JUDGMENT T.N.K. Singh, J. 1. Heard Mr. A. Modhuchandra, learned G.A. appearing for the appellants-defendants and also Mr. Kh. Chonjon, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-plaintiffs. This first appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge (Sr. Divn) Manipur West dated 30.12.2008 passed in Original (Money Suit) No. 2/1994/40/2008 of the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Divn) Manipur West decreeing the Original Suit that the State of Manipur, (defendant No. 5) represented by defendant No. 2, is responsible and accountable for the wrongful and illegal acts of its servants, therefore, is held liable to pay damages/compensation to the plaintiffs for the death of (L) Naorem Krishnamohon Singh, in police custody; and quantum of compensation is fixed at Rs. 7,20,000/- (Rupees seven lakhs twenty thousand) only and ordered that the defendant No. 5, State of Manipur without unnecessary delay should pay compensation to the plaintiffs. 2. The respondents-plaintiffs filed Money Suit No. 2/94 against the present appellants-defendants and two others namely, 1) Shri Maibam Khogen Singh (Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police), s/o (late) M. Naba Singh, resident of Khundrakpam Awang Leikai, P.S. Heingang, District, Imphal; and 2) Md. Firoj Khan, (Inspector of Police formerly O/C of Kakching Police Station), resident of Yairipok Kekru Basti, P.S. Yairipok, District Thoubal, in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Manipur West for the reliefs: i. A decree for compensation and/or damages of the sum of rupees fifty lakhs against the opposite party-defendants jointly and severally for the shock, loss and injuries caused to the deceased Shri Naorem Krishnamohon Singh and to the petitioners-plaintiffs by the O.P.-defendants as employers and employees, OR A decree for compensation and/or damages of the sum of rupees fifty lakhs against the State of Manipur for the tortious acts of its employees causing the death of Shri Naorem Krishnamohon Singh. ii. An interim order or relief against the O.P.-defendants or the State of Manipur alone for granting some financial assistance during the pendency of the suit. iii. Cost of this application/suit and iv. any other or further relief or reliefs as the Court may deem just and proper in law and equity. 3. ii. An interim order or relief against the O.P.-defendants or the State of Manipur alone for granting some financial assistance during the pendency of the suit. iii. Cost of this application/suit and iv. any other or further relief or reliefs as the Court may deem just and proper in law and equity. 3. The pleaded case of respondents-plaintiffs in the plaint of the Original Suit, is briefly noted: (Late) Naorem Krishnamohon Singh, aged about 35 years, s/o N. Nilamani Singh, (respondent-plaintiff No. 4) was a resident of Kakching Khullen Mayai Leikai, P.S., Kakching, District Thoubal and was a citizen of India; he also possessed good health and was industrious. Respondent-plaintiff No. 1 is the wife of (late) Naorem Krishnamohon Singh, respondent-plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 are his children, respondent No. 4 is his father and respondent-plaintiff No. 5 is his mother. On 29.07.1991 at about 10.30 p.m. a police party of Kakching P.S. led by the said Maibam Khogen Singh, defendant No. 1 arrested (late) Shri Naorem Krishnamohon Singh from his house without giving any reason. Respondent-plaintiff Nos. 1, 4 and 5 requested the police personnel to allow them to bring Krishnamohon Singh, to the police station in the next morning, but the police refused. The police took away, Krishnamohon Singh in the police jeep to Kakching Police Station. 4. The Kakching Police Station situates at a distance of about 1 km away from the house of the respondents-plaintiffs. The said Md. Firoj Khan (Inspector of Police)/defend-ant No. 2, was the Officer-in-charge of the Kakching P.S. On the next day, i.e. at about 3.30 a.m. of 30.07.1991, a police party led by the said Maibam Khogen Singh in collusion with other police personnel i.e. defendant No. 2, Md. Firoj Khan (Inspector of Police) came to the house of the plaintiff in their police jeep and purported to have enquired whether (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh had come back to his house by falsely saying that he had escaped from the police station. After asking this question, the police party suddenly gone away. 5. Firoj Khan (Inspector of Police) came to the house of the plaintiff in their police jeep and purported to have enquired whether (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh had come back to his house by falsely saying that he had escaped from the police station. After asking this question, the police party suddenly gone away. 5. It is further pleaded case of the respondents plaintiffs in their plaint that after arrest of (late) Krishnamohon Singh from his house in the said night i.e. 29.07.1991 he was detained and confined in the police lockup of the Kakching P.S. The police party, defendants had severely beaten and tortured (late) Krishnamohon Singh at the police station in the night of his arrest. (Late) Shri Krishnamohon Singh cried several times for help. As a result of the said assault and torture, Krishnamohon Singh lost his consciousness and ultimately to save the police from being responsible for the death of (late) Krishnamohon in their custody, police party had collusively dropped (late) Krishnamohon Singh into the barrage and dam of Sekmai River, lying at the distance of a couple of miles away from the said police station. 6. On 30.07.1991 at about 10.00 a.m. Shri N. Nimai Singh, Hon'ble M.L.A. from Kakching, visited the Kakching police station to enquire the cause and grounds for arrest of (late) Shri Krishnamohon Singh and also about his whereabout. But the said defendant Nos. 1 and 2 namely, Maibam Khogen, ASI and Md. Firoj Khan, Inspector of Police, O/C, Kakching P.S. were not at the Police Station except one or two Constables. 