JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sanjay Misra, J.—By means of this writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 31.1.1974 passed by the Consolidation Officer, Sirsa and the order dated 7.4.1975 passed in Appeal No. 1286, by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Meja, District Allahabad as also the order dated 18.10.1976 passed in Revision No. 547/468, by the Deputy Director, Consolidation, Camp at Allahabad. By the impugned orders, the consolidation authorities have determined the shares of the parties over the plots in question. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners has assailed the said orders on the ground that initially the plots in question were recorded in the name of common ancestor Angad Singh in 1308 F - 1309 F, but subsequently a mortgage was made by one of the sharers to another share holder, namely, Girivar Singh and Girivar Singh came to be recorded in 1334 F. The petitioners, who are the heirs of Girivar Singh came into possession in 1353 F in a different capacity and therefore, their possession is not as a continuation of possession as a co-sharer, but it is in their own independent right. The other ground is that in 1358 F, the opposite parties are not recorded in the Khatauni and therefore, there was no presumption regarding jointness of the family over the plots in question. 3. Placing reliance on the cases in Hira Lal and another v. Gajjan and others, 1990 RD 75 (SC); Gajjan v. Hira Lal and others, 1982 RD 9 (Sum); Sniveshwar Prasad Narain Singh and another v. Gharahu and another, 1979 RD 26 (SC); Lala Nanak Chand v. Board of Revenue and others, 1959 RD 165 (All)(DB), and Ram Avadh and others v. Ram Das and others, 2009 (106) RD 625 SC; learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that on the date of vesting the possession shown in the Khasra, is material and the occupant becomes adhivasi and subsequently a sirdar. He submits that under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (for short ‘the Act’), the rights of the petitioners had matured by being given benefit of Section 20 of the Act and hence, the consolidation authorities have committed an error in non-suiting the petitioners by allowing the objection of the private party respondents. 4. He submits that under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (for short ‘the Act’), the rights of the petitioners had matured by being given benefit of Section 20 of the Act and hence, the consolidation authorities have committed an error in non-suiting the petitioners by allowing the objection of the private party respondents. 4. Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the record, it is not in dispute that the petitioners and the private party respondents are of the same family coming from their common ancestor Angad Singh. In the supplementary affidavit dated 21.9.2011 filed by the petitioners, in paragraph 2 specific averments have been made that in 1308 F and 1309F Raja Ram Pratap Singh was recorded as owner of the plots and Jai Karan Singh son of Angad Singh was recorded as a tenant and Angad Singh was recorded as a sub-tenant. Their common ancestor Angad Singh and his son, were recorded in the revenue records in 1308 F -1309 F. This fact indicates that the land in question is ancestral land in the hands of the descendants. 5. A plea has been raised regarding a mortgage deed executed to the father of the petitioners, namely, Girivar Singh. Such submission or plea taken herein, has neither been proved before the consolidation Courts nor any evidence has been led about a mortgage nor the mortgage deed or any connecting evidence, has been brought on record of this writ petition. Therefore, to interpret the revenue entries of subsequent years i.e. after 1308 F as being based on the alleged mortgage, cannot be the basis for recording a finding on this argument and therefore, the claim of the petitioners to be in possession with effect from 1353 F in a different capacity, does not have any evidenciary backing. 6. The consolidation authorities while considering the various evidences filed by the parties have concurrently held that the property is coming from the common ancestor and the name of the karta khandan, was being recorded in the revenue records from 1308 F. Angad Singh had two sons, namely, Girivar Singh (father of the petitioners) and Mata Autar Singh (from whom the private parties respondents are descendants). The petitioners, who were the opposite parties in the proceedings before the Consolidation Officer, have not denied the family-tree brought on record by the respondents. The petitioners, who were the opposite parties in the proceedings before the Consolidation Officer, have not denied the family-tree brought on record by the respondents. After the death of Angad Singh, both his sons came to be in possession of the land in question but since Girivar Singh (father of the petitioners) was karta of the family, his name continued to be entered in the revenue records. However, there was no entry of any name in the Khasra for the period 1366 F -1377 F. The aforesaid fact indicates that the property in question was ancestral in the hands of the parties and possession of any of the parties during the above referred period, was not recorded. The consolidation authorities have therefore, on the basis of the shares inherited by the descendants of Angad Singh, determined the same under the impugned orders. 