N. N. Pathak v. Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwavidyalaya
2012-07-05
RAJENDRA MENON
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment As all these petitions are by the same petitioner i.e... Dr. N.N. Pathak, the questions involved therein are related to each other and as the facts are also common to a larger extent, all these petitions are being heard and disposed of by this common order. 2. In Writ Petition No.11875/2010(S), challenge made is to orders-dated 18.8.2010 and 6.8.2010 - Annexures P/23 and P/24, by which the powers of Head of the Department (Forestry) in Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Jabalpur is taken over and the administrative and financial powers of the petitioner are curtailed. By the same order, the statutory nomination of the petitioner as Head of the Department (hereinafter referred to as 'HOD') under section 31(3) of the Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act of 1963') is cancelled with immediate effect. 3. In Writ Petition No.16882/2011(S), challenge is made to the same action as is contained in Annexure P/9 dated 22.9.2011, by which respondent No.3 is nominated as Head of the Department (Forestry) under section 31(3) after the nomination of the petitioner was cancelled. 4. Finally, in Writ Petition No.20202/2011(S), challenge is made to an order-dated 17.10.2011 - Annexure P/1, passed by respondent No.2 - Vice Chancellor and Disciplinary Authority, by which punishment of stoppage of one increment without cumulative effect in accordance to the MP Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred as 'Rules of 1966') is imposed. 5. To consider the question with regard to challenge made to these orders, certain facts may be referred to. 6. Petitioner is working in the Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Jabalpur and claims to be the senior most Professor in the University. He holds the post of Professor (Forestry) and it is stated that he was duly selected and appointed to the post of Professor on regular basis after an All India advertisement was issued, he was selected for regular appointment as a Professor in the year 2001 in comparison to various other Professors like respondent No.3 in W.P.No. 16882/2011(8), who were either appointed to the said post in accordance to the Career Advancement Scheme or Merit Promotion Scheme formulated by the University Grants Commission.
By highlighting the academic credentials of the petitioner, various qualifications acquired by him in the field of Agriculture and Forestry, emphasis is made on the brilliant academic career of the petitioner to highlight that he is one of the senior most Professor, with a brilliant academic record. It is thereafter said that a regularly appointed Professor ranks senior than a Professor appointed under the various schemes formulated by the University Grants Commission. Accordingly, placing reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court, in the case of Dr. Rashmi Shrivastava Vs. Vikram University and others, (1995) 3 SCC 653 and certain other judgments of the Supreme Court, it is tried to be emphasized that in the matter of interse seniority and the matter of hierarchy in the cadre, a regularly appointed Professor ranks higher to a person appointed to the cadre under the Career Advancement Scheme or the Merit Promotion Scheme. 7. Be it as it may be, the fact remains that the petitioner was selected and was working as Professor (Forestry) in the respondent University after his nomination as HOD in accordance to the provisions of section 31 (3) of the Act of 1963, as per order passed by the Vice Chancellor on 10.4.2001 in the College of Agriculture, Jabalpur. According to the petitioner after his nomination as HOD, he continued to work in the same capacity till cancellation of his appointment after a period of 10 years on 5.7.2011 vide Annexure P/23. During this period he had taken various steps for advancement of the department and at every point of time the University had appreciated his endeavour for betterment of the department. 8. Subsequently, it is stated that due to certain reasons and pressure from employees and cadre personnel in the matter of prescribing qualification for selection to the post of Dean, College of Agriculture as the basic qualification required was not properly prescribed and an attempt was made to somehow bypass the petitioner for seeking selection to this post, petitioner challenged the action by filing a writ petition before this Court being W.P.No.7174/2008, which is still pending.
It is further emphasized that during pendency of this writ petition and when the petitioner started seeking for his legitimate rights, he was transferred to Ganjbasoda and, therefore, a sec "''id writ petition was filed by the petitioner before this Court, stay was granted with regard to the transfer and finally the transfer order was cancelled. Thereafter, when certain irregularities were committed in the matter of granting retrospective seniority to promotees under the Career Advancement Scheme, petitioner again filed another writ petition being W.P.No.460/2010, which is still pending. According to the petitioner, the aforesaid acts of the petitioner in pursuing his legitimate grievance were not appreciated by the University authorities and as a result a process of harassment and victimization of the petitioner commenced. 9. According to the petitioner in his capacity as HOD of the University, right from the year 2001 he started making endeavour for introducing new schemes, proposals in the Department and in December 2008, in furtherance to this endeavour of his, he made a proposal for introducing a Post Graduate course in Forestry, in the University. In the 216th Meeting of the Academic Council, the proposal submitted and recommended by the petitioner for starting the Post Graduate course was approved; it was approved by the Board of Management - the Apex Body of the University in its meeting held on 25.6.2009, and an approval was granted for starting the Post Graduate Programme in Forestry in accordance to the syllabus and course prescribed by the Indian Council of Forestry Research and Education, Dehradun (hereinafter referred to as 'ICFRE') for the Session 2009-2010. It is the case of the petitioner that after approval of the Board of Management on 25.6.2009, the Academic Council, granted permission and a formal Notification by the University in this regard was issued on 25.7.2009 vide Annexure P/5 for starting the Post Graduate Course in accordance to the provisions laid down by ICFRE. After Notification of the course on 25.7.2009 vide Annexure P/5, on 1.8.2009, admission after counseling was undertaken and the PG Course commenced in accordance to the syllabus notified as per the ICFRE. First Semester in M.Sc.