7. On 02.08.1991, the dead body of (late) Krishnamohon Singh was picked up by the police from Kharungpat (water body/small lake). The dead body was handed over to the respondents-plaintiffs after post-mortem examination. Respondent-plaintiff No. 4 lodged a complaint against the said defendant Nos. 1 and 2 i.e., Maibam Khogen Singh, ASI and Md. Firoj Khan, Inspector of Police in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thoubal, who forwarded the complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Thoubal for taking necessary action and submission of report regarding the death of Krishnamohon Singh; but the matter was kept in the cold storage without taking any step. 8. Late N. Krishnamohon Singh, was a graduate and he also passed two years' Catechists training course in the year 1993 from the Pastoral Training Centre, Imphal. 8. Late N. Krishnamohon Singh, was a graduate and he also passed two years' Catechists training course in the year 1993 from the Pastoral Training Centre, Imphal. He was working as an agent of Life Insurance Corporation of India, Imphal Branch during the period from 23.01.1984 to 22.08.1989. Thereafter he was doing business of photography by opening studio at Kakching Bazar at the time of his death. He was earning not less than rupees three thousands per month at the time of his death. 9. The appellants-defendants, i.e. the State are, liable for the said tortious act committed by the said police officers in the course of their employment and respondents-plaintiffs are entitled to get damages for the death of N. Krishnamohon Singh. Accordingly, the respondents-plaintiffs filed the suit for the reliefs stated above. Defendants, Shri M. Khogen Singh, ASI, and Md. Firoj Khan, Inspector of Police and appellants-defendants in the present appeal filed written statements. The pleaded case of the defendants in their written statement were that (late) Krishnamohon Singh was brought to Kakching P.S. on 30.07.1991 by the police personnel of Kakching P.S. and just after his arrival at the police station he asked Mr. Khogen, defendant No. 1, ASI far allowing him to go to latrine to answer the call of the nature. The defendants are not denying in their written statement that (late) Krishnamohon Singh was in their custody, i.e. police custody of Kakching P.S. on 30.07.1991. Further pleaded case of the defendants in their written statement is that as the latrine of the police station (general latrine) was found closed, (late) Krishnamohon Singh requested the defendant No. 1, M. Khogen Singh, ASI and his party to take him to the adjacent paddy field to respond the call of the nature; accordingly he was taken to the paddy field and allowed him to answer call of the nature. In such situation, defendant No. 1, M. Khogen Singh and other police personnel were waiting for (late) Krishnamohon Singh at a bit distance from the place where (late) Krishnamohon Singh was answering the call of nature and (late) Krishnamohon Singh escaped from the lawful custody of the police by taking undue advantage in the midst of paddy plants. Soon after, the defendant No. 1, M. Khogen, along with other police personnel searched whereabouts of (late) Krishnamohon Singh, but he could not be rearrested. Soon after, the defendant No. 1, M. Khogen, along with other police personnel searched whereabouts of (late) Krishnamohon Singh, but he could not be rearrested. At about 02.30 a.m. of the same day, defendant No. 1, M. Khogen, ASI along with other police personnel left the P.S. by a jeep and searched for the escapee, (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh in his house. For the said incident, i.e. escape of (late) Krishnamohon Singh on 30.07.1991 a case being FIR No. 122(7) 1991 Kakching P.S. under Section 224, IPC was registered. Therefore, the defendants are not liable for the loSS of life of (late) Krishnamohon Singh and also not liable to pay any kind of compensation claimed by the respondents-plaintiffs. Defendant No. 1, M. Khogen Singh was also dismissed from service for the said incident. The defendants further pleaded in their written statement that (late) Krishnamohon Singh was not only drug peddler involved in the FIR No. 47(4) 89 Kakching P.S. under Section 21 /25 ND&PS Act but also guilty of escape from police custody, therefore the question of deprivation or violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India does not arise at all. 10. The learned Trial Court after careful perusal and consideration of the respective pleadings of the parties framed the following six issues: 1. Whether N. Krishnamohon Singh died while he was in police custody of Kakching Police Station? And, if so, what was the cause or circumstance leading to his death? 2. Whether N. Krishnamohon Singh escaped from the custody of Kakching Police Station before his dead body was recovered from the Kharungpat? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get compensation for the death of N. Krishnamohon Singh? And, whether the defendants are liable in Tort? If so, to what extent? 4. Is there cause of action for the suit? 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs claimed? 6. What would be appropriate reliefs to be granted to the plaintiffs? 11. The respondents-plaintiffs, in support of their pleaded case had examined five P.Ws. namely. 1) N. Nilamani Singh, 2) Rashmani Devi, 3) N. Krishnamohan Singh. 4) N. Nimai Singh and 5) H. Nabachandra Singh and exhibited ten documents i.e. Ext. A/1 to A/11. Defendants also examined eleven D.Ws. i.e. D.W. 1, M. Thoiba Singh, D.W. 2, K.K. Mongsang, D.W. 3, Y. Nabadwip Singh, D.W. 4, Th. Shamungou Singh, D.W. 5, Kh. namely. 1) N. Nilamani Singh, 2) Rashmani Devi, 3) N. Krishnamohan Singh. 