7. In Hira Lal v. Gajjan and others, 1990 RD 7 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering a case where the allegation was that Munni Lal died leaving behind him four sons. Munni Lal was recorded in the Khasra 1356 F hence, he acquired adhivasi rights in 1359F i.e. on 1.7.1952 (Date of vesting under the Act) being in cultivatory possession. Munni Lal was a sub-tenant and the defendant Nos. 3 to 25 of the suit were the tenant-in-chief. The plaintiff was son of Munni Lal and came up with a plea that his other and three brothers, had separated consequently, on the death of Munni Lal in 1951, the plaintiff became sole-tenant. He claimed that the rights of the tenant-in-chief extinguished with the enforcement of the Act. The plaintiff had brought the suit for injunction, when the tenant-in-chief i.e. defendant Nos. 3 to 25, executed a sale-deed in 1968 in favour of defendant Nos. 1 and 2. 8. The Supreme Court held that there was entry of the name of Munni Lal in the Khasra 1356 F as a sub-tenant. An entry in the revenue record has to be presumed genuine and it was for the defendants to show that it was introduced surreptitiously out of ill-will or hostility. After the death of Munni Lal in 1951, his son was entered in the Khasra 1371 F and 1372 F as the person in possession. Therefore, the possession of the sub-tenant continued with his son. 9. After the death of Munni Lal in 1951, his son was entered in the Khasra 1371 F and 1372 F as the person in possession. Therefore, the possession of the sub-tenant continued with his son. 9. The ratio of this decision is sought to be applied by learned counsel in the present case. In this case the ancestor of the parties, was entered in the revenue records in 1308F. Thereafter his one son namely Girivar Singh (Father of the petitioners) was entered in the year 1334F. The respondents were not recorded in 1358 F Khatauni. There is no evidence on record nor there is any finding of the consolidation authorities, regarding a partition or separation amongst the members of the family. In Hira Lal’s case (supra) the other three sons of Munni Lal had separated hence, the appellant therein claimed his rights against the purchasers of the tenant-in-chief and it was upheld in view of Section 20 of the Act. In the present case, there is no decision of a separation or partition, nor there is any such evidence indicating a separation or partition in the family of the ancestor Angad Singh. In the absence of a partition, the members of the family would not loose their shares only because of possession of only one co-sharer reflected in the Khasra. 10. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners on the basis of the decisions cited by him relates to the benefit under the Act to a sub-tenant, who is shown in possession on the date of vesting i.e. 1359 F (1.7.1952) and such an occupant becomes adhivasi and thereafter sirdar. In the present case the aforesaid decisions would not have any application since the name of Girivar Singh was recorded as sub-tenant after the death of Angad Singh, the common ancestor, for the reason that Girivar Singh was the karta khandan and his name was definitely in a representative capacity. This is not a case where any right is claimed against the tenant-in-chief. This case related to rights of the members of a joint family as sub-tenant, as on the date of vesting. 11. The legal rights of a co-sharer sub-tenant will not extinguish merely for the reason that the revenue entry existed in the name of another member of the joint family. This case related to rights of the members of a joint family as sub-tenant, as on the date of vesting. 11. The legal rights of a co-sharer sub-tenant will not extinguish merely for the reason that the revenue entry existed in the name of another member of the joint family. Even in cases of exclusive cultivatory possession, when the person is not recorded in the revenue records, his share in the land would not vanish. This is more so, when the revenue records did not reflect or represent the correct state of affairs. 12. A feeble plea of partition before the date of vesting, has been raised by the petitioners. This plea is raised on the basis that the name of Girivar Singh finds place in the revenue records. Under the circumstances of the present case, when Girivar Singh was recorded as sub-tenant in a representative capacity, the same cannot lead to a conclusion that a partition had taken place. Apart from this, in case, a partition had taken place, then the name of other branch of deceased Angad Singh, namely, Mata Autar Singh, would have found place over the share allotted to them. But, there is no such record available in this writ petition to indicate that under the alleged partition, Mata Autar Singh was given any share. Therefore, to rely upon the revenue entries in the name of Girivar Singh or his branch, in the revenue records for the purpose of taking a plea of partition, is unfounded, because admittedly a partition of family will entail division of the holding and entry of names of respective share holders in the divided plots. In the absence of any evidence of partition, the said plea cannot be accepted. A plea of partition has to be proved by the person alleging it. The burden of proof has not been discharged nor any cogent evidence has been led. 13. In the case of Sniveshwar Prasad Narain Singh and another v. Gharahu and another, 1979 RD 26 (SC), it was held that the defendants were tenants of the plaintiff and the defendants were recorded as occupants in 1356F. Again the defendants were sub-tenants of the tenant-in-chief. Therefore, on the date of vesting they being recorded as the occupants obtained rights by operation of law. Again the defendants were sub-tenants of the tenant-in-chief. Therefore, on the date of vesting they being recorded as the occupants obtained rights by operation of law. The Supreme Court in such circumstances, held as under : “A tenant of Sir or a sub-tenant would become under Section 20 (a) (i) or (ii), as the case may be, an Adhivasi. Now let us recall the object in enacting the legislation which was to confer