After Notification of the course on 25.7.2009 vide Annexure P/5, on 1.8.2009, admission after counseling was undertaken and the PG Course commenced in accordance to the syllabus notified as per the ICFRE. First Semester in M.Sc. (Agro Forestry) continued in accordance to the said Notification and when the First Semester was coming to an end, according to the petitioner the Director of Instructions issued a latter on 13.7.2009 vide Annexure P/6 asking the petitioner as to how the course notified by ICFRE is being undertaken when the decision of the University was to implement the revised course as stipulated by the Indian Council of Agricultural Resea (hereinafter referred to as 'ICAR')- Petitioner clarified the position i-. informed that as per the decision of the Board of Management and Notification issued by the University vide Annexure P/5, on 25.7.2009, the course as notified-by ICFRE had already commenced, the First Semester is coming to an end and at this stage the course cannot be changed. The petitioner it seems also questioned the right of Director (Instructions) in issuing this letter without there being any approval of the Academic Council or the Board of Management or the University. Be it as it may be, the matter resulted in various communications to the petitioner and finally it seems that the Academic Council also took a decision to implement the course as notified by the ICAR in the academic session 2009-2010, and in this regard instructions were issued to the petitioner and the petitioner was informed that in the 218th Meeting of the Academic Council held on 22.8.2009, it was resolved to implement the ICAR revised course curriculum in all Departments, it was pointed out that except in the Forestry Department, all other Departments are implementing the same. It seems that when the petitioner clarified this position by putting forth his case and when certain meetings held by the Academic Council were not attended by the petitioner, initially orders were passed as indicated in W.P.Nos.11875/2010(S) and 16882/2011 (S), for cancelling the nomination of the petitioner as HOD and giving the charge to respondent No.3 [in W.P.No.16882/2011(S)]. The petitioner, therefore, challenged this action in W.P.No.11873/2010 and sought for stay of the order taking away the charge from him.
The petitioner, therefore, challenged this action in W.P.No.11873/2010 and sought for stay of the order taking away the charge from him. The question of stay was considered by a Bench of this Court in W.P.No.11875/2010(S) on 6.9.2010 and this Court refused to stay the action impugned mainly on the ground that for the present only a show cause notice is issued and a disciplinary inquiry is pending. When this order was passed vide Annexure P/7 available in the record of W.P.No.20202/2011 (S), petitioner challenged the said interlocutory order by filing a writ appeal bearing W.A.No.936/2010, and the Division Bench vide order-dated 21.9.2010 found that against the interlocutory order writ appeal was not maintainable and after taking note of the statement of the counsel for the University, disposed of the writ appeal directing the University to complete the inquiry initiated against the petitioner within six months. It seems that for a period of six months nothing was done, no inquiry was conducted and, therefore, MCC No.622/2011 was filed before the Division Bench by the University and on 12.7.2011 the Division Bench granted some more time to the University to conduct the inquiry. Accordingly, as a show cause notice/charge sheet under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1966 was already issued to the petitioner, one Dr. S.S. Tomar, Dean, Faculty of Agriculture was appointed as Inquiry Officer, who conducted the inquiry and submitted his report - Annexure R/10. Based on the report the punishment order - Annexure P/1 dated 17.1.2011 has been passed, stopping one increment of the petitioner without cumulative effect. Challenging various actions as indicated in paragraph 1, the petitioner has filed these writ petitions. 10. Shri Rajendra Tiwari and Shri Rohit Arya, learned Senior Advocates, and Shri Manoj Sharma, learned counsel, appearing for the petitioner, took me through various documents available on record and tried to emphasize that action is taken against the petitioner only to harass and victimize him in an arbitrary and illegal manner and without conducting a proper inquiry in accordance to the requirement of the Appeal and Revision Rules, the impugned action taken is illegal.