4) N. Nimai Singh and 5) H. Nabachandra Singh and exhibited ten documents i.e. Ext. A/1 to A/11. Defendants also examined eleven D.Ws. i.e. D.W. 1, M. Thoiba Singh, D.W. 2, K.K. Mongsang, D.W. 3, Y. Nabadwip Singh, D.W. 4, Th. Shamungou Singh, D.W. 5, Kh. Mohdndro Singh, D.W. 6, A. Pradeep Singh, D.W. 7, Md. Feroz Khan, D.W. 8, M. Khogen Singh, D.W. 9, N. Brajamani Singh, D.W. 10, K. Mitrabi Meitei & D.W. 11, O. Ibopishak Singh, in support of their pleaded case. The learned Trial Court after careful appreciation of the statements of P.Ws. and D.Ws. and exhibited documents made the findings that there is no dispute on the fact that the deceased, N. Krishnamohon Singh was arrested at 10.30 a.m. of 29.07.1991 by the defendant No. 1, M. Khogen Singh, who was then an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police and dead body of (late) Krishnamohon Singh was eventually found at Kharungpat (small lake) on 02.08.1991 and handed over to his family members on 04.08.1991 after post-mortem was done. Therefore, the burden of proof that (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh, escaped from police custody was on the defendants and also did not die while he was in their custody. The learned Trial Court after appreciation of the statements of D.Ws. held that the defendants had utterly failed to prove that (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh, escaped from police custody and further held that (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh died in the police custody. The reasons for findings in the impugned judgment dated 30.12.2008 that the defendants had utterly failed to discharge their burden to prove that (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh escaped from their custody and did not die while in their custody, read as follows: Although it is clear from the above that it is the burden of the defendants to show or prove that (L) Naorem Krishnamohon Singh (the deceased) escaped from their custody and did not die while in their custody due to any wrongful or illegal act of theirs it is considered necessary to bring out some of the relevant evidence given by the plaintiffs before the evidence of the defendants is taken up. The P.W. No. 1 who is plaintiff No. 4 and the father of (L) Naorem Krishnamohon Singh (the deceased) stated in his cross examination that though he did not see the police torturing his son while in police custody he was told by one Naorem Krishnamohon Singh s/o Ibochouba Singh of Kakching Paji Leikai that in the night of his arrest he heard the police tortured his son. This statement though is hearsay is confirmed by the said Naorem Krishnamohon (who incidentally have the same name with the deceased) himself when he gave his evidence as P.W. No. 3. In his examination-in-chief the P.W. No. 3 stated as follows: "on 29.7.1991 at about 8.30 p.m. I was arrested by Kakching Police and was lodged at Kakching P.S. At about 11 to 12 p.m. I heard a man crying "Eibu Hatle, Eibu Hatle" (cry of pain saying I am being killed) and I could recognize the crying voice as that of (late) Krishnamohon Singh as I was well acquainted with his voice. After sometime, I heard the sound of police personnel walking up and down. They seem to be very busy with something. I also heard a motor jeep being driven out from the police station. After sometime the dawn came and I was taken to Thoubal Court at about 11 a.m. and from there I was released. That when I came home I was told that (late) Krishnamohon Singh also was arrested yesterday. Then I believed that crying sound, I heard yesterday in the police custody was that of Krishnamohon Singh". This evidence of the witness is neither shaken nor discredited in anyway in his cross-examination. Moreover, the fact that the witness was arrested in the night of 29.7.1991 and was in the custody of Kakching P.S. is confirmed by the evidence given by P.W. No. 4 namely. Nimai Singh. Hon'ble MLA of Kakching. The Hon'ble MLA stated in evidence that when he visited Kakching P.S. on 30.7.1991 with one advocate to enquire about the arrest of the deceased (L) Naorem Krishnamohon Singh he found Naorem Krishnamohan Singh (the P.W. No. 3) at the police station. In the words of the witness "In the lock up there were two tribal persons and one Naorem Krishnamohon Singh s/o N. Ibochou Singh of Kakching Paji Leikai who was once Mr. Manipur". In the words of the witness "In the lock up there were two tribal persons and one Naorem Krishnamohon Singh s/o N. Ibochou Singh of Kakching Paji Leikai who was once Mr. Manipur". In view of the above stated evidence and the findings of the doctor (P.W. No. 5) who conducted post-mortem on the deceased and gave his report in the exhibit A/9 (post-mortem report) that there was a contusion of 5 x 3 cm. on the back of right arm 10 cm. below the tip of shoulder of the deceased which is ante-mortem there is no doubt that the deceased was tortured in the night of 29.7.1991. Though the very nature of the inquiry does not indicate that the death of (L) Naorem Krishnamohon Singh was caused by the same it does indicate that the accused was to some extent tortured. Therefore, the submission of the Ld. counsel for the defendants that since the witness P.W. No. 3 did not produce any document relating to his arrest his statement cannot be accepted is not acceptable. Generally everyone who were arrested once by police and released by Court may not necessarily have the documents related with it and even if one has he cannot be expected to produce spontaneously when called to give evidence in some case which is not directly related with like in the present case. The defendants, if they want to discredit the evidence of the witness should have themselves produce the list of arrested persons of that night or any relevant record which were made in the course of that day's business,. This has not been done, as such, they cannot point at others seemingly weakness and gain mileage out of it. They should stand on their own evidence. The evidence of the witness, therefore, as already stated, is confirmed or corroborated by the evidence of P.W. No. 4. Further, interestingly a copy of the General Diary of Kakching P.S. dated 29.7.91 exhibit D/1 which is exhibited by the defendant No. 2 during his examination as D.W. No. 7 mentioned that one Naorem Krishnamohon Singh (31), s/o N. Ibochou Singh of Kakching Paji Leikai (P.W. No. 