was doing normal frisking duty, he detected 3 packets of ganja from a bedding, which was carrying on the tope of the bus bearing No. MN01/0561. The name of the accused Bijoy Kumar was found appearing in the said bedding. It was written by black ink. The accused Bijoy Kumar came forward and identified the said bedding on being asked by the witness about the owner of the said bedding. Immediately he seized 3 packets of ganja in presence of the witnesses namely, Laishram Nobo Singh and Meisnam Joykumar Singh. The accused Bijoy Kumar was also arrested. After that he lodged a report to the O.C. Mao P.S. for registration of a case. The O.C. Mao P.S. registered the present case and endorsed the case to him for investigation. 8. Out of the two seizure witnesses, only one witness namely Shri Laishram Nobo Singh is examined as witness. Laishram Nobo Singh, who was examined as P.W.No.2 stated that he is a driver by profession. On 19.12.94 he was driving the said bus. While the bus was checked by the police at Mao Gate, it was said that some contraband ganja was seized from the bus as it was carried by some passengers. As stated by police he put his signature on a blank paper, after that we proceeded towards Guwahati. He also stated that he had forgotten the registration No. of the bus and also the name of the owner, due to lapse of time. He identified his signatures as Ext. P/4(1) and P/5(1). 9. As stated by police he put his signature on a blank paper, after that we proceeded towards Guwahati. He also stated that he had forgotten the registration No. of the bus and also the name of the owner, due to lapse of time. He identified his signatures as Ext. P/4(1) and P/5(1). 9. What the prosecution requires is to prove is the seizure of the ganja and not the signatures appearing in the papers. In the instant case, the witness who is the seizure witness did not state anything about the seizure. However, it is ascertained from his statement that the witness did not see the seizure. He simply heard it. Law requires that the seizure is to be proved by the person who saw the seizure. Hence, PW No. 2 Laishram Nobo Singh even though he is listed as a seizure witness, cannot prove the seizure as he is not a person who saw the seizure, and his evidence is not helpful to the prosecution in the matter relating to seizure. 10. In the circumstances I am coming to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused Bijoy Kumar Choudhury was found in possession of 3 packets of articles suspected to be ganja. 11. Record point is whether the seized articles has positive test of ganja. In the present case there is no dispute relating to the matter forwarded for chemical examination. There is also no dispute about the report which is marked as Ext.P/11, Ext.p/11 stated that the Ext. marked 01-CH/95 (marked by Laboratory) gave positive test of ganja. 12. In the circumstances, it is hereby concluded that the seized articles have positive test of ganja. 13. Considering the discussion and conclusions made above, I find no ground for conviction of the accused U/S 20(b)(ii)B of the ND & PS Act as there was a conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused Bijoy Kumar was found in possession of 3 packets of ganja. 14. In the result, it is hereby ordered that the accused be acquitted of all charges leveled against him. His bonds shall stand cancelled. 12. 14. In the result, it is hereby ordered that the accused be acquitted of all charges leveled against him. His bonds shall stand cancelled. 12. On conjoint reading of the Article of charge for the said departmental enquiry, the enquiry report dated 25.5.1996 submitted by the Enquiry Officer and the impugned dismissal order dated 02.10.96, the judgment and order of the learned Special Judge, ND & P.S. Manipur dated 25.2.2011 passed in Special Trial No. 2 of 2010, it is crystal clear that both the said departmental enquiry and the said criminal proceeding i.e. Special Trial No. 2 of 2010 are for the same incident, i.e. the alleged seizure of contraband ganja from the possession of the petitioner by the personnel of Mao P.S. on 19.12.94 at Mao Gate. Over and above in both the departmental enquiry and the criminal cases, an attempt had been made for proving the Article of Charge in the departmental enquiry and the charge in the said Special trial No. 2/2010 basing on the same set of facts and evidences. In such circumstance, it is the case of the petitioner that since the said criminal case, i.e. Special Trial No. 2/2010 was ended on acquittal of petitioner from the charge framed against him, the petitioner should have been re-instated by quashing the impugned dismissal order dated 2.10.96 based on the enquiry report dated 25.5.96 submitted by the Enquiry Officer of the said departmental enquiry. 13. Mr. Th. Babloo, learned counsel by placing heavy reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & another (1999)3 SCC 679 contends that normally departmental enquiry and criminal case could be proceeded simultaneously inasmuch as the departmental enquiry and the criminal case are operating in distinct and different jurisdictional area. There is a little exception where departmental enquiry and the criminal cases are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common and the criminal case ended in acquittal, the employee against whom the said departmental enquiry and the criminal proceeding had been initiated shall have the benefit of acquittal. There is a little exception where departmental enquiry and the criminal cases are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common and the criminal case ended in acquittal, the employee against whom the said departmental enquiry and the criminal proceeding had been initiated shall have the benefit of acquittal. In other words, in case the criminal trial is proceeded on the same set of facts and evidences basing on which the departmental proceeding was initiated and proceeded and ended in acquittal, the dismissal order basing on the report of the said departmental enquiry is liable to be quashed. Para 13, 14, 15, 18, 35 and 36 of the Capt M. Paul Anthony's case (supra) read as follows: 13. As we shall presently see, there is a consensus of judicial opinion amongst the High Courts whose decisions we do not intend to refer to in this case, the various pronouncements of this Court, which shall be copiously referred to, on the basic principle that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously with a little exception. As we understand, the basis for this proposition is that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional area. Whereas in the departmental proceedings, where a charge relating to misconduct is being investigated, the factors operating in the mind of the disciplinary authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the other staff, the standard of proof required in those proceedings is also different than the required in a criminal case. While