certain rights on persons who were in actual possession of land. Legislature must have in view the eventuality where a tenant of Sir or sub-tenant as contemplated by Section 20 (a) (i) or (ii), as the case may be, would not be in possession but some one else is in possession and enjoyment and, therefore, may have been recorded as an occupant in the Khasra or Khatauni of 1356 F. The statute in such a situation intended to confer the status of Adhivasi on such occupant in preference to a tenant of Sir or sub-tenant who is not in possession. This construction advances the object to be achieved by the legislation, namely, to remove intermediaries and to bring the tiller of the soil in direct relation to the State. Section 20(b) (i) contemplates an occupant who is recorded in respect of land therein mentioned as being in actual possession because Khasra records possession and enjoyment of the land and therefore the expression occupant was interpreted to mean a person holding a land in possession or actual enjoyment. If this meaning of the expression ‘occupant’ is kept in view, Section 20 (a) and (b) present no difficultly for construction. Section 20 (a) (i) and (ii) provide for conferring the status of Adhivasi on a tenant of Sir or sub-tenant, as the case may be, but it also comprehends the situation that such a tenant of Sir or a sub-tenant may not be in possession and there may be some one else recorded as occupant in Khasra or Khatauni of 1356 F, which would mean that some one other than the tenant of Sir, or a sub-tenant was in possession or actual enjoyment of the land. It is such an occupant who is in actual possession and enjoyment of land being the tiller of soil, was to be Adhivasi in preference to tenant of Sir or sub-tenant of such land. It is such an occupant who is in actual possession and enjoyment of land being the tiller of soil, was to be Adhivasi in preference to tenant of Sir or sub-tenant of such land. Such class of occupant envisaged in Section 20 (b) (i) is taken out of the operation of Section 20 (a) (i) or (ii) by engrafting an exception: except as provided in Section 20 (b) (i). That is why Section 20 (a) (i) and (a) (i) open with as exception, namely except as provided in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) which would mean that except where there is an occupant recorded in 1356 F, on the land of which there is a tenant of Sir or sub-tenant, the latter would become Adhivasi, but where there is an occupant on land recorded in 1356 F such occupant would be Adhivasi.” 14. The present case is not between the sub-tenant and the tenant-in-chief. There can be no dispute regarding the rights of a sub-tenant against the tenant-in-chief upon enforcement of the Act. But the rights of the sub-tenant with his co-sharers is completely a different matter. The co-sharer of a sub-tenant, if in possession with the sub-tenant, will get equal rights against the tenant-in-chief after and on the date of vesting under the Act. In this decision it was held that the plaintiff was an intermediary and held the land as Sirdar. The defendant was a tenant of the Sir. The defendant would therefore, become Adhivasi, under Section 20 (a) (i) of the Act, but would not become an Asami. 15. The case of Lala Naual Chand (supra), also related to an occupant of land in the relevant year and his rights against the proprietor of the Sir. It was not a case of the rights inter se between the occupants of the land. 16. In the case of Ram Avadh (supra), the appellants Ram Avadh and others were purchasers and the land was recorded in the name of the vendors who were co-tenure holders with Ram Das and others. When the consolidation operations started, they filed application to be recorded in place of their vendor. The respondents came up with a case that the vendors had no share in the property, hence, had no right to execute the sale-deed. When the consolidation operations started, they filed application to be recorded in place of their vendor. The respondents came up with a case that the vendors had no share in the property, hence, had no right to execute the sale-deed. The proceedings came up to the High Court, when the Consolidation Officer directed the name of Ram Avadh and others to be recorded. The High Court dismissed the writ petition and upheld the order of the Assistant Director of Consolidation, who had allowed the revision. The Supreme Court, set aside the order of the High Court and affirmed the decision of the Consolidation Officer. This case related to the rights of a purchaser as against the co-sharers. It was not a case of the rights of a co-sharer in a sub-tenancy as against the tenant-in-chief. 17. Therefore, when a sub-tenant obtains rights in land occupied by him on the date of vesting, the question to be answered in this writ petition would be, the claim of the co-sharers of the sub-tenant, hence, the arguments involving the tenant-in-chief and his rights against a sub-tenant, cannot be adjudicated here. The tenants-in-chief are neither parties herein nor any relief has been claimed against them. 18. Under these circumstances, the sub-tenant who was recorded in a representative capacity of a joint family, cannot claim the benefit of being sole beneficiary on the date of vesting, only for the reason that he was alone recorded in the revenue records at the relevant time. The law cited by learned counsel, would therefore, not apply in a dispute between two or more sub-tenants inter se, when there is no issue involved against the tenant-in-chief. 19. The consolidation authorities have therefore, rightly determined the inter se shares of the co-sharers (sub-tenants) in the plots in dispute. 20. There is no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. 21. No order is passed as to costs. ——————