3) was arrested u/S. 41 of Cr. P.C. at 9.30 p.m. of 29.7.1991 and brought to Kakching Police Station after he was examined in the Rural Hospital at Kakching. P.C. at 9.30 p.m. of 29.7.1991 and brought to Kakching Police Station after he was examined in the Rural Hospital at Kakching. This exhibit is a confirmation to the statement of P.W. No. 3 that he was also there at Kakching Police Station in the night of 29.7.1991. Therefore, there is no room for doubting his statement. Having pointed out the above the evidence of the defendants shall now be examined to find out if they have discharged the burden or duty of proving that the deceased (L) Naorem Krishnamohon Singh escaped from their custody and did not die of anything done by them. The statement of D.W. No. 8 (defendant No. 1) that since the general latrine was closed (L) Naorem Krishnamohon was taken to paddy field to answer nature's call and while doing so he took advantage of the darkness and escaped is not only unreasonable but lacks logic and corroboration, therefore, unworthy of trust. First, because the word "general latrine" indicates that it was for the use of people who are brought to, come to or stay in the police station which is supposed to be open twenty four hours, therefore, it is most unlikely that it would have been closed as claimed by the D.W. No. 8. Unless there is specific reason it is expected to remain open for use. Since the witness himself was in charge of the police station at the relevant time he would know why the latrine was closed, if it was closed at all and state the same if there is any. This having not been done by the witness it is not possible to believe in his claim. Secondly, the defendant No. 1 (D.W. No. 8) being in-charge of the police station that night he had all the authority to ask for the same to be open even if it was closed. As such, his statement that he took the deceased, (L) Naorem Krishnamohon to a nearby paddy field for easing himself since the general latrine was closed definitely lacks sound, logic and reason, as such, cannot be trusted and relied upon. Further, none of the other witnesses mentioned of being eyewitness to the alleged escape. The D.W. Nos. 2, 3 and 4 according to their evidence are the policemen who went with the defendant No. 1 to arrest the deceased and brought him to police custody. Further, none of the other witnesses mentioned of being eyewitness to the alleged escape. The D.W. Nos. 2, 3 and 4 according to their evidence are the policemen who went with the defendant No. 1 to arrest the deceased and brought him to police custody. They all stated that after they had reached the police station at 12.30 a.m. and kept the deceased in the lock up they have gone to sleep in their barrack within the P.S. but at about 2 a.m. of the same night there was a commotion in the police station relating to the escape of the accused, Naorem Krishnamohon Singh, so, soon thereafter, they left the P.S. with the defendant No. 1 for searching the accused. From the evidence given by these witnesses it is clear that they are not yet witness to the alleged escape of (L) Naorem Krishnamohon Singh (the deceased) if it ever took place. Further, the time between 12.30 a.m. and 2 a.m. of the same night is a long gap and what happened to the accused at that time only the defendant No. 1 will know, not the three witnesses. But what the defendant No. 1 has stated is not convincing as already stated above. The only person who could have given evidence about the alleged escape of the deceased before he died is one Khuraijam Sharat Singh, since the defendant No. 1 mentioned in his evidence that he along with him had taken (L) Naorem Krishnamohon Singh to the paddy field that night for easing himself but taking advantage of the situation he escaped. Khuraijam Sharat Singh, however, was not produced to give evidence, therefore, inference is that no person by that name or anyone went with the defendant No. 1 to the paddy field to let the deceased case himself. Further more, in the evidence given by the defendants there is nothing to show that the deceased Naorem Krishnamohon was arrested for any registered FIR case. It is only stated by the P.W. No. 8 (Defendant No. 1) that he and his party went to arrest the deceased at 11.30 p.m. for unauthorized possession and selling of contraband Narcotic drug-heroine powder. Nothing further is mentioned in evidence or any document is filed to show that a case was registered before or after arrest of the deceased. It is only stated by the P.W. No. 8 (Defendant No. 1) that he and his party went to arrest the deceased at 11.30 p.m. for unauthorized possession and selling of contraband Narcotic drug-heroine powder. Nothing further is mentioned in evidence or any document is filed to show that a case was registered before or after arrest of the deceased. Before the deceased was arrested an Ejahar should have been there and an FIR case registered. But none of these is shown as such, the arrest of the deceased itself shows not only police highhandedness but also shows that there is no reason why the deceased should have escaped as alleged. Even if it is true as alleged that he was once arrested in connection with FIR case No. 47(4) 89. Kakching P.S. u/S. 21 ND&PS Act and is charge-sheeted in that case one cannot imagine that the deceased for that reason alone would have escaped as alleged even at the risk of his life. The claim/allegation of the defendants, in fact, is unfounded as only a copy of FIR case is exhibited as (D/3) but charge-sheet or copy of it, if there is any, is not filed and exhibited. Lastly, on the evidence of the plaintiffs it is stated that the deceased was a graduate trained as a pastor, was LIC agent and had profitable profession of photography and had a wife and children and was responsible for looking after not only his immediate family but his parents. This evidence of the plaintiffs is neither discredited nor proved otherwise by the defendants. Therefore, it is unimaginable and most unlikely that a person who