Taking me through the provisions of Section 31 of the Act of 1963; the provisions of Rules 16 and 14 of Rules of 1966, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that the impugned punishment of stoppage of increment and the impugned action of withdrawing the nomination of the petitioner as HOD is an arbitrary and illegal decision. It was emphasized by referring to the decision of the Board of Directors earlier taken on 19.12.2008 and the Notification issued by the University on 25.7.2009, that it was the decision of the University and the Highest Body-the Board of Management, to start the course as notified by the ICFRE, but in between the Director (Instructions) on 13.7.2009 without approval or sanction of the University or the Academic Council directed for change of course and when the petitioner clarified the position the matter was decided by the Academic Council on a subsequent date. Be it as it may be, learned counsel argued that the petitioner in reply to the show-cause notice had given a detailed submission explaining his position as contained in Annexure P/18 and without referring to the explanation and defence of the petitioner in an arbitrary manner and without conducting a proper inquiry the impugned action is taken. 11. Learned Senior Advocates pointed out that in the show-cause notice issued to the petitioner on 26.3.2010 vide Annexure P/16, three allegations were levelled. The first allegation was that the petitioner continued to offer the old course of ICFRE inspite of instructions issued by the Director of Instructions, on 13.7.2009, and the decision of the academic council. The second allegation was that the petitioner did not attend certain meetings of the academic council instead deputed his subordinate to the said meeting. The third allegation was with regard to misusing the vehicle of the University bearing Vehicle No.MP-20-DA-0159 for going to Sehora, Katni and Maihar and disobeying the instruction of the University in the matter of attending a Convocation. Learned Senior Advocates argued that for each of the three allegations, specific replies were given by the petitioner supported by documents as is evident from Annexure P/18, but ignoring the same and in a very perverse and casual manner, without application of mind, the Enquiry Officer recorded the finding - Annexure R/10 holding the allegations to be established.
Learned Senior Advocates argued that for each of the three allegations, specific replies were given by the petitioner supported by documents as is evident from Annexure P/18, but ignoring the same and in a very perverse and casual manner, without application of mind, the Enquiry Officer recorded the finding - Annexure R/10 holding the allegations to be established. It is stated that the finding of the Enquiry Officer dated 9.7.2011 - Annexure R/10 is a perverse finding, contrary to the defence of the petitioner and without considering the explanation. That apart, as the Enquiry Officer has not conducted the inquiry in accordance to the requirement of the Rules of 1966, the same is illegal. Learned Senior Advocates inviting my attention to Rule 16 of the Rules of 1966, argued that when the Enquiry Officer is appointed to conduct an inquiry even with regard to the procedure to be followed under Rule 16, for imposing a minor punishment once the Enquiry Officer is appointed then as per the mandate of sub-rule (b) of Rule 16, the procedure contemplated under sub-rule (3) to (23) of Rule 14 has to be followed and as in this case the said statutory provision is violated, it is argued that the entire action stands vitiated. It was submitted that the powers of HOD is taken away from the petitioner only because of the allegations levelled in the show cause notice - Annexure P/17 and as these allegations are not proved in the departmental inquiry conducted and as the inquiry itself is an illegal one, the entire action stands vitiated. Learned Senior Advocate submitted that there is no breach of directions by the petitioner, the petitioner has only pointed out to the University the reasons for continuing with a particular course and ignoring the defence of the petitioner the action impugned is said to be unsustainable. 12. Inviting my attention to the law laid down in the following cases: Smt. S.R. Venkataraman Vs. Union of India and Another, 1979 (2) SCC 491 ; Suresh Pal and others V. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1987 SC 2027 ; Sahni Silk Mills (P) Limited and another Vs. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, 1994 (5) SCC 346 ; Kanailal Bera Vs. Union of India and others, 2007(11) SCC 517 ; and, State of Rajasthan & Others Vs.
Employees' State Insurance Corporation, 1994 (5) SCC 346 ; Kanailal Bera Vs. Union of India and others, 2007(11) SCC 517 ; and, State of Rajasthan & Others Vs. Jagdish Narain Chaturvedi, AIR 2010 SC 157 , learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in this case the entire action taken stands vitiated for the grounds and reasons indicated hereinabove and, therefore, the action be quashed. It may be emphasized that during the course of hearing of this writ petition, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner took me through various communications and documents to highlight as to how the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer is perverse and the reasons given by the University for taking the impugned action is unsustainable. It was the endeavour of the learned Senior Advocates was to show that in the proceedings held against the petitioner and in the impugned action, the defence and explanation of the petitioner is totally misconstrued and by treating it to be defiance of the lawful orders of the University the action is taken. In sum and substance, the contention of learned Senior Advocates, appearing for the petitioner, can be summarized in the following manner: (a) The petitioner has acted in furtherance to the interest of the Department and the students, at no point of time had he defied the authority of the University, he had only indicated certain reasons in support of his action. (b) By virtue of his nomination as HOD under section 31 of the Act of 1963, certain legal rights (in the matter of discharging statutory duties) had accrued to the petitioner, which cannot be taken away after a period of 10 years in an arbitrary and unjustified manner as is done in the present case. (c) The entire action is taken on the basis of a finding recorded in an inquiry which is wholly illegal, as the procedure contemplated under the statute, particularly the Rules of 1966, is not followed and is also perverse, as the finding of the Enquiry Officer is without considering petitioner's defence and is without application of mind. (d) The action is nothing but an act to victimize and harass the petitioner. 13.