in the departmental proceedings, the standard of proof is one of the preponderance of the probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The little exception may be where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common without there being a variance. The little exception may be where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common without there being a variance. The first decision of this Court on the question was rendered in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. vs. Kushal Bhan AIR 1960 SC 806 in which it was observed as under: It is true that very often employees stay enquiries pending the decision of the criminal trial courts and that is fair; but we cannot say that principles of natural justice require that an employer must wait for the decision at least of the criminal trial court before taking action against an employee. In Bimal Kanta Mukherjee vs. Newsman's Printing Works 1956 LAC 188 this was the view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. We may, however, add that if the case is of a grave nature or involves questions of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await the decision of the trial court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced. This was followed by Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Workmen AIR 1965 SC 155 in which it was, inter alia, laid down as under:- There is yet another point which remains to be considered. The Industrial Tribunal appears to have taken the view that since criminal proceedings had been started against Raghavan, the domestic enquiry should have been stayed pending the final disposal of the said criminal proceedings. As this Court has held in Delhi cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan it is desirable that if the incident giving rise to a charge framed against a workman in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a criminal court, the employer should stay the domestic enquiry pending the final disposal of the criminal case. 18. Then came the decision in Nelson Motis vs. Union of India (1992)4 SCC 711 which laid down that the disciplinary proceedings can be legally continued even where the employee is acquitted in a criminal case as the nature and proof required in a criminal case are different from those in the departmental proceedings. 18. Then came the decision in Nelson Motis vs. Union of India (1992)4 SCC 711 which laid down that the disciplinary proceedings can be legally continued even where the employee is acquitted in a criminal case as the nature and proof required in a criminal case are different from those in the departmental proceedings. Besides, the Court found that the acts which led to the initiation of departmental proceedings were not exactly the same which were the subject-matter of the criminal case. The question was not considered in detail. The Court observed: (SCC p.714, para 5) "5. So far the first point is concerned, namely whether the disciplinary proceedings could have been continued in the face of the acquittal of the appellant in the criminal case, the plea has no substance whatsoever and does not merit a detailed consideration. The nature and scope of a criminal case are very different from those of a departmental disciplinary proceeding and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceeding. Besides, the Tribunal has pointed out that the acts which led to the initiation of the departmental disciplinary proceeding were not exactly the same which were the subject-matter of the criminal case (Emphasis supplied) 35. Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case. 36. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge, insofar as it purports to allow the writ petition, is upheld. The learned Single Judge has also given liberty to the respondents to initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, specially having regard to the fact that the appellant is undergoing this agony since 1985 despite having been acquitted by the criminal court in 1987, we would not direct any fresh departmental enquiry to be instituted against him on the same set of facts. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, specially having regard to the fact that the appellant is undergoing this agony since 1985 despite having been acquitted by the criminal court in 1987, we would not direct any fresh departmental enquiry to be instituted against him on the same set of facts. The appellant shall be reinstated forthwith on the post of Security Officer and shall also be paid the entire arrears of salary, together with all allowances from the date of suspension till his reinstatement, within three months. The appellant would also be entitled to his cost which is quantified at Rs. 15,000/-. 14. As discussed above, said departmental enquiry against the petitioner and the said criminal case, i.e. Special Trial case No. 2/2010 are based on the same set of facts and evidences. 15. As laid down by the Apex Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony's case (supra), this Court is of the considered view that the impugned dismissal order dated 2.10.96 which had not been interfered with by appellate authority, i.e. the D.I.G.CRPF, Ajmer dated 9.4.1997 is called for interference by this Court. 16. Over and above, Mr. Babloo, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that even though Section 11(1) CRPF Rules, 1955 does not contemplate appointment of Presenting Officer in the departmental enquiry, the Presenting Officer is required to be appointed under the principles of natural justice. It is fairly well settled that principles of natural justice shall read into the statutory provisions unless the statutory provisions expressly excludes principles of natural justice. 17. This Court (Single Bench) in Mutum Shantikumar vs. Union of India and other 2005 (1) GLT 413 and also by the Division Bench in Union of India vs. Ram Lakhan 2011 (3) GLT 281 held that principles of natural justice shall read into the provisions of CRPF Act, 1949 and also the rules framed thereunder, and accordingly even if Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act, 1949 is silent regarding appointment of Presenting Officer in the disciplinary proceeding, the Presenting Officer should be appointed in the departmental enquiry in consonance with the principles of justice and fair procedure. Para 11, 17 and 18 of the GLR in Ram Lakhan's case (supra) read as follows: 11. While responding to the submission of Mr. Para 11, 17 and 18 of the GLR in Ram Lakhan's case (supra) read as follows: 11. While responding to the submission of Mr. Lodh, Ms Roy placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court which was referred by the learned Single Judge in his decision, particularly paragraph 11 to 15 wherein the learned Single Judge taking note of the decision of this Court as well as the Apex Court elaborately discussed the question involved in the matter and not only that, his Lordship also took note of a case decided by this Court in Mutum Shantikumar Singh v. Union of India & Ors reported in 2005 (1) GLT 413 wherein it was held that though Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955 is silent on appointment or non-appointment of a Presenting Officer it does not expressly exclude application of principles of natural justice and fair procedures and the principles of natural justice have to be read into rules unless law expressly or by necessary implication excludes the application of principles of natural justice and further held that non appointment of Presenting Officer amounts to violation of principles of natural justice and in that given case appointment of Presenting Officer is a must in the disciplinary proceedings against the CRPF constable. 