is happily settled and is with so many responsibilities, would, as alleged, try and escape from police custody risking all that and his own life without any reason. Besides the above stated findings and reasons there are other loopholes found in the case and evidence of the defendants. According to them the deceased was brought to police station at 12.30 a.m. of 30.7.1991 and soon after that he wanted to go to latrine for easing himself but since latrine was closed he was taken to the paddy field to enable him to do so. But taking advantage of the situation he escaped. According to them the deceased was brought to police station at 12.30 a.m. of 30.7.1991 and soon after that he wanted to go to latrine for easing himself but since latrine was closed he was taken to the paddy field to enable him to do so. But taking advantage of the situation he escaped. So at 2 p.m. a G.D. entry (Exhibit D/1/1) was made and FIR case No. 122(7) 91 Kakching P.S. u/S. 224 IPC (Exhibit D/2) was registered, and at 3.30 a.m. of the same night the same police party went to the residence of the plaintiffs and the deceased to enquire about the whereabouts of the deceased. From the above evidence of the defendants it can be seen that the accused was brought to police station at 12.30 a.m. of 30.7.1991 and soon thereafter he asked for permission to go to latrine. If this evidence is true why the officer-in-charge of the police station informed only at the belated hour i.e. at 2 p.m. and such formalities like making entries in the police G.D. and registration of FIR were done at that time. A time span of one and half hour is quite a long time for taking such action in such kind of cases where immediate action is required to be taken. The fact that it was not done so gives room for concluding that it was done after thought, therefore, genuineness of G.D. entry (Exhibit D/l/1) and the FIR Case No. 22(7) 91 Kakching P.S. u/S. 224 IPC (Exhibit D/2) are doubtful. The visit of the defendant No. 1 and his party to the residence of the deceased and the plaintiffs at 3.30 a.m. of the same night can be construed to be an act to hide their wrongful act since there is no hard evidence to show that the deceased escaped from police custody. 12. Statements of D.Ws., except D.W. No. 8, M. Khogen Singh (defendant himself) are all stereotype and they were not eye-witnesses or witnesses having direct knowledge of the alleged escape of (late) Naorem Krishnamohon Singh from the custody of the police. The depositions of D.W. 1, M. Thoiba Singh, D.W. 2, K.K. Mongsang, D.W. 3, Y. Nabadwip Singh, D.W. 4, Th. Statements of D.Ws., except D.W. No. 8, M. Khogen Singh (defendant himself) are all stereotype and they were not eye-witnesses or witnesses having direct knowledge of the alleged escape of (late) Naorem Krishnamohon Singh from the custody of the police. The depositions of D.W. 1, M. Thoiba Singh, D.W. 2, K.K. Mongsang, D.W. 3, Y. Nabadwip Singh, D.W. 4, Th. Shamungou Singh, were that on 29.07.1991 at about 11.40 p.m. they (police party) led by Defendant No. 1, M. Khogen, ASI, D.W. 8 left police station in a jeep to arrest a person and one N. Krishnamohon Singh, was arrested from Kakching Khullen Mayai Leikai and brought to the police station at 12.30 a.m. of 30.07.1991. Thereafter they proceeded to the barrack for taking rest. On 30.07.1991 at about 2 a.m. there were a commotion in the police station relating to the escape of N. Krishnamohon Singh, soon after they (police party) led by Defendant No. 1, M. Khogen Singh- D.W. 8 left police station in a jeep for searching the escapee (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh and carried out a thorough search in the surrounding area of Kakching P.S. and also went to his house but could not find him. as such, D.Ws. 1 to 4 have no knowledge as to how the (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh escaped from police station and also they neither witnessed the escape of (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh from the police custody nor they are members of the police party guarding (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh while he was allegedly taken to the adjoining paddy field for answering call of the nature. 13. D.W. No. 8, M. Khogen Singh (defendant No. 1) deposed that on 29.07.1991 at about 11.40 p.m. he along with the police party went to arrest (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh from his residence for unauthorized possession of contraband narcotic drug known as Number Four Heroine Powder for selling to the local drug addicts. He was arrested and brought to the police station on 30.07.1991 at around 12.30 a.m. for questioning. Just after he was brought to the police station, before questioning he asked him to allow to go to the latrine to answer call of the nature, at the relevant time, the latrine (general latrine) of the police station was found closed as such, he asked him to ease himself at the nearby paddy field and he was allowed to do so. Along with one Khuraijam Sharat Singh (police constable) were waiting for (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh, a bit distance from the place. After about ten minutes, he called him to come out from the said place but there was no response, on search he found that he managed to escape in the cover of the darkness in the midst of the paddy plants. At around 2 a.m. of 30.07.1991 the matter of alleged escape of (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh was reported by him in writing to the O/C, Kakching P.S. that the arrested accused, (late) Krishnamohon Singh escaped after deceiving him on the pretext he wanted to go to latrine. The statement of D.W. 8, defendant No. 1, Shri M. Khogen Singh was not corroborated by any of the D.Ws. One star witness, Shri Khuraijam Sharat, Constable, who was with the defendant No. 1, M. Khogen Singh-D.W. 8 at the time of waiting for (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh, who went to the paddy field to ease himself was not examined as D.W. The other D.Ws. are