(d) The action is nothing but an act to victimize and harass the petitioner. 13. Respondent University represented by Shri P.N. Dubey refuted each and every allegation of the petitioner and pointed out that the petitioner from the very beginning had been in the habit of disobeying the lawful orders of the superior authorities and undermining the authority of the University, was bent up proceeding in a manner as per his own desire and while doing, he was trying to create a situation because of which apart from the staff and students of the University, the working of the University was being adversely affected and, therefore, it is stated that the impugned action is taken, 14. Shri P.N. Dubey, learned counsel for the University, invited my attention to certain documents filed by the University vide I.A.No.4085/2011, on 7.5.2011, the decision taken in the Conference of the Vice Chancellors of State Agriculture Universities held in New Delhi on 19th and 20th January 2008 vide Annexure C to this application; the decision to introduce the course approved by ICAR; the decision of the Academic Council of the University taken on 12.8.2009 adopting the revised ICAR course curriculum for PG Faculty; the impugned act of the petitioner in defying the lawful authority of the Academic Council and continuing with the old course, which should not have been implemented. It was argued that the petitioner was all along insisting upon justifying his action in continuing with the old course inspite of the fact that he was repeatedly told not to continue with that course in view of the decision of the superior authorities, the petitioner continued with his adamant attitude as a result the impugned action is taken. It is argued by Shri P.N. Dubey that by taking away the powers of HOD from the petitioner, no adverse affect on the service condition of the petitioner is forthcoming. The charge is given to the Dean of the Department, who is a superior authority and as the petitioner has no right to insist upon continuing as HOD and as the service conditions of the petitioner are not adversely affected, it is stated that no interference into the matter is called for. 15.
The charge is given to the Dean of the Department, who is a superior authority and as the petitioner has no right to insist upon continuing as HOD and as the service conditions of the petitioner are not adversely affected, it is stated that no interference into the matter is called for. 15. As far as conduct of the inquiry is concerned, it is argued that only a minor punishment of stoppage of one increment without cumulative fact is imposed and for doing so, the procedure contemplated under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1966 of issuing a charge-sheet, calling for an explanation is to be complied with and as this is the only statutory requirement to be complied with, the action of the University is proper. It was finally argued that by adopting the procedure followed, no prejudice is caused to the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer in his report - Annexure R/10 dated 9.7.2011 has adverted to consider each and every aspect of the matter and after evaluating the documents pertaining to the dispute in question, has given a just and reasonable finding, which does not warrant any interference. Placing reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court, in the case of Food Corporation of India, Hyderabad and others Vs. Prahalada Rao and another, AIR 2001 SC 51 , learned counsel appearing for the University tried to emphasize that the action is an administrative action taken against the petitioner because of the act of insubordination shown by the petitioner and in doing so, the University has not committed breach of any statutory rule or regulation warranting interference by this Court. It is argued that the action taken by the University is based on due consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances and, therefore, the petition filed by the petitioner which is wholly misconceived, deserves to be dismissed. Shri P.N. Dubey submitted that the petitioner has made false and uncalled for allegations against the University, on the contrary all along for a period of more than 10 years when the petitioner worked as HOD at various stages it is only the University which protected the petitioner and now when the petitioner's attitude has become unbearable, the impugned action is taken. Accordingly, the respondents contend that the action of the University be upheld and the petitions dismissed. 16.
Accordingly, the respondents contend that the action of the University be upheld and the petitions dismissed. 16. It was also submitted by Shri P.N. Dubey, learned counsel, that as against the order of punishment imposed under the Rules of 1966, a statutory appeal to the Chancellor is available to the petitioner under Rule 23, therefore, a writ petition directly before this Court without exercising the statutory remedy of appeal is unsustainable. On this count also, prayer made is that the petition be dismissed. 17. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and on the basis of the facts that are available on record, it is clear that the petitioner is substantively holding the post of Professor in the respondent University and taking note of the fact that he was the senior most Professor, the Vice Chancellor on 10.4.2001 exercised the powers conferred upon him under section 31(3) of the Rules of 1963 and nominated him as HOD (Forestry). Right from April 2001 till the impugned action was taken, petitioner continued to discharge the duties of HOD (Forestry) in the College of Agriculture, Jabalpur. Even though in the return filed by the respondents certain complaints received from members of the Staff have been filed to indicate that the functioning of the petitioner as HOD was not satisfactory, but during all this period i.e... for 10 long years, no action was taken against the petitioner, no notice or memo was ever issued to him and there is no document available on record to indicate that at any point of time during this period of 10 years the University ever indicated to the petitioner any shortcoming or discrepancy, much less any acts of commission or omission in the discharge of his duties as a HOD. It is only when the question of implementing a particular course in the Academic Session 2009-2010 was to be undertaken that action was proposed to be taken against the petitioner. That being so, an assumption can be drawn by this Court to the effect that the petitioner had an unblemished service of 10 years during which period he discharged the duties of a HOD. 18. Section 31 of the Rules of 1963 contemplates that there shall be a HOD for each Department of Study and sub-section (3) contemplates that the Vice Chancellor shall nominate one of the Professors as HOD.