17. It appears from the impugned judgment and order that the learned Single Judge also took note of Union of India vs. HC Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 and Moni Shankar vs. Union of India, 2008 3 SCC 484 wherein the Apex Court held that a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one proceeding and the Inquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function. Although the provisions of evidence Act are not applicable in such proceedings, principles of Natural Justice are required to be complied with. The apex Court, in the case of Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank & other Reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 while considering the case of the appellant Roop Singh Negi who was working as a Peon in the respondent-Bank also noted that the tenor of the report demonstrates that the Inquiry Officer had made up his mind to find the appellant guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left. It would be profitable to reproduce the paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of the Roop Singh Negi (supra) as the same was also reproduced by the learned Single Judge in his judgment. Accordingly, those paragraphs are reproduced herein under for better appreciation:- 15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the enquiry officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. The appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left. 16. In Union of India vs. H.C. Goel it was held: (AIR pp.369-70, para 22-23) 22. The two infirmities are separate and distinct though, conceivably, in some cases both may be present. There may be cases of no evidence when where the Government is acting bona fide; the said infirmity may also exist where the Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of the Government not supported by any evidence may be the result of mala fide but that does not mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorari will not issue without further proof or mala fides. That is why we are not prepared to accept the learned Attorney General's argument that since no mala fides are alleged against the appellant in the present case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the respondent. 23. That taken us to the merit of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. 23. That taken us to the merit of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by the appellant is a reasonably possible view this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent's case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that Charge 3 was proved against him? In exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on the evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well founded, because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that Charge 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence. 17. In Moni Shankar vs. Union of India this Court held: (SCC p. 492 para 17) 17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. 17. In Moni Shankar vs. Union of India this Court held: (SCC p. 492 para 17) 17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece or evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the Department, even it is taken in its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely, preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality. 18. We are of the further opinion that in various disciplinary proceedings the statutory authority is working like an administrative authority when they have to act independently and discharge their duty as the statute prescribed applying their judicial mind. It is a settled position of law that the disciplinary proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding and the Inquiry Officer while acting in a disciplinary proceeding is to act like a judicial authority. We are of the further opinion that the Inquiry Officer should not act either for the Disciplinary Authority or for the delinquent officer. He is to act independently to take the inference of facts which is placed before him by the parties. He should not put questions like a Presenting Officer to the delinquent officer to prove the charges levelled against the delinquent officer. From such action of the inquiring officer it can be easily said that the inquiry officer is to the extent biased to the delinquent officer, which is unwarranted in law. He should not put questions like a Presenting Officer to the delinquent officer to prove the charges levelled against the delinquent officer. From such action of the inquiring officer it can be easily said that the inquiry officer is to the extent biased to the delinquent officer, which is unwarranted in law. If the statutory authority acted beyond the power vested on him then where the delinquent officer will go except to the Court of law, which course really has been taken by the respondent-writ petitioner to prove the biasness of the inquiring officer in the writ petition and ultimately succeeded. 18. For the foregoing reasons, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, specially the acquittal of the petitioner vide judgment and order of the learned Special Judge, ND & PS dated 25.2.2011 passed in Special Trial No. 2/2010, this Court is not directing for any fresh departmental enquiry for the same set of facts. The impugned dismissal order dated 2.10.96 and the order of the appellant authority dated 9.4.1997 are hereby quashed. The petitioner should be reinstated to the post of Constable within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. However, in the given case, there is no material on record that during the period, i.e. from the date of suspension to the date of dismissal the petitioner had been employed effectively elsewhere but in order to straight the balance between the parties, there shall be no arrear salary of the petitioner. Had the petitioner not been paid substance allowance from the date of suspension to the date of dismissal, he should be paid subsistence allowance for that period. With the above observations and directions, the writ petition is allowed accordingly. Petition allowed.