official witnesses regarding recovery of the dead body of (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh from Kharung Pat. 14. Defendants have admitted that (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh was in the custody of the police and his dead body was recovered from Kharung Pat. P.W. 3, Shri N. Krishnamohon Singh (P.W. 3) was one of the persons arrested by the Kakching P.S. and kept in the lock up of the Kakching P.S. when (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh was also in the custody/lock up of Kakching P.S. on 29.07.1991. P.W. 3 deposed that he heard the cry in pain made by (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh. 15. This court being the first appellate court had not only given anxious considerations of mind to the statements of D.Ws. P.Ws. and exhibited documents but also to the findings supported by reasons in the judgment dated 30.12.2008 passed by the Trial Court i.e. learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) Manipur West, on all issues, and is in complete agreement with the findings of the learned Trial Court. 16. The Apex Court in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by L.Rs. P.Ws. and exhibited documents but also to the findings supported by reasons in the judgment dated 30.12.2008 passed by the Trial Court i.e. learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) Manipur West, on all issues, and is in complete agreement with the findings of the learned Trial Court. 16. The Apex Court in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by L.Rs. : (2001) 3 SCC 179 : ( AIR 2001 SC 965 ) held that 'the task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial court is an easier one, The appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice.' Para 15 of the SCC in Santosh Hazari's case (supra) read as follows: 15. xxx xxx xxx The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial court is an easier one. The appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (See Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary : AIR 1967 SC 1124 ). We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. 17. The Apex Court in Madhusudan Das v. Smt. Narayanibai (deceased) by L.Rs. : (1983) 1 SCC 35 : ( AIR 1983 SC 114 ) held that when there is a conflict of oral evidence on any matter in issue and its resolution turns upon the credibility of the witnesses, the general rule is that the appellate court should permit the findings of fact rendered by the trial court to prevail unless it clearly appears that some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the notice of the trial court. In the instant case there is no conflict of oral evidence or any matter in issue inasmuch as this court is in complete agreement with the findings of the Trial Court. The findings of the Apex Court in Madhusudan Das's case, ( AIR 1983 SC 114 ) (supra) read as follows: In an appeal against a trial court decree, when the appellate court considers an issue turning on oral evidence, it does not enjoy the advantage which the trial court had in having the witnesses before it and of observing the manner in which they gave their testimony. When there is a conflict of oral evidence on any matter in issue and its resolution turns upon the credibility of the wit-nesses, the general rule is that the appellate court should permit the findings of fact rendered by the trial court to prevail unless it clearly appears that some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the notice of the trial court or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace its opinion as to where the credibility lies or the appraisal of the evidence by the trial court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on a misreading of the evidence or on conjectures and surmises. This approach should be placed in the forefront in considering whether the High Court proceeded correctly in the evaluation of the evidence before it when deciding to reverse the findings of the trial court. The principle is one of the practice and governs the weight to be given to a finding of fact by the trial court. 18. The Apex Court in Sahadevan alias Sagadevan v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police, Chennai: AIR 2003 SC 215 held that in case, deceased a suspect in crime taken into police custody and evidence of another suspect in police custody proved assault on the deceased theory of escape of deceased from custody put forward are to be proved by the police in as much as burden of proving such theory lies on the police and police will be liable for the injury or the death caused to the arrested person. 19. The Apex Court in Smt. Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble and Anr., AIR 2003 SC 4567 held that Rarely in cases of police torture or custodial death, direct ocular evidence of the complicity of the police personnel alone who can only explain the circumstances in which a person in their custody had died. Bound as they are by the ties of brotherhood, it is not unknown that the police personnel prefer to remain silent and more often than not even prevent the truth to save their colleagues. The Apex Court, further made a finding that: (para 6, p. 4570) 6. Bound as they are by the ties of brotherhood, it is not unknown that the police personnel prefer to remain silent and more often than not even prevent the truth to save their colleagues. The Apex Court, further made a finding that: (para 6, p. 4570) 6. Rarely in cases of police torture or custodial death, direct ocular evidence of the complicity of the police personnel alone who can only explain the circumstances in which a person in their custody had died. Bound as they are by ties of brotherhood, it is not unknown that the police personnel prefer to remain silent and more often than not even pervert the truth to save their colleagues -and the present case is an apt illustration -as to how one after the other police witnesses feigned ignorance about the whole matter. 