18. Section 31 of the Rules of 1963 contemplates that there shall be a HOD for each Department of Study and sub-section (3) contemplates that the Vice Chancellor shall nominate one of the Professors as HOD. Thereafter, in sub-section (4) the terms and conditions of appointment and duties of HOD is also laid down, as is prescribed by the Statutes, the responsibilities and duties of the HOD are prescribed under Statute No.38 of the Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya Statutes, 1964. It is, therefore, clear from a combined reading of Section 31 and Statute 38 that the nomination of a person as HOD is based on certain statutory provision and once a person is nominated to discharge a statutory function certain legal rights do accrue to him even though there may be no change in the monetary benefits pertaining to the service conditions. Nomination as HOD is made as per the statutory provisions and once such a nomination made is proposed to be cancelled, cogent reasons and justification should be available for doing so. In the absence of proper justification being available for cancelling a statutory nomination made in accordance to the Act of 1963 of the University, an inference can be drawn that the action is nothing but an arbitrary exercise of powers. That being the legal position, the contention of the respondents that by cancelling the nomination of the petitioner on the post of HOD, there is no adverse effect on his service career or that he has no right to continue on the post of HOD cannot be accepted. Once the nomination is based on a statutory provision and the nominated person discharges duties statutory in nature, it has to be held that certain legal right enforceable in nature is available to the person so nominated and if the nomination has to be withdrawn, it has to be done in accordance to the procedure contemplated under law, for reasons to be justified and cannot be undertaken in a manner which indicates arbitrariness or unreasonableness on the part of the authorities concerned. Accordingly, as the petitioner was nominated as HOD to discharge certain statutory functions, even though the respondents have a right to cancel the nomination, but the same can be done only for reasons which are justified and reasonable, that also after following a procedure or process known to law. 19.
Accordingly, as the petitioner was nominated as HOD to discharge certain statutory functions, even though the respondents have a right to cancel the nomination, but the same can be done only for reasons which are justified and reasonable, that also after following a procedure or process known to law. 19. In the present case, it is seen that when a notice to showcause was issued to the petitioner proposing to withdraw his nomination as HOD and when a decision was already taken to withdraw the nomination, petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.No.11875/2010(8). In the said case it was the claim of the petitioner that his nomination done under the statutory provision is being withdrawn only to harass him on extraneous considerations and for reasons which are not justified. He, therefore, sought for an interim order staying the action. When the matter was taken up by a Bench of this Court on 6.9.2010, to consider the question of staying the order/notice-dated 18.8.2010 withdrawing the administrative and financial powers of the petitioner, respondents brought to the notice of this Court that a show-cause notice - Annexure P/16 dated 26.3.2010 has been issued to the petitioner and an inquiry is pending into the allegations levelled in the show-cause notice and as the impugned action is being taken for allegations levelled in this show-cause notice, for which an inquiry was pending, this Court on 6.9.2010 refused to grant any interim relief to the petitioner as the matter was pending in an inquiry and there were allegations against the petitioner with regard to his discharge of duties as HOD. The order passed by this Court on 6.9.2010 was challenged before a Division Bench and if the records of the proceeding held before the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.936/2010 and MCC No.622/2011 are taken note of, it would be seen that before the Division Bench it was the categorical stand of the University that a departmental inquiry into the matter is pending and as the inquiry is pending no interference be made. Accordingly, initially the Division Bench granted six months time to the University to conduct the inquiry, which was further extended by an order passed in MCC No.622/2011.
Accordingly, initially the Division Bench granted six months time to the University to conduct the inquiry, which was further extended by an order passed in MCC No.622/2011. These facts go to indicate that for exercising the powers conferred on the Vice Chancellor, for withdrawing the powers of HOD, the University issued a show cause notice to the petitioner and decided to conduct an inquiry and then to take action. Accordingly, an inquiry was conducted and based on certain findings recorded in the inquiry not only the nomination as HOD was withdrawn, but a punishment of stoppage of one increment without cumulative effect as contemplated under Rule 10 of the Rules of 1966 was imposed. 20. Even though learned Senior Advocates appearing for the petitioner tried to emphasize that for the allegations levelled in the showcause notice multi-farious punishment have been imposed upon the petitioner, I am of the considered view that the same is not correct. The disciplinary action taken and the punishment imposed was stoppage of increment without cumulative effect and because of the allegations that were held as proved in the inquiry, the nomination of the petitioner as HOD was withdrawn. Withdrawal of nomination as HOD or curtailing the administrative and financial powers of the petitioner cannot be termed as a punishment on disciplinary inquiry. It is an administrative action taken and, therefore, the contention that for the same set of allegations multi-farious punishments are imposed cannot be accepted. But, at the same time when the punishment of stoppage of increment is imposed on the petitioner and thereafter certain duty, statutory in nature which was being discharged by the petitioner are withdrawn and when such withdrawal has the effect of taking away the rights which accrues to the petitioner by virtue of the statutory provisions as already indicated hereinabove, the action has to be reasonable, fair and should not be tainted with malafides or arbitrariness. That being so, to that extent judicial review into the matter in these proceedings can be undertaken and the same is now being undertaken by this Court. 21. Admittedly, the action impugned is taken against the petitioner on the basis of the allegations levelled against him in the show-cause notice -Annexure P/16 dated 26.3.2010 and thereafter an inquiry was conducted, finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the impugned action taken.