8. Though Sections 330 and 331 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short the 'IPC') make punishable those persons who cause hurt for the purpose of extorting the confession by making the offence punishable with sentence up to 10 years of imprisonment, but the convictions, as experience shows from track record have been very few compared to the considerable increase of such onslaught because the atrocities within the precincts of the police station are often left without much traces or any ocular or other direct evidence to prove as to who the offenders are. Disturbed by this situation the Law Commission in its 113th Report recommended amendments to the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act') so as to provide that in the prosecution of a police officer for an alleged offence of having caused bodily injuries to a person while in police custody, if there is evidence that the injury was caused during the period when the person was in the police custody, the court may presume that the injury was caused by the police officer having the custody of that person during that period unless the police officer proves to the contrary. The onus to prove the contrary must be discharged by the police official concerned. The onus to prove the contrary must be discharged by the police official concerned. Keeping in view the dehumanizing aspect of the crime, the flagrant violation of the fundamental rights of the victim of the crime and the growing rise in the crimes of this type, where only a few come to light and others don't, the Government and the legislature must give serious thought to the recommendation of the Law Commission and bring about the appropriate changes in the law not only to curb the custodial crime but also to see that the custodial crime does not go unpunished. The Courts are also required to have a change in their outlook approach, appreciation and attitude, particularly in cases involving custodial crimes and they should exhibit more sensitivity and adopt a realistic rather than a narrow technical approach while dealing with the cases of custodial crime so that as far as possible within their powers, the truth is found and guilty should not escape so that the victim of the crime has the satisfaction that ultimately the majesty of law has prevailed. 20. The ratio laid down in Smt. Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan's case, ( AIR 2003 SC 4567 ) (supra) and Sahadevan alias Sagadevan's case, ( AIR 2003 SC 215 ) (supra) are followed in Munshi Singh Gautam (dead) & Ors. v. State of M.P., (2005) 9 SCC 631 : ( AIR 2005 SC 402 ). Paras 6, 7 and 8 of the SCC in Munshi Singh Gautam's case (supra) read as follows: 6. Rarely in cases of police torture or custodial death, direct ocular evidence is available of the complicity of the police personnel, who alone can only explain the circumstances in which a person in their custody had died. Bound as they are by the ties of brotherhood, it is not unknown that police personnel prefer to remain silent and more often than not even pervert the truth to save their colleagues - and the present case is an apt illustration - as to how one after the other police witnesses feigned ignorance about the whole matter. 7. Bound as they are by the ties of brotherhood, it is not unknown that police personnel prefer to remain silent and more often than not even pervert the truth to save their colleagues - and the present case is an apt illustration - as to how one after the other police witnesses feigned ignorance about the whole matter. 7. The exaggerated adherence to and insistence upon the establishment of proof beyond every reasonable doubt by the prosecution, at times even when the prosecuting agencies are themselves fixed in the dock, ignoring the ground realities, the fact situation and the peculiar circumstances of a given case, as in the present case, often results in miscarriage of justice and makes the justice delivery system suspect and vulnerable. In the ultimate analysis society suffers and a criminal gets encouraged. Tortures in police custody, which of (late) are on the increase receive encouragement by this type of an unrealistic approach at times of the courts as well, because it reinforces the belief in the mind of the police that no harm would come to them if one prisoner dies in the lock up because there would hardly be any evidence available to the prosecution to directly implicate them in the torture. The courts must not lose sight of the fact that death in police custody is perhaps one of the worst kinds of crime in a civilized society governed by the rule of law and poses a serious threat to an orderly civilized society. Torture in custody flouts the basic rights of the citizens recognized by the Indian Constitution and is an affront to human dignity. Police excesses and the mal-treatment of detainees/undertrial prisoners or suspects tarnishes the image of any civilized nation and encourages the men in "khaki" to consider themselves to be above the law and sometimes even to become a law unto themselves. Unless stern measures are taken to check the malady of the very fence eating the crop, the foundations of the criminal justice delivery system would be shaken and civilization itself would risk the consequence of heading towards total decay resulting in anarchy and authoritarianism reminiscent of barbarism. Unless stern measures are taken to check the malady of the very fence eating the crop, the foundations of the criminal justice delivery system would be shaken and civilization itself would risk the consequence of heading towards total decay resulting in anarchy and authoritarianism reminiscent of barbarism. The courts must, therefore, deal with such cases in a realistic manner and with the sensitivity which they de-serve, otherwise the common man may tend to gradually lose faith in the efficacy of the system of the judiciary itself, which if it happens, will be a sad day, for anyone to reckon with. 8. Though Sections 330 and 331 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short the 'IPC') make