21. Admittedly, the action impugned is taken against the petitioner on the basis of the allegations levelled against him in the show-cause notice -Annexure P/16 dated 26.3.2010 and thereafter an inquiry was conducted, finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the impugned action taken. In view of the above, this Court is now required to examine as to whether the procedure followed for taking the action is legal; is in accordance to the requirements of law; and, based on proper considerations. 22. In the show-cause notice issued to the petitioner, three allegations are levelled. (a) The first allegation is with regard to not implementing the revised course curriculum of ICAR inspite of the resolution of the Academic Council dated 22.08.2009, and not following the instructions of Director (Instructions) dated 13.7.2009. (b) The second allegation is with regard to not attending the meeting of the Academic Council and deputing some junior officer to attend the same. (c) The third allegation is with regard to dis-obeying the instructions contained in a letter dated 15.10.2009 leaving the Headquarters and misusing the vehicle of the University on 19.10.2009, for performing unauthorized journey. 23. Petitioner submitted a detailed reply on 30.3.2010 - Annexure P/16, rebutting each and every allegation and in his reply gave a detailed justification for each of his act. He followed it up by submitting further additional submission vide Annexure P/11 on 2.7.2011 (available in the record of W.P.No.20202/2011(S). However, it is seen that one Shri S.S. Tomar, a Member of the Academic Council and Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture, was appointed as Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer called the petitioner, asked for his written explanation and thereafter one - Dr. O.P. Ved, Dean, College of Agriculture and Director of Instructions, was also summoned and a written reply and comments on the petitioner's reply was sought for from this Officer and based on these the Report - Annexure R/10 was submitted by the Enquiry Officer on 9.7.2011, holding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled in the show cause notice.
O.P. Ved, Dean, College of Agriculture and Director of Instructions, was also summoned and a written reply and comments on the petitioner's reply was sought for from this Officer and based on these the Report - Annexure R/10 was submitted by the Enquiry Officer on 9.7.2011, holding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled in the show cause notice. As the action impugned in these writ petitions are taken on the basis of this finding of guilty recorded against the petitioner in the departmental inquiry, the question would be as to whether the departmental inquiry conducted was proper, in accordance to the requirement of law, the statutory provisions and whether the findings recorded by the Enquiry officer was based on material available on record or is it perverse one contrary to the evidence and material available. 24. One of the main grounds raised for challenging the impugned action is that the departmental inquiry conducted is in total violation to the procedure prescribed in the Rules of 1966, therefore, the action is unsustainable. In this regard, it may be taken note of that under Rule 10 of the Rules of 1966, withholding of increment is a minor penalty and for imposing a minor penalty the procedure is contemplated under Rule 16. Under sub-clause (a) of Rule 16, it is contemplated that for imposing a minor penalty, the government servant should be informed in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the imputation of misconduct or mis-behaviour on which the action is proposed to be taken and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of making representation action can be taken. However, under sub-rule (b) it is indicated that holding of an inquiry in the manner laid down in sub-rule (3) to sub-rule 23 of Rule 14 may be resorted to in every case in which the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that such an inquiry is necessary. It is, therefore, clear from the aforesaid two provisions that for imposing a minor penalty the disciplinary authority can issue a charge-sheet informing the proposal to impose minor penalty indicating the imputation of misconduct and mis-behaviour, give an opportunity to represent and thereafter pass orders or option is given to the disciplinary authority to proceed with the inquiry as contemplated under sub-rule (3) to sub-rule (23) of Rule 14.
Under sub-rule (3) to sub-rule (23) of Rule 14, of the Rules of 1966, a detailed procedure for conducting a departmental inquiry is indicated and the procedure contemplates appointment of an Enquiry Officer, appointment of a Presenting Officer, framing of a charge-sheet, notifying the imputation of misconduct, proceedings with regard to recording of evidence and cross-examination and thereafter submission of a report. 25. In the case in hand, even though initially only a show-cause notice on 26.3.2010 was issued, and when the petitioner submitted his reply to the show-cause notice and when the matter was sub judice before this Court in W.P.No.1l875/2010(S), the disciplinary authority and the University informed this Court that they are conducting an inquiry and after some delay, as has been indicated in the order, Shri S.S. Tomar- Dean, Faculty of Agriculture, was appointed as Enquiry Officer. This act of the respondents in appointing an Enquiry Officer clearly indicates that they chose to proceed in the matter in accordance to the procedure contemplated under sub-rule (b) of Rule 16. It was only because of this reason that an Enquiry Officer was appointed else if the disciplinary authority wanted it could have decided the matter under sub-rule (a) of Rule 16, by taking note of the representation and pass the order of punishment. Instead, the disciplinary authority chose otherwise and decided to proceed in accordance to the procedure contemplated under sub-rule (b) of Rule 16 and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the disciplinary authority and the Enquiry Officer to comply with the mandatory provisions contemplated from sub-rule (3) to sub-rule (23) of Rule 14. If the manner in which the inquiry is conducted in the present case is evaluated, it would be clear that none of the procedure or process contemplated from sub-rule (3) to (23) of Rule 14 was complied with. After the show-cause notice was issued and when the petitioner submitted his explanation to the same, Shri S.S. Tomar was appointed as Enquiry Officer, but thereafter no Presenting Officer was appointed. Shri Tomar did not proceed with the enquiry by following the procedure contemplated under Rule 14, instead Dr. O.P. Ved, Dean, College of Agriculture was called by the Enquiry Officer and he submitted certain documents.
Shri Tomar did not proceed with the enquiry by following the procedure contemplated under Rule 14, instead Dr. O.P. Ved, Dean, College of Agriculture was called by the Enquiry Officer and he submitted certain documents. There is no order appointing Shri O.P. Ved as the Presenting Officer and it is now known as to how and on what basis and under whose authority Shri O.P. Ved appeared before the Enquiry Officer and submitted the documents. Shri O.P. Ved was not at all authorized to discharge the functions of a Presenting Officer and, therefore, his act in presenting the documents to the Enquiry Officer is an unauthorized act and even the permission granted to Dr. O.P. Ved is illegal. That apart, the Enquiry Officer after collecting the documents from Dr. O.P. Ved and getting a reply from the petitioner gave his finding without following the statutory procedure as is contemplated under Rule 14. As the mandatory provisions of Rule 14 have been given a complete go by, the entire inquiry stands vitiated. In this regard, the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court with regard to the malice in law being established on a statutory provision being violated as laid down in the case - Smt. S.R. Venkataraman Vs. Union of India and Another, 1977 (1) SCC 477; P. Mohanan Pillai Vs. State of Kerala and others, (2007) 9 SCC 497 ; and, State of Rajasthan and Others Vs. Jagdish Narain Chaturvedi, AIR 2010 SC may be taken note of. When the statutory provision contemplates a detailed procedure to be followed for conducting a departmental inquiry and when the departmental inquiry is conducted in total disregard to such a procedure, the entire action stands vitiated on this count alone. 26. The contention of Shri P.N. Dubey to the effect that by following the procedure contemplated no prejudice is caused to the petitioner and, therefore, the action cannot be sustained, cannot be accepted. Once the statute mandates a detailed procedure to be followed anything done in contravention to that procedure is deemed to have caused prejudice to the person concerned and actual proof of prejudice is not necessary when statutory provisions are violated. Accordingly, I am unable to accede to the contentions of Shri P.N. Dubey in this regard. Once the statutory rule for conducting a departmental inquiry is found to be violated, the entire departmental inquiry stands vitiated. 27.
Accordingly, I am unable to accede to the contentions of Shri P.N. Dubey in this regard. Once the statutory rule for conducting a departmental inquiry is found to be violated, the entire departmental inquiry stands vitiated. 27. Apart from the aforesaid ground the inquiry conducted in the matter and the impugned action stands vitiated on two other counts. 28. Shri S.S. Tomar was appointed as Enquiry Officer in the present case and it seems that the petitioner raised objection with regard to his appointment and Shri S.S. Tomar expressed his inability to conduct the inquiry because he was a member of the Academic Council, which had taken the decision to implement a particular course and had instructed the petitioner to change the course. Shri S.S. Tomar was a party to the decision which is said to have been disobeyed by the petitioner and on this count he was disentitled to discharge the functions of an Enquiry Officer. Inspite thereof the disciplinary authority compelled him to continue with the inquiry. Shri S.S. Tomar became a Judge in his own cause and conducted the inquiry, which was impermissible. Infact the main allegation against the petitioner was that he had disobeyed the directions of the Academic Council and as Shri S.S. Tomar was a Member of the Academic Council, which directed the petitioner to follow its decision, Shri S.S. Tomar should not have conducted the inquiry. As the explanation submitted by the petitioner with regard to not following the decision of the Academic Council was rejected by Shri Tomar, which has the affect of upholding his earlier decision taken as a Member of the Academic Council, the Enquiry Officer acted as a Judge, a prosecutor and a witness. This was impermissible and in doing so Shri Tomar acted as a Judge in his own cause. 29. Secondly, even if it is assumed for arguments sake that the punishment imposed is a minor punishment and, therefore, on the basis of representations and explanation submitted by the petitioner, the disciplinary authority could have imposed the minor punishment of stoppage of increment without cumulative effect, but in doing so a statutory duty is imposed upon the disciplinary authority to atleast consider the defence of the petitioner, his explanation has to be evaluated and has to be accepted or rejected after giving cogent reasons showing application of mind and by a speaking order.