punishable to those persons who cause hurt for the purpose of extorting the confession by making the offence punishable with sentence up to 10 years of imprisonment, but the convictions, as experience shows from track record have been very few compared to the considerable increase of such onslaught because the atrocities within the precincts of the police station are often left without much traces or any ocular or other direct evidence to prove as to who the offenders are. Disturbed by this situation the Law Commission in its 113th Report recommended amendments to the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act') so as to provide that in the prosecution of a police officer for an alleged offence of having caused bodily injuries to a person while in police custody, if there is evidence that the injury was caused during the period when the person was in the police custody, the court may presume that the injury was caused by the police officer having the custody of that person during that period unless the police officer proves to the contrary. The onus to prove the contrary must be discharged by the police official concerned. Keeping in view the dehumanizing aspect of the crime, the flagrant violation of the fundamental rights of the victim of the crime and the growing rise in the crimes of this type, where only a few come to light and others don't, the Government and the legislature must give serious thought to the recommendation of the Law Commission and bring about the appropriate changes in the law not only to curb the custodial crime but also to see that the custodial crime does not go unpunished. The Courts are also required to have a change in their outlook approach, appreciation and attitude, particularly in cases involving custodial crimes and they should exhibit more sensitivity and adopt a realistic rather than a narrow technical approach while dealing with the cases of custodial crime so that as far as possible within their powers, the truth is found and guilty should not escape so that the victim of the crime has the satisfaction that ultimately the majesty of law has prevailed. 21. The appellants-defendants had not produced the said, Khuraijam Sharat, police constable, who is the solitary ocular witness, according to the pleaded case of the appellants-defendants for the alleged escape of (late) N. Krishnamohon Singh from police custody as D.W. 1, to prove the pleaded case of the appellants-defendants. The principle of 'possible best evidence' has been discussed by the Apex Court in Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani (2003) 6 SCC 595 : (AIR 2003 SG 2418). Para 16 of the SCC in Roop Kumar's case (supra) read as follows: 16. The practical consequence of integration is that its scattered parts, in their former and inchoate shape, have no longer any jural effect; they are replaced by a single embodiment of the fact. In other words, when a jural act is embodied in a single memorial all other utterances of the parties on the topic are legally immaterial for the purpose of determining what are the terms of their act. This rule is based upon an assumed intention on the part of the contracting parties, evidenced by the existence of the written contract, to place themselves above the uncertainties of oral evidence and on a disinclination of the courts to defeat this object. When persons express their agreements in writing, it is for the express purpose of getting rid of any indefiniteness and to put their ideas in such shape that there can be no misunderstanding, which so often occurs when reliance is placed upon oral statements. Written contracts presume deliberation on the part of the contracting parties and it is natural they should be treated with careful consideration by the courts and with a disinclination to disturb the conditions of matters as embodied in them by the act of the parties. Written contracts presume deliberation on the part of the contracting parties and it is natural they should be treated with careful consideration by the courts and with a disinclination to disturb the conditions of matters as embodied in them by the act of the parties. (See Mc Kelvey's Evidence, p. 294) As observed in Greenlear's Evidence, p. 563, one of the most common and important of the concrete rules presumed under the general notion that the best evidence must be produced and that one with which the phrase "best evidence" is now exclusively associated is (sic) the rule that when the contents of a writing are to be proved, the writing itself must be produced before the court or its absence accounted for before testimony to its contents is admitted. The Apex Court in Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Namdeo Kadam, (2003) 2 SCC 91 : ( AIR 2003 SC 761 ) held that best possible evidence should be placed before the Court. It is now fairly well settled law that if the best possible evidence is not produced, there should be adverse inference. Regarding this settled position of law, it would be suffice to refer to the decisions of the Apex Court in (1) M.S. Narayana Menon alias Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr. (2006) 6 SCC 39 : ( AIR 2006 SC 3366 ), (2) Ashok Kumar v. State of T.N. (2006) 10 SCC 157 : ( AIR 2006 SC 2419 ) (3) State by Inspector of Police. Vishakhapatnam v. Surya Sankaram Karri : (2006) 7 SCC 172 : (AIR 2007 SC (Supp.) 1860). For the foregoing discussions and reasons, we are of considered view that the present first appeal is devoid of merit, and accordingly, dismissed. In the result, the judgment and decree of learned Trial Court dated 30.12.2008 is affirmed with a little modification that the said compensation of Rs. 7,20,000/- (Rupees seven lakhs twenty thousands) with the interest of six per cent per annum from the date of judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court i.e., 30.12.2008, should be paid to the respondents-plaintiffs within 4 (four) months from the date of passing the present judgment. Parties are to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.