In this case the disciplinary authority has only accepted the Report of the Enquiry Officer and passed the order of punishment. If the report of the Enquiry Officer dated 9.7.2010 - Annexure R/10 is evaluated and the manner in which the reply/defence of the petitioner considered is taken note of, it would be seen that the explanation and defence submitted by the petitioner is not at all considered and in a very casual manner it is held that he is guilty of the allegations levelled. 30. With regard to Charge No.(1), it was the case of the petitioner that he followed the mandate of the Board of Management and the earlier Notification issued by the University for conducting the course in accordance to the syllabus prescribed by ICFRE and in this regard informed the authorities that the University had already taken the decision, the course had commenced on the basis of the earlier decision of the University based on the recommendations of the Board of Management and the formal Notification of the University dated 25.7.2009 -Annexure P/5. He also pointed out that the first semester was coming to an end and wanted to know as to why the course is being changed in the midst. None of these explanation and defence submitted by the petitioner is adverted to, considered or discussed, but is rejected by the Enquiry Officer in his Enquiry Report, in a casual manner. 31. Similarly, with regard to Charge No. (2) with regard to not attending the meetings of the Academic Council on various dates, petitioner in his reply to the disciplinary authority and again in his explanation to the Enquiry Officer has given various reasons. He had pointed out that at that point of time counseling for admission process was going on, certain questions were asked in the Vidhan Sabha, these questions were forwarded to him and within a stipulated period he was directed to submit an explanation to these, examination work and preparation of results were in progress and pointing out the work which was entrusted to him, he had indicated that it was not possible for him to attend the meeting, instead a very efficient Senior Professor on the department well conversant with the subject was deputed to attend the meeting.
This explanation of the petitioner is not at all considered or inquired into and in a very casual manner it is held that the petitioner has admitted that he did not attend the meeting and the decision is taken. Admission of the petitioner for not attending the meeting has to be evaluated in the light of his explanation. It is a case where the explanation for not attending the .meeting and the justification given is not at all considered and, therefore, to that effect the finding of the Enquiry Officer lacks proper application of mind and is a perverse finding. 32. Finally, with regard to Charge No.(3), the petitioner has clearly indicated that he was on leave and on account of personal tour. He used the official vehicle, in the log-book it is clearly mentioned that the vehicle is being used for personal use and after the tour was over, on the basis of the bill raised by the Accounts Department, petitioner had deposited the amount for use of the vehicle. All these aspects were totally over-looked by the Enquiry Officer and without adverting to consider the explanation of the petitioner in this regard, he is held to be guilty merely on the ipsi-dixit of the Enquiry Officer and a decision taken. The finding of the Enquiry Officer as indicated hereinabove with regard to each of the charge is nothing but a perverse finding, which is contrary to the material available on record in as much as it is passed without adverting to consider the defence and explanation of the petitioner. The action taken on the basis of such an inquiry report, which shows total non-application of mind and which is based on extraneous consideration, without adverting to consider the defence and explanation of a delinquent employee cannot form the basis for taking any action or punishing an employee. Accordingly, not only is the departmental inquiry and the procedure followed in the inquiry vitiated for breach of the statutory provisions, but the finding of the Enquiry Officer is nothing but a perverse and illegal finding based on which no action could be taken.
Accordingly, not only is the departmental inquiry and the procedure followed in the inquiry vitiated for breach of the statutory provisions, but the finding of the Enquiry Officer is nothing but a perverse and illegal finding based on which no action could be taken. Once this Court comes to the conclusion that the finding of the Enquiry Officer and the departmental inquiry itself is vitiated, then the consequential action taken in pursuance thereof also stands vitiated and the punishment order dated 17.10.2011, imposing a punishment of stoppage of one increment without cumulative effect, is illegal. 33. That apart, as already indicated hereinabove, it was the case of the respondents that the financial and administrative powers of the petitioner and his nomination as HOD (Forestry) is taken away because of the allegations levelled against him in the show cause notice. It was because of these reasons that the respondents themselves took a decision to conduct an inquiry. As the inquiry conducted and the action is found to be wholly illegal, the action for passing these orders withdrawing the financial and administrative power and the nomination itself is illegal. To that effect relief is to be granted to the petitioner. 34. Even though the respondents may be right in contending that the Vice Chancellor has a right to withdraw the powers of HOD and nomination under section 31 of the Act of 1963, but once it is found that the nomination is withdrawn on grounds which are not justified or on allegations which are not established, the withdrawal of nomination cannot be upheld by this Court. 35. That apart, even though during the course of hearing Shri P.N. Dubey raised an objection that against the order petitioner has a remedy of filing statutory appeal under section 23 of the Rules of 1966, but once this Court finds that the action taken is contrary to the principles of law and the statutory provisions, it is not necessary to relegate the petitioner to take recourse to the said remedy, as the action is found to be illegal on the grounds indicated hereinabove. 36.
36. Even though during the course of hearing of these petitions, learned Senior Advocates appearing for the petitioner had placed reliance on various judgments and canvassed various other contentions, but in view of the findings recorded hereinabove, it is not necessary now to advert to consider all these questions as it is not necessary. 37. Accordingly, all the three petitions are allowed. Impugned orders-dated 18.8.2010 and 6.8.2010 - Annexures P/23 and P/24, in Writ Petition No.1187S/2010(S); order-dated 22.9.2011 - Annexure P/9 in Writ Petition No.16882/2011(S); and, order-dated 17.10.2011 - Annexure P/1, in Writ Petition No.20202/2011(S), are quashed. Respondents are directed to restore to the petitioner all the benefits to which he is entitled to by virtue of this order. 38. Petitions stand allowed and disposed of.